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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • In an uncertain world a seat at the UNSC

    As a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the next two years, India will have to navigate through a tumultuous world. Anti-terrorism will be top priority for India.

    India at UNSC

    • India will be back in the United Nations Security Council for a two-year term beginning January 1, 2021.
    • Two-year term will be a critical time in the history of the UN.
    • It is hoped that by then COVID-19 will have subsided, a U.S. President will have been elected.
    • And the contours of a new world order may have emerged.

    How elections take place

    • The basic contest for the non-permanent seats takes place in the respective regional groups and their sub-groups.
    • Voting in the General Assembly is to fulfil the requirement of countries having to secure a two-thirds majority of the member states.
    • But regional endorsement is becoming difficult.
    • Last time, it was Kazakhstan which vacated the place for India.
    • This time, it was Afghanistan. India could not have got the endorsement without such gestures from friendly countries.

    What will be India’s priorities as a member of UNSC

    • India will continue to provide leadership and a new orientation for a reformed multilateral system.
    • How far the UN will be able to reform itself in the new situation remains uncertain.
    • The UN did not succeed in either defining terrorism or in adopting the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
    • Counter-terrorism will be one of the highest priorities for India at the UNSC.

    Permanent member of India issue

    • India’s election as a non-permanent member has understandably ignited the hope that its quest for permanent membership.
    • Nothing is farther from the truth.
    • Seeking to amend the Charter to add new permanent members is difficult task.
    • None of the proposals has the possibility of securing two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and the votes of the five permanent members.
    • A majority of the UN members are against the privileges of the permanent members, particularly the veto.
    • India’s performance in the Council will not lead to its elevation to permanent membership as the opposition to any expansion is not India-specific.

    Role of India as non-permanent member

    • The non-permanent members have a collective veto over every resolution in the Council.
    • As a part of collective veto, India will have a higher profile at the UN for the next two years
    • Permanent members can prevent the adoption of resolutions by themselves through veto.
    • But they need at least nine votes to get a resolution passed.
    • India will also have a rare peep into the consultations chamber of the UNSC, which is closed to non-members of the Council.
    • India will get involved in many issues in which it may not have any direct interest.
    • Since India does not have a veto, it shall have to proceed cautiously not to offend anyone.

    Consider the question “India has been chosen as the non-permanent member of the UNSC and will be there at the critical time in the history of the UNSC. What should be India’s priority and approach as a member of the UNSC?”

    Conclusion

    India’s mission in New York has earned a reputation that it is next only to the permanent members in influence. But whether it will be able to deal with traditional challenges in novel ways will depend on the turns and twists in an uncertain world.

  • Crisis facing the global order

    The corona crisis has laid bare the fissures in the global order. This article examines the four issues that are principal global challenges. Pandemic has accentuated these challenges.

    Principal global challenges

    • 1) Geopolitical tensions 2) Climate crisis. 3) Global mistrust. 4) The dark side of the digital world —  are four issues which U.N. Secretary-General Guterres listed as primary threats.
    • The four challenges have, for now, been overshadowed by the corona pandemic crisis.

    1.Climate change challenge

    • The drop in emissions in 2020 is projected to be about 8 per cent down on last year.
    • This drop will just put us on track to where we should be if we are to reach the Paris agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 C.
    • The threat of climate change, although raising its head again, has been constrained.

    2.Digital space and its dark side

    • Cyberspace has been a digital saviour during the corona crisis.
    • Virtual communications enhanced through various services, new apps, expanded coverage has been key to enhanced virtual lives for millions by increase of the avenues for working from home, video chat connectivity and online delivery of goods.
    • Companies that have deftly used cyberspace have prospered the most: Amazons net capital gain has been over $400 billion in 2020.
    • However, a surge in cybercrime and cyber fraud is anticipated, if not there already.
    • The logic being that cyberspace use has expanded without commensurate growth in security features.
    • Thee are dire projections of an impending “cyber Pearl Harbour”.

    3.Geopolitical tensions

    • Accentuation of geopolitical tensions during the corona crisis is well-documented.
    • The US-China relationship was already deteriorating, the blame game over the virus has exacerbated it.
    • The brazen behaviour of China in matters relating to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, South China Sea and the India-China border has added to the inflammable state of geopolitics.
    • Rarely has the world seen such paucity of international cooperation since World War II.
    • The unravelling of the international institutions and partnerships that have been built since World War II is stark.

    4.Trust deficit among states

    • Trust amongst states has plummeted to its worst since World War II.
    • When faced with corona crisis shortages, almost all EU states responded at the national level.
    • Globally, at one time, more than 70 per cent of the world’s ports of entry — air, sea and land — restricted travel.
    • According to a Global Trade Alert study, nearly 90 governments blocked the export of medical supplies while 29 restricted food exports.

    Efficiency to self-sufficiency

    • Lack of trust is also impacting diversified supply chains.
    • The corona crisis is driving a shift from efficiency to self-sufficiency.
    • Japan is paying companies to relocate factories from China.
    • President Emmanuel Macron has pledged “full independence” for France in crucial medical supplies by year-end.
    • Prime Minister Modi has called for self-reliance and being vocal for local in India.
    • In the US, support for “Buy American” benchmarks for government health spending has growing bipartisan support.

    India’s role

    •  Challenges that transcend borders are of cardinal importance to India’s well being.
    • It is, therefore, time to conceptualise, in concrete terms, pathways to address them.
    • This will need to include our envisaging the new order and India’s own role in it as well as who our partners in this venture are to be.
    • Others are already working on their game plans.

    Consider the question “The cracks in the global order were apparent but the pandemic has accentuated the challenges to the global order. In light of this, examine the challenges to global order is facing the role that India should play.”

    Conclusion

    If India wants to be “rule shapers” rather than being “rule takers”, then we need to start working in partnership at blueprints for change. It is never too early to plan for the future

  • Reviving SAARC

    To counter a hegemon, showing a united front helps. Drawing on this maxim, India has to work on improving its standing in the region. And reviving SAARC could be a right step in this direction. So, why SAARC is in hibernation in the first place? Where India could start? Read to know…

    China challenging India’s interests in the region

    • China, as part of its global expansionism, is chipping away at India’s interests in South Asia.
    • China’s proximity to Pakistan is well known.
    • Nepal is moving closer to China for ideational and material reasons.
    • China is wooing Bangladesh by offering tariff exemption to 97% of Bangladeshi products.
    • China has intensified its ties with Sri Lanka through massive investments.
    • According to a Brookings India study, most South Asian nations are now largely dependent on China for imports despite geographical proximity to India.

    SAARC-Caught in India-Pakistan rivalry

    •  India’s strategic dealing with China has to begin with South Asia.
    • In this regard, it is important to reinvigorate SAARC, which has been in the doldrums since 2014.
    • In the last few years, due to increasing animosity with Pakistan, India’s political interest in SAARC dipped significantly.
    • India has been trying hard to isolate Pakistan internationally for its role in promoting terrorism in India.

    BIMSTEC cannot be an alternative to SAARC

    • India started investing in other regional instruments, such as BIMSTEC, as an alternative to SAARC.
    • However, BIMSTEC cannot replace SAARC for reasons such as lack of a common identity and history among all BIMSTEC members.
    • BIMSTEC’s focus is on the Bay of Bengal region, thus making it an inappropriate forum to engage all South Asian nations.

    Economic integration-way to revive SAARC

    • One way to infuse life in SAARC is to revive the process of South Asian economic integration.
    • South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world.
    • Intra-regional trade is at barely 5% of total South Asian trade
    • Intra-regional trade is 25% of intra-regional trade in the ASEAN region.
    • The lack of political will and trust deficit has prevented any meaningful movement.
    • According to the World Bank, trade in South Asia stands at $23 billion of an estimated value of $67 billion.
    • India should take the lead and work with its neighbours to slash the tariff and non-tariff barriers.
    • There’s a need to resuscitate the negotiations on a SAARC investment treaty, pending since 2007.
    • According to the UNCTAD intra-ASEAN investments constitute around 19% of the total investments in the region.
    • The SAARC region can likewise benefit from higher intra-SAARC investment flows.
    • Deeper regional economic integration will create greater interdependence with India acquiring the central role.
    • Which, in turn, would serve India’s strategic interests too.

    Two domestic challenges

    • 1) There has been an unrelenting top-dressing of anti-Pakistan rhetoric and Islamophobia on the Indian soil.
    • There’s also a recurrent use of the ‘Bangladeshi migrant’ rhetoric.
    • It dents India’s soft power of being a liberal and secular democracy, which gives moral legitimacy to India’s leadership in the region.
    • This divisive domestic politics fuels an anti-India sentiment in India’s neighbourhood.
    • 2) The economic vision of the government remains convoluted.
    • It’s unclear what the slogans of atma nirbharta (self-reliance) and ‘vocal for local’ mean.
    • If this marks sliding back to protectionism, one is unsure if India will be interested in deepening South Asian economic integration.

    Consider the question “Examine the issues that hinder the SAARC from realising its full potential as a regional grouping.”

    Conclusion

    Prime Minister did well by reaching out to SAARC leaders earlier this year, but such flash in the pan moments won’t help without sustained engagement.

  • Making sense of moves of China

    The role played by intelligence and emphasis on Summit diplomacy in relation with China are the two issues discussed in this article. So, what went wrong in Galwan incident from the intelligence point of view? And what are the perils of Summit diplomacy? Read to know...

    Galwan-New and fractious phase

    • What occurred in the Galwan heights on June 15, must not be viewed as an aberration.
    • It would be more judicious to view it as signifying a new and fractious phase in China-India relations.
    • Even if the situation reverts to what existed in mid-April India-China relations appear set to witness a “new and different normal”.
    • China’s reaction has been consistent — India must move out of Galwan.
    • This is something that India cannot ignore any longer.
    • Galwan incident cannot be viewed as a mere replay of what took place in Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017).
    • This is a new and different situation and India must not shrink from addressing the core issue that relations between India and China are in a perilous state.

    Close and careful analysis of China’s claim is necessary

    • China’s assertion of its claim to the whole of the Galwan Valley needs close and careful analysis for following reasons-
    • 1) Point 14 gives China a virtual stranglehold over the newly completed, and strategically significant, Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road, which leads on to the Karakoram Pass.
    • 2) The strategic implications for India of China’s insistence on keeping the whole of the Galwan Valley are serious as it fundamentally changes the status quo.
    • 3) By laying claim to the Galwan Valley, China has reopened some of the issues left over from the 1962 conflict.
    • And this demonstrates that it is willing to embark on a new confrontation.

    LAC and claim line of China

    • Ambiguity has existed regarding the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in this sector.
    • The Chinese “claim line” is that of November 1959.
    • For India the LAC is that of September 1962.
    • In recent years, both sides had refrained from reopening the issue, but China has never given up its claims.
    • By its unilateral declaration now, China is seeking to settle the matter in its favour. India needs to measure up to this challenge.

    Importance of Aksai Chin

    • The importance of Aksai Chin for China has greatly increased of late, as it provides direct connectivity between two of the most troubled regions of China, viz., Xinjiang and Tibet.
    • This does not seem to have been adequately factored in our calculations.
    • While Indian policymakers saw the reclassification of Ladakh as purely an internal matter.
    • They overlooked the fact that for China’s military planners it posited a threat to China’s peace and tranquillity.

    Intelligence capabilities

    • Admittedly, the timing and nature of China’s actions should have aroused keen interest in intelligence circles about China’s strategic calculations.
    • The Chinese build-up in the Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso and Hotsprings-Gogra did not require any great intelligence effort, since there was little attempt at concealment by the Chinese.
    • India also possesses high-quality imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.
    • These capabilities are distributed between the National Technical Research Organisation, the Directorate of Signals Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence and other agencies.
    • Which made it possible to track Chinese movement.
    • Where intelligence can be faulted is with regard to inadequate appreciation of what the build-up meant, and what it portended for India.
    • This is indicative of a weakness in interpretation and analysis of the intelligence available.
    • And also of inability to provide a coherent assessment of China’s real intentions.
    • Intelligence assessment of China’s intentions, clearly fell short of what was required.
    • While India’s technological capabilities for intelligence collection have vastly increased in recent years, the capacity for interpretation and analysis has not kept pace with this.
    • Advances in technology, specially Artificial Intelligence have, across the world, greatly augmented efforts at intelligence analysis.

    Who has the responsibility of intelligence assessment and analysis

    • The principal responsibility for intelligence assessment and analysis concerning China, rests with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
    • To a lesser extent, it remains with the Defence Intelligence Agency.
    • The decision of the NSCS to dismantle the Joint Intelligence Committee has contributed to a weakening of the intelligence assessment system.
    • In the case of the R&AW, lack of domain expertise, and an inadequacy of China specialists might also have been a contributory factor.

    Adverse impact of certain policy measures

    •  The preference given recently to Summit diplomacy over traditional foreign policy making structures proved to be a severe handicap.
    • Summit diplomacy cannot be a substitute for carefully structured foreign office policy making.
    • Currently, India’s Summit diplomacy has tended to marginalise the External Affairs Ministry with regard to policy making, and we are probably paying a price for it.
    • As it is, the Ministry of External Affairs’s (MEA) stock of China experts seems to be dwindling.
    • And MEA’s general tilt towards the U.S. in most matters, has resulted in an imbalance in the way the MEA perceives problems and situations.

    Conclusion

    Along with the other factors, India should also focus on intelligence analysis and interpretation and make sure there are enough China experts in the MEA.

  • Reimagining South Asian boundaries

    State-centric politics is the issue that plagues the regional cooperation in the region. But the consequences for the lives, livelihoods and the well-being of the people located at the edges of nation-states are overlooked. This issue is discussed in this article.

    State plays central role in disputes

    • One of the major problems of South Asian politics is that it has to flow from within a state-centric paradigm.
    • This state-centrism has given the state structure the propriety to be the sole arbiter of disputes.
    • It is the state that articulates, defines, and represents “national” interests in negotiations with other states.
    • States in South Asia places importance on political boundaries as the “natural” shield even in the arbitration of South Asian affairs.
    • This approach happens to be the dominant South Asian pattern.
    • In this approach territorial boundaries are valued more than lives, livelihoods and the well-being of the people located at the edges of nation states.
    • “Patriotism” looms large as and when inter-state relationships are viewed through the statist lens.
    •  Hostility, real or imagined, is used as the governing principle in the arbitration of territorial disputes across South Asia.

    Lack of regional identity

    • Basically, the term “region” seems to be a contested idea in a South Asian context.
    • This is because none of the South Asian states has ever recognised and respected the idea of regional identity or regional politics.
    • They have been wary of such natural division in politics.
    • Given that this is a reality, how could one even think of South Asia as a region to reckon with?

    South Asia as region of regions

    • One must understand that South Asia is perhaps the most natural regional grouping of states around the world.
    • And, at the same time, it is also the most difficult and contested grouping.
    • South Asia needs to be rethought, not as a region of states, but as a region of regions.
    • As such it demonstrates itself more as a borderland that needs to be cultivated out of contact zones.
    • Such contact zone exists beyond the limits of territorial boundaries shared by the member-states.

    So, how this applies to India-Nepal border dispute?

    • There is a need to go beyond the popular debates revolving around such “troubling” questions such as: how much area has been “encroached” upon by which state and on what basis.
    • Such questions appear to be “normal” in the way a “statist paradigm” deals with the issue.
    • To those who are to maintain their lifeworld at those zones these issues are troubling.

    Interconnected (fluid) life

    • South Asian life, essentially at the edges of the nation state, is bound to be fluid.
    • This is because the boundary, which confirms the territorial limits of a nation state, is at the same time the affirmed threshold of another nation state.
    • In a certain sense, the people living at the edges of nation states within South Asia do not actually belong to any of the two nation states.
    • Or in other words, they belong to both the states at the same time.
    • Plurality, differences and inclusivity bring coherence to borderland ontology.
    • They defy the logic of singular, unifying, exclusive identities that the nation states privilege.

    Implications for regional cooperation

    • Unless both India and Nepal agree to see the reality beyond the gaze of the statist paradigm, they would harm regional experiments such as the BIMSTEC or the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) sub-regional initiative.
    • South Asian states need to realise the difference between “regional cooperation” merely as advocacy and as an issue that demands self-approval and self-promotion.
    • South Asian countries may claim success on regional cooperation while closing all doors of recognising difference and mutual tolerance.
    • Powerful countries operating within and beyond the orbit of South Asia might become successful in establishing their control.
    • To establish control these countries may use the token of “regional cooperation” as an issue of realpolitik.

    Consider the question “South Asia is perhaps the most natural regional grouping of states around the world, yet it is also the most difficult and contested grouping. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Region and regional identity are not just issues of “realpolitik” in South Asia; rather, the need is to “officially” accommodate this rather naturally drafted way of doing politics, if we are genuinely concerned about South Asian geopolitics.

  • UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

    China will join a global pact to regulate arms sales that has been rejected by the United States.

    The New START, INF, Open Skies and now the ATT …. Be clear about the differences of these treaties. For example- to check if their inception was during cold war era etc.

    What is the Arms Trade Treaty?

    • The Arms Trade Treaty is a multilateral treaty that regulates the international trade in conventional weapons. It entered into force on 4th December 2014.
    • The ATT is an attempt to regulate the international trade of conventional weapons for the purpose of contributing to international and regional peace; reducing human suffering; and promoting co-operation, transparency, and responsible action by and among states.
    • 105 states have ratified the treaty, and a further 32 states have signed but not ratified it.
    • India has abstained from voting for this Treaty

    Highlights of the treaty

    ATT requires member countries to keep records of international transfers of weapons and to prohibit cross-border shipments that could be used in human rights violations or attacks on civilians. The treaty would ensure that no transfer is permitted if there is a substantial risk that it is likely to:

    • be used in serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, or acts of genocide or crimes against humanity;
    • facilitate terrorist attacks, a pattern of gender-based violence, violent crime, or organized crime;
    • violate UN Charter obligations, including UN arms embargoes;
    • be diverted from its stated recipient;
    • adversely affect regional security; or
    • seriously impair poverty reduction or socioeconomic development.

    China’s agenda at ATT

    • Beijing saying it is committed to efforts to “enhance peace and stability” in the world.
    • It comes after the US announced plans last year to pull the United States out of the agreement which entered into force in 2014.
    • The US Senate never ratified the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty after former president Barack Obama endorsed it, and Trump has said he would revoke his predecessor’s signature.

    Why has India abstained?

    • From the beginning of the ATT process, India has maintained that such a treaty should make a real impact on illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their illicit use especially by terrorists and other unauthorized and unlawful non-state actors.
    • India has also stressed consistently that the ATT should ensure a balance of obligations between exporting and importing states.
    • However, the ATT is weak on terrorism and non-state actors (undoubtedly Pakistan) and these concerns find no mention in the specific prohibitions of the Treaty.
    • Further, India cannot accept that the Treaty is used as an instrument in the hands of exporting states to take unilateral force majeure measures against importing states parties without consequences.

    Also read:

    U.S. set to exit the ‘Open Skies Treaty’ Copy

  • Why Ladakh matters to India and China?

    This article from IE discusses this cold, dry, high altitude territory with its extremely scarce vegetation that makes it a point of disagreement between India and China.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s boundary disputes with its neighbourhood are the legacy of its colonial past. Analyse.

    Ladakh: The Cold Desert of India

    • Ladakh is the highest plateau in India with much of it being over 3,000 m.
    • It extends from the Himalayan to the Kunlun Ranges and includes the upper Indus River valley.
    • The importance of Ladakh is rooted in complicated historical processes that led to the territory becoming part of the state of J&K, and China’s interest in it post the occupation of Tibet in 1950.

    Beginning of the Chinese claim

    • In July 1958, an official monthly magazine in China published a map of the country that would in the next few months become a bone of contention between India and its East Asian neighbour.
    • The map in question showed large parts of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the Himalayan territory of Ladakh as part of China.
    • Soon after ‘China pictorial’ came out with the new Chinese map, the leaders of both countries began writing to each other frequently regarding Ladakh.
    • The exchange of letters between Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was followed by the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
    • The war also led to the formation of the loosely demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) running through Ladakh.

    The Integration of Ladakh into India

    • Historically and culturally the state was intrinsically linked to neighbouring Tibet.
    • Language and religion linked Ladakh and Tibet; politically too, they shared a common history.
    • Ladakh was part of the Tibetan empire which broke up after the assassination of King Langdarma in 742 CE.
    • Up until the Dogra invasion of 1834, Ladakh was an independent Himalayan state, much the same way as Bhutan and Sikkim.
    • As the Sikhs acquired Kashmir in 1819, Emperor Ranjit Singh turned his ambition towards Ladakh.
    • But it was Gulab Singh, the Dogra feudatory of the Sikhs in Jammu, who went ahead with the task of integrating Ladakh into Jammu and Kashmir.

    British interests in Ladakh

    • The British East India Company, which was by now steadily establishing itself in India, had lacked interest in Ladakh initially.
    • However, it did show enthusiasm for the Dogra invasion of the area, with the hope that as a consequence, a large portion of Tibetan trade would be diverted to its holdings.
    • The state of J&K was essentially a British creation, formed as a buffer zone where they could meet the Russians.

    The Sino-Sikh War

    • In May 1841, Tibet under the Qing dynasty of China invaded Ladakh with the hope of adding it to the imperial Chinese dominions, leading to the Sino-Sikh war.
    • However, the Sino-Tibetan army was defeated, and the Treaty of Chushul was signed that agreed on no further transgressions or interference in the other country’s frontiers.
    • After the first Anglo-Sikh war of 1845-46, the state of J&K, including Ladakh, was taken out of the Sikh empire and brought under British suzerainty.

    Chinese interest in Ladakh after the occupation of Tibet in 1950

    • The annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 sparked a newfound interest in Ladakh, and particularly so after the 1959 Tibetan uprising that erupted in Lhasa with Dalai Lama’s political asylum in India.
    • In attempting to crush the Tibetan revolt while at the same time denying its existence, the Chinese have used methods which have brought China and India into sharp conflict.
    • To begin with, the road that the Chinese built across Ladakh in 1956-57 was important for the maintenance of their control over Tibet.
    • The building of the road through Ladakh upset Nehru’s government. The diplomatic negotiations failed, and the war of 1962 followed.

    Why conflict has flared up again?

    • There are two layers to this. First, up to 2013, India’s infrastructural development in that area was minimal.
    • From 2013, India started pushing for infrastructure projects there and by 2015; it became a major defence priority.
    • The second layer is the August 5, 2019 decision (to remove the special status of J&K and downgrade the state into two Union Territories).
    • From the Chinese point of view, they would have assumed that if India makes Ladakh a Union Territory, they would be reasserting its control over the entire state.
    • Moreover, it is also important to note that over time, Xinjiang which is part of Aksai Chin, has become very important to China for their internal reasons.

    The dispute

    • The British legacy of the map of the territory continued to remain the ground upon which India laid its claim on the area.
    • India insisted that the border was, for the most part, recognised and assured by treaty and tradition; the Chinese argued it had never really been delimited.
    • The claims of both governments rested in part on the legacy of imperialism; British imperialism (for India), and Chinese imperialism (over Tibet) for China.

  • Multilateralism post COVID-19

    What is the future of multilateralism? This is the question we have come across many times recently. Given the chaos that we are witnessing in the global order, multilateral seems to be headed for either collapse or capture by China. But, the author of this article suggests that it would be a mistake to consider the choice as binary. Between the collapse and the capture, there are many stakeholders working for its sustenance. So, multilateralism will endure.

    International institutions performing below par

    • The COVID-19 outbreak has placed all international institutions under a magnifying glass.
    • By any measure, most have performed below par.
    • Such is the caution espoused that multilateralism today seems to have reverted to its version 0.1.
    • The General Assembly now passes resolutions through no-objection procedure.
    • The Security Council has been found wanting in no small measure.
    • The 75th session’s ‘leaders week’ runs the risk of being reduced to a video playback session.

    Pursuit of change by threatening to leave

    • It is true that functioning of multilateral institutions requires reform.
    • They need to adapt to new realities.
    • However, the pursuit of change by threatening to leave multilateral institutions is a phenomenon we witnessed only during the period of the League of Nations.
    • One state followed another in bidding goodbye, until the League’s final demise.

    Why post Second World War institutions survived departures

    • The post Second World War multilateral institutions have survived such departures.
    • The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris and the Human Rights Council in Geneva have survived the departure of the U.S.
    • The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna continues despite the withdrawal of the U.S. and many others.
    • The World Health Organization (WHO), notwithstanding its visible shortcomings, will survive U.S. threats.
    • The reasons are simple.
    • Multilateral organisations serve desperately felt global needs of the vast membership.
    • The pandemic has reinforced the desire for greater global cooperation amongst most states.

    So, will the current multi-lateral order survive China’s onslaught?

    •  It is true that Chinese nationals head four multilateral organisations.
    • It is also true that Chinese nationals have failed in campaigns to head UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
    • Despite contributing nearly 10% of the UN’s budget, Chinese nationals are not exactly over-represented in terms of staff positions.
    • China has certainly risen up the multilateral pantheon and is able to better promote its interests.
    • It has warded off attacks against it in multilateral fora, at times with the aid of the heads of these organisations.
    • However, it is yet to display an ability to set the multilateral agenda and dominate the discourse on an array of issues, in the manner that the U.S. once indispensably did.
    • China’s flagship venture, the Belt and Road Initiative, remains only on the fringes of multilateral fora.
    • Neither in monetary terms nor in substantive inputs are there portents of a ‘Chinese takeover’.
    • Amidst this, multilateral bodies are populated by a plethora of small and middle states quietly working to restore equilibrium, when the balance tends to shift.
    • The capture of the existing multilateral order by a new hegemon is antithetical to the ethos of multilateralism.
    • Multilateralism thrives on the notion of the Lilliputians tying up Gulliver — old or new.

    Evolving multilateralism is not a choice between collapse and capture

    • Between collapse and capture, there are other pathways.
    • Multilateral architecture places a premium on structures over functions, processes over substance.
    • It slows down the change of any sort.
    • The same processes that have stalled change in the past will militate against a takeover in the future.
    • Does that mean that multilateralism will meander meaninglessly?
    • It will meander, but perhaps not meaninglessly.
    • The ‘pluri-laterals’ and the emerging ‘mini-laterals’ each have their place in terms of international agenda-setting, but global norm-setting requires inclusivity that they lack.

    Opportunity for India

    • Being able to shape the discourse at an incipient stage is a good perch to be on.
    • Issue-specific ‘coalitions of the willing’ are catalysts.
    • As a growing power, India needs to avail of such avenues.
    • However, by themselves, these will not do justice to the depth and variety of India’s interests and our stakes in global cooperation.
    • Also, they are not holistic solutions in ensuring global acceptance of norms.

    Understanding the essence of multilateralism

    • Responses of states during the COVID-19 crisis point to more emphasis on sovereign decision making than before.
    • The imprimatur for acting on behalf of the global community is not going to be available easily.
    • On myriad issues, from sustainable development to the environment, from climate change to pandemics and cyberspace to outer space, the demands for ‘nothing about us without us’ are likely to increase.
    • Since stakeholders perceive that their stakes have risen, they will call for enhanced engagement.
    • Convening such stakeholders in pursuit of global goals is the essence of multilateralism.

    Consider the question “In the world afflicted by Covid, multilateralism seems to be headed for collapse or capture by a hegemon. Critically examine.”

    Conclusion

    We need to patiently promote reforms while building partnerships to avail opportunities which may arise for more fundamental change. We need to bide our time without hiding our intent.

  • SIPRI Report on Nuclear Stockpiles

    All nations that have nuclear weapons continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals, while India and China increased their nuclear warheads in the last one year, according to a latest report by Swedish think tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

    About SIPRI

    • Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an international institute based in Sweden, dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament.
    • Established in 1966, the Stockholm based SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.

    Practice question for Mains:

    Q.“Nuclear disarmament of the world seems a distant dream”. Comment.

    Nuclear arsenals are on rise in ‘thy neighbourhood’

    • China is in the middle of a significant modernization of its nuclear arsenal.
    • It is developing a so-called nuclear triad for the first time, made up of new land and sea-based missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft.
    • China’s nuclear arsenal had gone up from 290 warheads in 2019 to 320 in 2020, while India’s went up from 130-140 in 2019 to 150 in 2020.
    • Pakistan’s arsenal was estimated to be between 150-160 in 2019 and has reached 160 in 2020.
    • Both China and Pakistan continue to have larger nuclear arsenals than India.

    A general decline across the globe

    • Together with the nine nuclear-armed states — the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea — possessed an estimated 13,400 nuclear weapons at the start of 2020.
    • This marked a decrease from an estimated 13,865 nuclear weapons at the beginning of 2019.
    • The decrease in the overall numbers was largely due to the dismantlement of old nuclear weapons by Russia and the U.S., which together possess over 90% of the global nuclear weapons.

    Major issue in reporting: Low levels of disclosure

    • The availability of reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states varied considerably, the report noted.
    • The U.S. had disclosed important information about its stockpile and nuclear capabilities, but in 2019, the administration ended the practice of publicly disclosing the size of its stockpile.
    • The governments of India and Pakistan make statements about some of their missile tests but provide little information about the status or size of their arsenals, the report said.

    New START seems to ‘STOP’ very soon

    • The U.S. and Russia have reduced their nuclear arsenals under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) but it will lapse in February 2021 unless both parties agree to prolong it.
    • However, discussions to extend the New START or negotiate a new treaty made no progress with the U.S.’s insistence that China must join any future nuclear arms reduction talks, which China has categorically ruled out.
    • The deadlock over the New START and the collapse of the 1987 Soviet–U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) in 2019 suggest that the era of bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between Russia and the U.S. might be coming to an end.
    • Russia and the U.S. have already announced extensive plans to replace and modernize their nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
    • Both countries have also given new or expanded roles to nuclear weapons in their military plans and doctrines, which marks a significant reversal of the post-Cold War trend towards the gradual marginalisation of nuclear weapons.

    Back2Basics: INF Treaty

    • Under the INF treaty, the US and Soviet Union agreed not to develop, produce, possess or deploy any ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles that have a range between 500 and 5,500 km.
    • It exempted the air-launched and sea-based missile systems in the same range.
    • The INF treaty helped address the fears of an imminent nuclear war in Europe.
    • It also built some trust between Washington and Moscow and contributed to the end of the Cold War.

    New START Policy

    • The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) pact limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and is due to expire in 2021 unless renewed.
    • The treaty limits the US and Russia to a maximum of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, well below Cold War caps.
    • It was signed in 2010 by former US President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
    • It is one of the key controls on superpower deployment of nuclear weapons.
    • If it falls, it will be the second nuclear weapons treaty to collapse under the leadership of US President Donald Trump.

  • Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

    India is looking to post Navy Liaison Officers at the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) of IOC in Madagascar and also at the European maritime surveillance initiative in the Strait of Hormuz.

    Note the members of the IOC form map. One may get confused considering India as a permanent member.

    About Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)

    • The IOC is an intergovernmental organization that was created in 1982 at Port Louis, Mauritius and institutionalized in 1984 by the Victoria Agreement in Seychelles.
    • The IOC is composed of five African Indian Ocean nations: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (an overseas region of France), and Seychelles.
    • These five islands share geographic proximity, historical and demographic relationships, natural resources and common development issues.

    Aims and Objectives of IOC

    • IOC’s principal mission is to strengthen the ties of friendship between the countries and to be a platform of solidarity for the entire population of the African Indian Ocean region.
    • IOC’s mission also includes development, through projects related to sustainability for the region, aimed at protecting the region, improving the living conditions of the populations and preserving the various natural resources that the countries depend on.
    • Being an organisation regrouping only island states, the IOC has usually championed the cause of small island states in regional and international fora.

    India and IOC

    • India was accepted as an observer getting a seat at the table of the organization that handles maritime governance in the western Indian Ocean.
    • India’s entry is a consequence of its deepening strategic partnership with France as well as its expanding ties with the Vanilla Islands.
    • The IOC has four observers — China, EU, Malta and International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF).

    Significance of IOC

    • For India, the importance of joining this organization lies in several things.
    • First, India will get an official foothold in a premier regional institution in the western Indian Ocean, boosting engagement with islands in this part of the Indian Ocean.
    • These island nations are increasingly important for India’s strategic outreach as part of its Indo-Pacific policy.
    • This move would enhance ties with France which is the strong global power in the western Indian Ocean.
    • It lends depth to India’s SAGAR (security and growth for all in the region) policy unveiled by PM Modi in 2015.
    • The move, India hopes, would lead to greater security cooperation with countries in East Africa.