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GS Paper: India & Its Neighborhood – Relations

  • Complexity of India-Nepal relations

    This article helps us understand Nepal’s perspective of the India-Nepal border dispute. Though the issue dates back to India’s independence, it came to dominate the political landscape in Nepal since 1990s. But there is no solution in sight. So, what makes the issue complex? Read to know…

    What the border dispute between two countries is about?

    • The inauguration of the “new road to Mansarovar” on May 8 by India’s defence minister has strained the relations between Nepal and India.
    • Nepal claims that a section of the road passes through the territory of Nepal and links with the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China through the Lipu Lekh pass in Nepal.
    • The 1816 Sugauli Treaty between Nepal and British India placed all the territories east of the Kali (Mahakali) river, including Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipu Lekh at the northwestern front of Nepal, on its side.
    • The borders of Nepal, India and China intersect in this area.
    • Given the situation in 1961, Nepal and China fixed pillar number one at Tinker pass with the understanding that pillar number zero (the tri-junction of Nepal, India, and China) would be fixed later.
    • Lipu Lekh pass is 4 km northwest and Limpiyadhura 53 km west of Tinker pass.

    No progress on the solution of the issue

    • The dispute over the Kalapani area has spanned the last seven decades.
    • Both Nepal and India have recognised it as an outstanding border issue requiring an optimal resolution.
    • When in August 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in 17 years, Nepal’s Prime Minister Sushil Koirala raised this issue again.
    • The two prime ministers agreed to resolve the issue on a priority basis and directed their foreign secretaries “to work on the outstanding boundary issues including Kalapani and Susta”.
    •  There was virtually no progress on the ground.

    Nepal’s objection to India-China agreement

    •  In May 2015, Prime Minister Modi visited China, and the two countries agreed to “enhance border areas cooperation”.
    • The May 2015 agreement is a broad one compared to the 1954 India-China agreement “on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India”, which mentions Lipu Lekh pass as one of the six passes “through which traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel”.
    • Nepal protested against the inclusion of its territory, Lipu Lekh, in the joint statement without its consent and demanded that the two countries make necessary corrections to reflect the ground realities.
    • The protest was ignored.

    Growing nationalism and distrust let to the deterioration of relations

    • The tone of Nepal-India relations appears to be dominated by frustrations of the past and traditional attitudes more than the opportunities of the future.
    • The widening gap in understanding each other’s concerns has helped feed Nepali nationalism and create a dense cloud of distrust and suspicion between the two countries.
    • The gap widened after India chose to impose an economic blockade in response to Nepal’s sovereign decision to promulgate a democratic constitution.
    • The current ruling Communist Party of Nepal made people’s anger over the blockade its campaign plank during the 2017 general election.

    What makes the border issues complex and difficult to solve?

    • Complexity of the issue stems from the fact that the political leadership handles only a small part of this very important bilateral relationship.
    • India as a big neighbour is rarely seen grasping the psychological dimensions of the relationship.
    • Officials handling these multifaceted relations may momentarily influence the atmospherics but they rarely touch the core of these relations, let alone reorient or transform them in the rapidly changing context.
    • This is manifest in the deferring of substantive conversations on the outstanding boundary issue for decades.
    • The foreign secretary level mechanism has not met even once to discuss the border issue since its formation.
    • There are over three dozen bilateral mechanisms between Nepal and India to engage at various levels.
    • The meetings of these mechanisms are rarely regular.

    Consider the question “The India-Nepal border dispute looks minor, but allowing it to fester is likely to sow the seeds of immense competition and intense rivalry in the sensitive Himalayan frontier with far-reaching geopolitical implications. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Geography, history, and economy make Nepal and India natural partners, sharing vital interest in each other’s freedom, integrity, dignity, security and progress. People-to-people relations are unique strengths of bilateral relations. India, for it’s part and in the spirit of its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy, must start a solution-oriented dialogue and find the solution to the dispute.

  • Pay attention to their objectives in dealing with China and Pakistan

    While their interests overlap, Pakistan and China diverge when it comes to their objective in Kashmir. Both want to keep the pressure on India to avoid it from changing the status quo. Extending this line of argument, the author in this article suggest that India should separate the policy response to China from Pakistan, as they differ in their objectives.

    Coordinated efforts to corner India?

    • Latest news on the Ladakh front suggests that Chinese and Indian forces have begun to disengage in select areas.
    • But this does not detract from the reality that in the past few weeks Beijing and Islamabad are making coordinated efforts to challenge India’s presence in the Kashmir-Ladakh region.
    • There is stepped-up activity on Pakistan’s part to infiltrate terrorists into the Valley.
    • China has undertaken provocative measures on the Ladakh front to assert control over disputed areas around the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

    Let’s see how Pakistan and China’s interests overlap

    • In Pakistan’s case the intensification in its terrorist activities is related in part to the dilution of Article 370. 
    • Dilution of Article 370 helps India de-link Ladakh from the Kashmir problem.
    • For China, the division of Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir allows India a freer hand in contesting China’s claims in the region.
    • Increasing road-building activity on India’s part close to the LAC augments this perception.
    • In addition, Ladakh borders China’s most restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.
    • Ladakh is also contiguous to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Chinese have invested hugely under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.
    • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s remark last year that India expects to have “physical jurisdiction over (POK) one day” has alarmed Beijing which sees any such Indian move as threatening the CPEC project.
    • These factors demonstrate the overlapping interests that Beijing and Islamabad have regarding India in this region.

    The above factors explain why Pakistan and China would want India to be so preoccupied with taking defensive measures in Kashmir and Ladakh as to have little time and energy left to attempt to alter the status quo in POK or in Aksai Chin.

    But there are major differences in Pakistani and Chinese objectives regarding India

    • These differences are related to their divergent perceptions of their disputes and their different force equations with India.
    • For China, Ladakh is primarily a territorial dispute with strategic ramifications.
    • China also believes it is superior to the Indian militarily and, therefore, can afford to push India around within limits as it has been attempting to do in the recent confrontation.
    • For Pakistan, its territorial claim on Kashmir is based on an immutable ideological conviction that it is the unfinished business of partition and as a Muslim-majority state is destined to become a part of Pakistan.
    • Islamabad also realises that it is the weaker power in conventional terms and therefore has to use unconventional means, primarily terrorist infiltration, to achieve its objective of changing the status quo in Kashmir.
    • China is a satiated power in Ladakh having occupied Aksai Chin and wants to keep up the pressure on New Delhi to prevent the latter from trying to change the situation on the ground.

    Way forward-Pay attention to objectives while negotiating

    • China’s primary concern with regard to Kashmir is to prevent any Indian move from threatening the CPEC project.
    • It does not challenge the status quo in Kashmir.
    • Pakistan, on the other hand, is committed to changing the status quo in Kashmir at all cost.
    • It has been trying to do so since Partition not only through clandestine infiltration but also by engaging in conventional warfare.
    • Therefore, while it is possible to negotiate the territorial dispute with China on a give-and-take basis.
    • Doing the same is not possible in the case of Pakistan which considers Kashmir a zero-sum game.
    • India should, therefore, distinguish the different objectives on the part of Beijing and Islamabad and tailor its responses accordingly without conflating the two threats to its security.

    Consider the question “Policy response of India in dealing with Pakistan and China should consider differences in their objectives in relation to Kashmir. And clubbing them together just because of their tactical overlap should be avoided. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    Lumping the twin threats posed by Pakistan and China together because of a tactical overlap between them makes it difficult to choose policy options rationally. So, the policy response must understand the difference in their objectives and avoid clubbing them together.

  • India-China border crisis: It is not about the U.S.

    India’s growing closeness to the U.S. could be the reason for China’s aggression along India’s border. This is the explanation we often come across. But is it really the case?. This article probes the same question. Example of China’s dispute with Indonesia and Philippine help us analyse the U.S. angle to Indo-China border dispute. So, what is the conclusion?

    An easy explanation to India-China border crisis

    • Why has China precipitated a fresh military crisis with India in eastern Ladakh?
    • Among the many explanations making the rounds in Delhi, there is always the easy and attractive one — it’s all about America.
    • Delhi has incurred Beijing’s wrath by moving closer to Washington, goes the argument.
    • India’s renewed enthusiasm for the US-led Quad, it is said, is encouraging China to teach a lesson to Delhi.

    But does this explanation applies to the other countries as well? Look at Indonesia

    • No!
    • This theory does not hold up in relation to other countries having problems with China.
    • Let us turn to the South China Sea, where China is on a bold and ambitious drive to expand its control over the disputed waters.
    • Let us start with gathering tensions over the territorial dispute between Beijing and Jakarta.
    • Over the last year and more, Jakarta is coping with a Chinese challenge in its waters off its Natuna Islands.
    • The Natuna are nearly 1,500 km from the Chinese mainland.
    • The Natuna themselves lie outside Beijing’s nine-dash line that claims nearly 80 per cent of the South China Sea.
    • The dispute is over the exclusive economic zone that the islands confer on Indonesia.
    • China says it has historic rights to these waters and has been dispatching its fishing fleet into these waters.

    Maybe China sees a problem with Jakarta-Washington relations: Let’s analyse

    • Jakarta did not support the US approach to the Indo-Pacific.
    • and went to great lengths to develop a concept of its own and get it endorsed by the ASEAN.
    • Indonesia is not a member of the much-maligned Quad.
    • Its foreign policy is wedded to non-alignment.
    • And as the host of the historic Bandung Conference in 1955, Indonesia is a founding member and champion of Non-aligned Movement.

    Now, let’s consider second example: Philippines

    • The story of the Philippines — one of the oldest military allies of the US in Asia — nicely complements the non-aligned Indonesia’s troubles with China.
    • When he came to power in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte decided to distance the Philippines from the US and embraced China.
    • He had a hope of finding a reasonable settlement to the substantive maritime territorial dispute with Beijing.
    • In February this year, Manila announced the decision to terminate the agreement that lets American troops operate in the Philippines.
    • But last week, the Philippines “suspended” the decision to terminate military cooperation with the US.
    • The reason: The PLA’s relentless military pressure on the South China Sea islands claimed by Manila and including them in a new Chinese administrative district.

    So, what the two examples suggest?

    • Neither Jakarta that is scrupulously non-aligned nor Manila that was ready to break its alliance with the US has been spared from Beijing’s current muscular approach to China’s territorial disputes.
    • China has long-standing claims, right or wrong, on the territories of its neighbours.
    • The other is the dramatic shift in the regional power balance in favour of China.
    • Unlike in the past, China now has the military power to make good its claims and alter the territorial status quo, if only in bits and pieces.
    • This is what China is doing in the South China Sea.
    • And the situation may not be any different in Ladakh.

    Consider the question “The shift in the regional power balance and not the growing Indo-U.S. relations explains the assertive nature of China in India-China border issues. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    The real challenge for Delhi in managing its expansive territorial dispute with Beijing, then, is to redress the growing power imbalance with China. The rest is detail.

  • What is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)?

    Security issue in the disputed South China Sea has helped convince the Philippines to delay quitting a key U.S. military pact called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. What’s behind diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea? How it is set to become another flashpoint between the US and China?

    The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)

    • A VFA is a version of a status of forces agreement that only applies to troops temporarily in a country.
    • The US military operates around the world thanks to Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) in 100 or so countries.
    • Similarly, the VFA spells out the rules, guidelines and legal status of the US military when operating in the Philippines.
    • The VFA also affirms the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty as well as the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement — agreements that enable the U.S. military to conduct joint exercises and operations in the Philippines.
    • It came into force on May 27, 1999, upon ratification by the Senate of the Philippines.
    • It also exempts U.S. military personnel from visa and passport regulations in the Philippines.

    Significance of VFA

    • Both the US and Philippines remain wary of Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea (SCS). The VFA, therefore, act as an insurance policy against Chinese threats.
    • Terminating the VFA would leave the U.S. military without any legal or operational standing in the Philippines — and that’s a problem for the alliance.
    • Without a VFA, the U.S. military would not be able to support either of these defence agreements.

    Philippines-China spat on SCS

    • The Philippines has had diplomatic spats with China over the Scarborough Shoal and Spratlys in particular.
    • It says China’s “nine-dash line”, which China uses to demarcate its territorial claims, is unlawful under the UNCLOS convention.
    • The SCS is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region.

    Back2Basics: South China Sea Row

    • It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys – two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries.
    • China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims.
    • Alongside the fully-fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal.
    • China claims by far the largest portion of territory – an area defined by the “nine-dash line” which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
    • Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims.
    • It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

    Spat over Chinese claims

    • China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols.
    • The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them “freedom of navigation” operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes.
    • Both sides have accused each other of “militarizing” the South China Sea.
    • There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences.

    With inputs from Washington Post

  • Dilemma for Delhi in Ladakh standoff

    Though the rest of the world is preoccupied with Covid pandemic, China is busy in raising tension over border issues with its neighbour-India. What explains such actions by China? And timing selected by China has also puzzled many. India, on its part, faces a dilemma. This article dissects the various issues related to the standoff and explains the options available with India to deal with the Chinese intimidation.

    Why the latest transgression by PLA is unprecedented?

    • There are around 400 transgressions/faceoffs each year on an average along the LAC.
    • But the recent spate of territorial transgressions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is unprecedented in its scope and manner.
    • Even as independent accounts point out that Chinese troops are yet to withdraw from the transgressed territories and restore status quo ante.
    • Those territories are traditionally considered by both sides to be on the Indian side of the LAC.
    • Chinese officials have gone ahead and stated that the “Situation in China-India border is overall stable & controllable”.

    What this move by China signals?

    • The Indian government is left with two basic choices: 1) accept territorial loss as a fait accompli or 2)  force or negotiate a reversal to status quo ante, unless of course the PLA unilaterally withdraws.
    • Either way, China’s growing territorial aggression on the LAC signals the end of Beijing’s peaceful rise and its traditional desire to maintain regional status quo with India.
    • China under its President, Xi Jinping, unequivocally seeks to demonstrate that it is the preponderant power in the region. 

    Let’s analyse the aggression

    • While the timing could be explained by the global political distraction caused by COVID-19.
    • And also the international pressure on China (including by India) to come clean on the origins of the novel coronavirus could have played the role.
    • But the proximate causes could be several. Consider the following-

    1. Statement by India on Aksai Chin

    • For one, New Delhi’s terse statements about Aksai Chin following the Jammu and Kashmir reorganisation in August last year had not gone down well with Beijing.
    • While not many in India believe that New Delhi was serious about getting back Aksai Chin from Chinese control, Beijing may have viewed it as India upping the ante.
    • More pertinently, in a clear departure from the past, New Delhi has been carrying out the construction of infrastructural projects along the LAC — a long overdue activity — which is something that seems to have made China uneasy.

    2. Broader context of long-term geopolitical world view

    • The Chinese angle to the J&K conundrum deserves more attention here.
    • The aggression must also be viewed in the broader context of a long-term geopolitical world view China has for the region. Consider the following in this regard-
    • 1) China’s China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connectivity to Pakistan through the Karakoram and New Delhi’s criticism of it.
    • 2) The reported presence of PLA troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).
    • 3) India’s new-found activism on Aksai Chin.
    • 4) The PLA’s incursions into areas in eastern Ladakh.

    3. Strategic goals

    • It is equally important to appreciate the larger Chinese strategic calculations behind its recent spate of aggressions.
    • Having given up its traditional slogan of ‘peaceful rise’, China, under Mr. Xi, is beginning to assert itself as the next superpower.
    • Over the years, Beijing has perhaps realised that India is not keen on toeing the Chinese line in the region.
    • So this is Beijing sending a message to New Delhi to fall in line.
    • A message that will not go unnoticed in the smaller capitals around China — from Colombo to Kathmandu to Hanoi.

    4. Political message

    • Given that China is currently engaged in what many analysts are describing as a new cold war with the United States, in the middle of a crackdown in Hong Kong along with fighting COVID-19 at home, one would not have expected the Chinese leadership to open another front.
    • And yet, by opening a limited military front with India on the LAC, China is signalling the U.S. that it can handle pressure.
    •  And telling India that it has the political and military wherewithal to put pressure on New Delhi notwithstanding its other preoccupations.

    Why limited scope confrontation is cost-effective and preferred option by China?

    • China’s limited scope military expeditions on the long-contested border is cost effective for the PLA.
    • This is because the ever-growing conventional military superiority that it enjoys with India.
    • Moreover, because limited fights or smaller land grabs may not provoke an all-out confrontation or nuclear use.
    • The side with conventional superiority and more border infrastructure would likely carry the day.

    India’s China dilemma

    • Picking a direct fight with India which might lead to an undesirable military escalation with India does not suit Beijing’s interests.
    • But carrying out minor military expeditions with the objective of inflicting small-scale military defeats on India is precisely what would suit the Chinese political and military leadership.
    • They are cost effective, less escalatory, and the message gets conveyed.
    • More so, India’s military response would depend a great deal on how far the regime in New Delhi is willing to acknowledge such territorial losses due to domestic political constraints.
    • If New Delhi acknowledges loss of territory, it would have to regain it, but doing so vis-à-vis a conventionally superior power would not be easy.
    • Put differently, growing conventional imbalance and domestic political calculations could prompt New Delhi to overlook minor territorial losses on the LAC.
    • But let us be clear: the more New Delhi overlooks them, the more Beijing would be tempted to repeat them.
    • These considerations lie at the heart of India’s China dilemma.

    How India could respond?

    • Yet, there are limits to China’s LAC adventurism.
    • 1) There are several places along the several thousand kilometre long LAC where the PLA is militarily weak, the Indian Army has the upper hand.
    • And, therefore, a tit-for-tat military campaign could be undertaken by New Delhi.
    • 2)  While China enjoys continental superiority over India, maritime domain is China’s weak spot, in particular Beijing’s commercial and energy interest to which the maritime space is crucial.
    • 3) Finally, and most importantly, would Beijing want to seriously damage the close to $100 billion trade with India with its military adventurism on the LAC?

    Way forward

    • In any case, for India, the age of pussyfooting around Chinese intimidation strategies is over.
    • The time has come to checkmate Beijing’s military aggression even as we maintain a robust economic relationship with our eastern neighbour.
    • It is also a reminder for us to get more serious about finalising a border agreement with China.
    • The bigger the power differential between India and China, the more concessions Beijing would demand from New Delhi to settle the dispute.

    Consider the question-“There have been growing instances of PLA aggression on India-China border. Examine the multiple objectives China’s actions seek to achieve. What are the options available with India to deal with situation?

    Conclusion

    There is little doubt that China is our neighbour and that we have to live next to the larger and more powerful China. However, India should not accept Beijing’s attempts at land grabs, or military intimidation. That China is a rising superpower located next door to us is a reality, but how we deal with that reality is a choice we must make as a nation.

  • Analysing three-pronged strategy of China in Ladakh

    The article gives an in-depth analysis of the current border dispute between India and China in Ladakh. But the present dispute follows the pattern. China has been encroaching and gaining control over the disputed territory since the 1980s. And this dispute also fits into that pattern.

    China acting strategically in Ladakh

    • While India has pursued its core national interests in J&K, China’s response was strategic — a shift that may have a lasting imprint on geopolitics.
    • We have been harping on the “differing perception” theory of the LAC for decades.
    • But in reality China has been gaining control over a massive “disputed territory” in Eastern Ladakh since the 1980s.

    Major Chinese encroachment events

    • The Chinese first made encroachments into the 45-km long Skakjung pastureland in Demchok-Kuyul sector.
    • This resulted in local Changpas of Chushul, Tsaga, Nidar, Nyoma, Mud, Dungti, Kuyul, Loma villages gradually losing their winter grazing.
    • Ladakh’s earlier border lay at Kegu Naro — a day-long march from Dumchele.
    • Starting from the loss of Nagtsang in 1984, followed by Nakung (1991) and Lungma-Serding (1992), the last bit of Skakjung was lost in 2008.
    • The PLA followed the nomadic Rebo routes for patrolling in contrast to Indian authorities restricting Rebo movements that led to the massive shrinking of pastureland and border defence.
    • By the 2000s, the PLA’s focus shifted to desolate, inhospitable Chip Chap which remains inaccessible until end-March.
    • After mid-May, water streams impede vehicles moving across Shyok, Galwan, and Chang-Chenmo rivers leaving only a month and a half for effective patrolling by the Indian side.
    • No human beings inhabit here, a 1962 war site, an entry point into Ladakh for the Uyghurs and Tibetans.
    • Local Ladakhi personnel manned the posts here, but patrolling in the 972 sq km Trig Height area has been lax.
    • Easier accessibility allowed the PLA to intrude into Chip Chap with impunity during July-August — its regulars usually spent a few hours before crossing back.
    • But, during the 21-day Depsang stand-off in 2013, when Burtse became a flashpoint, the PLA set up remote camps 18-19 km inside Indian territory.
    • Chinese soldiers virtually prevented Indian troops from getting access to Rakinala near Daulat Beg-Olde (DBO) where the IAF reactivated the world’s highest landing strips in 2008.
    2008 Daulat Beg Oldi Stand-off
    • This plus the reopening of Fukche and Nyoma airbases perhaps provoked the PLA’s intrusion in Depsang.

    So, what is the current stand-off about?

    • Despite topographical challenges, the BRO has lately fast-tracked the 260 km long Shayok-DBO road construction.
    • That road construction probably triggered the PLA intrusion in early May sparking the current Galwan stand-off.
    • Towards the south at Pangong Tso, forces had physical scuffles over area-denial for patrolling at Sirijap on May 5-6 and on May 11.
    • The situation remains tense at Sirijap’s cliff spurs and also at the Tso, where troops are chasing each other in high-speed patrol boats.
    • Clearly, intrusions are part of China’s never-ending effort to push Indian troops westward of the Indus and Shyok rivers and reach the 1960 claimed line.

    Details of the disputed border in Ladakh

    • Out of the 857 sq km long border in Ladakh only 368 sq km is the International Border, and the rest of the 489 sq km is the LAC.
    • The two traditional disputed points included Trig Heights and Demchok.
    • At eight points, the two sides have differing perceptions.
    • But lately, China has raised two fresh dispute points at Pangong Tso 83 sq km and at Chumur where it claims 80 sq km.
    • The old dispute sites were at the end point of Pangong Tso and at Chushul — the 1962 battle-site.

    Three-pronged strategy

    • 1) The Sirijap range on the northern bank of the lake remains most contested, from which several cliff spurs jut out — the “finger series” 1 to 8.
    • India’s LAC claim line is at Finger-8, but the actual position is only up to Finger-4.
    • The Chinese are asserting further west to claim 83 sq km here.
    • The PLA has built a 4.5 km long road to prevent patrolling by Indian troops.
    • The PLA’s road network from here extends to Huangyangtan base located near National Highway G219.
    • 2) Further south in Demchok, China claims some 150 sq km.
    • The PLA has built massive infrastructure on its side, moved armoured troops into Charding Nalla since 2009.
    • Tibetan nomads pitch tents on Hemis Monastery’s land throughout 2018-2019.
    • 3)In Chumur, China claims 80 sq km and probably wants a straight border from PT-4925 to PT-5318 to bring Tible Mane (stupa) area under its control.
    • For India, holding of Chumur is critical for the safety of the Manali-Leh route.
    • PLA demanded removal of India’s fortified positions in Burtse (2013) and Demchok and Chumur (2014) for its retreat.

    What could be the implications for India?

    • Overall, the pattern shows the PLA’s desperate design to snatch the lake at Lukung through a three-pronged strategy of attacking from Sirijap in the north, Chuchul in the south and through the lake water from middle.
    • This is the key chokepoint from where the Chinese can cut off Indian access to the entire flank of Chip Chap plains, Aksai Chin in the east and Shayok Valley to the north.
    •  Which means that Indian control is pushed to the west of the Shyok river and south of the Indus river, forcing India to accept both rivers as natural boundaries.
    • And once China gets control of the southern side of the Karakoram it can easily approach Siachen Glacier from the Depsang corridor.
    • And meet at Tashkurgan junction from where the CPEC crosses into Gilgit-Baltistan.
    • That would be disastrous for Indian defence, leaving the strategic Nubra vulnerable, possibly impacting even India’s hold over Siachen.
    • China’s access to Changla-pass through Lukung and Tangtse would threaten the entire Indus Valley.
    • It is quite possible that China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok, Galwan and Chang-Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin and its Ali region.

    Consider the question “What could be the strategic and security implications of China’s claim in Pangong Tso region for India?”

    Conclusion

    India should resist the Chinese design which could have disastrous consequences for India’s defence and strategic interests. This should involve diplomatic channels rather than skirmishes on the borders.

  • Looking beyond Taliban: Focus on the Pashtun Question

    The US-Taliban peace deal signals growing heft of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent population of Afghanistan and the Taliban is essentially a Pashtun formation. Also,  remember Pakistan: just like the kid who is always up to something. The ethnic fragmentation and Pakistan’s meddling is a recipe for perpetual conflict zone in the region.

    The question of India’s engagement with Taliban

    • Taliban’s effective control of territory in Afghanistan expanded in recent years.
    • This led to the question of India’s direct dialogue with the Taliban gain some relevance.
    • It has acquired some immediacy after the US announced plans for a significant draw down of its forces from Afghanistan and signed a peace deal with the Taliban earlier this year.
    • Also, recently the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, called on India to open a political conversation with the Taliban.
    • The interest was further amplified by a signal from the Taliban that it is eager for a productive relationship with India.

    So, what should India do?

    • Those calling for direct engagement with the Taliban say that Delhi can’t ignore such an important force in Afghan politics.
    • Opponents say there is no reason for Delhi to join the international stampede to embrace the Taliban.
    • If and when the Taliban becomes a peaceful entity and joins the quest for a political settlement with Kabul, they argue, Delhi should have no objection to direct talks.
    • So, opening a dialogue with the Taliban is a tactical issue focused on when, how and on what terms.

    Pashtun question and India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan

    • The Taliban remains an important sub-set of the larger and more strategic Pashtun question.
    • The Pashtun question holds the key to India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan: Promoting a peaceful, independent and a sovereign Afghanistan that is not a subaltern to the Pakistan army.

    2 Basic issues that will define the Pashtun question

    1. Forming unity among multiple ethnic groups

    • First is the problem of reconciling the interests of multiple ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent of the population.
    • The sizeable Afghan minorities include 27 per cent Tajiks, 9 per cent each of Hazaras and Uzbeks.
    • Irrespective of the nature of the regimes in Kabul over the last four decades— constructing a stable internal balance has been hard.
    • That problem will acquire a new intensity as the Taliban stakes claim for a dominant role in Kabul.

    But has the Taliban learnt to live in peace with the minorities?

    • The Taliban, an essentially Pashtun formation, had brutally crushed the minorities during its brief rule in the late 1990s.
    • There are some indications that the Taliban is now reaching out to the minorities but it is some distance away from winning their trust.

    2. Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan

    • The problem of constructing internal balance in Afghanistan has been complicated by Pakistan’s meddling.
    • Pakistan would like to have the kind of hegemony that the British Raj exercised over Afghanistan.
    • Neither can Pakistan replicate that dominance nor are the Afghans willing concede it to the Pakistan army.

    What about the Pashtun minority in Pakistan?

    • There are more than twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtun population is estimated to be around 15 million in Afghanistan and 35 million in Pakistan.
    • And as mentioned above, the Taliban is essentially Pashtun formation.
    • Although Pashtun separatism has long ceased to be a force in Pakistan, Islamabad finds the Pashtun question re-emerge in a different form.
    • Pakistan can’t really bet that the Taliban will not put Pashtun nationalism above the interests of the Pakistani state.
    • The Taliban, for example, has never endorsed the Durand Line as the legitimate border with Pakistan.
    • It is by no means clear if Pakistan’s construction of the Taliban as a conservative religious force has obliterated the group’s ethnic character.
    • Sufferings of Pakistani Pashtun People: Islamabad’s quest for control over Afghanistan over the last four decades has heaped extraordinary suffering on the Pashtun people on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line.
    • As the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement seeks a peaceful redressal of its demands for basic human rights, Pakistan has unleashed massive repression.

    India’s importance in Afghanistan

    • That the Taliban wants to talk to India and Pakistan brands Pashtun leaders as Indian agents only underlines Delhi’s enduring salience in Afghanistan.

    Consider the question “After the US-Taliban peace deal, India is forced with a difficult prospect of opening the dialogue with the Taliban. Examine the implications of the return of Taliban in Afghanistan for India. What is your opinion on India starting the dialogue with Afghanistan?”

    Conclusion

    Pakistan’s expansive military and political investments in Afghanistan have not really resolved Islamabad’s security challenges on its western frontier. If an Afghan triumph eludes Pakistan, Delhi can’t escape the complex geopolitics of the Pashtun lands.

  • India Nepal Border issue: Colonial legacy or the Dragon’s Power Play

    India – Nepal relations are having its “see saw swing” moment. At one end, lies the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship, close people to people relations and India’s aid during 2015 earthquake. But on the other end lies the economic blockade and Madhesi protest. Another entry to the later side is the Border issue.

    • The inauguration of road from Dharchula to Lipu Lekh was done with great fanfare, at least on the Indian side.
    • The metalled road is a BIG relief for pilgrims and traders on the traditional route for the Kailash-Mansarovar yatra, who otherwise were stuck for days in the arduous walk.

    So, where is the issue?

    The issue lies in Nepal’s charge claiming that the stretch passes though Nepalese territory. This was displayed by some politicized moves like-

    • Intemperate remarks by Nepal’s PM in the Nepalese Parliament.
    • Manner (airdropped to the location by helicopters) and timing(why now?) of the Deployment of armed police at Chharung, close to Kalapani, in its Sudoor Paschim.
    • Finally, Nepalese government has raised the stakes further by authorizing a new map extending its territory across an area sensitive for India’s defence.

    The very beginning: The Sugauli Treaty

    • Before the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli, the Nepalese kingdom stretched from the Sutlej river in the west to the Teesta river in the East.
    • Nepal lost the Anglo-Nepalese War and with the signing of Sugauli Treaty was brought down to its present territories.

    The Sugauli Treaty stated that “[t]he Rajah of Nipal [Nepal] hereby cedes to the Honourable [the] East India Company in perpetuity all the under-mentioned territories”, including “the whole of the lowlands between the Rivers Kali and Rapti.” It elaborated further that “[t]he Rajah of Nipal [Nepal] renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claim to or connection with the countries lying to the west of the River Kali and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants there of.”

    • The present controversy arose with Nepalese contest that the tributary that joins the Mahakali river at Kalapani is not the Kali river. Nepal now contends that the Kali river lies further west to the Lipu Lekh pass.
    • But here’s the catch!
    • The British used the Lipu Lekh pass for trade with Tibet and China.
    • Even Survey of India maps since the 1870s shows the area of Lipu Lekh down to Kalapani as part of British India.
    • Even though the areas of Nepalgunj and Kapilvastu were restituted to Nepal as a reward for the military help rendered by Jung Bahadur Rana in quelling the 1857 uprising. The British did not return any part of Garhwal or Kumaon, including the Kalapani area, to Nepal.
    • Infact, both the Rana rulers of Nepal and the Nepalese Kings accepted the boundary and did not raise any objection with the government of India after India’s Independence.
    • True that India did not existed in 1816 when the Treaty of Sugauli was concluded.
    • But many borders of the world and India are colonial legacy, which we have to work out.

    The path to peace

    • The Nepal-India Technical Level Joint Boundary Working Group was set up in 1981 to resolve boundary issues, to demarcate the international border, and to manage boundary pillars.
    • By 2007, the group completed the preparation of 182 strip maps, signed by the surveyors of the two sides, covering almost 98% of the boundary, all except the two disputed areas of Kalapani and Susta.
    • Not able to solve the border issues in these disputed areas has left us hanging.

    India has successfully resolved far more intractable border issues with Bangladesh.

    • The land boundary settlement required an exchange of territories, including the transfer of population, and a constitutional amendment to give effect to the 1974 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement.
    • The maritime boundary issue with Bangladesh involved going to the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration. Despite knowing well that if the Court applied the principle of equity, India would lose up to four-fifths of the disputed area. India lost but the government of India accepted the ruling.
    • Compared to what was accomplished between India and Bangladesh, the India-Nepal border issues appear more easily solvable.

    Respecting out Ties

    • India Nepal ties are unique.
    • Historical link between the nations.
    • Spirit of maintaining India’s close and friendly bilateral relations with Nepal.
    • The people-to-people relationship between India and Nepal is unmatched.

    What lies ahead?

    • This matter can be best handled bilaterally, through quiet diplomacy.
    • The Official Spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, Anurag Srivastava, has said recently that India and Nepal have an established mechanism to deal with all boundary matters.
    • He has affirmed that India is committed to resolving outstanding boundary issues through diplomatic dialogue.
    • The remaining issues concerning the boundary i.e Kalapani and Susta are not difficult to resolve unless they are caught up in domestic or international concerns.
    • The next steps should be approval of the strip maps by the respective governments (that of the Nepalese Government is still awaited), the resolution of the differences of opinion over Kalapani and Susta, and speeding up the erection of damaged or missing border pillars.

    Consider the question “India-Nepal ties are unique. Both countries have many things in common. Yet, recent developments over the border dispute threaten to snap these ties. Examine the border issue between the two countries. What is India’s stand on the issue? Suggest ways to resolve the issue.”

    Conclusion

    The more the trouble festers, those who stand to gain by deteriorating India-Nepal relations will benefit. There is need for the two countries to lower the temperature and defuse the issue. They must invest time and effort to find a solution. Raking up public controversy can only be counterproductive to the relationship.

  • [pib] New ports and routes added under the Protocol on Inland Water Transit between India and Bangladesh

    India and Bangladesh have opened a new chapter in regional connectivity by expanding the scope of inland water transport mechanism that would enable to boost trade in the region.

    Note all the ports mentioned in the newscard and the image. Also, keep a tab on river systems of North east India.

    What is the news?

    • The Standing Committee on the Protocol and the Shipping Secretary level Talks are the institutional arrangements to discuss and make the Protocol more effective.
    • During the latest discussions key decisions were taken on the extension of protocol routes, the inclusion of new routes and declaration of new Ports of Call to facilitate trade between the two countries.

    New routes

    The number of Indo Bangladesh Protocol (IBP) routes is being increased from 8 to 10 and new locations are also added to the existing routes: –

    1) Inclusion of Sonamura- Daudkhandi stretch of Gumti river (93 Km) as IBP route:

    • It will improve the connectivity of Tripura and adjoining States with Indian and Bangladesh`s economic centres and will help the hinterland of both the countries.

    2) Rajshahi-Dhulian-Rajshahi Routes and its extension up to Aricha (270 km)

    • It will help the augmentation of infrastructure in Bangladesh as it would reduce the transportation cost of stone chips/aggregate to northern part of Bangladesh through this route. It will also decongest the Land Custom Stations on both sides.

    Ports of Call

    • Port of call means an intermediate stop for a ship on its scheduled journey for cargo operation or taking on supplies or fuel.
    • The following are existing Ports of Call in the two countries on Indo-Bangladesh Protocol (IBP) route:
    India Kolkata Haldia Pandu Karimganj Silghat Dhubri
    Bangladesh Narayanganj Khulna Mongla Sirajganj Ashuganj Pangaon
    • Newly added: Two more extended Ports of Call have been added
    • Inclusion of Jogigopha in India and Bahadurabad in Bangladesh as new Port of Call will provide connectivity to Meghalaya, Assam and Bhutan.

    About the Protocol on Inland Water Transit

    • Bangladesh and India have a long-standing and time-tested Protocol on Transit and Trade through inland waterways of both countries.
    • This Protocol, which was first signed in 1972 (immediately after independence of Bangladesh), is a reflection of shared history and friendship between the two countries.
    • It was last renewed in 2015 for five years with a provision for its automatic renewal for a further period of five years giving long term assurance to various stakeholders.

  • Tracking Chinese diplomacy

    We are no stranger to the assertive nature of China in geopolitics. But had it always been the same? This article captures the transformation of the nature of Chinese diplomacy. Two personalities that had a profound impact on the nature of the diplomacy of that country are Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. Each of them imparted special characteristic to diplomacy. Now, that all seems lost from present China. Read the article to know about the contribution of two personalities and trends in Chinese diplomacy now.

    Zhou Enlai: Preference for Persuasion and compromise

    “All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.” – Zhou Enlai

    • If Mao Zedong represented the crude face of Chinese communism, then Zhou was the epitome of its refinement.
    • Zhou preferred to seduce his opponents through word and gesture in the pursuit of national self-interest.
    • Force was used rarely, and only when all other means of persuasion failed.
    • So, amid Korean War in 1950, when the U.S. Army crossed into North Korea, Zhou Enlai delivered message against crossing 38th Parallel through Indian Ambassador, instead publicly declaring this.
    • He chose to give diplomacy a chance.

    Role in First Indochina War

    • In 1954, the Chinese made their entry onto the world stage in Geneva.
    • The Vietnamese were winning against the French in the First Indochina War.
    • And the Americans were preparing to intervene fearing that another “domino” would fall to communism.
    • China’s self-interest lay in ending this war while denying the U.S. a foothold in its backyard.
    • Zhou’s strategy was to undermine western unity.
    • His watchwords were persuasion and compromise.
    • He even gave “face” to the French who had just lost to the Vietnamese in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, by travelling the “extra mile” to meet Prime Minister of France to secure the peace.

    Low profile at Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung

    • In 1955, at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Zhou used the same tactics to pursue another objective: Developing relations with leaders of the Afro-Asian countries.
    • He deliberately kept a low profile, allowing Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesian President Sukarno to take the lead.
    • His tactic, he reported to Mao, was “not to be involved in provocative or disruptive debate”.
    • His guidance to his team was to “strive to expand the united front of the world peace force.“
    • He also instructed the team to create conditions for establishing diplomatic work or diplomatic relations between China and a number of Afro-Asian countries.

    So, how Zhou shaped China’s foreign policy?

    • Zhou’s style of diplomacy came to define Chinese foreign policy over the next half-century.
    • The strategy was consistent: avoid isolation, build solidarity with non-aligned countries, divide the West.
    • The tactics were called ‘united front’ — isolate the main threat by building unity with all other forces.
    • Under Zhou, diplomats of calibre kept handled the task of diplomacy with skill and held firm even in storms like the Cultural Revolution.
    • When the tide rose, these diplomatic fishermen gathered the fish — expanding China’s global presence and gaining international acceptability.
    • When it ebbed, they saw to it that the ship remained firmly moored.
    • They navigated the Cold War, playing the Soviets against the Americans.
    • To relieve pressure, Zhou opened border talks with the Soviets and channels to the U.S.
    • Public animosity did not deter him from turning on the full extent of his diplomatic skills on either Alexei Kosygin or Henry Kissinger.
    • In February 1972, he persuaded U.S. President Richard Nixon to abandon Taiwan.
    • It was a staggering act of diplomacy.

    Deng Xiaoping: hide our capacities and bide our time

    “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

    • In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping took up the reins.
    • Deng supplemented Zhou’s strategy with a “24-Character Strategy” of his own(the above quote).

    Character of Chinese diplomacy in Deng Xiaoping’s time

    • “24-Character Strategy” became the ‘mantra’ of Chinese diplomacy.
    • Chinese diplomats measured their words and kept their dignity.
    • They projected power but rarely used more words than needed.
    • They were masters of their brief because Zhou had taught them that the real advantage in negotiations was to know more than the other side.
    • They flattered acquaintances, calling them “old friends”.
    • They built relationships by making it a point to engage the less friendly interlocutors with greater courtesies than friends.
    • Behind closed doors, they were tireless in reducing opposition through negotiation.
    • And skillfully in putting the onus of responsibility for failure on the other party.
    • And occasionally, they would hold out a veiled threat with a look of concern rather like an uncle anxious to save you from embarrassment.
    • But they rarely offended.

    Tumultuous period of 1980s and 1990s and entry into WTO

    • The 1980s and 1990s were the peak for Chinese diplomacy.
    • The U.S. President George Bush and Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited China.
    • They normalised relations, settled borders and won hearts and minds through general financial help.
    • So effective was Chinese diplomacy that the Americans even broke their own sanctions imposed after the 1989 ‘Tiananmen Incident’, within a matter of four weeks.
    • A decade later, the U.S. and the European Union bought into Chinese assurances that it would soon transition to a market economy.
    • And helped steer China into the World Trade Organization.

    After Deng Xiaoping: Arrogance and threats in diplomacy

    • Deng died in 1997. China prospered just as Deng had imagined.
    • It began to occupy centre stage in world diplomacy, but the basics of Chines diplomacy started changing
    • A new generation of diplomats, with knowledge of the English language and a careerist mindset, has started to destroy the foundations set down by Zhou and Deng.
    • Arrogance has replaced humility.
    • Persuasion is quickly abandoned in favour of the stick when countries take actions contrary to Chinese wishes.
    • The Chinese pursue unilateralism instead of compromise in the South China Sea.
    • In place of ‘united front’ tactics, they are bent on creating irritations simultaneously with multiple China neighbouring countries.
    • Avenging the ‘Century of Humiliation’ that endured in the hands of western imperial powers from roughly 1839-1840 to 1949 is on their mind now.
    • To avenge that they adopt a one-size-fits-all approach.
    • But they forget that much of the world has done nothing to China and, indeed, shares a similar historical experience.
    • Statements of fact or reasoned opinion are seen by them as insult or humiliation.
    • Foreign governments are educated about their responsibilities in managing the media and the narrative, even as the Chinese manipulate the same media to serve their purposes.
    • They expect to receive gratitude for everything they do, including handling COVID-19, as if it was only done with the foreigner in mind.
    • The veneer of humility has thinned.
    • The reserves of goodwill are fast depleting. The ship seems to be adrift at sea.

    Questions related to China has been a recurrent theme in the UPSC papers. Consider the question asked in 2017  “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as a tool to develop potential military power status in Asia. In light of this statement discuss its impact on India and her neighbours.”

    Conclusion

    In the post-pandemic world, India and the rest of the world will have to reckon the role played by China in the pandemic. In such a changing scenario India will do well to take note of the changing trends of Chinese diplomacy.