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GS Paper: Indian Economy

  • Lottery, gambling, betting taxable under GST Act

    The Supreme Court has held that lottery, gambling and betting are taxable under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Act.

    Try this question from CSP 2018:

    Q.Consider the following items:

    1. Cereal grains hulled
    2. Chicken eggs cooked
    3. Fish processed and canned
    4. Newspapers containing advertising material

    Which of the above items is/are exempt under GST (Goods and Services Tax)?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1, 2 and 4 only

    (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4

    What did the court say?

    • A three-judge Bench led by Justice Ashok Bhushan said the levy of GST on lotteries does not amount to “hostile discrimination”.
    • The court held that lottery, betting and gambling are “actionable claims” and come within the definition of ‘goods’ under Section 2(52) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
    • Lottery, betting and gambling are well known concepts and have been in practice in this country since before Independence and were regulated and taxed by different legislations.

    Parliament to decide

    • The court said that the Parliament had an absolute power to go for an “inclusive definition” of the term ‘goods’ to include actionable claims like lottery, gambling and betting.
    • The court accepted the government’s stand that the Parliament has the competence to levy GST on lotteries under Article 246A (inserted after GST Act) of the Constitution.
    • The power to make laws as conferred by Article 246A fully empowers the Parliament to make laws with respect to GST and expansive definition of goods given in Section 2(52).

    Must read:

    Goods and Services Tax

  • Premature membership of RCEP would not serve Indian interests

    The article analyses government’s decision to stay out of RCEP and factors responsible for it.

    What India chose not to join RCEP

    • By joining RCEP, India would have further risked a flood of cheap Chinese imports in sectors like electronics.
    • India had tried and failed to win substantial concessions in areas like work visas for its information technology-enabled services.
    • Two of India’s proposals—an RCEP business travel card and an RCEP service supplier card—failed to find favour with a majority of the bloc’s members.

    Arguments in favour of India joining the RCEP

    •  First argument made is RCEP would have provided an excellent opportunity for Indian firms to get integrated with regional value chains.
    • However, merely joining a trade bloc does not automatically result in integration with global value chains.
    • The complex nature of global production networks requires a lot of economic and trade policy reforms on the domestic front.
    • Second important argument made is that India would lose an opportunity to access RCEP’s common market.
    • But this argument too doesn’t hold much water if Indian producers are not competitive.
    • Competitiveness is driven by factors both within and beyond the control of domestic industry.
    • So it would be an over-simplification to assume that Indian industry does not have the capability or appetite to be competitive.
    • Often, global competitiveness inside factory gates gets diluted by costs borne outside those gates.

    What past data suggests

    • India’s merchandise exports grew at an annual rate of more than 18% between 2000-01 and 2010-11, which was largely a pre-FTA period.
    • In this period, India activated only two FTAs—with Sri Lanka and Singapore.
    • India joined the FTAs in a big way from 2010 onwards.
    • It operationalized big trade agreements with the 10-nation Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, Korea, and separately with Malaysia.
    • However, despite these deals, India could realize annual merchandise export growth of only 2.5% between 2010-11 and 2019-20.
    • This disappointing performance shows that FTAs are not conducive for exports.

    Conclusion

    While RCEP may theoretically offer India new opportunities for exports and integration with pan-Asian production networks, we have a lot of work to do internally before we are in a position to make the most of free-trade deals.

  • Mistake in allowing industrial houses to own banks

    The article analyses the risks involved in allowing the corporate houses to own and operate the banks.

    Context

    • An internal working group of the RBI has recently made a recommendation to permit industrial houses to own and control banks.

    Encourage bank but not owned by banks

    • According to the report, the main benefit is that industry-owned banks would increase the supply of credit, which is low and growing slowly.
    • Credit constraints are indeed a real problem, and creating more banks is certainly one way of addressing the issue.
    • But this is an argument for encouraging more banks but it is not an argument for creating banks specifically owned by industry.
    • The other powerful way to promote more good quality credit is to undertake serious reforms of the public sector banks.

    Problems in allowing industrial houses in banking

    • The problem with banks owned by corporate houses is that they tend to engage in connected lending.
    • This can lead to three main adverse outcomes:

    1) Over-financing of risky activities

    • Lending to firms that are part of the corporate group allows them to undertake risky activities that are not easily financeable through regular channels.
    • Precisely because these activities are risky, they often do not work out.
    • And when that happens, it is typically taxpayers who end up footing the bill.
    • In principle, connected lending can be contained by the regulatory authority.
    • However, experiences in other nations show that regulating connected lending is impossible convincing most advanced countries that regulating connected lending is impossible.
    • Indonesia tried to regulate the practice: It banned the practice.
    • The only solution is to ban corporate-owned banks.
    • Regulation and supervision need to be strengthened considerably to deal with the current problems in the banking system before they are burdened with new regulatory tasks.

    2) Lack of exit

    • The economic landscape is littered with failed firms, kept alive on life support, making it impossible for more efficient firms to grow and replace them.
    • While some progress was initially made under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), this had stalled even before the pandemic, largely because existing promoters and owners mounted a stiff resistance.
    • If industrial houses get direct access to financial resources, their capacity to delay or prevent exit altogether will only increase.

    3) Increasing dominance

    • The Indian economy already suffers from over-concentration.
    • We not only have concentration within industries, but in some cases the dominance of a few industrial houses spans multiple sectors.
    • If large industrial houses get banking licences, they will become even more powerful, not just relative to other firms in one industry, but firms in another industry.

    Impact on regulator and government

    • The power acquired by getting banking licences will not just make them stronger than commercial rivals, but even relative to the regulators and government itself.
    • This will aggravate imbalances, leading to a vicious cycle of dominance breeding more dominance.

    Impact on quality of credit

    • Indian financial sector reforms have aimed at improving not just the quantity, but also the quality of credit.
    • The goal has been to ensure that credit flows to the most economically efficient users, since this is the key to securing rapid growth.
    • If India now starts granting banking licences to powerful, politically connected industrial houses we will effectively be abandoning that long-held objective.

    Impact on economy and democracy

    • Indian capitalism has suffered because of the murky two-way relationship between the state and industrial capital.
    • If the line between industrial and financial capital is erased, this stigma will only become worse.
    • Corporate houses that are already big will be enabled to become even bigger allowing them to dominate the economic and political landscape.
    • A rules-based, well-regulated market economy, as well as democracy itself — will be undermined, perhaps critically.

    Consider the question “What are the challenges and opportunities in allowing the industrial houses to own and operate the banks.”

    Conclusion

    The conclusion is clear. Mixing industry and finance will set us on a road full of dangers — for growth, public finances, and the future of the country itself.

  • NPCI caps UPI transactions on third-party apps at 30%

    The article deals with the recent NPCI decision to cap the number of transactions by third party application providers (TPAPs).

    Context

    • The National Payments Corp of India (NPCI), in its recent guidelines imposed a 30% volume-based cap on the share of transactions by TPAPs and payment service providers (PSPs), effective from January 2021.

     5 issues with the volume-based cap

    1) It undermines cashless economy

    • The growth and recognition of UPI would not have been possible had a cap been in place.
    • Typically, customers limit themselves to one or two TPAPs of their choice.
    • A transaction cap that forces users to use multiple apps may result in more transaction failures and dilute UPI’s popularity and impact.
    • Lack of accessibility and user-friendliness would push users away from UPI towards other payment methods, or even cash.

    2) It’s an anti-consumer decision

    • Open markets and user choice have been crucial factors in the exponential increase seen in UPI adoption and its transactions.
    • A volume-based cap would compel TPAPs to either limit the number of transactions on their platforms or stop enrolling new users, which in turn would restrict the customer’s use of UPI.
    • TPAPs will likely be forced to redact customer incentives like cashbacks, coupons and the like.
    • This could go against consumer interests by reducing choice.

    3) It will also make the Indian market less attractive for investors:

    • The cap would raise compliance and regulatory costs for players in the sector, which could deter new investors from entering.
    • It would also adversely affect the growth potential of existing UPI players.

    4) No regulatory impact assessment

    • The idea of a volume-based cap does not appear to have undergone an assessment of its impact on the sector.
    • As a general principle, before any such rule is imposed, an RIA (Regulatory Impact Assessment) needs to be undertaken.
    • Systemic risks are not restricted to UPI and are common in all financial systems; yet, a similar cap has not been suggested for, say, retail bank transactions.

    5) Impact on Atmanirbhar Bharat

    •  In order for Indian businesses to grow and compete at the global level, we need to integrate business processes with the global economy.
    • Indian start-ups, in particular, need tools and infrastructure that lets them gain an international edge.
    • Atmanirbhar Bharat envisions a self-reliant India that thrives on innovation, technology and entrepreneurship.
    • But this vision cannot be fulfilled if our policies restrain the growth of a cashless economy.

    Conclusion

    India’s UPI ecosystem is nascent, but has demonstrated significant growth and has had a positive impact on the economy by providing the backbone needed to move towards cashless commerce. Any policy decision by regulators at this point should aim at catalysing innovation in this space. Stifling it would serve India badly.

  • Allowing corporate houses in banking

    The article argues against the suggestion of allowing the corporate houses in the banking sector in India.

    Context

    • An Internal Working Group of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has recommended that corporate houses be given bank licences.

    Background of the idea

    • In February 2013, the RBI had issued guidelines that permitted corporate and industrial houses to apply for a banking licence.
    • No corporate was ultimately given a bank licence.
    • None of the applicants had met ‘fit and proper’ criteria.
    • In 2014, the RBI restored the long-standing prohibition on the entry of corporate houses into banking.
    • The RBI’s position on the subject has remained unchanged since 2014.

    Advantages

    • Corporate houses will bring capital and expertise to banking.
    • Moreover, not many jurisdictions worldwide bar corporate houses from banking.

    Risks involved

    • As the report notes, the main concerns are interconnected lending, concentration of economic power and exposure of the safety net provided to banks
    • Corporate houses can easily turn banks into a source of funds for their own businesses.
    • In addition, they can ensure that funds are directed to their cronies.
    • They can use banks to provide finance to customers and suppliers of their businesses.
    • Adding a bank to a corporate house thus means an increase in concentration of economic power.
    • Not least, banks owned by corporate houses will be exposed to the risks of the non-bank entities of the group.
    • If the non-bank entities get into trouble, sentiment about the bank owned by the corporate house is bound to be impacted.

    Suggestion by IWG and issues with them

    • The Internal Working Group (IWG) believes that before corporate houses are allowed to enter banking, the RBI must be equipped with a legal framework to deal with interconnected lending and a mechanism to effectively supervise conglomerates that venture into banking.
    • But there are following 4 issues with such suggestion-
    • 1) Tracing interconnected lending will be a challenge.
    • 2)The RBI can only react to interconnected lending ex-post, that is, after substantial exposure to the entities of the corporate house has happened.
    • It is unlikely to be able to prevent such exposure.
    • 3) Any action that the RBI may take in response could cause a flight of deposits from the bank concerned and precipitate its failure.
    • 4) Pitting the regulator against powerful corporate houses could end up damaging the regulator.

    Issues in allowing NBFC owning corporate house in banking

    • Under the present policy, NBFCs with a successful track record of 10 years are allowed to convert themselves into banks.
    • The Internal Working Group believes that NBFCs owned by corporate houses should be eligible for such conversion.
    • This promises to be an easier route for the entry of corporate houses into banking.
    • The Internal Working Group argues that corporate-owned NBFCs have been regulated for a while.
    • However, there is a world of difference between a corporate house owning an NBFC and one owning a bank.
    • Bank ownership provides access to a public safety net whereas NBFC ownership does not.
    • The reach and clout that bank ownership provides are vastly superior to that of an NBFC.
    • The objections that apply to a corporate house with no presence in bank-like activities are equally applicable to corporate houses that own NBFCs.

    Consider the question “What are the concerns and challenges in allowing the corporate houses in the banking sector in India?” 

    Conclusion

    India’s banking sector needs reform but corporate houses owning banks hardly qualifies as one. If the record of over-leveraging in the corporate world in recent years is anything to go by, the entry of corporate houses into banking is the road to perdition.

  • Sustaining India’s Growth Momentum

    The article highlights the factors that explain that India’s economic recovery is broad-based and sustainable in nature.

    Revising India’s GDP forecast

    • With major banks, investor advisory groups, and credit rating agencies revising their GDP forecasts for the next financial year while lowering estimates of economic contraction for this fiscal, surely the bounce back is well on track.
    • Some of the earlier assessments were too pessimistic and assumed a gradual pace of economic normalisation.
    • Thus, a reassessment was given but nevertheless welcome.

    Many continue to challenge conventional belief regarding India’s economic recovery being broad-based and sustainable in nature. It is important that we look at underlying data and relate it with steps undertaken by the government with the sole objective of reviving India’s economy.

    1) Employment figures

    •  Economic activity will see a faster revival than employment figures as labour markets tend to lag.
    • This is because most firms face costs associated with hiring and firing and they prefer to adjust the working hours before adjusting employment numbers.
    • Trends labour market does indicate prospects of a cyclical recovery which will lead to jobs being added at a faster pace than what was originally estimated.
    • Critically, the new scheme subsiding part of the EPFO contribution for the unskilled workers will benefit enormously which will then have spill-over effects.

    2) Normalisation driven by rural economy

    • The bulk of the normalisation of economic activity was driven by the rural economy which eventually benefited the rest of the economy.
    • Rural growth has gained momentum and definitely augurs well for the Indian economy as it gets one of the engines firing.
    • The strong push by the government towards financing construction of assets has a significant impact.

    3) Avoiding excessive and inefficient use of public funds

    • The design of the aid by the government is similar in terms of its size to programmes announced by other emerging markets.
    • However, the choice of instruments is along the lines those deployed by developed countries.
    • The government has refrained from excessive and inefficient use of public funds by restricting expenditures to temporary fiscal commitments.
    • This is important as our 2008 response had a lot of permanent fiscal expenditures which led to a systematic deterioration of our macroeconomic fundamentals.
    • The government has taken undertaken a sizable fiscal expansion combining automatic stabilizers, cash transfers, bank guarantees, expansion of expenditure under various programs such as MGNREGA, Food Security Act and Urban Affordable Housing Measures.
    • The fiscal component under each of these policies can be easily reversed making it possible for India to revert to its fiscal consolidation path a lot sooner.

    4) Structural reforms as a part of its economic response package

    • These reforms are geared at unshackling the productivity potential in areas such as APMCs,  labour markets, other reforms that allow for greater private role within the economy in critical areas such as coal, space technology etc.
    • These moves and their productivity gains will help India improve its potential growth rate.
    • This means that India should be better equipped at sustaining a high-growth rate of above 7 per cent due to the productivity gains that will be an outcome of the proposed reforms.
    • This will further help a faster reduction in fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP and our public debt to GDP figures.

    Conclusion

    Strong macroeconomic fundamentals are necessary for sustained economic growth and the government has focused on a response package which prioritises sustainability of growth rather than having a fast yet unsustainable economic recovery from the crisis.

  • Analysing India’s economic growth

    The article analyses India’s economic trajectory after independence and divides it into five phases. India’s progress is also compared with Pakistan’s as both countries have had much in common.

    What drives economic growth

    • Examining the experiences of different countries to analysing the growth may seem a promising approach.
    • However, generalising from specific experiences can be misleading since ground conditions vary hugely across countries.
    • There are two ways to avoid the pitfalls of generalising from specific cases.
    • 1) The first is to examine the same country over time to look for changes in outcomes at specific points in time.
    • 2) A second approach is to compare countries with shared history, culture and geography.
    • If there are stark differences in outcomes between them, then there may be some policy lessons to be drawn.

    The Indian subcontinent provides lessons from both approaches. The 73 years of post-Independence India has generated a lot of evidence across different political-economic regimes. This period has also provided us with the contrasting experiences of India and Pakistan, two countries that share history, geography and socio-cultural mores.

    5 phases of India’s economic progress in 73 years: first approach

    • 1) The first phase was the period 1950-65. This was the Nehruvian period of state-led industrialisation.
    • Starting in 1950 annual per person GDP growth averaged 2 per cent during this period.
    • This translated to aggregate annual GDP growth of around 4 per cent since the population was growing at close to 2 per cent.
    • 2) The second phase of post-Independence India was during 1965-84.
    • This period was an unmitigated economic disaster with negative per capita growth.
    • The phase was marked with increasing state control of the economy, nationalisation of industry, closing of the economy to trade and a systematic weakening of institutions.
    • 3) The third phase is 1984-91 when the government ushered in the first round of economic reforms by liberalising capital goods imports as well as starting industrial de-licensing.
    • These reforms were rewarded by a growth take-off. India’s annual per capita GDP growth averaged 3.1 per cent while aggregate GDP grew at 5.2 per cent during 1984-91.
    • 4) The period 1991-2004 is typically classified as the liberalisation phase.
    • The reform effort was reflected in the 4.9 per cent annual per capita GDP growth during 1991-2004.
    • 5) India embarked on a distinctive phase of faster growth post-2004 on the back of large investments in infrastructure.
    • Per person GDP growth in the period 2004-2015 averaged 7.7 per cent.
    • The corresponding aggregate GDP growth averaged 9 per cent.
    • This came at a cost, as a number of these infrastructure projects later caused problems in the banking sector on account of burgeoning NPAs, a problem that continues till today.

    Comparison with Pakistan

    • In 1950, Pakistan’s per person GDP was almost 50 per cent greater than India that year.
    • Due to political uncertainty, Pakistan stagnated throughout the 1950s while a politically stable India grew.
    • As a result, by 1960, India had almost caught up with Pakistan in per capita GDP terms.
    • Unfortunately, from 1964, India went into two decades of economic stagnation while Pakistan opened up to foreign capital.
    • By 1984, Pakistan’s per capita income was more than double that of India’s.
    • Pakistan’s slowdown began in the 1980s.
    • This period coincided with the reforms in India.
    • Nevertheless, it wasn’t till as recently as 2010 that India’s per capita GDP finally overtook Pakistan.

    4 takeaways

    •  First, openness to trade and private enterprise usually has positive effects on growth.
    • Second, rapacious and exploitative democratic systems do not necessarily promote growth. Pakistan in the 1950s, 1990 and post-2010 is a good example.
    • Third, the socio-economic environment surrounding religious fundamentalism may be inimical to growth.
    • Fourth, degradation of institutions that regulate, arbitrate and enforce laws can be costly.

    Conclusion

    India’s growth when analysed from both the perspective offers valuable lessons for India and these lessons must guide India’s future economic trajectory.

  • India’s no to RCEP could still be a no

    The article examines the significance of the RCEP and India’s concerns over its provision. 

    Significance of RCEP

    • Last week, 15 East Asian countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest free trade agreement (FTA) ever.
    • In 2019, RCEP members accounted for about 30% of world output.
    • More importantly, about 44% of their total trade was intra-RCEP, which is a major incentive for the members of this agreement.
    • The deal could contribute to the strengthening of the regional value chains.

    Comparing RCEP with Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

    • The TPP included several regulatory issues including labour and environmental standards and “anti-corruption”.
    • All of these issues could raise regulatory barriers and severely impede trade flows.
    • In contrast, RCEP includes traditional market access issues, following the template provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
    • RCEP also includes issues like electronic commerce, investment facilitation that are currently being discussed by WTO members to “reform the multilateral trading system”.

    Would RCEP be able to realise trade and investment liberalisation?

    • In case of trade in goods, RCEP members have taken big strides towards lowering their tariffs.
    • However, commitments made by RCEP members for services trade liberalisation do look shallow in terms of the coverage of the sectors.
    • Movement of natural persons, an area in which India had had considerable interest, is considerably restricted.
    • The areas of investment and electronic commerce, in both of which India had expressed its reservations on the template adopted during RCEP negotiations, the outcomes are varied.
    • The text on investment rules shows that it is a work-in-progress.
    • The rules on dispute settlement procedures are yet to be written in.

    Will India’s concerns get addressed in near future?

    • The answer seems to be unambiguously in the negative on two counts.
    • 1) Two of the concerns India had raised, namely,  the deep cuts in tariffs on imports from China, and provisions relating to the investment chapter, have become even more significant over the past several months.
    • 2) India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan is primarily focused on strengthening domestic value chains, while RCEP, like any other FTA is solely focused on promoting regional value chains.

    Consider the question “What were India’s concerns about RCEP that resulted in India not signing it? ” 

    Conclusion

    This suggests that the prospects of India joining the RCEP in the near future appears bleak.

  • The MSME sector holds the key to an Indian economic recovery

    The article highlights the importance of MSMEs for the economy and issues faced by the sector.

    Context

    • The economy may have recovered from the trough of April but is yet to show signs of a sustained recovery on an annual basis.
    • The number of establishments registered with the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation declined by more than 30,800 in October, compared to September.

    Incentives for MSMEs

    • The above-cited numbers are indicator of the vulnerability of the employment situation, but also as a performance indicator of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).
    • The MSME sector is vital for employment generation, as also for an economic recovery to sustain.
    • Under Atmanirbhar Rozgar Yojana the government will bear the entire provident fund contributions for two years of all new employees hired.
    • However, similar announcements earlier failed to enthuse the MSME sector.
    • Along with the employment incentive, the MSME sector has also been provided collateral free credit.
    • But the offtake from the scheme has not been impressive, pointing to deeper issues.

    Why the incentives failed

    • Part of the reason these incentives failed lies in the very nature of the MSME sector and its heterogeneity, which is inherent in its definition as a residual sector once large enterprises are excluded.
    • A 2015-16 survey of the National Statistical Office shows that almost 94% of these enterprises are tiny, with less than four workers.
    • Only 31% are registered under various acts, but these face regulatory hurdles, some of them related to compliance with the goods and service tax (GST).

    Problems faced by MSMEs

    • In 2015-16 survey of the National Statistical Office two most important problems mentioned were a lack of demand and unpaid dues.
    • On both, the situation after 2015-16 has worsened, with the economy slowing down and the government responsible for the largest unpaid dues.
    • With the finances of state governments also strained due to pandemic, the fiscal situation has added to the problem of unpaid dues.
    • The sector is also affected by the political economy of state intervention, which seems biased in favour of large corporations.
    • Unlike the ₹1.5 trillion tax bonanza that large companies received as part of a pre-pandemic stimulus, there was no such bounty for the MSME sector.
    • With most state governments relaxing labour regulations for large companies, even the low-wage advantage that this sector enjoyed has got diminished.
    • Policy changes have not only reduced the compliance burden of labour laws, but have also helped large enterprises reduce wage costs.
    • Consequently, the MSME sector has to now compete with a corporate sector that has easy access to capital, cheap and unregulated labour and a lower tax burden than before.

    Way forward

    • Apart from the fiscal stimulus, the sector requires a political-economy approach that prioritizes MSME interests.
    • India needs to ease the regulatory burden of small units and aid their survival through fiscal support.
    • Above all, they need a level-playing field vis-à-vis big businesses.

    Consider the question “Despite several incentives by the government MSME sector fails to play the role expected of it. What are the issues faced by the sector and suggest the measure to deal with the issues.” 

    Conclusion

    Given the important role played by the sector in the economy, issues faced by it must be addressed on ani urgent basis to revive the economy battered by the pandemic.

  • Faultlines in India’s economic liberalism

    The article counters the argument made by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar about the impact of economic liberalisation on India’s economy.

    Impact of liberalism on India

    • India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently disapproved of free trade and globalisation.
    • About FTA’s he said that “the effect of past trade agreements has been to de-industrialise some sectors.”
    • These observations were made days after countries of the Asia-Pacific region signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement.
    • He said that , “in the name of openness, we have allowed subsidi[s]ed products and unfair production advantages from abroad to prevail”

    Flaws in the argument

    •  There are several flaws in Mr. Jaishankar’s arguments.

    1) India cannot be the part of global value chain

    • India is now truly at the margins of the regional and global economy.
    • With trade multilateralism at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) remaining sluggish, FTAs are the gateways for international trade.
    • By not being part of any major FTA, India cannot be part of the global value chains.
    • India’s competitors such as the East Asian nations, by virtue of they being part of mega-FTAs, are in an advantageous position to be part of global value chains and attract foreign investment.

    2) Indian economy has bee relatively closed economy

    • India is surely a much more open economy than it was three decades ago, globally, India continues to remain relatively closed when compared to other major economies.
    • According to the WTO, India’s applied most favoured nation import tariffs are 13.8%, which is the highest for any major economy.
    • Likewise, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, on the import restrictiveness index, India figures in the ‘very restrictive’ category.
    • From 1995-2019, India has initiated anti-dumping measures 972 times (the highest in the world) trying to protect domestic industry.

    3) Economic survey accepts the benefits of FTAs

    • The External Affairs Minister is contradicting government’s economic survey presented earlier this year.
    • The survey concluded that India has benefitted overall from FTAs signed so far.
    • Blaming FTAs for deindustrialisation means ignoring real problem of the Indian industry — which is the lack of competitiveness and absence of structural reforms.

    4) India has been a major beneficiary of economic globalisation

    • It cannot be ignored that India has been one of the major beneficiaries of economic globalisation — a fact attested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
    • Post-1991, the Indian economy grew at a faster pace, ushering in an era of economic prosperity.
    • According to the economist Arvind Panagariya, poverty in rural and urban India, which stood at close to 40% in 2004-05, almost halved to about 20% by 2011-12.
    • This was due to India clocking an average economic growth rate of almost 8%.

    Conclusion

    Desire to make India a global destination for foreign investment is a pipe dream because it is naive to expect foreign investors to be gung-ho about investing in India if trade protectionism is the government’s official policy.