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GS Paper: GS3-20.Linkages between Development and Spread of Extremism.

  • What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.

    The N-E region comprising eight states and connected to the Indian mainland by a small Silghuri Corridor (Chicken Neck – 23 km width) has been facing the problems of insurgency for over 5 decades.

    Major challenges to internal security and peace process in North-Eastern states

    Cross-Border Dynamics– Porous Indo-Myanmar borders enable arms, insurgent movement, and illegal trade.

    “Tyranny of distance” – Policy attention from New Delhi remains inadequate due to geographic remoteness and low political representation of the region.

    Ethnic divisions – Eg- deepening Meitei-Kuki-Zo divide post-2023 riots in Manipur

    Weak peace processes – Talks with 30+ insurgent groups in Manipur and Nagaland continue without breakthroughs

    Protracted insurgencies and splintering of groups reduce prospects for a single comprehensive settlement. Eg- NSCN splits (IM/NK/R).

    Poor governance and developmental deficit sustain grievance and provide recruitment ground.

    Drug trafficking, illegal timber/mineral extraction and extortion fund insurgents and fuel local conflict. Eg- proximity to Golden Traingle

    Demographic stress – Large-scale illegal Bangladesh-origin immigration create social tensions and political mistrust. Eg- in Assam

    High Violence– In 2024, NE India experienced 266 insurgency-related incidents, causing 258 deaths and displacing 60,000 people.

    External factors

    China – Territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh and support to insurgent groups

    Bangladesh – Anti-India shift post coup and growing Pakistan-China influence

    Myanmar – destabilised border post ‘Spring Revolution’

    Map of major peace accords

    2015 – Naga Framework Agreement for an “inclusive political solution” within the Indian Union (framework terms still being negotiated).

    2019 – Tripura NLFT (SD) Memorandum of Settlement – surrender of cadres and rehabilitation package to end insurgency.

    2020 – Bru-Reang Agreement (Tripura-Mizoram) – Repatriation and rehabilitation of Bru refugees with security and development assurances.

    2020 – Bodo Peace Accord (Phase-II) – Expansion of Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) powers, and development funds.

    2021 – Karbi Anglong Agreement (Assam)

    2022 – Assam-Meghalaya Boundary Agreement – land demarcation to resolve long-standing boundary disputes.

    2022 – Adivasi (Assam) Peace Accord (2022) – Settlement package including rehabilitation and development measures.

    2023 – Dimasa accords – Ceasefire, surrender/rehab and local development commitments.

    2023 – ULFA Accord – bringing a major faction of ULFA into a political process in Assam

    2024 – NLFT and ATTF Agreements (Tripura) – Memoranda of Settlement leading to cadre surrender and integration

    Other supporting measures (2015-2024) –

    Extension of ceasefires with various Naga factions, multiple SoO (Suspension of Operations) agreements, and targeted MoUs with smaller groups

    AFSPA withdrawal from Tripura and MEghalaya

    Peace in the North-East requires a multipronged approach involving negotiated settlements backed by credible security, sustained development, rights protection and wide stakeholder inclusion

    Terrorism

  • The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    Determinants of Left-Wing Extremism in Eastern India

    Maoist ideology of armed class struggle

    Land Displacement due to Mining

    Poor implementation of FRA, 2006, and PESA.

    Historical Socio-Economic Deprivation

    Unemployment & Lack of Livelihood Options

    Governance Deficit

    Geographical challenges

    Impact on people

    Over 14,000 lives were lost to Naxal violence in the last 20 years

    Infrastructure Destruction– targeting road networks, railways, and telecom towers in the “Red Corridor”.

    Extortion and “Levy”

    Human Rights Violations – Eg- abduction and killing of local leaders

    Low-growth trap increases inequality and poverty. Eg- The HDI for Malkangiri district (Odisha) – a LWE stronghold – is only 0.37, compared to the state’s average of 0.579.

    Socio-economic impact – Eg- As per MHA report, 70% population of naxal affected areas lives under BPL.

    Recruitment of Minors and Vulnerable Youth – Eg- Reports of child soldiers in southern Bastar.

    Measures taken by government

    Security Measures

    Specialised Forces- Eg- Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh and the Bastariya Battalion in Chhattisgarh

    Naxal’s Financial chocking

    Security Related Expenditure and Special Infrastructure Scheme for strengthening State Special Forces and Special Intelligence Branches

    Developmental measures

    Building Critical Infrastructure in LWE Areas – Eg- Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I) constructing 14000 km of roads

    Socio-economic development

    Financial Inclusion- over 1,00 bank branches have been opened in LWE affected districts since April 2015.

    Aspirational districts program

    ROSHNI Scheme for skill development and employment-linked training for youth

    Surrender and rehabilitation policy – attractive incentives and assured livelihood. Eg- stipend for professional training

    Panchayat Extension To Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) and Forest Rights Act 2006 for strengthening tribal self-governance

    Progress anchored in justice and inclusion is the best antidote to extremism.

  • [23rd April 2026] The Hindu OpED: India’s post-LWE future, from red sun to new dawn

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2022] Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.Linkage: The article reflects the shift from security-centric suppression to governance-led, multi-layered strategy, directly aligning with the PYQ’s demand. It highlights that post-LWE success now depends on inclusive development, state legitimacy, and trust-building, which form the core of a holistic strategy.

    Mentor’s Comment

    India’s declaration in March 2026 that it is free of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) marks a historic shift from decades of insurgency. This comes in the news especially after the 2010 Dantewada attack (76 CRPF personnel killed) which symbolized peak violence. This is significant as it represents a transition from a security-centric approach to governance-led transformation, highlighting that while insurgency has declined, the deeper challenge of state legitimacy, inclusive development, and trust-building in affected regions still remains unresolved.

    How did India transition from peak insurgency to near elimination of LWE?

    India’s transition from peak insurgency (2010) to the current phase of near elimination was driven by a multi-pronged National Policy and Action Plan (2015). This strategy integrated aggressive security operations with massive infrastructure and developmental pushes, reducing Left Wing Extremism (LWE) violence by over 80% since 2010. 

    1. Security consolidation: Ensures coordinated operations between Centre and States, reducing insurgent capacity; example: decline post-2010 Dantewada attack phase.
      1. Integrated Strategy: The government replaced scattered efforts with the SAMADHAN doctrine (2017), focusing on Smart leadership, Aggressive strategy, and Actionable intelligence.
      2. Expanded Infrastructure: Over the last decade, the number of Fortified Police Stations increased from 66 to 656. Since 2019 alone, 280 new security camps have been established to fill the security vacuum in core areas.
      3. Financial Choking: Dedicated verticals in the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) have systematically dismantled Maoist funding networks, seizing assets worth over ₹90 crore.
    2. Political consensus and State capacity : Strengthens bipartisan support and sustained strategy across governments.
      1. Capacity Building: Through the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, the Centre released ₹3,331 crore over the last 11 years, a 155% increase from the previous decade, to empower state police forces. 
    3. Institutional focus: Promotes joint strategic and operational planning, ensuring continuity of efforts.
      1. Infrastructure Push: Since 2014, over 12,000 km of roads were constructed in LWE areas to break geographical isolation.
      2. Saturation of Welfare: Programs like the Aspirational Districts Programme and the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan target 100% implementation of government schemes in tribal areas. 
    4. Governance intervention: Facilitates district-level developmental programs under Integrated Action Plan.
      1. Lucrative Surrender Policies: High-rank cadres now receive immediate grants of ₹5 lakh, while all surrenderees receive a monthly stipend of ₹10,000 for vocational training. Over 8,000 Naxalites have abandoned violence in the last 10 years.

    Why is the post-LWE phase more complex than the insurgency phase?

    The post-LWE (Left Wing Extremism) phase is more complex because it shifts from a clear-cut military battle to a nuanced “inclusion-led” transformation. While security forces can clear a territory, building lasting peace requires addressing deep-seated psychological and structural fractures. 

    1. Legitimacy deficit: Weakens state credibility due to historical governance gaps; example: fear-driven environments and alienation.
      1. The Trust Gap: Restoring the State’s credibility is harder than neutralizing insurgents.
      2. Parallel Governance Legacy: Maoists established parallel administrative structures; the vacuum left behind must be filled by functional, local, and accountable governance rather than just police presence
    2. Development paradox (The resource curse): LWE areas often hold India’s richest mineral deposits (iron ore, bauxite, coal) but rank lowest in human development. It sustains underdevelopment despite resource richness (resource curse).
    3. Psychological scars: The “final mile” of the LWE journey is as much psychological as administrative.
      1. Intergenerational Trauma: Entire generations have grown up normalized to “gunfire and encounters,” leading to a deep loss of self-confidence and belonging within the tribal population.
      2. Social Stigma: Surrendered cadres often face dual threats, retribution from former Maoist colleagues and social bias or suspicion from the local community and security agencies
    4. Invisible citizens: While tribal populations are formally included in the Constitution, they are often excluded from its actual benefits.
      1. Dilution of Rights: Acts like the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) and the Forest Rights Act are frequently bypassed for industrial projects, weakening tribal rights over “Jal, Jangal, Jameen” (Water, Forest, Land).
      2. The Digital Divide: As government services move online, the lack of digital access in remote tribal belts risks creating a new form of “digital exclusion”

    What structural economic transformation is required in LWE regions?

    1. Local value creation: Strengthens forest produce processing and agroforestry; example: Jungle Mahal, Saranda, Bastar models.
    2. Livelihood diversification: Supports MSMEs and community enterprises for employment generation.
    3. Community ownership: Restores control over commons to tribal communities.
    4. Infrastructure provisioning: Facilitates roads, banking, schools, and healthcare access.

    How can governance reforms ensure sustainable peace in these regions?

    1. Justice delivery: Ensures credible justice systems and grievance redressal mechanisms.
    2. Decentralisation: Strengthens Panchayati Raj institutions with financial devolution; example: Article 275(1), TSP grants.
    3. Administrative convergence: Reduces fragmentation across schemes like PM-JANMAN, DAJGUA.
    4. Accountability systems: Promotes evidence-based governance with transparency mechanisms.

    What role do social transformation and trust-building play in post-conflict recovery?

    1. Human policing: Builds trust through respectful and community-oriented policing.
    2. Rights-based approach: Ensures citizens are treated as stakeholders, not beneficiaries.
    3. Educational integration: Expands access to residential schooling and scholarships.
    4. Cultural integration: Promotes sports and identity-based belonging; example: tribal youth participation.

    Why is cooperative federalism critical in post-LWE transformation?

    1. Centre-State coordination: Ensures unified policy implementation.
    2. Local governance empowerment: Facilitates last-mile delivery at Panchayat level.
    3. Mission convergence: Integrates Aspirational Districts Programme with tribal initiatives.
    4. Policy continuity: Sustains long-term transformation beyond political cycles.

    Conclusion

    Post-LWE India represents a moral and governance threshold, where absence of violence must translate into presence of justice, dignity, and opportunity. Sustainable peace depends on state legitimacy, inclusive development, and trust-based governance.

  • Not the only path: On acting against the Maoists

    Why in the News?

    On March 20, 2025, security forces carried out two missions in Bastar, Chhattisgarh, and killed 30 Maoist people. This made the total number of Maoists killed this year more than 100.

    What were the key reasons behind the decline of the Maoist insurgency in India?

    • Strong Counter-Insurgency Operations: Security forces, including CRPF’s elite COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) unit and state police forces, have conducted targeted operations against Maoist strongholds. Example: Operation Prahar in Chhattisgarh led to the elimination of top Maoist leaders and disrupted their logistical networks.
    • Improved Governance and Development Initiatives: Infrastructure projects like roads, electrification, and mobile connectivity have reduced Maoist influence by increasing state presence. Example: The Aspirational Districts Programme has focused on healthcare, education, and employment in Maoist-affected regions.
    • Erosion of Support Base: Maoists have lost support due to their violent tactics, including forced recruitment, extortion, and attacks on civilians. Example: The killing of Madvi Hidma, a local tribal leader, by Maoists in Bastar led to mass protests by villagers against them.
    • Surrender and Rehabilitation Policies: Government schemes like the ‘Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy’ offer financial aid, skill training, and housing to former Maoists. Example: Over 600 Maoists surrendered in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh after the government provided rehabilitation and employment opportunities.
    • Internal Divisions and Leadership Crisis: The Maoist movement has suffered from ideological splits, a lack of new leadership, and desertions. Example: The death of Kishenji (Maoist leader) in 2011 and the arrest of several senior cadres have weakened organizational unity.

    Why is a purely militaristic approach insufficient in tackling the Maoist insurgency?

    • Deep-Rooted Socio-Economic Issues Drive Insurgency: Maoism thrives in areas with poverty, land alienation, and lack of governance. Military force alone does not address the core grievances of tribal communities. Example: The displacement of tribals due to mining projects in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, has fueled resentment, making them vulnerable to Maoist influence.
    • Risk of Civilian Casualties and Alienation: Excessive military action can lead to civilian deaths, human rights violations, and loss of trust in the state, pushing locals towards Maoists instead of the government. Example: The Salwa Judum campaign (2005-2011), a state-backed militia to counter Maoists, led to severe human rights abuses, ultimately worsening the conflict.
    • Failure to Provide a Long-Term Solution: Military operations can weaken Maoists but do not offer a sustainable path for peace and rehabilitation. A mix of governance, dialogue, and development is needed. Example: The Nepali Maoists transitioned into mainstream politics through a negotiated peace process, showing that engagement can be a more effective long-term strategy.

     

    Where are the remaining strongholds of Maoist influence in India?

    • Southern Chhattisgarh (Bastar Region): Dense forests, difficult terrain, and historical neglect in governance make it a Maoist stronghold. Example: Dantewada, Sukma, and Bijapur districts frequently witness Maoist ambushes on security forces.
    • Border Regions of Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana: The tri-junction of these states provides a strategic corridor for Maoist movement and arms supply. Example: Latehar (Jharkhand), Malkangiri (Odisha), and Bhadradri-Kothagudem (Telangana) remain active insurgent zones.
    • Gadchiroli District (Maharashtra): Proximity to Chhattisgarh’s Maoist belt and forested terrain offer a safe haven for Maoist cadres. Example: The Jambhulkheda encounter  saw security forces eliminate top Maoist leaders in this region.

    Who are the primary stakeholders in resolving the Maoist issue peacefully?

    • Government (Union and State Governments): Responsible for policy-making, law enforcement, and development initiatives in affected regions. Example: The Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy offers incentives for Maoists to reintegrate into society.
    • Security Forces (Police, Paramilitary, and Intelligence Agencies): Play a crucial role in counterinsurgency operations and maintaining law and order. Example: The Greyhounds (Telangana), CoBRA (CRPF), and District Reserve Guard (Chhattisgarh) specialise in anti-Maoist operations.
    • Tribal Communities and Local Populations: Often caught in the crossfire, they need protection, development, and inclusion in governance. Example: The PESA Act (1996) empowers tribal self-governance to address their grievances.
    • Civil Society and NGOs: Mediate peace talks, advocate for human rights, and support socio-economic development. Example: Swami Agnivesh’s peace efforts attempted negotiations between Maoists and the government.
    • Former Maoists and Rehabilitation Advocates: It can influence insurgents to surrender and integrate into mainstream society. Example: Former Maoist leader Gopanna Markam, who surrendered and helped bring others into the fold.

    How can lessons from international experiences, such as FARC in Colombia or Nepali Maoists? (Way forward)

    • Negotiation and Political Integration: Offering insurgents a political pathway can encourage them to abandon violence. Example: Nepali Maoists transitioned from armed struggle to mainstream politics through the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, leading to their participation in democratic governance.
    • Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs: Providing economic and social reintegration opportunities reduces the chances of re-radicalization. Example: Colombia’s peace deal with FARC (2016) included land reforms, financial aid, and skill development programs for former rebels.
    • Addressing Root Causes through Development: Long-term peace requires addressing socio-economic grievances that fuel insurgencies. Example: Colombia’s rural development programs aimed to improve infrastructure, education, and healthcare in former conflict zones to prevent a resurgence of violence.

    Mains PYQ:

    Question: “Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.” (2022)

    Reason: This question directly addresses Naxalism (Maoist insurgency) as more than just a security problem, aligning with this article. It also asks for a multilayered strategy, hinting at the need for more than just security measures, such as addressing social and economic issues.

  • Miles to go: On change in Manipur, the road to normalcy

    Why in the News?

    After months of struggling to manage the ethnic crisis, the Union government finally took action by removing the N. Biren Singh-led government in Manipur and imposing President’s Rule, hoping this change would bring peace and stability.

    Who are the key stakeholders involved in the ethnic conflict, and what are their demands?

    • Meitei Community: Seeks protection of territorial integrity and opposes any division of Manipur. Example: Meitei groups have opposed the creation of a separate Kuki-Zo administrative region, fearing it would fragment the State.
    • Kuki-Zo Community: Calls for Union Territory status or a separate administrative arrangement to safeguard their identity and security. Example: Civil society organizations representing the Kuki-Zo people have warned against free movement unless their request for separate governance is met.
    • Naga Community: Resists any move to carve out a separate region, as it could affect their ancestral lands and autonomy. Example: Naga groups have opposed the Kuki-Zo call for Union Territory status, fearing loss of their territorial claims.
    • Union Government: Aims to restore law and order, maintain territorial integrity, and recover stolen arms. Example: After imposing President’s Rule, the government set a deadline for militant groups to surrender looted weapons and worked to reopen blockaded highways.

    What steps has the Union government taken to restore normalcy in Manipur after imposing President’s Rule?

    • Weapon Recovery Drive: Initiated efforts to retrieve stolen weapons from non-State actors to curb violence. Example: Set a deadline for groups to return weapons looted from police armories, recovering nearly one-third of the 3,000 missing firearms.
    • Clearing Highway Blockades: Worked to remove blockades on key highways to restore the free movement of goods and people. Example: Central armed police forces attempted to clear blockades in Kangpokpi district, though clashes resulted in one death and over 40 injuries.
    • Strengthening Security Measures: Deployed additional central forces to control violence and secure vulnerable areas. Example: Increased the presence of paramilitary forces in both the hill and valley regions to prevent further ethnic clashes.
    • Engaging in Dialogue: Encouraged talks with community representatives while rejecting violent and separatist threats. Example: Continued discussions with leaders from the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities to find a peaceful resolution.
    • Central Leadership Involvement: Called for the active engagement of senior government officials to address grievances and appeal for peace. Example: The Union Home Ministry and senior officials emphasized the need for dialogue and public appeals to restore calm and facilitate the return of displaced persons.

    Why is the demand for Union Territory status or a separate arrangement for Kuki-Zo areas considered a dangerous move?

    • Deepening Ethnic Divisions: Such a move could escalate tensions between communities, worsening the already fragile social fabric. Example: It may intensify hostility between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo groups, making reconciliation and long-term peace more difficult.
    • Resistance from Other Communities: The proposal could face strong opposition from other ethnic groups, such as the Nagas, who also reside in the hill areas and have their own territorial interests. Example: Naga groups may view the creation of a separate Kuki-Zo region as a threat to their claims and autonomy, leading to new conflicts.
    • Undermining Territorial Integrity: Fragmenting the state could weaken Manipur’s territorial integrity and set a precedent for further separatist demands. Example: Accepting such a demand could encourage other communities to seek similar autonomous arrangements, complicating governance and stability.

    Way forward: 

    • Inclusive Dialogue and Mediation: Facilitate continuous engagement with all ethnic groups to address grievances and promote mutual understanding through impartial mediation.
    • Strengthening Law and Order: Intensify efforts to recover illegal weapons, enforce rule of law, and ensure equitable development to rebuild trust and maintain peace.

    Mains PYQ:

    Q Analyze internal security threats and transborder crimes along Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan borders including Line of Control (LoC). Also discuss the role played by various security forces in this regard. (UPSC IAS/2020)

  • [23rd November 2024] The Hindu Op-ed: Understanding the changing face of extremist violence

    PYQ Relevance:

    Q) Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism. (UPSC CSE 2022)

    Mentor’s Comment:  UPSC Mains have always focused on ‘Left Wing Extremism’ (2023), ‘Growth of Naxalism, and Radicalization’ (2022 and 2024).

    The SATP report notes an increase in Maoist activities across 12 states, highlighting a rise from 10 states in 2022. Despite claims of declining violence due to the National Policy and Action Plan (NPAP), challenges remain.

    But Why? What is the root cause?

    Today’s editorial talks about the significance of vigilance and adaptability in combating extremist violence. This content can be used for ‘Rising Radicalization and Terrorism in India’.

    _

    Let’s learn!

    Why in the News?

    At the end of COP 29 in Baku (Azerbaijan), India will push for ambitious climate mitigation financing from developed nations. At the same time, India is at a critical juncture in its environmental and public health journey.

    What are the key observations from the early post-independence history?

    • The India-Pak partition in 1947 resulted in one of the largest mass migrations (14 to 18 million people displaced) that led to widespread communal violence, resulting in approximately one million deaths across religious communities. This continues to affect India-Pakistan relations even today.
    • Further, under the leadership of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the government employed a combination of negotiations and military action to integrate these states into the Indian Union. For example, Hyderabad through Operation Polo and Junagadh’s accession following a plebiscite.
    • The new Indian government emphasized secularism as a foundational principle, and the Constitution adopted a framework for democracy and civil rights while promoting equality among all citizens. The practice of untouchability was abolished, and reservations were implemented for marginalized communities.
    o But in the immediate years, agricultural productivity was low, exacerbated by droughts and inadequate infrastructure.
    o The government recognized the need for economic reforms to uplift the agrarian sector and improve living conditions.
    • This period (1950s-1960s) also witnessed the emergence of political movements addressing regional aspirations and demands for statehood, such as the formation of Andhra Pradesh following widespread protests after the death of Potti Sriramulu during a hunger strike.

    How has the nature of extremist violence evolved in the digital age?

    • Increased Accessibility and Propagation: The internet has made extremist content more accessible than ever before. Individuals can easily find and engage with violent extremist materials online, which contributes to normalization and desensitization to radical ideas.
      • Social media platforms have become critical tools for extremists to disseminate their messages and recruit new members.
      • Research shows that social media played a role in the radicalization processes of nearly 90% of extremists in certain datasets between 2005 and 2016. It allows individuals to radicalize without physical contact, often leading to what is termed “lone actor terrorism”. 
    • Use of Disinformation Tactics: Extremists have increasingly created echo chambers where their ideologies are reinforced without challenge. Right-wing extremists, in particular, have been noted to benefit from such tactics more than other groups, utilizing disinformation campaigns to further their agendas.
    • Role of Anonymity and Encryption: Encrypted messaging apps and decentralized platforms enable them to communicate securely, share resources, and organize activities without attracting attention from law enforcement. This shift has made it more challenging for authorities to monitor and counteract.
    • Gaming Platforms: Emerging trends show that gaming platforms are being leveraged by extremists as new venues for recruitment and radicalization. These environments allow for interaction with potential recruits in less scrutinized settings, where extremist ideologies can be presented in a more palatable manner.

    What are the reasons behind the rise of new forms of extremist violence?

    • Socio-Political Factors: Ongoing geopolitical issues and perceived injustices within the country and the society, fuel extremist sentiments. Economic disparities and social inequalities drive individuals towards extremist ideologies.
    • Recruitment and Exploitation: Extremist groups generally prefer these isolated individuals, particularly children and youth, for recruitment.
    • Hybridization of Extremist Ideologies: Individuals combine various ideologies and conspiracy theories, creating complex motivations for violence. Their narratives are often tailored to personal experiences and grievances faced by the Indian society.
    • Covert Operations: Digital Encryption allows extremists to communicate and organize without detection. For Example, increased incidents of individuals committing violence independently, often using online resources for planning.

    What strategies can be implemented to effectively counteract extremist violence?

    • Community Engagement and Empowerment: Engage local communities through initiatives that foster trust between law enforcement and community members. Ensure that community engagement efforts are broad-based and inclusive, addressing all forms of ideologically motivated violence.
    • Education and Awareness Programs: Implement educational initiatives that promote respect for diversity, human rights, and critical thinking skills among youth. This can help counteract extremist narratives and reduce susceptibility to radicalization.
    • Countering Online Radicalization by PPP: The government can collaborate with technology companies to develop tools that can help identify and counter extremist content online while respecting privacy rights.
    • Socio-Economic Development: Focus on socio-economic development by offering effective alternatives to violence for at-risk groups. This includes enhancing participatory decision-making processes and strengthening local governance to address the root causes of discontent that can lead to radicalization.

    https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/understanding-the-changing-face-of-extremist-violence/article68899358.ece

  • How the Peace Deal in Colombia has affected its Cocaine Industry?

    Why in the News?

    Colombia, the global center of the cocaine industry, is undergoing significant changes due to domestic and global forces.

    Recent Changes: Disruption in Cocaine Trade

    • Colombia, the global center of the cocaine industry, is undergoing significant changes due to domestic and global forces.
    • Two years ago, drug traffickers who buy coca paste stopped showing up.
    • This sudden halt left the villagers without income, leading to food shortages and exodus in search of jobs.
    • The population of Cano Cabra shrunk from 200 to 40 people.
    • This pattern has repeated in communities across Colombia where coca is the only source of income.

    About the FARC Peace Deal

    • It refers to the agreement reached between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to end decades of conflict. It is a significant milestone in Colombia’s efforts to achieve lasting peace and stability.
    • FARC is a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group founded in 1964 that waged an armed struggle against the Colombian government for over five decades.
    • The conflict resulted in over 220,000 deaths and the displacement of millions of people, making it one of the longest-running conflicts in Latin America.
    • A peace deal was signed on November 24, 2016, and subsequently ratified by the Colombian Congress.

    How does the peace deal impact Columbia?

    • The FARC financed its war through cocaine, relying on farmers to provide coca leaves.
    • After the FARC left the cocaine industry, smaller criminal groups took over, adopting a new economic model.
    • These groups buy large quantities of coca from fewer farmers and limit operations to border regions for easier drug transport.
    • The shift in the drug trade has left the communities economically devastated.

    Cocaine Production in Latin America:

    • Pablo Escobar the famous drug lord and the leader of the Medellín Cartel was a Colombian.
    • Ecuador has become a top cocaine exporter, and coca cultivation has increased in Peru and Central America.
    • These changes have pushed global cocaine production to record highs.
    • While cocaine consumption has reduced in the United States, it is growing in Europe and Latin America and emerging in Asia.

    Implications on India:

    • Changes in the Colombian cocaine industry may alter global drug trafficking routes.
    • India, as part of the global drug trade network, could see changes in the routes used to smuggle cocaine into the country.
    • Increased cocaine production globally could lead to a higher availability of the drug in India.
    • This could result in an increase in drug trafficking activities within the country visible in increased seizures in major cities like Pune.
    • Higher availability of cocaine could lead to an increase in drug abuse cases in India.

    PYQ:

    [2018] India’s proximity to the two of the world’s biggest illicit opium-growing states has enhanced her internal security concerns. Explain the linkages between drug trafficking and other illicit activities such as gunrunning, money laundering and human trafficking. What counter-measures should be taken to prevent the same?

  • In 2024, Maoists suffer severe setbacks in Chhattisgarh  

    Why in the news?

    As of July 9, 2024, India has recorded a total of 162 Maoist fatalities this year, with Chhattisgarh alone reporting 141 deaths.

    • This marks one of the highest casualty figures for extremists in the predominantly tribal state since the establishment of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004.

     

     About Left-wing extremism in India

    • Origins and Ideology: LWE in India began with the 1967 Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal, advocating armed revolution for a Maoist communist state overthrowing the Indian government.
    • Modus Operandi: Naxalites engage in guerrilla warfare, attacking security forces, extorting, intimidating, and propagandizing. They target government, infrastructure, and economic interests, and run parallel governance in controlled areas.
    • Red corridor Areas: LWE affects several states in central and eastern India, including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Kerala, although to varying degrees.
    • Factors Contributing to LWE: Socio-economic disparities, land alienation and displacement of local communities, and issues related to Adivasi rights have contributed to the proliferation of LWE. Left-wing extremist groups have capitalized on these grievances to gain support among marginalized communities.
    • Government Response: The Government of India has taken various measures to counter LWE, including security operations, development initiatives, and rehabilitation programs. Violence related to LWE has decreased by 76% in 2022 compared to 2010, and the geographical spread of violence has also reduced.

    In 2024, Maoists suffer severe setbacks in Chhattisgarh 

    • Maoist Casualties in Chhattisgarh: In 2024, Chhattisgarh reported the highest number of Maoist deaths (141) since the formation of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004. This spike coincided with the return of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in December 2023.
    • Historical Context and Operations: The year 2009 saw the highest number of Maoist deaths (154) following the launch of ‘Operation Green Hunt’ by the Indian government, which included military offensives involving the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and Chhattisgarh police.
    • Security Forces and Civilian Casualties: While Maoist casualties have increased recently, the number of security force personnel deaths has decreased. Civilian casualties have also reduced since their peak in 2006.
    • District-Wise Insights: Bijapur district witnessed the highest number of clashes in 2024, resulting in significant Maoist casualties. This district, along with Sukma, hosts several Border Security Force (BSF) camps, indicating intense security operations.
    • Surrenders and Operations: Despite some districts being declared ‘Maoist-free’ in recent years, significant operations continue, such as the joint BSF and District Reserve Guard operation in Kanker district resulting in top Maoist commander Shankar Rao’s death.
    • Development and Insurgency: There is a correlation between the intensity of the insurgency and lower development indicators like sanitation and literacy in districts like Dantewada, Bijapur, Sukma, Bastar, and Kanker. These areas are heavily forested, complicating security operations.

    Way forward: 

    • Integrated Development and Security Strategy: Implement a comprehensive strategy that integrates robust security measures with accelerated development initiatives in LWE-affected regions. This approach should prioritize improving socio-economic conditions, addressing land alienation, providing livelihood opportunities, and enhancing basic infrastructure like education and healthcare.
    • Enhanced Intelligence and Targeted Operations: Strengthen intelligence-gathering capabilities to preempt Maoist attacks and disrupt their operational networks effectively. This includes enhancing coordination among security forces, intelligence agencies, and local law enforcement to gather timely and actionable intelligence.

    Mains PYQ: 

    Q Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend, but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE. (2018)

  • Manipur accounted for 97% of displacements in South Asia   

    Why in the News?

    The report by the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) termed it the highest number of displacements in India triggered due to the conflict and violence in India since 2018.

    Key highlights on Internal Displacement in India (2009-2023):

    • The above image shows the Internally Displaced People (IDP) currently living in India.
      • This term focuses on the individuals who have been displaced till the end of every year. At the end of 2023, there were 0.61 million such persons in India.
    • Globally, India was among the top five countries with the highest number of new internal displacements in 2022 due to disasters, with 2.5 million displacements.
    • Causes:
      • Natural: In 2023, India experienced over half a million internal displacements due to floods, storms, earthquakes, and other disasters.
      • Artificial: Over the past five years (2009-2023), the number of internally displaced people resulting from regional conflict and land disputes has increased by 22.6 million, with the two biggest increases in 2022 and 2023.
      • Over 1/3rd of the displacements took place within Manipur, with almost a fifth moving to the neighboring state of Mizoram and smaller numbers to Nagaland and Assam.

    Regional Scenario (2009-2023):

    • In 2023, conflict and violence triggered 69,000 displacements in South Asia, with Manipur violence alone accounting for 67,000, the highest number since 2018.
    • The violence erupted after a ‘Tribal Solidarity March’ was organized in Manipur’s hill districts to protest against the Meitei community’s demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status.
    • This led to ethnic clashes between the Meitei and Kuki communities even in bordering areas of Myanmar and Bangladesh.

    Global Scenario (2009-2023):

    • The number of IDPs has grown by 50% in the last five years. The report said that 68.3 million people worldwide were displaced by conflict and violence as of 2023.
    • By the end of 2022, at least 8.7 million people in 88 countries and territories were internally displaced by disasters, with India being one of them.
    • Conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Palestine accounted for nearly two-thirds of new conflict movements in 2023
    • 3.4 million new movements in the Gaza Strip in the last quarter of 2023, leaving 1.7 million internally displaced by the end of the year.

    Way Forward: 

    • Dialogue and Mediation: Facilitate dialogue between conflicting communities, such as the Meitei and Kuki, to address underlying issues like land disputes.
    • Legal Framework: Strengthen legal frameworks to protect minority rights and address grievances that may lead to violence.
    • Peacebuilding Initiatives: Implement peacebuilding programs that promote social cohesion and understanding among different ethnic and community groups.

    Mains PYQ:

    Q How far are India’s internal security challenges linked with border management particularly in view of the long porous borders with most countries of South Asia and Myanmar? (UPSC IAS/2013)

  • Operation Sadbhavana by Indian Army

    Operation Sadbhavana

    Introduction

    • The Indian Army has recently adopted Topa Pir village in Poonch district, Jammu and Kashmir, as a model village under Operation Sadbhavana.

    Operation Sadbhavana

    • Purpose: Operation Sadbhavana (Goodwill) is an initiative by the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh to address the needs of people affected by terrorism, primarily sponsored by Pakistan.
    • Welfare Activities: The operation includes running Army Goodwill Schools, infrastructure development projects, and educational tours for children in remote areas.
    • Focus on Education: There are seven Army Goodwill Schools under Operation Sadbhavana in the Ladakh Region, aiming to improve the standard of education.
    • Objectives: The operation aims to achieve national integration, women empowerment, employment generation, and development activities towards nation-building.
    • Collaborative Approach: Projects under Operation Sadbhavana are selected considering local aspirations and in coordination with the local civil administration.

    Adoption of Topa Pir Village

    • Model Village Initiative: The Army’s adoption of Topa Pir village is a step towards creating a model village, with an emphasis on community development and welfare.
    • Recent Incidents: The village gained attention following a controversial incident involving the alleged torture of civilians by the Army, which led to the deaths of three individuals.
    • Community Relations: The incident has significantly impacted the relationship between the Army and the local Gujjar and Bakarwal communities, who predominantly inhabit areas near the Line of Control (LoC).