Subject: Social Justice

Why in the News

Amid ongoing youth protests demanding education reform and Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation, data analysis shows the decline in education spending is not confined to the Union Budget. In fact, State Governments’ own education spending share has fallen too over the same period.

Why does state level spending matter when education policy debates usually focus on the Centre?

1. Concurrent subject: Education is in the Concurrent List (Seventh Schedule), so both the Union and State Governments can legislate and spend on it.
2. The Centre’s own decline: The Education Ministry’s share of the Union Budget fell from 4.6% (2013-14) to 2.5% (2025-26).
3. The national state average mirrors it: The average share of all States’ and Union Territories’ expenditure devoted to education fell from around 17% (2013-14), tracking the same downward trend as the Centre’s budget share.

What does the state level data reveal about educational outcomes?

1. Bihar versus Kerala: Bihar’s Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) at the secondary level is 45, against Kerala’s 94, confirming long held differences in educational outcomes.
2. GER as a measure of distance to travel: Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) is the number of students enrolled in a given education level, regardless of age, divided by the official age-group population for that level and multiplied by 100; a low GER indicates how far a state is from achieving adequate educational coverage.
3. Spending share does not track outcome: Kerala and Tamil Nadu, despite strong GER, spend a lower share of their budgets on education than the national average, while Bihar and Delhi spend higher shares, showing that budget share alone does not explain educational outcomes.

Is there an exception that breaks the declining trend?

1. Delhi under the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP): Between 2014-15 and 2024-25, Delhi’s education spending share increased sharply even as the national average declined, reflecting a government that prioritised health and education.
2. Kerala and Tamil Nadu have converged toward, then fallen behind, the national average: Kerala allocated a higher than average share until 2020 (COVID-19 period) and has lagged since; Tamil Nadu broadly tracked and later fell slightly below the national average over the long term.

Conclusion

The decline in India’s education spending is a joint Centre-State phenomenon, not solely a Union Government decision. The exception of Delhi’s rising education expenditure under a government that made education a political priority suggests the decline reflects policy choices, not an unavoidable trend. The findings therefore distribute responsibility for India’s education outcomes across both levels of government.

Back2Basics

1. Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER): The total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the official age group for that level; a key indicator of the reach of the education system.
2. Concurrent List: The list of subjects under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India on which both Parliament and State Legislatures can make laws. In case of inconsistency, Parliamentary law prevails under Article 254.

PYQ Relevance

[UPSC 2022] The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 remains inadequate in promoting incentive-based system for children’s education without generating awareness about the importance of schooling. Analyse.

Linkage: The PYQ examines challenges in implementing the Right to Education through adequate public investment, equitable access, and improved educational outcomes. The article highlights declining education expenditure by both the Centre and States, raising concerns over financing and effective implementation of the Right to Education.

Why in the News:

Protesters at Jantar Mantar are demanding Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation over the NEET (National Eligibility cum Entrance Test) paper leak, and the government is countering with a promise of a clean retest. Both sides are treating a retest as the solution, when the actual failure is a shrinking Union education budget and unresolved Centre-state coordination since education moved to the Concurrent List in 1976.

What does a retest actually fix, and what does it leave untouched?

1. Narrow scope of a retest: A retest addresses the manipulation of a single examination cycle, nothing more.
2. Small share of aspirants affected: Competitive examinations like NEET select only a small fraction of the hundreds of thousands who appear.
3. The larger unaddressed problem: The majority of India’s youth remain ill-prepared and poorly equipped to participate in the country’s growth story, a gap no retest can close.

How has the Union government’s own education-spending record shaped this crisis?

1. Declining budget share: Union government allocations for education have fallen sharply as a percentage of total government expenditure over the twelve years since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government took charge.
2. Signal, not just shortfall: This downward trajectory reflects the government’s low prioritisation of education, not merely a resource constraint.
3. Policy without investment: The government has refreshed the National Education Policy but has not matched it with investment in human resources as infrastructure for growth.

Why does the 1976 shift of education to the Concurrent List complicate a fix?

1. Constitutional history: Education was a State subject until 1976, when it was moved to the Concurrent List.
2. Coordination requirement: Concurrent List placement means systemic reform requires substantial coordination between the Centre and State governments, not unilateral Union action.
3. Limits of a Union-only response: A retest ordered by the Union government cannot substitute for the coordinated systemic reform the Concurrent List structure demands.

What is the political stake if the underlying failure remains unaddressed?

1. A generation coming of age: By the next general election in 2029, a generation of voters will have grown up entirely under NDA-led governments.
2. Rising impatience: This cohort is likely to be far less tolerant of an unreformed education system and the toll it takes on growth.
3. The real demand: The Jantar Mantar mobilisation is not asking the government to fix one exam; it is demanding that education be placed at the centre of governance and political discourse.

Conclusion:

The NEET leak is only the visible trigger; the substantive failure is chronic underinvestment in education and unresolved Centre-state coordination on a subject moved to the Concurrent List in 1976. Unless the Union treats education as core to growth policy rather than an electoral-cycle afterthought, retests will keep recurring without addressing employability. A durable Centre-state financing and coordination mechanism for education outcomes remains missing.