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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • [pib] Goa Maritime Symposium (GMS) – 2021

    Fostering relations with maritime neighbours

    • Towards fostering friendly relations with its maritime neighbours, Indian Navy hosted ‘GMS-21’.
    • The event for the first time was hosted in virtual mode, with online participation of Naval representatives from 13 Indian Ocean Littoral countries.
    • The 13 countries included India, Bangladesh, Comoros, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
    • The theme for GMS-21 was focused on “Maritime Security and Emerging Non-Traditional Threats: A Case for Proactive Role for IOR Navies,” with emphasis on capacity building amongst the IOR Navies to tackle emerging common maritime threats.

    Bringing together the stakeholders

    • With the Indian Ocean becoming the locus of 21st century strategic landscape, the symposium will play a constructive role in bringing together the stakeholders who have a role in evolving strategies, policies and implementation mechanisms on the issues of common interest in maritime domain.
    • In addition to presenting cooperative strategies for enhancing interoperability among partner maritime agencies, the event provided a forum for articulation of views on the crucial maritime issues, followed by theme based discussions.

  • Evaluate the Ladakh crisis

    The article highlights the need for a critical assessment of the stand-off with China last year and offers key lessons in managing the strategic competition with China.

    Year after stand-off

    • After over a year, the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh shows no signs of resolution.
    • More broadly, the India-China bilateral relationship has ruptured.
    • Reversing a long-held policy, India will no longer overlook the problematic border dispute for the sake of a potentially lucrative wider relationship.
    • Even if disengagement continues, the relationship will remain vulnerable to destabilising disruptions.
    • Therefore, the Ladakh crisis offers India three key lessons in managing the intensifying strategic competition with China.

    Three key lessons

    1) Military strategy based on denial are more useful

    •  Military strategies based on denial are more useful than strategies based on punishment.
    •  The Indian military’s standing doctrine calls for deterring adversaries with the threat of massive punitive retaliation for any aggression, capturing enemy territory as bargaining leverage in post-war talks.
    • But this did not deter China from launching unprecedented incursions in May 2020.
    • In contrast, the Indian military’s high-water mark in the crisis was an act of denial — its occupation of the heights on the Kailash Range on its side of the LAC in late August.
    • This action served to deny that key terrain to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and gave the Indian Army a stronger defensive position.
    • A doctrinal focus on denial will give the Indian military greater capacity to thwart future land grabs across the LAC.
    • Over time, improved denial capabilities may allow India to reduce the resource drain of the increased militarisation of the LAC.

    2) Political cost matters more

    • China is more likely to be deterred or coerced with the threat of political costs, rather than material costs.
    • The material burden of the crisis would not disrupt its existing priorities.
    • In contrast, India successfully raised the risks of the crisis for China through its threat of a political rupture, not military punishment.
    • A permanently hostile India or an accidental escalation to conflict were risks that China, having achieved its tactical goals in the crisis, assessed were an unnecessary additional burden.
    • The corollary lesson is that individual powers, even large powers such as India, will probably struggle to shift Beijing’s calculus alone.
    • Against the rising behemoth, only coordinated or collective action is likely to be effective.

    3) India should accept more risk on LAC

    • India should consider accepting more risk on the LAC in exchange for long-term leverage and influence in the Indian Ocean Region.
    • From the perspective of long-term strategic competition, the future of the Indian Ocean Region is more consequential and more uncertain than the Himalayan frontier.
    • At the land border, the difficult terrain and more even balance of military force means that each side could only eke out minor, strategically modest gains at best.
    • In contrast, India has traditionally been the dominant power in the Indian Ocean Region and stands to cede significant political influence and security if it fails to answer the rapid expansion of Chinese military power.

    Conclusion

    As these three lessons show, the future of the strategic competition is not yet written. If India’s leaders honestly and critically evaluate the crisis, it may yet help to actually brace India’s long-term position against China.

  • India and EU relaunch FTA talks, sign connectivity partnership

    Resumption of FTA

    • Prime Minister of India interacted virtually from Delhi with EU chiefs.
    • India and the European Union agreed to relaunch free trade negotiations by resuming talks that were suspended in 2013 for the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA).
    • The talks had run into trouble over market access issues, and tariffs by India on products like wine, dairy and automotive parts, as well as EU resistance over visas for Indian professionals.
    • In addition, Indian government’s decision to scrap all Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in 2015 posed hurdles for new EU investments in India.

    Connectivity Partnership document

    • The EU-India leaders adopted a Connectivity Partnership document.
    • The India-EU connectivity partnership committed the two sides to working together on digital, energy, transport, people to people connectivity.
    • The partnership is seen as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and comes as the EU’s negotiations with China on their Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) have run into trouble.
    • The contract for the second tranche of $150 million from the EU for the Pune Metro rail project was also signed.

    No EU support for Covid-19 vaccine waiver

    • India failed to secure the support of the European leaders for patent waivers for Covid vaccine.
    • The support of a major bloc like the EU is crucial to passing the resolution at the WTO by consensus.

  • What patent waiver in the COVID fight mean for global health equity

    The article highlights the implications of patent waiver for Covid-19 for global health equity.

    Where the opposition to waiver proposal came from

    • Recently, the US agreed to support the India-South Africa proposal, seeking a waiver of patent protection for technologies needed to combat and contain COVID-19.
    • Response to the proposal was divided during earlier debates at the WTO.
    • While many low and middle income countries supported it, resistance came from the U.S., the United Kingdom, the European Union, Switzerland, Australia and Japan.
    • Since the WTO operates on consensus rather than by voting, the proposal did not advance despite drawing support of over 60 countries.
    • Predictably, the pharmaceutical industry fiercely opposed it and vigorously lobbied many governments.
    • Right-wing political groups in the high income countries sided with the industry.

    Issues with the reasons given for opposition to the waiver proposal

    1) Quality and safety of vaccine production in low and middle-income countries

    • It was argued that the capacity for producing vaccines of assured quality and safety was limited to some laboratories.
    • So, it is argued that it would be hazardous to permit manufacturers in low and middle-income countries.
    • However, pharmaceutical manufacturers have no reservations about contracting industries in those countries to manufacture their patent-protected vaccines for the global market.

    2) Licenced manufacturing

    • The counter to patent waiver is an offer to license manufacturers in developing countries while retaining patent rights.
    • This restricts the opportunity for production to a chosen few.
    • The terms of those agreements are opaque and offer no assurance of equity in access to the products at affordable prices, either to the country of manufacture or to other developing countries.

    3) Supplying vaccines through COVAX facility

    • It was also stated that developing countries could be supplied vaccines through the COVAX facility, set up by several international agencies and donors.
    • While well-intended, it has fallen far short of promised delivery.
    • Some U.S. states have received more vaccines than entire Africa has from COVAX.

    4) No availability of extra capacity for vaccine production

    • Critics of a patent waiver say there is no evidence that extra capacity exists for producing vaccines outside of firms undertaking them now.
    • Even before the change in the U.S.’s position, manufacturers from many countries expressed their readiness and avidly sought opportunities to produce the approved vaccines.
    • They included industries in Canada and South Korea, suggesting that capable manufacturers in high income countries too are ready to avail of patent waivers but are not being allowed to enter a restricted circle.
    • The World Health Organization’s mRNA vaccine technology transfer hub has already drawn interest from over 50 firms.
    • Instead of arguing that capacity is limited, high-income countries and other donors should be supporting the growth of more capacity to meet the current and likely future pandemic.
    • They should learn from the manner in which India built up capacity and gained a reputation as a respected global pharmacy by moving from product patenting to process patenting between 1970 and 2005.

    5) Time required to utilise patented technology is long

    • Patent waivers are also dismissed as useless on the grounds that the time taken for their utilisation by new firms will be too long to help combat the present pandemic.
    • But many countries have low vaccination rates and variants are gleefully emerging from unprotected populations.
    • This makes it difficult to put the end date for the pandemic to end

    6) China factor

    • An argument put forth by multinational pharmaceutical firms is that a breach in the patent barricade will allow China to steal their technologies, now and in the future.
    • The original genomic sequence was openly shared by China, which gave these firms a head start in developing vaccines.

    Issue of rewarding innovation financially

    • Much of the foundational science that built the path for vaccine production came from public-funded universities and research institutes.
    • Further, what use is it to hold on to patents when global health and the global economy are devastated?
    • It is often argued that for defending patent protection, is that innovation and investment by industry need to be financially rewarded to incentivise them to develop new products.
    • Even if compulsory licences are issued bypassing patent restrictions, royalties are paid to the original innovators and patent holders.

    Way forward

    • Developing countries must take heart from his gesture and start issuing compulsory licences.
    • The Doha declaration on TRIPS flexibilities permits their use in a public health emergency.
    • High-income countries and multilateral agencies should provide financial and technical support to enable expansion of global production capacity.

    Consider the question “Why are the implications of patent waiver for Covid-19 vaccine for the global health equity? What were the reasons for opposition to waiver proposal?” 

    Conclusion

    The U.S.-supported patent waiver in the COVID fight has the potential to bring in much-needed global health equity.

  • The vaccine patent row

    What is the vaccine patent row about?

    • Medicines and other inventions are covered by patents which provide legal protection against being copied, and vaccines are no exception.
    • Patents give makers the rights to their discoveries as well as the means to make more money from them – which is an incentive to encourage innovation.
    • But these are not normal times.
    • Last autumn, developing nations led by India and South Africa proposed to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that the patents on vaccinations and other Covid-related items should be waived.
    • They argued that, given the extreme nature of the pandemic, the recipe for the life-saving jabs should be made widely available so they could be produced locally in bulk by other manufacturers.

    What’s the problem?

    • The proposals were met with immediate criticism from pharmaceutical companies and Western nations including the EU, UK and the US.
    • The obvious objection to lifting patents is that it could erode revenue and deter innovation.

    So, does this just come down to money?

    • The key argument from vaccine producers and their home countries is that waiving patents alone wouldn’t solve much. It would, they say, be like handing out a recipe without the ingredients or instructions.
    • The patent covers the bare bones of the blue print but not the precise production process. That’s crucial here. Vaccines of the mRNA type – such as Pfizer and Moderna – are a new breed and only a small number of people understand how to make them.
    • BioNTech, the German company which partnered with Pfizer, have said that developing the manufacturing process took a decade and validating production sites can take up to a year. The availability of the raw materials needed has also been an issue.
    • Industry bodies fear that without access to all the know-how and parts, a waiver could result in quality, safety and efficacy issues and possibly even counterfeits. They point out that Moderna has already said it would not prosecute those found to be infringing their patent – but no one has yet.

    What’s the alternative?

    • The EU says it is ready to talk, but it previously said the best short-term fix would be supply chain improvements and pushing richer countries to export more jabs.
    • The UK says it is one of the biggest donors to Covax, which is masterminding the rollout of vaccines to many poorer countries. It also favours voluntary licensing – such as collaborations between the Serum Institute of India and Oxford-AstraZeneca. It wants the WTO, which oversees the rules on global trade, to support more partnerships.
    • The WTO system allows for this licensing arrangement to go even further. Governments can impose compulsory licenses on vaccine makers, compelling them to share their know-how and overseeing the production process along the way. But those pharmaceutical companies would have to be compensated for doing so.

    Why did the US change its mind?

    The announcement came after the US Trade Representative Katharine Tai held meetings with the big vaccine makers in an effort to supercharge vaccine production.

    What happens next?

    • Now the discussions will continue at the WTO where decisions are made by consensus.
    • Without the backing of other key nations, the proposals may stall. But they may pave the way to a compromise that could boost production.
    • The key question is when – and by how much.

    Support grows for IP waiver

    • Attention is now turning to those richer nations, notably in the European Union — and France was the first to voice its support.
    • France joined the United States in supporting an easing of patent and other protections on COVID-19 vaccines that could help poorer countries get more doses and speed the end of the pandemic.
    • Russian President Vladimir Putin also said he supported the idea of a waiver on patent protections for coronavirus vaccines.

     

  • [pib] India-UK virtual summit strengthens STI cooperation

    Enhance partnership in science, education, research and innovation

    • The Prime Minister of India and the UK  met virtually on 4 May 2021 and emphasised their shared commitment to an enhanced partnership in science, education, research and innovation.
    • In keeping with this commitment, both the leaders welcomed the following:
    • The new MoU on Telecommunications/ICT and the Joint Declaration of Intent on Digital and Technology.
    • There was also the establishment of new high-level dialogues on tech.
    • A new joint rapid research investment into Covid19.
    • A new partnership to support zoonotic research,
    • New investment to advance understanding of weather and climate science.
    • There will be continuation of the UK-India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI).

    Key points to strengthen STI cooperation

    • Enhance cooperation between India and the UK on strengthening the role of women in STEM at schools, universities, and research institutions through initiatives like Gender Advancement for Transforming Institutions (GATI) project.
    • Develop collaborations between Industry, Academia and the Government to foster innovation among school students by focusing on teacher training, mentoring and sharing of global best practices through initiatives like the India Innovation Competency Enhancement Program (IICEP)
    • Build on the two countries’ existing bilateral research, science and innovation infrastructure and governmental relationships to continue to support high-quality, high-impact research and innovation through joint processes.
    • Forge partnership across the pipeline of research and innovation activity, from basic research to applied and interdisciplinary research.
    • Leverage and build on existing, long-standing bilateral partnerships such as on education, research and innovation, to stimulate a joint pipeline of talent, excellent researchers and early-career innovators.
    • Work together to share knowledge and expertise regarding artificial intelligence, scientific support to policies and regulatory aspects including ethics, and promote a dialogue in research and innovation.
    • Through Tech Summits, bring together tech innovators, scientists, entrepreneurs and policy makers to work together on challenges including the norms and governance of future tech under the cross-cutting theme of ‘data’.
    •  Grow programmes such as the Fast Track Start-Up Fund to nurture innovation-led, sustainable growth and jobs, and tech solutions that benefit both countries.

  • What the easing of IP norms on Covid vaccines means for India

    Background of waiver proposal

    • U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration announced its support for waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines.
    • Following the onset of the pandemic, the World Health Organisation proposed a COVID-technology access pool as a knowledge sharing initiative to rapidly scale up vaccine output around the world.
    • As vaccine research progressed last year, wealthy and advanced countries, placed huge advance purchase orders for vaccines.
    • This meant that smaller, developing countries would take longer to get vaccines and find resources to pay for them.
    • In October 2020, India and South Africa floated a proposal at the World Trade Organisation’s TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Council to waive certain provisions of the WTO’s TRIPS pact till the pandemic subsides.
    • The proposal envisaged facilitating wider access to technologies necessary for the production of vaccines and medicines.
    • While a majority of the least developed countries backed the proposal, some like China, Turkey and Thailand sought more clarity.
    • However, the proposal was nixed with the E.U., the U.S., Switzerland, Norway, Australia, Canada, Japan and the U.K. rejecting it outright, along with Brazil.
    • Among other things, the argument was that such waivers could dampen innovation and research in areas such as pharmaceuticals and diagnostic technologies.

    What next

    • The WTO’s TRIPS Council is tentatively expected to hold a meeting on the waiver proposal again later this month.
    • If and when an agreement is reached here, the WTO’s Ministerial Council will also have to sign off.
    • Since WTO decisions are based on consensus, all 164 members need to agree on every single aspect of the negotiated waivers and conditions attached.

    Way forward for India

    • The Centre can take two steps immediately in consonance with its stance at the WTO, following the U.S.’ statement of support.
    • The Union government must issue notification under Sections 92 and 100 of the Patents Act to freely licence all patents necessary for vaccine and drug production to treat COVID-19.
    • Issues of the amount of royalties can be decided in due course as laid out in the Patents Act, but that should not come in the way of immediate licensing by the government.
    • The government need to provide full support to companies to scale up vaccine production.
    • Indian industry has a well-respected expertise and capability to rapidly manufacture raw materials, consumables and equipment necessary to produce drugs, vaccines, medical devices and equipment if Intellectual Property barriers are removed.

    ————————————————-//—————————————

    BACK2BASICS

    • COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) will compile, in one place, pledges of commitment made under the Solidarity Call to Action to voluntarily share COVID-19 health technology-related knowledge, intellectual property and data. C-TAP works through its implementing partners, the Medicines Patent Pool, Open COVID Pledge, UN Technology Bank-hosted Technology Access Partnership and Unitaid to facilitate timely, equitable and affordable access to COVID-19 health technologies.

    Understand how the story has progressed:

    India seeks TRIPS waiver for Vaccines

    How IPR served as barrier to the right to access healthcare

  • How Covid would impact India’s foreign policy canvass

    Foreign policy consequences

    • The devastation caused by the second Covid wave prompted India to accept foreign aid after a gap of 17 years.
    • This is bound to have far-reaching strategic implications for India.
    • As a direct consequence of the pandemic, India’s claim to regional primacy and leadership will take a major hit.
    • India ‘leading power’ aspirations will be dented, and accentuate its domestic political contestations.
    • These in turn will impact the content and conduct of India’s foreign policy in the years to come.

    What would be the strategic implications?

    1) Impact on India’s regional primacy

    • COVID 2.0 has quickened the demise of India’s regional primacy.
    • India’s geopolitical decline is likely to begin in the neighbourhood itself.
    • India’s traditional primacy in the region was built on a mix of material aid, political influence and historical ties.
    • Its political influence is steadily declining, its ability to materially help the neighbourhood will shrink in the wake of COVID-19.
    • Its historical ties alone may not do wonders to hold on to a region hungry for development assistance and political autonomy.

    2) Impact on India’s great power aspiration

    •  India aspires to be a leading power, rather than just a balancing power.
    • While the Indo-Pacific is geopolitically keen and ready to engage with India, the pandemic could adversely impact India’s ability and desire to contribute to the Indo-Pacific and the Quad.
    • COVID-19, for instance, will prevent any ambitious military spending or modernisation plans.
    • Covid-19 will also limit the country’s attention on global diplomacy and regional geopolitics, be it Afghanistan or Sri Lanka or the Indo-Pacific.
    • With reduced military spending and lesser diplomatic attention to regional geopolitics, New Delhi’s ability to project power and contribute to the growth of the Quad will be uncertain.

    3) Domestic political contestation  and its impact on strategic ambition

    • Domestic political contestations in the wake of the COVID-19 devastation in the country could also limit India’s strategic ambitions.
    • General economic distress, a fall in foreign direct investment and industrial production, and a rise in unemployment have already lowered the mood in the country.
    • A depressed economy, politically volatile domestic space combined with a lack of elite consensus on strategic matters would hardly inspire confidence in the international system about India.

    4) Impact on India-China equation

    • From competing with China’s vaccine diplomacy a few months ago, New Delhi today is forced to seek help from the international community.
    • China has, compared to most other countries, emerged stronger in the wake of the pandemic.
    • The world, notwithstanding its anti-China rhetoric, will continue to do business with Beijing — it already has been, and it will only increase.
    • Claims that India could compete with China as a global investment and manufacturing destination would be dented.
    • India’s ability to stand up to China stands vastly diminished today: in material power, in terms of balance of power considerations, and political will.

    5) Depressed foreign policy

    • Given the much reduced political capital within the government to pursue ambitious foreign policy goals, the diplomatic bandwidth for expansive foreign policy goals would be limited.
    • This, however, might take the aggressive edge off of India’s foreign policy.
    • Less aggression could potentially translate into more accommodation, reconciliation and cooperation especially in the neighbourhood, with Pakistan on the one hand and within the broader South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) framework on the other.
    •  COVID-19 has forced us to reimagine, to some extent at least, the friend enemy equations in global geopolitics.
    • While the United States seemed hesitant, at least initially, Russia was quick to come to India’s aid. 

    6) Implications for strategic autonomy

    • The pandemic would, at the very least indirectly, impact India’s policy of maintaining strategic autonomy.
    • As pointed out above, the strategic consequences of the pandemic are bound to shape and structure India’s foreign policy choices as well as constrain India’s foreign policy agency.
    • It could, for instance, become more susceptible to external criticism for, after all, India cannot say ‘yes’ to just aid and ‘no’ to criticism.

    Consider the question “Examine the strategic implications of Covid for India.” 

    Way forward

    • COVID-19 will also do is open up new regional opportunities for cooperation especially under the ambit of SAARC.
    • India might do well to get the region’s collective focus on ‘regional health multilateralism’ to promote mutual assistance and joint action on health emergencies such as this.
    • Classical geopolitics should be brought on a par with health diplomacy, environmental concerns and regional connectivity in South Asia.

    Conclusion

    While the outpouring of global aid to India shows that the world realises India is too important to fail, the international community might also reach the conclusion that post-COVID-19 India is too fragile to lead and be a ‘leading power’.

  • [pib] Cabinet approval to MoU between India and UK on Global Innovation Partnership

    Cabinet approval to GIP

    • The Union Cabinet gave ex-post facto approval to the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) India and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) of the United Kingdom on Global Innovation Partnership (GIP).
    • GIP will support Indian innovators to scale up their innovations in third countries thereby helping them explore new markets and become self-sustainable.

    How GIP will help India

    • It will also foster an innovative ecosystem in India.
    • GIP innovations will focus on Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) related sectors thereby assisting recipient countries achieve their SDGs.
    • Through seed funding, grants, investments and technical assistance, the Partnership will support Indian entrepreneurs and innovators to test, scale-up and take their innovative development solutions to select developing countries.
    • GIP will also develop an open and inclusive e-marketplace (E-BAAZAR) for cross-border innovation transfer and will focus on results-based impact assessment thereby promoting transparency and accountability.

  • Article 21 and the right of non-refoulement

    Significance of Manipur High Court judgement

    • The High Court of Manipur on Monday allowed seven Myanmar nationals, to travel to New Delhi to seek protection from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
    • “The far-reaching and myriad protection afforded by Article 21 of our Constitution, as interpreted and adumbrated by our Supreme Court time and again, would indubitably encompass the right of non-refoulement,” the court said.

    What is the principle of non-refoulemennt

    • Non-refoulement is the principle under international law that a person fleeing from persecution from his own country should not be forced to return.
    • Though India is not a party to the UN Refugee Conventions, the court observed that the country is a party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966.