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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • Looking back at India’s journey at the UN

    The article examines India’s journey at the UN as it enters it 75year. It also analyses the challenges India faced at the UN and tracks India’s transformation from being an outlier to the high table.

    Three phases of India’s presence at the UN

    • Seven and a half decades of India at the UN may be viewed with reference to roughly three distinct phases.

    First phase: From independence to 1989

    • The first phase lasted until the end of Cold War in 1989.
    • During this phase, India had learnt to explore and enhance its diplomatic influence in easing armed conflicts in Asia and Africa by disentangling them from the superpower rivalry.
    • India also leaned that the UN could not be relied upon to impartially resolve vital security disputes such as Jammu and Kashmir.
    • India strove to utilise the UN only to focus on common causes such as anti-colonialism, anti-racism, nuclear disarmament, environment conservation and equitable economic development.
    • India seemed to claim the moral high ground by proposing, in 1988 three-phase plan to eliminate nuclear weapons from the surface of earth.
    • But it resisted attempts by neighbouring countries to raise bilateral problems.
    • Defeat in 1962 war against China meant a definitive redesign of the country’s diplomatic style to privilege bilateral contacts over the third party role by the UN.

    Second phase: 1990s

    • The 1990s were the most difficult decade for India in the UN.
    • The 1990s were marked by the sudden end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the unrivalled power.
    • Besides, the uncertain political climate along with the balance of payments crisis constrained the country’s capability to be active in various bodies, especially in the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly.
    • There was a change in India’s foreign policy: At the UN as India showed pragmatism in enabling the toughest terms on Iraq even after Gulf War or in reversing position on Zionism as racism.
    • At the same time, growing militancy in Kashmir in the early 1990s helped Pakistan to internationalise the dispute with accusations about gross human rights violations by India.
    • India to seek favours from Iran and China in the Human Rights Commission to checkmate Pakistan.
    • The violation of the sovereignty principle by NATO intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999 without the authorisation of the UNSC deeply disturbed India.
    • At the same time call for an end to aerial attacks on Yugoslavia did not garner much support in the UNSC.
    • India’s diplomatic difficulties was exposed when it suffered a defeat in the hands of Japan in the 1996 contest for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC.
    • India resolutely stood against indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.
    • India strongly rejected the backdoor introduction for adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
    • It is against this background that India surprised the world in 1998 with its Pokhran nuclear weapon tests, ignoring the likely adverse reaction from the nuclear club.

    Third phase: Rise in influence in 21st century

    • The impressive economic performance in the first decade of the 21st century due to economic liberalisation and globalisation policies, helped a great deal in strengthening profile.
    • This is only aided by its reliable and substantial troop contributions to several peacekeeping operations in African conflict theatres.
    • India has emerged as a responsible stakeholder in non-traditional security issue areas such as the spread of small and light weapons, the threat of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and the impact of climate change.
    • India has scaled up its contributions to development and humanitarian agencies, while India’s share to the UN assessed budget has registered a hike from 0.34% to 0.83%.
    • India’s successful electoral contests for various prestigious slots in the UNSC, the Human Rights Council, the World Court, and functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council indicates its growing popularity

    Major unsuccessful initiatives by India

    • Two major initiatives India has heavily invested in are stuck:
    • 1) The draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism it drafted and revised with the hope of helping consensus.
    • It encountered reservations on provisions regarding definition of terrorist and the convention’s application to state armed forces.
    • 2) Second is the question of equitable expansion of the UNSC to enable India to attain permanent membership along with other claimants from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
    • The move has been stuck for more than 25 years because of a lack of unity among the regional formations.
    • It also includes opposition from some 30 middle powers such as Italy and Pakistan which fear losing out to regional rivals in the event of an addition of permanent seats.
    •  The only realistic possibility seems to settle for a compromise, i.e. a new category of members elected for a longer duration than the present non-permanent members without veto power.

    Priorities at the UNSC as a non-permanent member

    • India’s future role will depend on its ability to deal  economic slowdown and a troubled relationship with China.
    • This is pertinent as India will soon begin its two-year term as a non-permanent UNSC member (January 1, 2021).
    • Its areas of priority will continue to be the upholding of Charter principles, act against those who support, finance and sponsor terrorists, besides striving for securing due say to the troop contributing countries in the management of peace operations.
    • It is reasonable to assume (based on earlier patterns) that India will work for and join in consensus on key questions wherever possible.
    • But it may opt to abstain along with other members including one or two permanent members.

    Consider the question “Elaborate on the transformation in India’s role at UN. What are the challenges India may face as a non-permanent member of the UNSC” 

    Conclusion

    As a non-permanent UNSC member now, India needs to uphold the Charter principles in the backdrop of a turbulent world.

  • US Secretary of state Visit to India

    Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo makes his way to India next week, exactly a week before the election. This article discusses the various aspects that could form the part of the discussion.

    Difference in U.S’s and India’s position on Quad

    • He has stated that meeting in India “would include discussions about how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party”.
    • Just a few weeks ago, at the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting, U.S. Secretary of State had called for collaboration to protect people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion.
    •  In contrast, India has maintained that its membership of the Quad is aligned to its Indo-Pacific policy, and by no means directed against any country.
    • While Chines aggression is changing India’s priorities, any shift in India’s position on the Quad at the U.S.’s prompting must also benefit India.

    What should be the part of U.S.-India collaboration

    • It is critical to study just how India hopes to collaborate with the U.S. on the challenge that Beijing poses on each of India’s three fronts: at the LAC, in the maritime sphere, and in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region surrounding India.
    • On the maritime sphere, discussions will include strengthening ties in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing joint military exercises like the ‘Malabar’ and completing the last of the “foundational agreements” with the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA).
    • In Male, the U.S. has announced a defence agreement that will pave the way for a strategic dialogue.
    • And unlike in the past, India has not objected this agreement with Male for entering in its area of influence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it will allow the U.S. to counter Chinese influence there.
    • With Sri Lanka the U.S. is in discussions on infrastructure projects, and progress on its “Millenium Challenge Corporation” (MCC) offer of a five-year aid grant of about $480 million.
    • At a time when India is delaying Sri Lanka’s requests for debt relief, given its own economic constraints, the U.S. aid offer will be seen as one way of staving off China’s inroads into Sri Lanka.
    • Most important will be how the U.S. and India can collaborate on dealing with India’s most immediate, continental challenge from China: at the LAC.
    • Apart from enhancing and expediting U.S. defence sales to India, there is must the U.S. could promise to India.
    • The U.S. must also commit to keeping the pressure on Pakistan on terrorism, despite the U.S. need for Pakistan’s assistance in Afghan-Taliban talks.
    • A firm U.S. statement in this regard may also disperse the pressure the Indian military faces in planning for a “two-front” conflict with China.

    Resolving other key issues with the U.S.

    • Resolution of Trade issues, an area the Trump administration has been particularly tough, and restoration of India’s Generalised System of Preferences status for exporters should also be priority.
    • The government could press for more cooperation on 5G technology sharing, or an assurance that its S-400 missile system purchase from Russia will receive an exemption from CAATSA sanctions.

    Conclusion

    By inviting Secretary of State this close to the U.S. elections, New Delhi has taken a calculated and bold gamble, however, our leaders must drive a harder bargain to consolidate the pay-offs from the visit.

    Back2Basics: What is CAATSA?

    • The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is a U.S. federal law that imposes economic sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea.
    • The bill came into effect on August 2, 2017, with the intention of countering perceived aggressions against the U.S. government by foreign powers.
    • It accomplishes this goal by preventing U.S. companies from doing business with sanctioned entities.

  • What is Blue Dot Network?

    A group of US Senators has written to India asking to join the Blue Dot Network.

    Try this MCQ:

    Q.The Blue Dot Network recently seen in news is a global alliance for:

    a) Beaches Certification

    b) Infrastructure development

    c) 5G connectivity

    d) Patents regulation

    The Blue Dot Network

    • Blue Dot is a US-led collaboration with Australia and Japan that supports private-sector-led infrastructure financing opportunities in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • It was formally announced on 4 November 2019 at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in Bangkok, Thailand on the sidelines of the 35th ASEAN Summit.
    • It is led by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia.
    • It is expected to serve as a global evaluation and certification system for roads, ports and bridges with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

    Fundamental difference between BRI and Blue Dot

    • While the former involves direct financing, giving countries in need immediate short-term relief, the latter is not a direct financing initiative and therefore may not be what some developing countries need.
    • The question is whether Blue Dot offering first-world solutions to third-world countries.
    • Secondly, Blue Dot will require coordination among multiple stakeholders when it comes to grading projects.
    • Given the past experience of Quad, the countries involved in it are still struggling to put a viable bloc. Therefore, it remains to be seen how Blue Dot fares in the long run.

  • Opportunities for India in Bangladesh’s economic success

    Bangladesh is expected to cross India in terms per capita income. This speaks volumes about the achievements of Bangladesh when contrasted with Pakistan. At the same time, it has several implications for the region. The elaborates on such implications.

    What other countries can learn from Bangladesh

    • The International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook published recently predicts that Bangladesh’s per capita GDP will overtake that of India this year.
    • The projected difference is rather small — $1,888 to $1,877 — and unlikely to last beyond this year.
    • International development institutions are convinced that the rest of the subcontinent and developing countries around the world can learn much from Dhaka’s experience — the so-called “Bangladesh model”.

    5 Implications for the region

    1) Rising global interest in the subcontinent

    • Rapid and sustained economic growth in Bangladesh has begun to alter the world’s perception of the subcontinent.
    • India and Pakistan dominated the region and other countries were considered small.
    • But Bangladesh was far from being small, demographically it’s  the eighth-largest nation in the world.
    • The economic rise of Bangladesh is changing some of that.

    2) Changing economic weights of Bangladesh and Pakistan

    • This year, Bangladesh’s GDP is expected to reach about $320 billion.
    • The IMF did not have the 2020 numbers from Pakistan to report but in 2019, Pakistan’s economy was at $275 billion.
    • The IMF suggests that Pakistan’s economy will contract further this year.
    • Bangladesh has controlled its population growth and Pakistan has not.
    • Dhaka has a grip over its inflation and Islamabad does not.
    • There is no question that Pakistan’s negative geopolitical weight in the world will endure.
    • But Bangladesh’s growing economic muscle will help Dhaka steadily accumulate geopolitical salience in the years ahead.

    3) Accelerate regional integration

    • Bangladesh’s economic growth can accelerate regional integration in the eastern subcontinent.
    • The region’s prospects for a collective economic advance are rather dim.
    • Due to Pakistan’s opposition to economic cooperation with India and its support for cross-border terror, the main regional forum for the subcontinent, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc), is dormant.
    • Instead of merely praying for the revival of Saarc, Delhi could usefully focus on the BBIN.
    • BBIN is sub-regional forum among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal, activated in the middle of last decade — has not advanced fast enough.
    • It is time for Delhi and Dhaka to take a fresh look at the forum and find ways to widen the scope and pace of BBIN activity.
    • Meanwhile, there is growing interest in Bhutan and Nepal for economic integration with Bangladesh.

    4) Increasing importance of Bangladesh in geopolitics of Indo-Pacific

    • The economic success of Bangladesh is drawing attention from a range of countries in East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
    • The US, which traditionally focused on India and Pakistan, has woken up to the possibilities in Bangladesh.
    • Bangladesh does not want to get into the fight between Beijing and Washington, but the great power wooing of Dhaka is bound to intensify in the new geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

    5) Development of India’s eastern and north-eastern states could accelerate

    • Bangladesh’s economy is now one-and-a-half times as large as that of West Bengal; better integration between the two would provide a huge boost for eastern India.
    • Also, connectivity between India’s landlocked Northeast and Bangladesh would provide a boost to the development of north-eastern states.
    • Delhi and Dhaka are eager to promote greater cooperation, but there has been little political enthusiasm in Kolkata.
    • In Assam, the issue of migration continues to impose major political constraints.

    Way forward

    • Parliamentary approval of the boundary settlement in 2015, despite the opposition, was a step in the right direction from India.
    • So was the acceptance of the 2014 international arbitration award on the maritime boundary dispute between India and Bangladesh.
    • But the positive dynamic surrounding the bilateral relationship acquired a negative tone in the second amidst the poisonous rhetoric in India around the Citizenship Amendment Act.
    • There is much room for course correction in Delhi and to shift the focus from legacy issues to future possibilities.

    Conclusion

    Both the countries need to jointly develop and pursue with Dhaka an ambitious framework for shared prosperity.

  • Opportunity for India to push for reforms at the UN

    The article analyses the changing geopolitical context against the background of the pandemic. China has been facing some challenges at the UN of late. Multilateralism faces an unprecedented crisis. This context provides an opportunity for India to push for reforms in international institutions. 

    China facing difficulty in elections to UN bodies

    • Recently, India besting China in the elections for a seat on the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).
    • Soon after the CSW vote, it lost another election, this time to tiny Samoa for a seat on the UN Statistical Commission.
    • And a couple of days ago, it just about managed to get elected to the UN High Rights Council, coming fourth out of five contestants for four vacancies.
    • Earlier, China’s candidate had lost to a Singaporean in the race for DG World Intellectual Property Organization.

    China’s strengths

    • Taking advantage of its position as a member of the P-5 and as a huge aid giver, China made itself invincible in UN elections.
    • It won among others, the top positions at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

    Historical background on China’s rise at the UN

    • World War II saw strong U.S.-China collaboration against the Japanese, including U.S. operations conducted from India.
    • Their bilateral ties saw the U.S. include the Chinese in a group of the most important countries for ensuring world peace post- World War II, along with the U.S., the USSR and the U.K.
    • This enlarged into the P-5, with France being added by the UK at the San Francisco conference held in 1945 where the UN charter was finalised.
    • The pure multilateralism of the League of Nations was thus infused with a multipolarity, with the U.S. as the sheet anchor.

    Challenges to multilateralism and the need for reform in the international institutions

    • Multilateralism is under stress due to COVID-19 pandemic and a certain disenchantment with globalisation.
    • At the root is the rise of China and its challenge to U.S. global hegemony.
    • But in the current scenario multilateralism backed by strong multipolarity in the need of the hour.
    • This demands institutional reform in the UN Security Council (UNSC) and at the Bretton Woods Institutions.
    • In this context, it is good that recently India, Germany, Japan and Brazil (G-4) have sought to refocus the UN on UNSC reform.
    • As proponents of reform, they must remain focused and determined even if these changes do not happen easily or come soon.
    • This is also the way forward for India which is not yet in the front row.

    Way forward

    • Earlier in the year, India was elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for a two-year term.
    • India will also host the BRICS Summit next year and G-20 Summit in 2022.
    • These are openings for India in collaborating the world in critical areas that require global cooperation especially climate change, pandemics and counter-terrorism.
    • India also needs to invest in the UN with increased financial contributions in line with its share of the world economy and by placing its people in key multilateral positions.

    Consider the question “The UN, which came into existence in different time fails to take into account the realities of the changing world. In light of this, examine the basis of India’s claim to a permanent seat at the UN. What are the challenges to India’s claim.”

    Conclusion

    Against the backdrop of pandemic and subsequent pushback against China at the UN, it is also an opportune moment for India and a Reformed Multilateralism.

  • What is New START Treaty?

    Russian President Mr Putin has proposed a one-year extension without conditions of the last major nuclear arms reduction accord, the New START Treaty between Russia and the U.S.

    The New START, INF and the Open Skies …. Be clear about the differences of these treaties. For example- to check if their inception was during cold war era etc.

    New START Treaty

    • The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) pact limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and is due to expire in 2021 unless renewed.
    • The treaty limits the US and Russia to a maximum of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, well below Cold War caps.
    • It was signed in 2010 by former US President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
    • It is one of the key controls on superpower deployment of nuclear weapons.
    • If it falls, it will be the second nuclear weapons treaty to collapse under the leadership of US President Donald Trump.
    • In February, US withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), accusing Moscow of violating the agreement.

    Also read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/us-confirms-pull-out-from-inf-treaty/

  • Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)

    Russian Navy along with CSTO members has begun military exercises in the central waters of the Caspian Sea north of the Azerbaijani capital Baku.

    Try this MCQ:

    Q.The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) sometimes seen in news is an alliance led by:

     

    (a) Russia (b) USA (c) India (d) European Union

    Collective Security Treaty Organization

    • CSTO is an intergovernmental military alliance that was signed on 15 May 1992.
    • In 1992, six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States—Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—signed the Collective Security Treaty
    • This is also referred to as the “Tashkent Pact” or “Tashkent Treaty”.
    • Three other post-Soviet states—Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia—signed the next year and the treaty took effect in 1994.
    • Five years later, six of the nine—all but Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan—agreed to renew the treaty for five more years, and in 2002 those six agreed to create the CSTO as a military alliance.

  • Five Eyes (FVEY) group of nations

    India joins the UK in drive known as ‘Five Eyes’ group of nations, as a seventh member against encrypted social media messages.

    Map the countries in ‘Five Eyes’ group of nations.

    ‘Five Eyes’ group of nations

    • The Five Eyes (FVEY) is an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
    • The origins of the Five Eyes alliance can be traced back to the Atlantic Charter, which was issued in August 1941 to lay out the Allied goals for the post-war world.
    • These countries are parties to the multilateral UK-USA Agreement, a treaty for joint cooperation in signals intelligence.
    • India is among seven countries to back a UK-led campaign against end-to-end encryption of messages by social media giants such as Facebook, which they say hinder law enforcement by blocking all access to them.

    A formal expansion

    • The UK and India joined this group to ensure they do not blind themselves to illegal activity on their platforms, including child abuse images.
    • This marks an expansion of the so-called “Five Eyes” group of nations, a global alliance on intelligence issues, to include India and Japan.

    For a common cause

    • All members claim that end-to-end encryption policies such as those employed by the social media giant erode the public’s safety online.
    • They have made it clear that when end-to-end encryption is applied with no access to content, it severely undermines the ability of companies to take action against illegal activity on their own platforms.
    • It also prevents law enforcement investigating and prosecuting the most serious crimes being committed on these services such as online child sexual abuse, grooming and terrorist content.

    Back2Basics: End-to-end encryption

    • End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is a system of communication where only communicating users can read the messages.
    • It is regarded as the most secure way to communicate privately and securely online.
    • By encrypting messages at both ends of a conversation, end-to-end encryption prevents anyone in the middle from reading private communications.
    • In principle, it prevents potential eavesdroppers – including telecom providers, Internet providers, and even the provider of the communication service – from being able to access the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt the conversation.

  • Growing salience of multilateralism

    Multilateralism faces several challenges at the time when it is needed the most. The article highlights the need for more of it in the face of global challenges.

    Lack of international collaboration to deal with Covid

    • As COVID-19 recognises no boundaries, one would have expected that countries with technological and financial capabilities, would agree to pool their resources together to work on an effective and affordable anti-virus vaccine.
    • Instead, there are several parallel national efforts underway even as the World Health Organization (WHO) has put together a Covax alliance for the same purpose.
    •  Active collaboration would have enhanced our collective ability to overcome what has become a public health-cum-economic crisis.
    • But we live in an era when nationalist urges, fuelled by a political opportunism, diminish the appeal of international cooperation.
    • The post-pandemic world will have the awful dilemma of global integration without solidarity.

    Trends in the global order that suggests the need for multilateralims

    1) Global food crisis

    • The World Food Program has been awarded this year’s Noble Peace Prize.
    • The award is sending a message to the world — that we need multilateralism as an expression of international solidarity.
    • According to the WFP, 132 million more people could become malnourished as a consequence of the pandemic.
    • To the 690 million people who go to bed each night on an empty stomach, perhaps another 100 million or more will be added.
    • The Nobel Prize to the WFP will hopefully nudge our collective conscience to come together and relieve this looming humanitarian crisis.

    2) Despite issues, U.N. is still important

    • The United Nations is at the centre of multilateral institutions and processes and kept alive the notion of international solidarity and cooperation.
    • But it suffers from several disabilities due to the fault of its most powerful member countries.
    • They have deprived the UN of resources.
    • They have resisted efforts to institute long-overdue reforms.
    • Its structure no longer reflects the changes in power equations that have taken place and country such as India continues to be denied permanent membership of the Security Council.
    • And yet, the UN is now an essential part of the fabric of international relations for two reasons:
    • 1) The salience of global issues has expanded.
    • 2) The need for multilateral approaches in finding solutions has greatly increased.

    3) Multilateral institutions have become platform for contestation

    • In the network of multilateral institutions, several belong to the UN system, others are inter-governmental, still others may be non-governmental of a hybrid character.
    • This network performs two important tasks:
    • 1) Enable governance in areas which require coordination among nation-states.
    • 2) Set norms to regulate the behaviour of states so as to avoid conflict and to ensure both equitable burden-sharing and, equally, a fair distribution of benefits.
    • While there are multilateral institutions they have become platforms for contestations among their member states.
    • There is recognition of the need to cooperate but this is seen as a compulsion rather than desirable.

    4) Globalisation driven by technology will remain here

    • Globalisation may have stalled, but as we become increasingly digitised, there will be more, not less, globalisation.
    • The pandemic has triggered galloping globalisation in the digital economy.
    • Globalisation is driven by technology and as long as the technology remains the key driver of economic growth, there is no escape from globalisation.
    • In the contemporary world, the line separating the domestic from the external has become increasingly blurred.
    • In tackling domestic challenges deeper external engagement is often indispensable. This is certainly true of climate change.
    • The pandemic originated in a third country but soon raged across national borders.
    • If there had been a robust and truly global early warning system, perhaps it could have been contained.

    5) Interconnectedness of challenges

    • We must also take into account the inter-connectedness among various challenges, for example, food, energy and water security are inter-linked with strong feedback loops.
    • Enhancing food security may lead to diminished water and energy security.
    • It may also have collateral impact on health security.
    •  It is in recognition of these inter-connections that the international community agreed on a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
    • The SDGs are cross-domain but also cross-national in character, and hence demand greater multilateral cooperation in order to succeed.

    6) Need for more democratic world

    • The lack of cooperation from even a single state may frustrate success in tackling a global challenge.
    • A fresh pandemic may erupt in any remote corner of the world and spread throughout the globe.
    • Prevention cannot be achieved through coercion, only through cooperation. It is only multilateralism that makes this possible.

    Conclusion

    It is a paradox that precisely at a time when the salience of cross-national and global challenges has significantly increased, nation-states are less willing to cooperate and collaborate in tackling them. So, there is a need for more of multilateralism to deal with the issues of global level.

  • Four lessons for the Quad from Asia’s history and geopolitics

    The article highlights the 4 issues related to the history and geopolitics of Asian that the Quad members should pay attention to while formulating the future course of action. 

    The 4 factors

    If the Quad is to prosper as a geopolitical construct, it would do well to heed four lessons drawn from the long arc of Asia’s history and geopolitics.

    1) Lack of existence of Indo-Pacific system

    • There has never been Indo-Pacific system ever since the rise of the port-based kingdoms of Indochina in the first half of the second millennium.
    •  There were two Asian systems — an Indian Ocean system and an East Asian system — with intricate sub-regional balances.
    • The effort by a U.S. to artificially manufacture to combine the Indo and the Pacific into a unitary system is unlikely to succeed.

    2) Lack of peaceful existence dominated by any power

    • The Indo-Pacific region possesses no prior experience of long period of peace, prosperity and stability engineered from its maritime fringes.
    • Rather, dynamic long cycles of Chinese influence radiating outwards have alternated with sharp periods of turmoil.
    • The of ASEAN-centred multilateralism is more in tune with regional tradition and historical circumstance.
    • For their part, the Indo-Pacific’s ‘flanking powers’, India and Japan, have never balanced Chinese power throughout their illustrious histories.

    3) India must use its leverage judiciously

    •  The sea lines of communication constitute the important links connecting Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific.
    • It is also a valuable arena of leverage vis-à-vis Chinese shipping and resource flows.
    • This leverage must be wielded judiciously on India’s terms, not on the Quad’s terms.
    • The Quad, after all, has little to offer materially with regard to New Delhi’s continental two-front dilemma.
    • However, ceding this chokepoint leverage will invite overwhelming Chinese pressure against the full range of India’s South Asian interests — to which the other Quad members possess neither will nor desire to answer.

    4) Check on China’s India Ocean Ambitions

    •  The Quad has a valuable role to play as a check on China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.
    • India must develop ingrained habits of interoperable cooperation with its Quad partners.
    • This interoperable cooperation could pre-emptively dissuade China from mounting a naval challenge in its backyard.

    Conclusion

    The Quad must consider these factors while formulating the future course of action.