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GS Paper: GS2-09.Appointment to various Constitutional posts; Constitutional Bodies(powers, functions and responsibilities); Statutory, Regulatory and Quasi-judicial bodies

  • How regulation stifles HEIs

    Why in the News

    The Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan (VBSA) Bill, 2025, now under legislative review, seeks to overhaul how Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) are regulated in India. The live question is whether a new overarching regulator will harm the quality it claims to protect, since India’s best institutions already work outside the regulators.

    What is the VBSA Bill, and why is it being questioned?

    1. What it is: The VBSA Bill, 2025 proposes a single, overarching regulatory apparatus for higher education, replacing today’s set of separate regulators. It works like one licensing office for all colleges and universities.
    2. Why it was proposed: The Bill’s stated aims are to ensure quality and accountability, enforce minimum standards, and prevent malpractice.
    3. What the critique says: The problem is regulation’s “governmentality”, the habit of governing through external supervision. When supervision replaces an institution’s own internal integrity, HEIs ask only what minimum must be shown on paper.
    4. The takeaway: A stronger regulator can produce better files without producing better teaching, which is the risk the Bill must avoid.

    How does the regulatory culture hurt teaching?

    1. Fear of the regulator: HEIs optimise academic work for the inspector, not for teaching. Teachers document evidence for annual self-assessment reports instead of asking what makes a class worthwhile.
    2. Rankings over learning: University authorities track ranking and accreditation scores, not how a teacher builds students’ intellectual engagement.
    3. ‘Paper blizzard’: Institutions now produce an evidence blizzard, a flood of digital documents made for inspection. A college can meet every norm and keep perfect files, yet its students stay disengaged.
    4. Contradictory rules: The University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulation (2018) sets norms that do not match each other:
      • it expects a 40-hour working week;
      • it requires teachers on campus for only five hours a day;
      • clarifications issued to fix such mismatches create fresh irregularities.
    5. Trust deficit and risk aversion: Constant surveillance and an assembly line model of work, which treats teaching like factory output, erode trust. Institutions then avoid risk, so innovation stalls and conventional mediocrity becomes the safest option.

    What do India’s autonomous institutions show?

    1. Outside the architecture: India’s top institutions are not bound by the regulators’ uniform formulas:
      • the Indian Institute of Science (IISc);
      • the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs);
      • the National Institutes of Technology (NITs) and Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research (IISERs).
    2. Own rules: They set curricula at their own pace, recruit through their own process and direct resources by their own strategy.
    3. Counter-evidence: If intensive regulation were the engine of quality, the most tightly regulated universities would outperform these institutions. They do not, so the regulatory logic misreads what quality higher education requires.
    4. Risk of a new casualty: Bringing these institutions under the VBSA framework would extend the same constraints to the sector’s best performers.

    Can quality be secured without the inspection model?

    1. Case for autonomy: Regulation built on force and fear ignores the moral base of society, as economist Alan Greenspan observed. Quality rises from internal integrity, not from compliance alone.
    2. The real test: The Bill succeeds only if it makes HEIs bolder hubs of teaching and inquiry, not portals that are updated for inspection.

    Challenges

    1. Compliance burden: Documentation demands take teachers’ time away from teaching and research.
    2. Metric capture: Accreditation and ranking scores reward visible outputs over classroom quality. Eg. Publication counts chased for rankings.
    3. Autonomy at risk: Folding autonomous institutions into one framework could dilute the model that works best.

    Way Forward

    1. Graded autonomy: Give more self-governance to institutions with a proven record, under a “light but tight” approach.
    2. Outcome-based inspection: Replace document checks with assessment of teaching quality and student learning.
    3. Consistent regulations: Audit UGC rules for contradictions before carrying them forward.

    Conclusion

    India’s higher education problem is less a shortage of rules than a shortage of trust in institutions to govern themselves. Whether the Bill widens autonomy or deepens inspection is the decision to watch.

    Higher education regulation in India

    1. Scale: India runs the world’s second-largest higher education system, with about 4.65 crore students enrolled in 2026 (All India Survey on Higher Education (AISHE) and NITI Aayog).
    2. Apex regulators: The UGC funds universities and sets standards. The All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) regulates technical education, and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) regulates teacher training.
    3. Accreditation bodies: The National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) grades HEIs. The National Board of Accreditation (NBA) assesses technical and professional programmes.
    4. Fragmentation: Overlapping bodies issue conflicting guidelines, delaying institutional autonomy.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12 marks] For achieving the desired objectives, it is necessary to ensure that the regulatory institutions remain independent and autonomous. Discuss in the light of the experiences in recent past.”

  • Centre frames rules to standardise recruitment to various tribunal posts

    Why in the News

    Appointments to 16 tribunals and appellate bodies will move from separate arrangements to one uniform set of recruitment and eligibility rules, run by an independent National Tribunals Commission (NTC). The Union Law Ministry has issued the National Tribunals Commission and Qualification, Selection and Conditions of Service of Chairperson and Members of Tribunals Rules, 2026.

    What is the National Tribunals Commission, and why was it created?

    1. What it is: The NTC selects and oversees the people who run tribunals, specialised bodies deciding disputes outside regular courts. It works like a common recruitment board for all of them.
    2. Court trigger: The Supreme Court struck down parts of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 for violating separation of powers and judicial independence. Parliament then created the independent, expert commission it ordered through the Tribunals Reforms Bill in August.
    3. Its aim: The NTC seeks efficient appointments that are free of executive pressure (independence), open (transparency) and the same across tribunals (uniformity).
    4. Composition: Headquartered in Delhi, it has four members, half judicial and half technical, under a chairperson who is a retired Supreme Court judge or retired High Court Chief Justice.
    5. The takeaway: Choosing tribunal heads and members now rests with the independent commission the Court itself demanded.

    What do the 2026 Rules standardise?

    1. Uniform eligibility: The rules set common recruitment and eligibility standards for tribunal posts in place of separate arrangements.
    2. Service conditions: They prescribe service conditions and remuneration for commission and tribunal office-holders.
    3. Commission pay: The NTC chairperson gets ₹2.5 lakh a month and each member ₹2.25 lakh.
    4. Tribunal parity: Tribunal chairpersons and members get similar pay, with specified exceptions.

    How do the rules handle vacancies, selection and misconduct?

    1. Advance filling: Recruitment for a vacancy must begin at least six months before it arises, so tribunals do not sit empty.
    2. Selection method: Search-cum-selection committees, panels that shortlist and pick candidates, will assess candidates through expert evaluation, personal interaction and, where needed, writing exercises.
    3. Misconduct inquiry: A formal inquiry mechanism will handle complaints of misconduct against members.

    Challenges

    1. Ministry-framed rules: The executive that litigates before tribunals has written their service rules, which keeps independence concerns alive.
    2. Litigation history: Earlier tenure and age rules were repeatedly struck down. Eg. Madras Bar Association vs Union of India (2021).
    3. Parent-ministry dependence: Tribunals still rely on sponsoring ministries for budgets and staff, which weakens their autonomy.
    4. Chronic vacancies: Tribunals have long worked with unfilled posts, and a deadline alone does not guarantee timely selection.

    Way Forward

    1. Financial autonomy: Give the NTC its own budget and secretariat, as L. Chandra Kumar (1997) envisaged a single supervising agency.
    2. Public vacancy tracker: The NTC should publish vacancies and selection timelines for every tribunal.
    3. Annual report: Require the NTC to report yearly to Parliament on appointments and inquiries.
    4. Stable tenure: Fix tenures long enough to attract serving judges and experts.

    Conclusion

    The Rules are now issued, but no date is set for the commission’s first appointments. Whether the NTC fills tribunal vacancies on time without ministry interference will decide if this reform succeeds where earlier ones failed.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2009] Consider the following statements : 1. Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was set up during the Prime Ministership of Lal Bahadur Shastri. 2. The Members for CAT are drawn from both judicial and administrative streams. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: B”

  • ‘Left out’ voters: EC orders special drive in 20 states where SIR over

    Why in the News

    Voters deleted in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) will now return through the plain statutory Form 6, not a form carrying an extra SIR declaration, in the 20 States and Union Territories (UTs) where the revision is over. The Election Commission of India (ECI) ordered this special drive amid scrutiny over 13 crore names struck off draft rolls in 30 States and UTs.

    What is the special drive, and how will it bring voters back?

    1. What the SIR was: A door to door recheck of every voter entry, like a fresh census of voters, that struck ineligible names off draft rolls.
    2. The directive: The ECI’s Secretary told all Chief Electoral Officers (CEOs), who run elections in each State, to enrol “left out” and first time electors under continuous updation, the routine process of adding voters at any time.
    3. Roll comparison and house visits: CEOs must compare pre-SIR and post-SIR rolls and list those deleted. Officials will then visit genuine voters to fill Form 6, the form for new voters, helped by party booth level agents.
    4. The takeaway: The Commission is using its ordinary enrolment route to repair exclusions its own revision created.

    Why was the SIR question dropped from Form 6?

    1. The July change: The online Form 6 began asking whether the applicant or the parents were on the roll after the last SIR. An 18 year old whose parents had been deleted could not answer truthfully.
    2. Who can change the form: Only the government can, by amending the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, and it had not.
    3. Commissioners’ objection: Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi objected in May that the Rules had not been amended. Sandhu later called the change “unauthorised/illegal”.
    4. The correction: The ECI’s letter to CEOs confines the declaration to the “SIR phase only”. Outside an SIR, the forms prescribed under the 1960 Rules apply.

    Why is control over ECINet contested?

    1. Dissent on record: The two Commissioners objected 14 times in 10 months to decisions taken without their knowledge, including centralised control of ECINet, the software holding every electoral roll.
    2. Law versus access: The law gives roll duties to Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), who maintain each constituency’s roll, and to CEOs. Sandhu noted that the Director General (IT) had centralised ECINet access instead, and Joshi sought an audit.
    3. Goa’s blocked restorations: Goa’s EROs cleared 97 deleted voters for restoration, but ECINet had no way to reverse a deletion. The Goa CEO’s messages to the Commission went unanswered.
    4. Review promised: The Commission’s September 26 meeting set up a committee with an independent IIT/IIIT expert to review ECINet.

    How is Maharashtra handling voters still under revision?

    1. No hearing for flagged voters: The September 26 meeting ruled that voters served notices need not appear for hearings. These were voters marked “unmapped”, meaning not linked to a relative in the previous roll, or flagged for “logical discrepancies” in their details.
    2. No hasty exclusion: Maharashtra, where the SIR is still under way, told EROs to give a fresh chance, a hearing and an order before removing any name.
    3. Documents at the doorstep: Booth Level Officers (BLOs) will collect documents at homes for the ERO to decide, and special camps will be held.
    4. Scale of the task: The State’s draft roll flagged 1.22 crore records for verification.

    Challenges

    1. Burden on the excluded: Wrongly deleted citizens must reapply as new voters.
    2. Software over statute: Statutory officers cannot correct rolls where the software blocks them.
    3. Divided Commission: Decisions bypassing two Commissioners weaken a multi member body.
    4. Uneven reach: House visits depend on BLO capacity, so migrants may still be missed.

    Way Forward

    1. Forms by rule only: The ECI should alter forms only after the government amends the Rules.
    2. Restore ERO powers: ECINet should let EROs reverse deletions overturned on evidence.
    3. Publish deletion lists: CEOs should publish booth wise SIR deletion lists.
    4. Formal sittings: The full Commission should decide roll procedure in recorded meetings.

    Conclusion

    The Commission has conceded that its revision left eligible citizens out and is using routine enrolment to restore them. Whether the software review returns control to the officers the law holds responsible will decide if future revisions repeat these exclusions.

    Key numbers

    1. Relatives’ details mismatch: 62.48 lakh records in Maharashtra’s draft roll.
    2. Unmapped to a relative in the previous roll: 59.75 lakh records in Maharashtra.
    3. Maharashtra camp dates: October 3, 4, 10 and 11.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • When Congress loses an election, it blames the democratic system

    Why in the News

    A mature democracy must separate electoral disappointment from institutional illegitimacy, argues a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) national spokesperson, replying to Congress attacks on the Election Commission of India (ECI). The writer holds that the Congress’s concern for ECI independence sits uneasily with its own history.

    What separates losing an election from an illegitimate one?

    1. Two different claims: Disappointment is a normal result of political competition. Illegitimacy is a grave constitutional allegation and must rest on evidence.
    2. Accepting defeat: The writer’s party lost the Bankipur by-poll without blaming the ECI, the rolls or electronic voting machines. Sometimes the voter wanted something else.
    3. Scrutiny is legitimate: Roll revisions, scheduling and Model Code of Conduct enforcement should stay open to scrutiny.
    4. Proper channels: These include representations before the Commission, judicial review and statutory remedies.
    5. The takeaway: Treating every defeat as fraud weakens the institutions through which citizens exercise sovereign choice.

    Why does the writer say Congress’s history weakens its criticism?

    1. Shah Commission findings: The Justice J C Shah Commission on Emergency excesses made severe findings on Navin Chawla’s conduct as a Delhi administrator.
    2. Chawla’s appointment: The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance still made him Election Commissioner in 2005 and Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) in 2009.
    3. M S Gill: CEC from 1996 to 2001, he later entered Parliament on a Congress ticket and served as a Union Minister.
    4. T N Seshan: The CEC who redefined the ECI’s powers later contested a Lok Sabha election for the Congress. The writer concedes none of this proves misconduct in office.
    5. Emergency precedent: After the Allahabad High Court set aside Indira Gandhi’s election, the Emergency followed, with opponents jailed and civil liberties curtailed.

    What evidence does the writer cite for the ECI’s standing?

    1. Judicial backing: In a May 2026 judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the legal basis of Bihar’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. Justice Surya Kant stressed correcting discrepancies in the rolls.
    2. Global role: The ECI is a founding member and former chair of the Association of World Election Bodies.
    3. Training capacity: Its India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management has trained election officials from scores of countries.
    4. Observer programmes: Foreign delegations join India’s Election Visitors’ programmes, though this is not a certificate of infallibility.

    Does the selection law answer the independence concern?

    1. Opposition’s formal role: The Leader of the Opposition now has a formal place in selecting Election Commissioners.
    2. How it came about: The role followed Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) and Parliament’s Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023.
    3. Contested design: The writer accepts that the law’s design can be debated and remains under judicial scrutiny.
    4. Invitation, not accusation: The Congress should take evidence-backed grievances to the Commission and courts, not turn every disagreement into a referendum on democracy.

    Challenges

    1. Government majority on the panel: Two of three panel members are from the government side, so the Leader of the Opposition can be outvoted.
    2. Post-retirement roles: No law bars former commissioners from joining parties, which feeds suspicion of partisanship.
    3. Perception of neutrality: Partisan links of past commissioners hurt trust even without misconduct.
    4. Slow remedies: Judicial review often ends after the poll, too late for the affected election.

    Way Forward

    1. Cooling-off period: Bar former commissioners from government or political roles for two years.
    2. Consensus in selection: The panel should select by consensus, or include a member from outside the executive.
    3. Evidence-led grievances: Parties should file specific, booth level objections with the ECI.
    4. Time bound review: Courts should decide roll related petitions before polls.

    Conclusion

    Separating defeat from illegitimacy protects elections, but trust in a referee also needs rules that keep it beyond the reach of whoever holds power. Judicial scrutiny of the selection law will decide whether the Opposition’s place in it is real or nominal.

    How independent is the Election Commission by design?

    1. CEC’s tenure protection: The CEC can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds applying to a Supreme Court judge.
    2. Weaker cover for Election Commissioners: Other Election Commissioners can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation. The Tarkunde (1975) and Goswami (1990) Committees suggested they get the CEC’s protection.
    3. Financial dependence: Unlike the Comptroller and Auditor General, the ECI’s budget is not “charged” on the Consolidated Fund of India, so it needs Parliament’s vote. The Law Commission’s 255th Report recommended charging it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Pause SIR and conduct an audit of voter deletions

    Why in the News

    Opposition demands to remove Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar have run into a legal framework that makes involuntary removal nearly impossible without government backing. A Congress Member of Parliament (MP) argues that the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls should be paused and its voter deletions independently audited.

    How can a Chief Election Commissioner be removed?

    1. What the rule is: Removal of a CEC is modelled on the impeachment of a Supreme Court judge. Parliament’s presiding officers must first admit a removal petition. Both Houses must then pass it by majority.
    2. Why it exists: The high bar shields an election referee from a government displeased with its decisions.
    3. What went wrong: Earlier removal notices alleging partiality were declined by the presiding officers of both Houses. The Congress and INDIA bloc allies are preparing fresh ones.
    4. Voluntary exit only: Under Section 11 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023, a commissioner may resign by writing to the President.
    5. The takeaway: A shield built for independence can become an insurmountable barrier to accountability.

    Why has political pressure not moved the CEC?

    1. Street protests: The Congress held some 930 protest agitations against the CEC in one week.
    2. Opposition demands: Opposition leaders seek the CEC’s immediate resignation and criminal proceedings over alleged bias favouring the ruling party.
    3. Coalition allies: Some partners the government depends on have sought transparency on the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) internal decisions, weakening the executive’s protection of the CEC.
    4. Government’s refusal: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will not yield to protests. A resignation would be claimed as an Opposition victory and cast doubt on past electoral outcomes.

    What is now before the Supreme Court?

    1. Unilateral decisions: One petition challenges policies and software modifications allegedly made without the unanimous consensus of the three-member ECI.
    2. Selection panel: A second petition challenges the Act’s selection panel. The Act replaced the Chief Justice of India with a Union Cabinet Minister, giving the executive a two-to-one majority.
    3. Immunity clause: Section 16 of the Act grants serving and former commissioners immunity from civil or criminal proceedings for acts done in official duty.
    4. Immunity under review: If the Court strikes the clause down, the writer says, the CEC could face dismissal and criminal prosecution.

    Why does the writer want the SIR paused and audited?

    1. Lost global standing: The ECI was once a model for the world, sought by the United Nations to advise emerging democracies.
    2. Scale of deletions: The writer claims the ECI has deleted “a global record 130 million voters” and reduced one polling booth to a single voter.
    3. Neutrality at risk: The CEC’s continued tenure threatens the ECI’s perceived neutrality, on which electoral credibility rests.
    4. Three demands: Pause the disputed SIR, disclose the ECI’s decision-making record, and back an independent audit of deletions and software changes.
    5. Cost of inaction: Until then, each election risks deepening the crisis of democracy it should resolve.

    Challenges

    1. Near immune office: A CEC the government backs faces no effective removal threat.
    2. Unaudited software: No independent body has reviewed the software changes behind deletions.
    3. Collective body in name: A multi-member design does not by itself ensure collective decisions.
    4. Partisan framing: Opposition-led protests let the government dismiss accountability demands as politics.

    Way Forward

    1. Independent sample audit: A panel outside the ECI should audit a sample of SIR deletions.
    2. Recorded decisions: The ECI should publish each commissioner’s position on major SIR decisions.
    3. Software disclosure: The rules driving deletions should be open to expert scrutiny.
    4. Selection reform: Parliament should add a member from outside the executive to the selection panel.

    Conclusion

    The design shields an election referee from the government but gives voters no route to hold it to account. The Supreme Court’s rulings on the selection panel and the immunity clause are where that balance can be reset.

    What is a Special Intensive Revision?

    1. Door to door check: An SIR is a time bound, house-to-house count. Booth Level Officers (BLOs) physically verify every voter entry, unlike the annual Summary Revision.
    2. Legal basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 allows a special revision at any time, for recorded reasons.
    3. Procedure: The Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 set how the revision is carried out.
    4. Past rounds: Intensive revisions have been held about 14 times, including in 2002 and the current cycle.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • ECI and Court make it harder, not easier to trust in independent institutions

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court and the Election Commission of India (ECI) have together handled the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in a way that disenfranchised citizens and inflicted administrative cruelty on them, argues a signed column. Because both bodies exist to guard the vote, their conduct now deepens scepticism about independent institutions.

    What went wrong with the SIR, according to the writer?

    1. What the SIR is: The SIR is a door to door recheck of every voter entry, like a census of voters. The writer accepts it may be justified in principle.
    2. Poor design and execution: It was “so badly conceived and executed” that citizens are reeling. Neither body answered critics on its fairness.
    3. Burden shifted to voters: An opaque process, including its software protocols, made citizens prove their own eligibility. The writer calls this a flaw of substance, not mere procedure.
    4. Mass appeals: The ECI filed appeals en masse against 16 lakh voters in West Bengal who had already been found eligible for inclusion.
    5. The takeaway: When the referee challenges voters it already cleared, the citizen bears the cost of protecting the vote.

    Why was the Court the only check, and how did it fall short?

    1. Shield of impeachment: The ECI controls the integrity of voting lists, and its Commissioners can be removed only by impeachment. The Supreme Court was therefore the only practical check.
    2. Safeguards not demanded: The Court could have demanded strong safeguards without curbing the ECI’s powers. It instead legitimised the exercise.
    3. Remarks from the Bench: Justice Joymalya Bagchi remarked that excluded voters could simply vote in the next election, which the writer calls ad hominem, meaning personal rather than reasoned.
    4. No urgent hearing: The Chief Justice of India (CJI) declined to expedite a petition on pending West Bengal appeals before the Rejinagar and Nandigram by-elections.

    Why does the writer see a culture of impunity, not one bad exercise?

    1. “Constitution of Impunity”: The writer’s term for arbitrary power working inside constitutional offices without abolishing them. Both bodies made up SIR procedures at will.
    2. Independence as a shield: Opposition anger targets constitutional authorities, so the government gets off lightly.
    3. Rot beyond politics: The decline spans a whole elite, including public servants, not politics alone.
    4. Nihilism about institutions: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the writer says, thrives on scepticism about constitutional functionaries, and both bodies reinforced it.
    5. Invisible victims: Excluded voters stay unmobilised and out of public view, so their numbers have not turned into political pressure.

    Can better appointment rules restore trust?

    1. Appointment question revived: The Court has belatedly questioned how Election Commissioners are chosen, since the executive dominates selection.
    2. Procedure and virtue: The Court’s own conduct shows appointment rules do not decide behaviour in office: “procedure is no substitute for virtue”.
    3. Partial admission: The ECI’s press notes partly admit procedural impropriety and promise help to voters facing queries.
    4. Signals of accountability: The Chief Election Commissioner’s resignation, or the Court repairing the SIR, would signal accountability.

    Challenges

    1. Accountability gap: Impeachment level protection leaves no routine check on the ECI’s administrative choices.
    2. Opaque technology: Voter-flagging software is not public, so excluded voters cannot contest its logic.
    3. Delay as denial: An appeal decided after a poll means that vote is lost for good.
    4. Executive led selection: Government control of selection erodes confidence even in fair appointees.

    Way Forward

    1. Published protocols: The ECI should publish the software rules used to flag voters.
    2. Time bound appeals: Courts should decide exclusion appeals before the next poll in that seat.
    3. Burden on the state: The ECI should show grounds for each deletion.
    4. Balanced selection panel: Parliament should ensure no single branch holds a majority on the panel.

    Conclusion

    Independent institutions earn legitimacy by how they treat the weakest voter, not by formal insulation. Whether the Court now hears exclusion claims before votes are cast will show if that trust can be rebuilt.

    What is the Election Commission of India?

    1. Constitutional basis: Article 324 vests the “superintendence, direction, and control” of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, President and Vice-President in the ECI.
    2. Electoral rolls: The ECI prepares and periodically revises electoral rolls.
    3. Plenary powers: Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) confirmed the ECI’s plenary powers under Article 324 to act where the law is silent.
    4. Limit on those powers: Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar (2000) affirmed the ECI’s power to ensure error free rolls, provided it follows natural justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Few judicial officers make it to High Courts despite training and decades of experience

    Why in the News

    Career judges from the subordinate judiciary fill only 233 of the High Courts’ 1,114 sanctioned posts, far below the one-third share convention leaves them in most States. It resurfaced as seven district judges’ elevation lifted the Delhi High Court to 50 working judges of a sanctioned 60.

    How do judges reach a High Court?

    1. Two streams under Article 217: Article 217 of the Constitution lets High Court judges come from the Bar (advocates) or from judicial officers of the State service. It fixes no ratio between them.
    2. The one-third convention: By convention, two-thirds of vacancies go to the Bar and one-third to the service cadre. It works like an informal quota that no law enforces.
    3. Colonial origin: Under British rule, magistrates’ courts were run by Indian Civil Service officers, who were executive officials. They mainly heard faujdari (criminal) cases, not deewani (civil) disputes.
    4. Separation of powers: The Constitution separated the judiciary from the executive. Trial courts therefore passed to independent State Judicial Services, with a career ladder of their own.
    5. The takeaway: The Constitution names both streams without a ratio, so an unwritten convention decides, and it leaves career judges only a minority of seats.

    How far short of the norm do High Courts fall?

    1. Delhi’s intake: After the latest elevations, 19 of the Delhi High Court’s 50 working judges came from the subordinate courts.
    2. National shortfall: Only 233 judges in office came from the district judiciary, against 1,114 sanctioned High Court posts. That is roughly one in five.
    3. Near the norm: Tripura, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi exceed or near the one-third share. Eg. Tripura at 40%.
    4. Far behind: Service judges make up just 9.09% in Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh, and Sikkim has no judge from its State Judicial Service.

    Why do service judges arrive too late to matter?

    1. Slow climb: Most law graduates join as civil judges in their late twenties. Reaching senior civil judge takes about 10 years, and district and sessions judge another decade.
    2. Late zone of consideration: Officers enter the zone of consideration (the pool screened for elevation) in their late fifties, leaving a few years before the retirement age of 62.
    3. Supreme Court gap: No sitting Supreme Court judge began in the trial courts. The last was Justice Bela M. Trivedi, appointed in August 2021. She retired in June 2025.
    4. Talent deterrent: A former Principal District and Sessions Judge warns that unclear career progression deters top law graduates from the lower judiciary.

    What has the Supreme Court said, and what do former judges want?

    1. Plea for a 50% quota: In 2023 the Judicial Service Association of Delhi asked the Supreme Court to direct that half of High Court seats be filled from the service quota.
    2. Plea declined: A three judge Bench declined the prayer on 25 April 2023. It left the applicants to seek remedies before a forum “permissible in law”.
    3. Advance recommendations: The Bench directed High Courts to recommend service cadre names before vacancies arise, noting that service judges often got only a few years of tenure.
    4. Case for a larger share: A retired Delhi High Court judge from the service cadre argues seats “ought to have been divided equally if not more” for the service.
    5. Faster filling: Appraisals, integrity reports and judgment records already exist for officers, so their names can be processed months before a vacancy.

    Challenges

    1. No written ratio: Article 217 fixes no proportion, so each High Court’s service share depends on the discretion of its selectors.
    2. Short tenures: Officers elevated late rarely gain the seniority needed to become a Chief Justice or reach the Supreme Court.
    3. Collegium opacity: The collegium (the panel of senior judges that recommends appointments) publishes no criteria for choosing between the two streams.

    Way Forward

    1. Minimum service share: The Supreme Court collegium should fix a published minimum service share for every High Court.
    2. Earlier promotion: High Courts should widen accelerated promotion through limited competitive examinations, in-service tests that let able officers move up ahead of seniority, so they reach district judge rank younger.
    3. Vacancy calendar: Each High Court should publish expected vacancies in advance, so service names are ready on time.

    Conclusion

    The two constitutional streams into the High Courts have narrowed in practice into a small and late share for career judges. Whether any minimum share is written down will decide if trial court experience reaches the higher Bench.

    Key numbers

    1. Telangana and Odisha: 11.90% and 15.15% of High Court judges drawn from the service.
    2. Bombay High Court: 17.02% drawn from the service.
    3. Himachal Pradesh and Delhi: 35.29% and 31.67% drawn from the service.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] Consider the following statements : 1. Pursuant to the report of H.N. Sanyal Committee, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was passed. 2. The Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court and the High Courts to punish for contempt of themselves. 3. The Constitution of India defines Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt. 4. In India, the Parliament is vested with the powers to make laws on Contempt of Court. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?4 (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 1, 2 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 only (d) 3 only Answer: B”

  • [26th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The case for accountable lottery regulation in India

    [26th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The case for accountable lottery regulation in India

    Question (2019, GS2 – 10 Marks): “From the resolution of contentious issues regarding distribution of legislative powers by the courts, ‘Principle of Federal Supremacy’ and ‘Harmonious Construction’ have emerged. Explain.
    Linkage: The B.R. Enterprises judgment is a classic example of harmonious construction and reading down a statute. The Supreme Court harmonized Union List Entry 40 (Lotteries organized by the Government of India or a State) and State List powers with Article 301 (Freedom of Trade and Commerce) to prevent discriminatory protectionism between states.

    Mentor Comment

    Prohibition of a vice with persistent demand removes legal supply and leaves the demand intact. The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 lets a State organise a lottery and lets a State prohibit lotteries organised by others. B.R. Enterprises vs State of U.P. (1999) read that second power down, so a State may exclude other States’ lotteries only by abandoning its own and becoming wholly lottery free. Faced with that trade off between revenue and regulatory control, two large States chose total prohibition and forfeited the option of running an accountable public lottery. The contest is between a State’s interest in supervising what is sold inside its territory and a legal rule built as an all or nothing choice.

    What does the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 provide?

    1. Legislative competence: Government organised lotteries fall under Entry 40 of the Union List.
    2. Section 4: The Act permits States to organise lotteries subject to the conditions in Section 4. Section 4 also permits a State to sell tickets directly, or through distributors or agents.
    3. Section 5: Section 5 empowers a State to prohibit lotteries organised by other States inside its territory.
    4. Section 6: Section 6 empowers the Union government to prohibit a lottery in violation of Sections 4 and 5.

    What harms do lotteries carry?

    1. Regressive burden: Lotteries disproportionately burden poorer households. They encourage a household to stake scarce income on a remote chance of reward.
    2. Compulsive play: Rapid draws and instant games encourage compulsive play and loss chasing.
    3. Distorted risk perception: Giant jackpots distort the perception of risk.
    4. Sales practices: Credit sales, opaque odds and manipulative advertising compound these harms.
    5. What the harms justify: These are arguments for stringent regulation, not necessarily for prohibition.

    What does a prohibition produce instead?

    1. Illegal channels: A ban pushes players towards smuggled tickets, offshore portals and unlicensed numbers betting such as matka, satta and single digit rackets.
    2. Absence of safeguards: These enterprises operate through cash agents and mule accounts. They carry no audits, no age restrictions, no secured prize funds and no effective remedy against fraud.
    3. Revenue forgone: Governments lose lottery surpluses and Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenue.
    4. Livelihoods and enforcement: Legitimate vendors, many of them poor or disabled, lose their livelihoods. Enforcement costs rise at the same time.
    5. The paradox of protection: A state seeking to protect the vulnerable leaves them at the mercy of unaccountable operators.

    Is the state’s paternalism applied evenly across classes?

    1. Permitted speculation: An affluent citizen can day trade, use leveraged derivatives or speculate in crypto assets. The risk of ruinous losses in those markets is no bar to entry.
    2. No competence test: The state does not test competence before admitting a retail trader to these markets. Securities trading involves skill, and derivatives support hedging and price discovery.
    3. The regulator’s own finding: The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) found that the vast majority of day traders, and of traders in futures and options, incurred losses.
    4. Why markets are legal: Financial markets are legal because risks are disclosed, intermediaries are regulated and fraud is punished. Adult choice is preserved alongside those safeguards.
    5. Application to lotteries: Lotteries can follow the same principle, with more stringent safeguards appropriate to games of chance.

    What does international practice show about regulating rather than banning?

    1. United States prohibition, 1920 to 1933: The United States imposed prohibition through the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act. It suppressed legal supply and left demand intact.
    2. What the ban produced: Prohibition fuelled a lucrative black market controlled by violent syndicates. Bootlegging corrupted public institutions, deprived governments of excise revenue and imposed heavy enforcement costs.
    3. The repeal: The Twenty First Amendment repealed prohibition, on the recognition that a regulated and taxed market causes fewer harms than an unenforceable ban.
    4. Controlled legality is the norm: Lotteries are legal in nearly four fifths of countries, with surpluses allocated transparently to education, health care, sports, welfare or infrastructure. Blanket prohibition survives mainly in countries enforcing strict Sharia based gambling prohibitions, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Brunei, and in closed ideological regimes such as Cuba.
    5. The public operator model: Nearly 70 per cent of lottery jurisdictions follow the public operator model. A government body, statutory authority or State owned company runs the lottery, and private firms supply retail and technology services.
    6. The concession model: The State regulates the lottery and grants operating rights to a private concessionaire.
    7. Federal practice: Lotteries operate in 45 of the 50 United States and Washington DC, in all 10 Canadian provinces and three territories, in all six Australian States and both mainland territories, and in all 16 German Lander.
    8. Cross border sales: Authorisation in one jurisdiction does not confer the right to sell in another. Cross border sales require the destination jurisdiction’s consent or its participation in a cooperative arrangement.
    9. Pooling without losing control: Powerball in the United States, Lotto 6/49 in Canada, the Australian lottery blocs and Germany’s national lottery bloc, the DLTB, let participating jurisdictions pool players and prizes without surrendering regulatory autonomy.

    What does Indian law do to a State that wants to regulate rather than ban?

    1. Res extra commercium: Settled Supreme Court jurisprudence treats gambling, including State organised lotteries, as res extra commercium, meaning an activity outside the protection of Article 19(1)(g), the fundamental right to trade, and of Article 301, the freedom of trade across India.
    2. The alcohol parallel: A parallel doctrine applies to potable alcohol and allows a State to restrict or prohibit consignments from outside its territory.
    3. Why the all or nothing rule is hard to justify: A State directly oversees its own lottery administration. Its oversight of another State’s operations inside its territory is necessarily indirect, and it still bears the local enforcement burden.
    4. The choice two States made: Tamil Nadu in 2003 and Karnataka in 2007 chose total prohibition. Both gave up the option of running accountable public lotteries of their own.
    5. How many States run lotteries: A Lok Sabha reply of 14 March 2023 identified nine States operating lotteries: Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Kerala, Maharashtra, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim and West Bengal.
    6. The fiscal context: Persistent State fiscal stress makes the widespread preference for prohibition worth reconsidering.

    What would an accountable alternative look like?

    1. First amendment, to Section 5: Parliament should clarify that Section 5 applies whether or not the prohibiting State organises a lottery of its own. The consent of the destination State should be decisive, subject to uniform treatment.
    2. Uniform treatment: A State must either admit all outside lotteries or exclude them all.
    3. Second amendment, a new Section 4A: A new Section 4A should authorise two or more States to establish a common lottery by agreement, pooling players, prizes, technology and costs.
    4. Why compulsory access is no remedy: Smaller States, especially in the northeast, face exclusion from larger markets. Compulsory access is not the remedy for that exposure.
    5. Departmental operation: Marketing agents supply guaranteed revenue. Departmental operation is more transparent and opens retail distribution to small vendors, persons with disabilities, women’s self help groups and cooperatives. That widens livelihood opportunities and limits intermediary capture.
    6. The Kerala record: Kerala earned Rs 2,883.80 crore from its lottery in the 2023 to 2024 financial year. That total is Rs 1,129.71 crore in net lottery revenue and Rs 1,754.09 crore in State Goods and Services Tax.
    7. Where the surplus goes: Kerala channels its lottery surpluses into health care and welfare. Its model is a useful template for reform rather than the only one.

    Conclusion

    A vice with persistent demand does not disappear when the state withdraws the legal channel. The transaction moves to operators who keep no accounts and answer to no regulator. The real choice for a State is therefore between an auditable public supplier and an untraceable illegal one. Current law forces that choice into an all or nothing form, so a State that wants to shut out unaccountable outside operators must first shut down its own accountable one, and it is that single provision that has to change first.

    Betting and Gambling Regulation in India

    1. Scale of the market: The online betting and gaming market was valued at 5.02 billion dollars in 2024 to 2025. It is projected to reach 10.77 billion dollars by 2030.
    2. User base: India has over 517 million online gamers, of whom 155 million play money based games. India accounts for 20 per cent of the global gaming user base.
    3. Split jurisdiction: Gambling is a State subject, and online gaming has been brought under the Union. That split produces persistent legal friction.
    4. The skill and chance test: In Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) the Court established the predominance of skill test. Horse racing qualified as a game of skill on that test.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025: The Act prohibits online money games, meaning real money betting, and permits e sports and social games.
    2. Online Gaming Authority of India: A central regulator under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology classifies games, issues digital certificates and handles enforcement.
    3. Blocking duty on intermediaries: Amendments to the information technology intermediary guidelines require an intermediary to block any platform flagged as a money game by the Authority.

  • Conflict and consensus: The rupture in the poll panel

    Why in the News

    The functioning of the three member Election Commission of India (ECI) is under scrutiny after an investigation reported that two Election Commissioners placed objections on record at least 14 times in 10 months. The poll body has responded that its decisions have been unanimous. It describes the recorded entries as observations that form part of the deliberative process. The dispute is over whether a recorded objection is a dissent or a step inside a deliberation that ends in agreement.

    How does the Election Commission take decisions?

    1. Article 324: Article 324 of the Constitution vests the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and of the conduct of elections in the Commission. It covers elections to Parliament, to the legislature of every State and to the offices of President and Vice President.
    2. Composition: The Commission consists of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and such number of other Election Commissioners as the President may appoint, subject to the provisions of law. The CEC acts as the Chairman of the Commission.
    3. Section 17: Section 17 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 requires the business of the Commission to be transacted in accordance with that Act.
    4. Section 18: Section 18 requires all business of the Commission to be transacted unanimously as far as possible. A matter on which the CEC and the other Election Commissioners differ is decided by the opinion of the majority.
    5. Equal voting rights: All three members hold one vote each, and the CEC is the first among equals. Two of the three can therefore decide a matter that is not settled unanimously.

    What does the record of past differences show?

    1. The 1993 expansion: The Commission was permanently expanded from a single member body to a three member commission in 1993. Differences have emerged between the individuals holding the posts since then.
    2. T.N. Seshan vs Union of India (1995): The then Chief Election Commissioner had challenged the appointment of the two Election Commissioners in the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the appointment and ruled that the three members hold equal status and an equal say in decision making.
    3. The 2009 removal request: In January 2009 the then Chief Election Commissioner wrote to the President seeking the removal of an Election Commissioner, citing a lack of political neutrality. No such action followed, and that Commissioner was later appointed Chief Election Commissioner.
    4. The 2019 dissent: The majority view in 2019 gave the Prime Minister and the then president of the Bharatiya Janata Party a clean chit on complaints of Model Code of Conduct violations. A member of the Commission recorded a dissent against that view, and objected that his dissent notes were not being carried into the final orders passed by the Commission.
    5. The 2020 resignation: That member was in line to take over as Chief Election Commissioner on the basis of seniority. He opted to resign from the Commission in 2020.

    How is a dissent distinguished from an observation?

    1. Recording a dissent: An Election Commissioner who disagrees with the majority view can record a dissent note on the file.
    2. The observation on the draft revision order: Before the Commission issued the order starting the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls on 24 June 2025, an Election Commissioner observed on the draft order that the exercise should not lead to harassment of voters and citizens. The recorded wording asked that genuine voters and citizens, particularly the old, the sick, persons with disabilities, the poor and other vulnerable groups, should not feel harassed and should be facilitated.
    3. Treated as an observation: That entry was treated as an observation rather than a dissent, and the revision order was eventually unanimous.
    4. Objections recorded since: The two Election Commissioners have recorded objections on files several times since. The subjects include the functioning of the poll body’s information technology infrastructure and the insertion of a new declaration in the voter enrolment form, Form 6.
    5. Routine differences: Differing opinions on matters before the Commission are a routine occurrence, on the conduct of elections and on administrative matters alike. The Commission meets once or twice a week to discuss pending matters.

    What has the Election Commission said?

    1. Observations as standard practice: Operational queries or inputs raised by members of the Commission at the draft stage are described as standard administrative practice aimed at safeguarding voter rights. The suggestions given by the Commissioners are described as being for further improving the electoral processes.
    2. Part of the decision making process: Differing views and observations are described as a normal part of deliberation in any institution, arriving before a final decision is taken.
    3. Every officer may suggest: Every officer of the Commission, and not only the three Commissioners, is authorised to give suggestions for improving the electoral system.
    4. Unanimity claimed: All decisions taken in recent months are described as the outcome of unanimous decisions. The Commission cited the recent elections in Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Assam and West Bengal in support.

    Conclusion

    The statute makes unanimity a preference and a majority decision lawful, so a recorded difference inside the poll body is not by itself a breach of procedure. What the record cannot settle is whether an entry on a file is a suggestion or a refusal to agree, because the Commission alone decides how that entry is finally described. Past differences ended in a resignation, in an appointment and in a court ruling on equal status, never in a published account of who disagreed with what. A requirement that a dissent be carried into the final order is the change that would put that description beyond the Commission’s own choice.

    Back2Basics: Model Code of Conduct

    1. What it is: The Model Code of Conduct is a set of non statutory norms agreed upon by political parties. It exists to prevent the ruling party from misusing state machinery and to curb unethical campaign practices.
    2. Duration: It takes effect the moment the poll body announces the election schedule and remains in force until the results are declared.
    3. Penalties: The Code carries no statutory penal provision. The Commission can issue warnings, censure a candidate or delay a poll, and criminal violations such as bribery and hate speech are prosecuted under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
    4. Evolution: It began in 1960 as a short set of instructions for the Kerala Assembly elections. It was consolidated into its present form in 1991.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Consider the following statements: 1. The Election Commission of India is a ‘ five-member body. 2. Union Ministry of Home Affairs decides the election schedule for the conduct of both general elections and bye-elections. 3. Election Commission resolves the disputes relating to splits/mergers of recognized political parties. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 3 only Answer: (d)”

  • FSSAI proposes ban on sale of analogue ‘paneer’

    Why in the News

    The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has proposed amending its regulations to stop non dairy substitutes being sold as paneer. These are products in which milk fats and milk proteins are replaced with vegetable oils, fats and vegetable proteins. The proposal follows an episode last year in which social media posts alleged that “fake paneer” was served at a Mumbai restaurant. The existing dairy standard already bars vegetable fat from paneer. The contested point is therefore not composition but nomenclature, since a product lawfully licensed as a dairy analogue could still reach the buyer under the name of the dairy product it displaces.

    What does the draft amendment on analogue paneer propose?

    1. Prohibition on the name: The draft notification prohibits the sale of “paneer made of constituents not derived from milk” as paneer.
    2. Stated rationale: The amendment is proposed to restrict the manufacture and sale of analogue products as paneer, to prevent misleading consumers regarding the nature and composition of the product.
    3. Existing licence holders: Products already licensed or registered under the Analogue in Dairy Context category must discontinue use of the term paneer in their nomenclature, labelling or marketing.
    4. Consultation window: FSSAI has invited suggestions on the draft notification within 60 days.

    Why did the existing dairy standard not prevent the name being used?

    1. Compositional rule: Under FSSAI’s dairy products standards, paneer may be made only from milk and milk solids.
    2. Permitted additions: The standard allows acidulants such as lactic acid, citric acid, malic acid, vinegar, glucono delta-lactone and sour whey, along with salt, spices or condiments.
    3. Exclusion of vegetable inputs: Vegetable oils, fats and vegetable proteins are not permitted in paneer under that standard.
    4. The naming gap: The standard fixes what paneer may contain. It does not fix what a product outside that standard may be called, so the term travelled to the very products the standard had excluded.

    Challenges to the ban on the sale of analogue paneer

    1. Detection capacity: Separating vegetable fat from milk fat in a mixed or cooked product needs laboratory testing rather than inspection. Eg. FSSAI’s Food Safety on Wheels mobile vans were introduced to reach districts with no fixed testing laboratory.
      The Fix: Notify a standard test method for vegetable fat in paneer and route samples from unequipped districts to an accredited laboratory.
    2. Loose and unbranded sale: A labelling prohibition binds pre packaged food, so paneer sold loose over a counter carries no declaration to check. Eg. Petty food manufacturers and retailers below the turnover threshold in the Food Safety and Standards (Licensing and Registration of Food Businesses) Regulations, 2011 only register rather than take a licence.
      The Fix: Require a composition declaration on a display board at the point of loose sale, on the model of the display duties the Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020 place on food service establishments.
    3. No lawful name for a legitimate product: Barring the term leaves dairy analogues without a name a buyer recognises, which pushes them toward vaguer descriptors. Eg. Vegetable oil based cheese substitutes are sold internationally as analogue cheese rather than as cheese.
      The Fix: Notify a positive naming convention for dairy analogues, so the category carries a lawful name of its own alongside the prohibition.
    4. Price advantage in bulk channels: Vegetable fat substitutes cost less than milk based paneer, so commercial kitchens buying in bulk keep the incentive to source them. Eg. Palm oil, the commonest vegetable fat in such substitutes, is India’s largest imported edible oil and trades far below milk fat.
      The Fix: Extend the nomenclature rule to institutional supply invoices and menus, so a bulk buyer sees the same declaration as a retail consumer.

    Conclusion

    The gap the regulator is closing is one of naming, not of composition. A standard that lists permitted ingredients does not by itself stop a substitute borrowing the name of the product it displaces, and the dairy analogue category gave such products a lawful footing from which to do so. The markers to watch are the final notification once the consultation closes and the compliance date set for existing licence holders.

    Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India

    1. Governing Act: FSSAI was established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which consolidated the earlier food laws including the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
    2. Administrative home: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    3. Mandate: It lays down science based standards for articles of food and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import.
    4. Enforcement route: It licenses or registers food businesses, and standards are enforced through State food safety commissioners and designated officers.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] With reference to pre-packaged items in India, it is mandatory to the manufacturer to put which of the following information on the main label, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011? 1. List of ingredients including additives 2. Nutrition information 3. Recommendation, if any, made by the medical profession about the possibility of any allergic reactions 4. Vegetarian/non-vegetarian Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1, 2 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 only Answer: (c)”