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GS Paper: GS2-09.Appointment to various Constitutional posts; Constitutional Bodies(powers, functions and responsibilities); Statutory, Regulatory and Quasi-judicial bodies

Censor Board meets after six years, members ask who’s on film review panel
Why in the News
The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), also known as the Censor Board, has held its 149th meeting, its first in six years and the first under its new chairperson. Members used it to ask for a list of the people who have consistently headed Revising Committees in recent years, the panels that re-examine a film when a certification decision is disputed. The request follows an investigation published in September 2025, which found that three board members had been heading most Revising Committees. The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024 require the board to meet once every quarter, and the 12-member board had last met on 31 August 2019. No member has been officially reappointed since the board was reconstituted in 2017, though the tenure is three years. A body whose membership has not been renewed and which does not meet is the body from which every panel deciding a contested certification is drawn.
What is a Revising Committee?
1. When it is constituted: A Revising Committee re-examines a film where either the producers or the board are dissatisfied with the Examining Committee’s decision.
2. What it sits above: The Examining Committee is the first panel to view a film and recommend its certificate.
3. Who staffs it: It is headed by a member of the board, which is why the identity of the recurring heads decides the outcome of contested certifications.
What did members ask for at the 149th meeting?
1. The list of recurring panel heads: Members requested a list of those who consistently headed Revising Committees in recent years to review films.
2. The finding behind the request: An investigation published in September 2025 found that three board members had been heading most Revising Committees.
3. What else was on the agenda: Recent films that had generated controversy, strategies for moving forward, and industry outreach programmes were discussed at the virtual meeting.
What do the rules require, and what happened instead?
1. The meeting requirement: Under the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024, the CBFC board must meet once every quarter.
2. The record against it: The 149th meeting took place on 29 August, and the board had last met on 31 August 2019.
3. The board resolved to do what the rules already say: It was discussed that the board should meet at least once quarterly, in accordance with the rules.
Why is the board’s own composition in question?
1. No reappointment since 2017: None of the members of the 12-member board has been officially reappointed since that year.
2. The tenure has long since run out: The stated tenure of a member is three years, and the board was last reconstituted on 1 August 2017.
3. The consequence for the panels: Revising Committees are headed by board members, so an unrenewed board narrows the pool from which every contested review is drawn.
What did the 2024 Rules change?
1. They replaced the earlier framework: The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024 were notified in supersession of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983, and that change itself came up for discussion at the meeting.
2. Age-based categories replaced a single UA mark: The 2024 Rules subdivided the existing UA category into three age-based categories, UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+, in place of the earlier twelve year mark.
3. The new categories need interpretation: A request for clarification on the difference between the 16 year and the 18 year certification was made at the meeting.
Challenges to the CBFC’s certification framework
1. Delay operates as a decision: A certificate is the precondition for theatrical release, so time taken over a review has the same commercial effect as a refusal. Eg. A film awaiting a revision date loses the release window around which its distribution and publicity were booked.
  The Fix: Fix an outer time limit for a Revising Committee to report, with automatic escalation to the board once that limit lapses.
2. The reviewer and the appellate reviewer come from one pool: Advisory panel members sit on Examining Committees and board members chair the panels that review them, so the second look is not independent of the first. Eg. Both tiers are constituted by the same appointing authority from the same panel lists.
  The Fix: Draw the revision tier from a separate roster with fixed terms, published in advance of any specific film.
3. The specialist appellate tier no longer exists: The Film Certification Appellate Tribunal was abolished by the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, so a producer’s remedy against a certification decision now lies in a High Court. Eg. Certification disputes that the tribunal would once have heard are now filed as writ petitions.
  The Fix: Restore a specialist appellate forum, or fix a statutory hearing timeline for certification writs so the remedy matches the release cycle.
4. Modifications are negotiated rather than adjudicated: A producer facing a restrictive category has an incentive to accept voluntary cuts instead of contesting them. Eg. Voluntary modifications are routinely offered to secure a less restrictive certificate.
  The Fix: Require every accepted modification and its stated ground to be recorded in a published certification order.
5. The framework does not cover the largest release channel: The Cinematograph Act, 1952 governs films for public exhibition, and content released on a streaming service falls instead under the self-regulation regime of the Information Technology Rules, 2021. Eg. The same title can carry a CBFC certificate in theatres and a self-assigned rating on a streaming platform.
  The Fix: State in law which regime a release falls under by medium, and align the age categories across the two so a rating means the same thing in both.
Conclusion
The board has resumed meeting and has put its own functioning on the record as the first item of business. Two decisions now sit with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting rather than with the board: reconstitution of a membership whose term expired years ago, and whether the list of recurring Revising Committee heads is supplied. What to watch is whether the next quarterly meeting is held on schedule, which is the first test of whether the six year gap was an aberration or the operating norm.
Back2Basics: Central Board of Film Certification
1. What it is: A statutory body constituted under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, functioning under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
2. What it does: It certifies films for public exhibition in India, and a film cannot be publicly exhibited without its certificate.
3. The certificate categories: U for unrestricted public exhibition, UA with its age-based subdivisions, A restricted to adults, and S restricted to a specialised audience.
4. How it is staffed: It has a chairperson and non-official members appointed by the Centre, with regional offices that constitute the Examining Committees.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2022] With reference to the “Tea Board” in India, consider the following statements : 1. The Tea Board is a statutory body. 2. It is a regulatory body attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. 3. The Tea Board’s Head Office is situated in Bengaluru. 4. The Board has overseas offices at Dubai and Moscow. Which of the statements given above are correct ? (a) 1 and 3 (b) 2 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 ANSWER: (d)”
September 12, 2026
SC seeks timeline for FSSAI’s food warning label roll-out
Why in the News
The Supreme Court has put the two phase rollout of front-of-pack warning labels (FoPL) proposed by the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) under scrutiny. A two judge Bench held that a “reasonable, scientifically justified and clearly defined timeline” must divide the two phases, warning that the second phase could otherwise be “indefinitely postponed”. The Court also questioned why a warning should require a product to be high in at least two nutrients of concern when excess of even one can pose a health risk. The directions came on a public interest litigation seeking mandatory front of pack warnings on packaged foods high in sugar, salt and saturated fats. The protective content of the label therefore turns on a threshold and a commencement date that the proposal left to administrative discretion.
What is front-of-pack labelling?
1. What it is: Front of pack labelling puts a summary nutrition signal on the front face of a package, so a buyer sees it without reading the nutrition table printed on the back.
2. A warning is a directive signal: A warning label declares that a product is high in a specified nutrient, which tells the buyer what to do rather than offering a score the buyer has to interpret.
3. The nutrients of concern: The Indian proposal covers added fat, added sugar and salt, each linked to non communicable disease at excess intake.
4. The threshold does the work: A product carries a warning only where it crosses a set limit on a nutrient, so the level of that limit and the number of nutrients required decide how much of the market is actually labelled.
What did the Court hold on the two phase timeline?
1. The phased design as proposed: Warnings would initially apply to packaged foods high in two or more nutrients of concern, and would extend in a second phase to products high in even one of them.
2. Why FSSAI wanted the split: The regulator proposed the phased approach to give consumers time to adapt to the new labels and the food industry time to reformulate its products.
3. The Court’s objection: The Bench held that assessment of consumer acceptability and adequate reformulation time “cannot be reason enough for this uncertainty in time”, and that a clearly defined timeline or transitionary period dividing the two phases must be indicated for the FSSAI’s approach to be a workable one.
4. The risk it named: Without a fixed timeline the second phase could be “indefinitely postponed”, which would leave the narrower first phase standing as the operative regime.
Why is the two nutrient trigger being questioned?
1. The Court’s question: It asked why a warning should initially require a product to be high in at least two nutrients of concern when excess levels of even one could pose health risks.
2. The petitioners’ ground: The petition contends that the two nutrient requirement lacks a scientific basis and would leave many products outside the first phase.
3. The alternative the Court floated: It asked FSSAI to consider a model bringing products with the highest levels of nutrients of concern under the warning regime first, followed by those crossing lower thresholds.
4. What that alternative would change: Sequencing by severity rather than by the count of nutrients would capture a product that is extreme on a single nutrient, which the two nutrient trigger currently leaves out.
5. The counter claim on the record: Stakeholders objected to placing ultra processed foods on the same footing as minimally processed packaged foods, on the ground that the latter carry greater nutritional benefit.
What else did the Court direct, and what happens next?
1. Nutritional literacy in schools: The Bench asked the Union government to incorporate nutritional literacy into school curricula, teaching children how to interpret nutritional information on a label.
2. Why children were singled out: The Bench recorded that children are particularly “vulnerable” to “impulse or uninformed dietary decision-making”, so a label by itself does not protect them.
3. The affidavit and the next date: FSSAI was directed to file an affidavit within 10 days setting out its responses and clarifications, and the matter was posted to 28 September.
4. The petition behind it: The directions came while hearing a public interest litigation filed by the non profit 3S and Our Health Society, seeking mandatory front of pack warnings on packaged foods high in sugar, salt and saturated fats.
Challenges to front of pack warning labelling in India
1. The threshold is set administratively and decides the regime: A limit fixed a little higher exempts most of the processed food shelf without any change to the rule’s text. Eg. FSSAI’s earlier Indian Nutrition Rating proposal drew criticism that its thresholds would have left most packaged snacks favourably rated.
  The Fix: Place the numerical thresholds in the regulation itself rather than in guidance, so any change requires the same consultation the regulation did.
2. A rating signal is weaker than a warning signal: A star or score lets a buyer rationalise a poor product as better than the alternative, and a warning does not. Eg. Chile’s black octagonal “high in” warnings reduced purchases of labelled products, while star rating systems elsewhere recorded smaller effects.
  The Fix: Settle on a single warning format and bar any parallel voluntary rating on the same pack face.
3. Reformulation can move a nutrient rather than remove it: A manufacturer can substitute an unlabelled ingredient to drop below a threshold without lowering the product’s health cost. Eg. Sugar replaced by non nutritive sweeteners takes a product below a sugar limit while leaving an ultra processed formulation intact.
  The Fix: Add an ultra processed classification to the pack alongside the nutrient warnings, so formulation is disclosed and not only nutrient content.
4. Advertising sits outside a labelling rule: A warning on the pack does nothing about the promotion that put the product in the trolley. Eg. Children’s programming and digital platforms carry advertising for products high in fat, sugar and salt that no packaging regulation reaches.
  The Fix: Restrict advertising of products carrying a warning label during children’s viewing hours and on platforms with a substantial child audience.
5. Most food sold in India is unpackaged: Warning labels reach the packaged segment, and not the loose, street and restaurant food where a large share of fat, sugar and salt is consumed. Eg. FSSAI’s menu labelling requirement applies only to chain restaurants above a size threshold and leaves standalone eateries out.
  The Fix: Extend calorie and nutrient disclosure to chain outlets below the current threshold and to food aggregator listings, where the menu is already digital.
6. Enforcement capacity is the binding constraint: A labelling requirement is only as real as the sampling and prosecution behind it. Eg. Food testing laboratory capacity and food safety officer strength in the States have repeatedly been flagged as short of sanctioned levels.
  The Fix: Publish a State wise compliance sampling rate for front of pack labelling, so enforcement effort is visible rather than assumed.
Conclusion
The label’s protective value sits in two numbers the proposal leaves to administrative discretion: the level at which a nutrient triggers a warning, and how many nutrients must cross it. The Court has decided neither. It has refused to let the gap between the phases stay open ended, which converts a design choice into something the regulator must now justify on the record. What to watch is whether the regulator defends the two nutrient trigger with evidence or moves to the severity first sequence the Bench proposed.
Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India
1. Its governing statute: FSSAI is a statutory body established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which consolidated several earlier food laws into a single framework.
2. Its ministry: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
3. What it does: It frames science based standards for food articles and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import.
4. How it regulates: It issues regulations such as the Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020, and licenses and registers food businesses through State food safety commissioners.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2016] With reference to pre-packaged items in India, it is mandatory to the manufacturer to put which of the following information on the main label, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011? 1. List of ingredients including additives 2. Nutrition information 3. Recommendation, if any, made by the medical profession about the possibility of any allergic reactions 4. Vegetarian/non-vegetarian Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1, 2 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 only ANSWER: (c)”
September 12, 2026
After DGCA cracks whip, dope tests begin on all pilots of Indian airlines
Why in the News
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the civil aviation regulator, has ordered every Indian airline to conduct a one time test for psychoactive substances on all its pilots by July next year. The direction was issued in August and testing has already begun. Indian airlines are estimated to employ close to 14,000 pilots. The order follows an Air India pilot testing positive for drugs after the aircraft he was commanding lost altitude suddenly on a Phuket to Delhi flight. The standing requirement is annual random testing of 10% of pilots, so the response to a single detected case is a census rather than a tighter sample.
How does a psychoactive substance test work?
1. The sample is split at collection: The employee’s urine sample is divided and stored in two separate containers.
2. The first container is screened at once: A screening test is run on that sample immediately after it is collected.
3. A non negative screening result grounds the pilot: A result indicating the presence of psychoactive substances takes the pilot off flying duty immediately, pending the confirmatory result.
4. The second container decides the case: It is sent to a designated laboratory for a confirmatory test using high complexity instrumentation, because screening can return false positives from certain medications, food items and technical errors.
What happens after a confirmed positive?
1. A medical review comes first: The organisation’s medical in charge must consult a medical review officer to establish whether the result arose from legitimate therapeutic treatment or another innocuous source rather than from drug abuse. Eg. Pain relief medication containing codeine can trigger a positive result for opiates.
2. A first offence is treated as a health problem: The employee is referred by the organisation to a specialist doctor, counsellor or de addiction centre for a rehabilitation programme.
3. Return to duty is conditional: The employee must undergo fresh testing, obtain a negative report, and obtain a fitness certificate from the organisation’s medical in charge.
4. The ladder then turns punitive: A positive result after return to duty suspends the licence for three years. A third positive result leads to cancellation of the licence.
Why has the regulator moved from a sample to a census?
1. The rule it is working around: The Civil Aviation Requirements on testing for psychoactive substances, effected in January 2022, make annual random testing of a tenth of pilots and air traffic controllers mandatory.
2. The ministry asked for more: The Ministry of Civil Aviation suggested to the regulator that every pilot undergo a test once a year in place of the random sample.
3. The revision was already under way: Consultations to revise the rules on testing aviation personnel were in progress when the incident occurred, and the incident produced calls for a stricter testing protocol and stricter disciplinary action in proven cases of drug abuse.
4. The census is an interim step: With consultations still open, the regulator chose to put all airline pilots through a single test spread over nearly 12 months. A draft of the new and more stringent norms is expected by the end of this month, per the Union Civil Aviation Minister.
Who else does the testing regime cover?
1. Air traffic controllers sit alongside pilots: The existing rules treat both groups as the primary focus segments for testing, and the one time census covers pilots alone.
2. The rules reach further than the cockpit: Aircraft maintenance engineers and certifying staff, trainee pilots, and instructors and examiners are all covered as personnel engaged in safety sensitive functions.
3. Their testing is event based: That wider group is tested at the time of hiring or after specific incidents rather than on an annual cycle.
What did the airline do before the regulator acted?
1. A voluntary round came first: The Air India Group had already initiated one time random drug tests on an estimated 5,000 pilots employed by Air India and Air India Express, before the regulator’s direction was issued.
2. Dismissal followed the investigator’s disclosure: Hours after the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau flagged the positive drug test of the pilot in command of that flight, the airline said it had terminated the pilot’s employment.
Challenges to psychoactive substance testing of aviation personnel
1. A one time census tests a date, not a habit: A single sweep across a year detects use in a narrow window and creates a predictable gap on either side of it. Eg. A pilot already tested knows that no further test is due until the revised norms take effect.
  The Fix: Move to unannounced random testing at a high annual coverage rate, so the probability of being tested stays constant instead of being exhausted.
2. A test detects consumption, not impairment in the cockpit: A positive result establishes that a substance was consumed and does not establish that performance was degraded on a particular flight. Eg. Alcohol is handled separately through pre flight breath analyser checks, precisely because impairment there is measured at the point of duty.
  The Fix: Link the regime to flight data monitoring, so a recorded performance anomaly triggers a test as readily as a test triggers an inquiry.
3. A punitive ladder suppresses self reporting: A regime in which a repeat finding costs the licence discourages a pilot from disclosing a dependency or a prescribed medication. Eg. Aviation medicine practice elsewhere pairs testing with a confidential peer support route back to the cockpit.
  The Fix: Create a protected disclosure channel with treatment and monitored return, entered voluntarily rather than after a failed test.
4. Laboratory and custody capacity is the binding constraint: Confirmatory testing needs accredited laboratories and an unbroken chain of custody, and a census multiplies both demands at the same time. Eg. A mishandled sample cannot be tested again, so a disputed result becomes unresolvable for the employee and the regulator alike.
  The Fix: Notify the designated laboratories with their assessed capacity, and audit custody records rather than only test outcomes.
Conclusion
The regulator has answered a detection failure with coverage. Testing everyone once establishes a baseline, and it does not change the odds a user faces on any given day, which is what actually deters use. The substantive decisions sit in the rules still being drafted, namely the annual coverage rate, whether testing is unannounced, and whether a pilot who comes forward is treated as a patient or as a case. Those three choices, and not the size of the first sweep, will decide whether the regime catches impairment before a flight rather than after one.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2015, GS2, 12 marks] For achieving the desired objectives, it is necessary to ensure that the regulatory institutions remain independent and autonomous. Discuss in the light of the experiences in recent past.”
September 11, 2026
Day after Cabinet move, Mann skips Chief Justice’s oath event
Why in the News
Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra has taken oath as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Punjab Cabinet had passed a resolution a day earlier demanding that the appointment and the administration of the oath be put on hold until the State’s views were obtained and duly considered. The Punjab Governor administered the oath at Chandigarh, and the Punjab Chief Minister did not attend. The Union Ministry of Law and Justice had already notified the appointment under Article 217(1) of the Constitution. The contest is over what a State’s views amount to in a High Court Chief Justice’s appointment, a consultative input the Centre may record and move past, or a consent it must first obtain.
What is the Memorandum of Procedure?
1. What it is: The Memorandum of Procedure is the written document setting out the steps for appointing judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
2. Where it comes from: It was framed to give administrative effect to the collegium system established through the Second and Third Judges cases. It is neither a statute nor part of the Constitution.
3. What it governs: It fixes who initiates a proposal, who is consulted, and the order in which the file moves between the collegium, the State and the Union government.
How was this appointment processed?
1. Collegium recommendation: The Supreme Court collegium recommended four High Court Chief Justices, including this one, on 6 August.
2. Views sought from the States: On 12 August the Centre sought the views of the Chief Ministers and the Governors of the four States concerned.
3. The notification: The Appointments Division of the Department of Justice notified the appointment on 5 September under Article 217(1), with effect from the date the appointee assumes charge.
4. He was already discharging the office: The Centre had asked him on 1 June to perform the duties of Chief Justice, after the previous Chief Justice was elevated to the Supreme Court.
What does Punjab say was violated?
1. The resolution: An emergency Cabinet meeting resolved that the appointment and the administration of the oath be held until Punjab’s views were obtained and duly considered.
2. Consent, not consultation: The State’s stated position is that the appointment was made without obtaining the consent of the State government.
3. A pattern claim: The resolution described the step as another instance of the Centre bypassing Punjab’s constitutional rights and established procedure.
4. The ground stated publicly: The Chief Minister’s objection rested on the Memorandum of Procedure and on constitutional norms rather than on any statutory bar.
Where does the process actually leave a State?
1. Article 217(1) names its consultees: The President appoints a High Court judge after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the Governor of the State. A Chief Minister acts through the Governor and is not a separate consultee.
2. No deadline binds a State’s reply: The Memorandum of Procedure stipulates no time period within which a State must respond to a request for its views.
3. Chief Justice appointments move fastest: Consent for the appointment of a Chief Justice is dealt with immediately in practice, so a State that does not answer quickly is overtaken by the file.
4. Consultation is not concurrence: A collegium recommendation reiterated after reference back binds the executive. A State’s view is an input into that process and not a veto over it.
Why is this friction not an isolated episode?
1. A pending money order against the State: The High Court directed the Punjab government on 3 August to release pending dearness allowance instalments and arrears to employees and pensioners.
2. The State has gone to the Supreme Court: Punjab has filed a special leave petition against that ruling, delivered by a division bench headed by the same judge while he was acting Chief Justice.
3. Policies stayed and rolled back: The High Court stayed the Land Pooling Policy, 2025 in August 2025 and the Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 in December 2025, and the State later withdrew or reversed both.
4. Welfare corpus diversion blocked: In July 2026 the High Court stayed a proposal to divert the Punjab Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Board corpus to other schemes.
5. The electoral clock: Punjab Assembly elections are less than six months away, which gives the confrontation a political audience it would otherwise lack.
Challenges to the Memorandum of Procedure
1. It carries no legal force: The Memorandum is an executive document, so no participant can be compelled to complete a step within any time. Eg. The revised Memorandum sought after the National Judicial Appointments Commission judgment of 2015 has still not been settled between the government and the collegium.
  The Fix: Give the Memorandum statutory backing, so each stage carries a deadline that a court can enforce.
2. Delay operates as a silent veto: The Union government can sit on a recommendation without formally rejecting it, which produces the outcome of a rejection without the record of one. Eg. Names reiterated by the collegium have remained pending with the government for well over a year on repeated occasions.
  The Fix: Treat a reiterated recommendation as notified if the government does not act on it within a fixed period.
3. The consultation record is closed: Views submitted by a State or a Governor are never published, so a claim that they were ignored cannot be tested by anyone. Eg. Punjab’s objection here rests on a file that no one outside the process can read.
  The Fix: Publish the sequence of consultations for every appointment, with the date each input was received and acted on.
4. Transfers proceed without stated grounds: The Memorandum does not set out the criteria on which a judge is moved from one High Court to another. Eg. Collegium resolutions record transfers as being in the interest of better administration of justice, with no further reasoning.
  The Fix: Require a written and published reason for every transfer proposal before it is acted upon.
Conclusion
The appointment has gone through and the disagreement it exposed has not. A State can be consulted on a High Court appointment while nobody is obliged to wait for its answer, which makes the consultation real in form and empty in effect. That gap is not a Punjab problem, and it will recur wherever a State government and the Centre sit on opposite sides. Closing it needs a written timeline binding on both, not a resolution passed after the file has already moved.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2017, GS2, 10 marks] Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ with reference to appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India.”
September 8, 2026
Why does India’s food safety system need a Clint Eastwood?
Why in the News

India’s food safety regulation fails at disclosure and enforcement rather than at data collection. Between May and July a Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration drive led by a 2005 batch Indian Administrative Service officer inspected 3,137 restaurants, issued 764 improvement notices and shut 165 eateries.

What is FoSCoS?
1. The regulator’s integrated digital platform: The Food Safety Compliance System (FoSCoS) is the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India’s single platform for licensing, inspections, laboratory results and penalties, with the compliance chain digitised and connected.
2. The designed sequence: A violation is found, a laboratory test is ordered, results are analysed, an audit is conducted, adjudication follows, a penalty issues and the establishment is closed.
3. The record is held, never published: The platform accumulates violation data that never reaches the person choosing where to eat.
Why does the enforcement chain stall?
1. The design is a series of checkpoints: A violation sits in audit, then in adjudication, then in enforcement.
2. No step carries a closing clock: Each checkpoint can hold a file indefinitely, so a violation is never formally disposed of.
3. The system has more blockers than doers: The count of officers who can stop a file exceeds the count who can conclude one, so enforcement resumes only when a senior officer personally drives it.
What did the Maharashtra drive actually demonstrate?
1. A crackdown is not a system: The drive produced closures at a scale the routine machinery had not, using powers the routine machinery already held.
2. A folk hero is evidence of failure: Celebrating an enforcement officer amounts to conceding that the enforcement design does not work without one.
3. The output is not durable: An enforcement wave attached to one officer’s posting ends with that posting, and the platform returns to recording violations nobody acts on.
What do the disclosure regimes elsewhere show?
1. Singapore publishes the result where the customer stands: Inspections and rules resemble India’s. A failed inspection produces a rating displayed on the storefront and online.
2. The pressure that works is commercial: The owner fears customers who see a failed grade and walk away, not the inspector or the fine. Revenue falls the same week and the problem is fixed at once.
3. Denmark and Australia publish within days: Violations become public within days and the media carries them.
4. Publication also disciplines the regulator: A lenient district looks bad against a neighbouring district’s published record, so an official cannot let files sit unseen.
Why would publication work where inspection has not?
1. The system is built for the wrong user: The compliance chain is designed for the convenience of the regulator, and the customer, who bears the risk, sees none of its output.
2. Automatic publication is the specific proposal: Violation data should go public online within 48 hours, in food delivery apps and in restaurant windows, so a customer knows before ordering.
3. A working regulator is invisible: Countries with published hygiene ratings generate no news coverage of their food safety enforcers, because enforcement there is routine rather than exceptional.
Where else would published regulatory data change behaviour?
1. Real estate: Buyers cannot tell whether a building was flagged for structural problems. Municipal violation history displayed in property listings would move demand away from flagged buildings and force developers to remedy them.
2. Television channels: Official data exists on complaints against news channels for fake news, hate speech and bias, and never appears at the point where a viewer chooses a channel.
3. Schools: Education departments inspect schools and record violations that parents never see while comparing institutions.
4. Hospitals: Data on doctor complaints, disciplinary action and malpractice cases is held and withheld, so a patient chooses on reputation alone.
Challenges to the food safety regulator’s enforcement design
1. Testing capacity and procedure are the weak link: An enforcement order stands only if the sampling and laboratory chain behind it survives challenge. Eg. The 2015 national recall order on Maggi noodles was set aside by the Bombay High Court in August 2015, partly over how the samples had been tested.
  The Fix: Accredit a referral laboratory for every zone and publish its sample turnaround time against a fixed standard.
2. Penalties are capped in absolute rupees: A ceiling fixed in the statute does not scale with the turnover of the business penalised. Eg. Section 52 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 caps the penalty for sub-standard food at Rs 5 lakh.
  The Fix: Link the penalty for a repeat violation to declared annual turnover rather than to a flat statutory ceiling.
3. Most food businesses are registered rather than licensed: Small operators below a turnover threshold need only registration, which carries a lighter inspection and record obligation. Eg. Street food vendors and small eateries fall almost entirely into the registration category.
  The Fix: Extend a simplified published hygiene grade to registered outlets, so the lighter compliance route still produces a visible signal.
4. The regulator sets standards and does not enforce them: Designated officers and food safety officers are appointed and paid by State commissioners, so the national platform records violations that no national authority can act on. Eg. An enforcement drive in one State changes nothing about a chain’s outlets in the next State.
  The Fix: Publish State-wise enforcement counts and pendency on the platform, so a State’s inaction is visible against its neighbours.
Conclusion

The instrument that would change behaviour is already built and already loaded, and it is pointed at the regulator instead of at the customer. Disclosure converts a compliance record into a commercial consequence, which is the one pressure a restaurant answers within the week. What is worth watching is whether any State food safety commissioner makes publication automatic and time-bound rather than discretionary, since the platform holding the data is national and the decision to open it is not.

Laws and Rules Governing Food Safety Regulation
1. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006: Consolidated the earlier food laws into a single statute and created the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India as the standard-setting regulator.
2. It repealed the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which had governed food adulteration for five decades.
3. Food Safety and Standards (Licensing and Registration of Food Businesses) Regulations, 2011: Split food businesses into registration and licensing categories by turnover and scale of operation.
4. Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020: Fixed the mandatory declarations and the display obligations for food service establishments.
5. Consumer Protection Act, 2019: Created the Central Consumer Protection Authority, which acts against misleading advertisements and unsafe goods independently of the food regulator.
Government Initiatives for Food Safety
1. Eat Right India: The regulator’s national movement combining regulatory measures, industry self-compliance and consumer awareness on safe and healthy food.
2. Food Safety Training and Certification (FoSTaC): Mandatory training and certification of food safety supervisors for licensed food businesses.
3. Clean Street Food Hub and Eat Right Station certification: Audited hygiene certification for street food clusters and railway stations.
4. BHOG, Blissful Hygienic Offering to God: Hygiene certification programme for places of worship that prepare and distribute prasad.
[2018] Consider the following statements:

1. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 replaced the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

2. The Food Safety and Standard Authority of India (FSSAI) is under the charge of Director General of Health Services in the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

(a) 1 only

(b) 2 only

(c) Both 1 and 2

(d) Neither 1 nor 2
September 7, 2026
State consent not taken, put HC Chief Justice appointment on hold: Punjab Govt
Why in the News
The Punjab Cabinet has passed a resolution demanding that the appointment of Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court be put on hold. The resolution states that the Centre notified the appointment without obtaining the State government’s views, as the Memorandum of Procedure for the appointment of High Court judges requires. The Supreme Court Collegium had recommended four High Court Chief Justices on 6 August. The Centre sought the views of the Chief Ministers and Governors of the four States on 12 August, and notified the appointments on 5 September. The contest is over a document that gives a State a consultative role, sets no period within which the State must use it, and creates no right the State can enforce.
What is the Memorandum of Procedure?
1. A working document, not a statute: The Memorandum of Procedure sets out the steps by which judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are recommended, consulted on and appointed. It carries no statutory force and confers no enforceable right on any party.
2. It came out of the Judges cases: The Supreme Court’s Second Judges case (1993) and Third Judges case (1998) placed primacy in a Collegium of senior judges. The Memorandum was drawn up afterwards to record how the Collegium and the executive would process an appointment.
3. The State enters as a consultee: For a High Court appointment the Centre seeks the views of the Chief Minister and the Governor of the State before the recommendation is processed for notification.
What has Punjab demanded, and on what ground?
1. A hold on the appointment and the oath: The Cabinet resolved at an emergency meeting that the appointment and the administration of oath be put on hold until Punjab’s views are obtained and duly considered.
2. The stated ground is procedural bypass: The Cabinet described the appointment as “yet another instance” of the Centre bypassing Punjab’s constitutional rights and established procedure.
3. The objection was escalated to the constitutional heads: The Chief Minister wrote to the President, the Prime Minister and the Governor, enclosing the resolution. The Chief Minister is not expected to attend the oath ceremony.
4. The Bar has framed it as executive overreach: The Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association has read the notification as the executive acting past a procedural safeguard rather than as a routine posting.
Why did the appointment proceed without Punjab’s response?
1. The document fixes no time period: Nothing in the Memorandum states how long a State may take to send its views.
2. Convention supplies the missing clock: Consent for a Chief Justice is conventionally dealt with immediately, and inputs from a Chief Minister on a High Court judge take four to six weeks.
3. Silence is read as assent: After a certain period the Law Ministry deems that the State government had no objection to the recommendation.
4. Three other States had already replied: Bihar, West Bengal and Maharashtra sent their inputs immediately. The delay by Punjab held up those three appointments as well.
Where does this leave the wider appointments cycle?
1. Every High Court now has a regular Chief Justice: Eight appointments were notified on Collegium recommendations of 6 August and 31 August, filling all 25 High Courts. The Chhattisgarh appointment followed separately after its sitting Chief Justice retired on 4 September.
2. The Collegium’s attention shifts to the top court: Four vacancies remain in the Supreme Court, which trace to the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026 raising the sanctioned strength in May. The Court currently sits at 34 judges.
3. The window is narrow: A fifth seat falls vacant on 29 November on a retirement, and the Chief Justice of India retires on 9 February 2027. These are the last recommendations the present Collegium can make.
Challenges to the Memorandum of Procedure
1. The revised document has stayed unsettled for a decade: After the Supreme Court struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), a five judge Constitution Bench directed the government to finalise a revised Memorandum. Eg. Successive drafts have moved between the Collegium and the Law Ministry without agreement on a national security exception or on a permanent secretariat.
  The Fix: Settle the revised document against a dated deadline set by the Court, so that the operative rulebook is a published text rather than a decade of correspondence.
2. No clause binds the executive to notify within a period: A recommendation the Collegium reiterates is binding in substance, and nothing fixes when the notification must issue. Eg. Justice K M Joseph’s elevation was recommended in January 2018, returned by the government, reiterated in July 2018 and notified only in August 2018.
  The Fix: Write a fixed outer limit for notification into the revised Memorandum, with the recommendation taking effect on its expiry.
3. The criteria for selecting a Chief Justice are unpublished: Seniority combined with suitability operates as a convention rather than as a stated test, so a comparative assessment cannot be examined. Eg. Collegium resolutions record the name recommended without the assessment that produced it.
  The Fix: Publish the criteria and an anonymised comparative note with each Chief Justice recommendation.
4. A State’s view has no remedy attached to it: The Memorandum creates no right, so a State that believes it was not consulted has no forum that can stay the appointment. Eg. Punjab’s objection could travel to the President and the Prime Minister and to no authority able to halt the oath.
  The Fix: Record the State’s response, or its absence, on the file as a dated entry that the notification must recite.
Conclusion
The dispute is not about the individual appointed. It sets a State’s claim to be consulted against a document that binds nobody and can be satisfied by the passage of time. A State that responds late has its silence converted into consent, and a State that objects afterwards has nowhere to take the objection. Until the Memorandum of Procedure is itself settled, a State’s dissent on a judicial appointment will keep arriving as a political resolution rather than as a step in the appointment process.
Back2Basics: The Collegium system
1. What it is: A body of the senior most judges of the Supreme Court that recommends appointments and transfers of judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
2. Composition: The Chief Justice of India and the four senior most judges of the Supreme Court for Supreme Court appointments. A smaller collegium of the Chief Justice of India and two senior most judges handles High Court recommendations.
3. Source of authority: It is a judicial creation, not a constitutional provision. Articles 124 and 217 speak only of consultation with the judiciary.
4. The executive’s residual role: The government may return a recommendation once with its objections. A reiterated recommendation is binding on it.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.”
September 7, 2026
Judicial integrity – a case the Court cannot ignore
Why in the News
A sitting judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice Sandeep Mehta, wrote three letters to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) on 2, 10 and 17 August seeking the immediate transfer of the Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma. The letters allege victimisation of judges, maladministration, improper shifting of cases to his own Bench, and nepotism in appointments to the Permanent Lok Adalat. The last of the three records concern at the CJI’s inaction, with Justice Sharma due to retire on 26 September. The stated response is that allegations cannot be treated as findings and must be dealt with strictly through the established institutional mechanism. The tension is that the established mechanism is precisely what has not worked, since the appointment system carries no published criteria and the removal machinery has never removed a judge.
What is the “master of the roster” power?
1. What the power is: The Chief Justice of a court holds the exclusive administrative authority to constitute Benches and to assign cases among them.
2. Where it comes from: It rests on convention and on the Supreme Court’s own rulings treating the Chief Justice as first among equals for administrative purposes, not on any statutory provision.
3. Its reach in this case: The power covers roster allocation for the whole court, and it is exercised by the Acting Chief Justice wherever the office of Chief Justice is vacant.
What do the letters allege?
1. Interference with the roster: Cases were allegedly shifted improperly to the Acting Chief Justice’s own Bench, in misuse of the master of the roster power.
2. Pressure on colleagues: Judges were allegedly intimidated with the threat of retributive measures including transfers, on the basis of claimed proximity to the CJI.
3. Favouritism at the Bar: The letters refer to specific instances of alleged favouritism towards a chosen few among the lawyers.
4. Appointments outside the court: Nepotism is alleged in appointments to the Permanent Lok Adalat, the statutory body that decides disputes relating to public utility services and whose award is final and binding.
5. The state of the record: There has been no official denial of the reports concerning the contents of the letters, and Justice Sharma has publicly denied the accusations as baseless.
What is the record behind the appointment itself?
1. A long acting tenure: The High Court functioned under an Acting Chief Justice for about 11 months, which is not a sound institutional arrangement for a court of that size.
2. An earlier transfer out: Justice Sharma was transferred to the Patna High Court in 2022.
3. A rejected repatriation: His request to return to the Rajasthan High Court was rejected by the Collegium in 2023, which instead proposed his transfer to the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
4. A reversal without a stated reason: He was nonetheless retransferred to the Rajasthan High Court in 2025 and then allowed to function as Acting Chief Justice with wide administrative and judicial powers.
How did the institution respond?
1. The Bar acted first: Lawyers staged a sit-in protest on the High Court premises, following which Justice Sharma opted out from hearing cases.
2. The Collegium moved on the vacancy: On 31 August the Supreme Court Collegium recommended the appointment of Justice Sanjay Agrawal as the new Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, and that appointment has since been made.
3. The complaint itself drew no step: For several weeks no cogent step was initiated on the letters, with the retirement date approaching.
4. The trust cost is measurable: Transparency International’s 2002 report, based on a household survey, identified the judiciary as the second-most corrupt institution in certain South Asian countries including India.
Why does the appointment system produce this?
1. There are no criteria at all: The selection of judges proceeds without published standards against which a candidate can be assessed or a rejection explained.
2. The Collegium and the Executive must collaborate: The unavoidable joint working of the Collegium and the Union Executive under the present system makes appointments partisan, opaque and often arbitrary.
3. The filter cannot do the job asked of it: A process built this way is incapable of identifying the cleanest and most meritorious candidates.
4. The link to corruption is direct: Corruption in the judiciary is inseparable from the method of selecting candidates for judicial office, so the accountability problem starts at entry rather than at removal.
Why does the removal machinery not work?
1. The inquiry statute is dormant: The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is inadequate to tackle judicial corruption and has for all practical purposes become defunct.
2. A criminal investigation cannot begin: In K. Veeraswami vs Union of India (1991) the Supreme Court held that the permission of the CJI is a necessary precondition for registering a First Information Report against a judge of the higher judiciary. The requirement is circular in practice, because the police will not seek permission without clinching evidence and cannot obtain that evidence without investigating.
3. Impeachment has failed as a route: Removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, as provided by Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) of the Constitution, has not worked in practice.
4. The internal route has no teeth: The in-house mechanism adopted by the Supreme Court in 1999 has not proved fault-free or effective.
5. The legislative fix lapsed: The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill passed the Lok Sabha in 2012 and lapsed with the dissolution of the 15th Lok Sabha in 2014, and the later effort to revive it with changes remained a non-starter.
What do other systems do differently?
1. Canada invites applications: Candidates apply for judicial office rather than being identified privately, so the pool and the criteria are both visible before a selection is made.
2. The United Kingdom uses an independent body: Judicial selection is conducted by a body separate from both the judiciary and the executive, which breaks the circularity of judges choosing judges.
3. Neither is currently available in India: Both arrangements remain unthinkable in the Indian setting, which is why the accountability argument keeps returning to the removal stage rather than the entry stage.
How have earlier Chief Justices responded to comparable situations?
1. The 1990 precedent, advice to step back: When an inquiry was underway against Justice V. Ramaswami for alleged misconduct, the then CJI advised him to take leave and keep away from judicial work.
2. The 1993 precedent, work withheld after a failed motion: The impeachment motion against him failed in Parliament following the Congress party’s strategic abstention. He attempted to resume judicial work with about nine months of tenure remaining, and the then CJI refused to allocate any cases to him for hearing.
3. The recent precedent, immediate transfer: After partly burnt currency notes were reportedly found at the Delhi residence of Justice Yashwant Varma, the then CJI quickly transferred him to the Allahabad High Court, where he was practically not allocated judicial work.
4. The Court’s own statement of the duty: In XXX vs Union of India (2025) the Supreme Court emphasised the responsibility of the CJI in matters relating to judicial integrity and allegations of corrupt practices.
Challenges to judicial accountability in India
1. Asset declaration rests on resolution rather than statute: Judges of the higher judiciary declare their assets under an internal resolution, so a failure to declare carries no legal consequence. Eg. Publication of the declarations on the Supreme Court’s website began only in 2025.
  The Fix: Place the declaration requirement in statute, with an annual filing deadline and a public register maintained by an authority outside the court.
2. The selection record stays outside disclosure: The reasons recorded for an elevation, a rejection or a transfer are not published, so a questionable appointment cannot be traced to a reasoning. Eg. The 2023 rejection of a repatriation and the 2025 reversal of that position were never explained on the record.
  The Fix: Publish the Collegium’s recorded reasons for every recommendation and every transfer at the time the decision is communicated.
3. The in-house procedure runs to no timeline: An internal inquiry proceeds at the discretion of the CJI, with no fixed stage limits and no published outcome. Eg. The procedure can end in advice to resign, leaving no finding on the record at all.
  The Fix: Fix statutory timelines for each stage of the inquiry and require publication of the finding, with reasons, on completion.
4. Removal depends on parliamentary arithmetic: The final step turns on the numbers in both Houses rather than on the inquiry’s finding, so a party decision can defeat a proved case. Eg. No judge of the higher judiciary has ever been removed under the constitutional procedure.
  The Fix: Make an adverse inquiry finding trigger the automatic withdrawal of judicial work, so the consequence does not wait on a vote.
Conclusion
Two failures are operating at once and neither can substitute for the other. Entry into the higher judiciary is decided without published criteria, and exit from it is governed by a statute that has never produced a removal, which leaves everything in between resting on how quickly one officeholder chooses to act. That is not accountability but discretion, and discretion is what the present controversy has tested. The measure of what follows is whether a complaint carrying verifiable material now generates a recorded step with a date attached to it, rather than a retirement that closes the file.
Back2Basics: The Collegium system
1. What it is: The mechanism through which the higher judiciary selects its own judges, evolved through the Supreme Court’s judgments rather than from the text of the Constitution.
2. Its origin: The Second Judges Case (1993) and the Third Judges Case (1998) read the word “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 as requiring the concurrence of the CJI, and fixed the collegium’s composition.
3. Its composition: The CJI and the four senior most judges of the Supreme Court decide Supreme Court appointments; the CJI and the two senior most judges decide High Court appointments and transfers.
4. The failed replacement: The National Judicial Appointments Commission, created by the 99th Constitutional Amendment, was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 as violating judicial independence, leaving the collegium in place.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2019] Consider the following statements: 1. The- motion to impeach a Judge of the Supreme Court of India cannot be rejected by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 2. The Constitution of India defines and gives details of what Constitutes ‘incapacity and proved misbehaviour’ of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India. 3. The details of the process of impeachment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India are given in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. 4. If the motion for the impeachment of a Judge is taken up for voting, the law requires the motion to be backed by each House of the Parliament and supported by a majority of total membership of that House and by not less than two-thirds of total members of that House present and voting. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 (b) 3 only (c) 3 and 4 only (d) 1, 3 and 4 (c)”
September 7, 2026
SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr
Why in the News

The Supreme Court has directed States to raise the retirement age of judicial officers in the district judiciary from 60 to 62 years. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India passed the order on 1 September, and the text was published on Friday. The Court recorded that 5.18 crore cases lie pending in district courts across the country. It described stopping the attrition of experienced judicial talent as the “crying need of the hour”, warning that access to justice would otherwise remain “a mere chimera” because of unfilled posts. Only seven States have agreed so far. The rest have resisted on the ground of financial burden, which the Court has held to be arithmetically misconceived.

What has the Court directed, and to whom?
1. The seven States that agreed: Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have agreed to enhance the retirement age of their judicial officers.
2. The deadline for them: These State governments have been directed to amend their service rules within two months.
3. The condition attached: The High Court concerned will enhance superannuation to 62 years for an officer on attaining 60, subject to an assessment of that officer’s suitability.
4. The States and Union Territories yet to agree: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Keralam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Puducherry have responded with a direct refusal or have taken no position at all.
5. The deadline for them: They have been directed to take a decision on enhancement to 62 years within two weeks.
Why does the Court treat attrition rather than recruitment as the binding constraint?
1. Recruitment has not filled the cadre: Most recruitment drives undertaken in the various States have not produced optimum recruitment or filled the sanctioned cadre strength.
2. The gap is universal: A yawning gap between sanctioned strength and working strength persists across the board.
3. Recruitment is slow by design: Selecting independent and competent judicial officers is an arduous task, so a post is not refilled at the speed at which it falls vacant.
4. What that leaves as the available lever: Retaining an officer already in service is the only step that adds working strength without waiting for a recruitment cycle.
Why does the Court reject the financial burden objection?
1. What the States fear: States cite the cost of paying the maximum salary in the pay scale for a further two or five years, and a higher outlay on retiral benefits.
2. The parity fear: States also apprehend that employees in other State services would demand the same extension for themselves.
3. Why the Court calls that misconceived: Judicial officers render a specialised service, so an extension confined to them does not found a claim by other cadres.
4. The 1992 precedent quoted: The alleged burden on the State exchequer is negligible against the enormous advantage the administration of justice and society at large derive from a higher retirement age.
5. The double spend: A State that retains retirement at 60 pays post retiral dues to the officer who has left and salary to the officer newly appointed, in the same period.
6. What continuation does to that cost: Allowing an experienced officer to serve to 62 postpones the post retiral outlay rather than adding to it.
What safeguard have the High Courts proposed?
1. Why most High Courts agreed: Most State High Courts consented to the enhancement because they are face to face with the crisis in the dispensation of justice.
2. The rider: Some High Courts, including Madras, have recommended a thorough assessment of judicial work as a condition precedent to continuation in service.
3. What the rider is for: Only competent officers of proven integrity would be permitted to continue in the cadre.
4. The Court’s view of it: The suggestion preserves experienced officers while removing what the Court called the “clog of deadwood” that blocks the entrance of young blood into the system.
Challenges to raising the retirement age in the district judiciary
1. The sanctioned strength is itself inadequate: Extending tenure fills posts within an existing cadre, and the cadre was fixed against a judge to population ratio far below what has been recommended for India. Eg. The Law Commission’s 120th report of 1987 recommended 50 judges per million population, against a sanctioned figure that has stayed close to 21.
  The Fix: Revise sanctioned cadre strength against a stated case load norm, and attach a dedicated State budget line to the additional posts.
2. A suitability assessment can become an informal removal power: Continuation to 62 will turn on a High Court’s assessment, which inserts a discretionary stage into a service that otherwise holds tenure until superannuation. Eg. Compulsory retirement of judicial officers on the administrative side has repeatedly been challenged before the Supreme Court.
  The Fix: Publish the assessment criteria in advance and require a written reasoned order with an internal review, so a refusal to extend can be tested.
3. Court infrastructure does not expand with tenure: A retained officer needs a courtroom, support staff and record space, and district court infrastructure is funded through a centrally sponsored scheme that depends on State matching contributions. Eg. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary has run since 1993-94 with persistent shortfalls in court halls and residential units.
  The Fix: Link the release of infrastructure funds to the number of judicial officers actually working in a district rather than to sanctioned posts.
4. The promotion chain below is frozen: Officers waiting for elevation to the District Judge cadre and for High Court appointment from the service quota face a two year delay in every vacancy. Eg. Appointments to High Courts from the district judiciary already move slowly through the collegium process.
  The Fix: Expand the number of posts in the higher judicial service in step with the extension, so the vacancy chain continues to move.
5. Pendency has drivers that bench strength does not reach: Adjournments, failure of service of summons and the volume of government litigation extend case life independently of how many judges sit. Eg. Government departments and their agencies remain the largest single class of litigant before Indian courts.
  The Fix: Enforce the three adjournment limit already written into Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and screen government appeals before they are filed.
Conclusion

The Court has converted a suggestion into a directed timeline, and the decision now sits with State governments rather than with the judiciary. Its reasoning treats the age of superannuation as the one lever that can be pulled without waiting for a recruitment cycle to conclude. The case is listed again on 1 October, by which time the States that have not responded are required to have taken a position.

Back2Basics: The District Judiciary under the Constitution
1. Article 233: The Governor appoints district judges in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in that State.
2. Article 234: Persons other than district judges are appointed to the State judicial service by the Governor, under rules made after consulting the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
3. Article 235: Control over district courts and subordinate courts, including posting, promotion and leave of judicial officers, vests in the High Court.
4. Why a State government must act: Conditions of service, including the age of superannuation, are fixed by rules the State government frames, so a High Court’s consent by itself does not change a retirement age.
[2017, GS2, 10 marks] Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ with reference to appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India.
September 5, 2026
Bar Council has no power to punish students: SC
Why in the News
The Supreme Court has held that the Advocates Act, 1961 confers no power, expressly or impliedly, on the Bar Council of India (BCI) or the State Bar Councils to take disciplinary or punitive action against law students. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India recorded that only the parent university or the competent authority under law holds disciplinary power over students. The holding answers the BCI’s letters of 13 August, which asked NALSAR, the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, to open an inquiry against students who had protested at their convocation, and asked the State Bar Councils to block their professional enrolment. The regulator withdrew those letters and argued that no cause of action survived. The Court fixed the boundary of the regulator’s jurisdiction anyway, to protect university space and the right to dissent against a repetition.
What is the Bar Council of India and where does its authority begin?
1. It is a statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, and the State Bar Councils are constituted under the same Act for each State.
2. Its core functions are professional: It lays down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, safeguards their rights and privileges, and exercises disciplinary control over the profession.
3. It also recognises law degrees: The Act gives it a role in promoting legal education and in recognising universities whose law degrees qualify a person for enrolment as an advocate.
4. The roll of advocates is maintained by the States: A State Bar Council enrols an advocate and maintains the roll on which that advocate’s name appears.
What did the Court actually hold?
1. The statute contains no power over students: The Advocates Act, 1961 confers no express or implied power on the BCI or the State Bar Councils to discipline or punish law students.
2. Jurisdiction begins at enrolment: The regulator’s disciplinary powers under the Act are limited to registered advocates, so it does not enter the picture before a student is enrolled.
3. Disciplinary power over students is exclusive to the institution: Only the parent university or the competent authority under law can take action against a student.
4. The letters were extinguished: The 13 August letters were declared obsolete, and the Indian Express account records them as being without authority of law and bad in law.
5. The chairperson’s position was covered too: The BCI’s chairperson was held to lack jurisdiction over students in the same terms as the body itself.
Why did the Court rule after the letters were withdrawn?
1. The regulator sought closure: The BCI said the letters to NALSAR and the State Bar Councils had been withdrawn within an hour, and argued that the controversy should be given a quietus.
2. A withdrawal leaves the power claim intact: A letter recalled without a finding on jurisdiction leaves the same body free to issue another one, which is what the Court’s boundary setting order forecloses.
3. The petition alleged a chilling effect: Two former NALSAR graduates argued that the letters had created a chilling effect on freedom of speech and freedom of association among students.
4. The order is framed prospectively: It was designed to safeguard university space and students’ right to express dissent freely against future attempts to breach it.
5. A parallel grievance was routed elsewhere: The same Bench allowed young lawyers to approach the Delhi High Court over an alleged mob assault at the BCI premises during a sit in demanding the chairperson’s resignation.
What was the underlying dispute?
1. The protest was over a convocation invitation: Students objected to the Chief Justice of India being chief guest at their convocation, following oral comments in court comparing youth to “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
2. The regulator’s response targeted enrolment: Its letters sought an inquiry against the protesting students and moved to block the entry of the 2026 batch into the profession.
3. Enrolment is the leverage point: A threat to withhold enrolment reaches a student’s entire career rather than a single academic year, which is why the Court treated it as more than an internal disciplinary question.
Challenges to the Bar Council of India’s regulatory role
1. Its powers over legal education overlap with those of universities: The regulator prescribes curriculum and inspects institutions that are already regulated by the University Grants Commission and by their own statutes, which produces conflicting requirements. Eg. National Law Universities established by State Acts answer to their own governing bodies and to the BCI at the same time.
  The Fix: Confine the regulator to prescribing the outcomes a degree must meet for enrolment, and leave institutional governance to the university and its parent statute.
2. Entry costs have been set beyond the statute: State Bar Councils charged enrolment fees far above the statutory ceiling, which priced first generation entrants out of the profession. Eg. In Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court held enrolment fees above the Rs 750 and Rs 125 limits in Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 to be illegal.
  The Fix: Route enrolment collections through a published statutory account audited annually, so any charge beyond the ceiling is visible at source.
3. Disciplinary complaints against advocates stall: Complaints against advocates routinely outrun the one year period in which a State Bar Council must decide them, after which the case is transferred to the national body and slows further. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 was inserted precisely because State level proceedings were not being completed.
  The Fix: Publish a disciplinary docket with case age for every State Bar Council, and make transfer automatic and reported rather than discretionary.
4. The regulator is elected by those it regulates: Members are chosen by advocates on the rolls, which makes strong action against the profession’s own interests unlikely. Eg. Bar strikes have continued after the Supreme Court held in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2002) that lawyers have no right to strike.
  The Fix: Add non advocate members drawn from academia and the judiciary to the disciplinary committees, so professional discipline is not decided by peers alone.
5. Its rulemaking has repeatedly been struck down for exceeding the Act: The body has issued rules on matters the statute does not cover, and courts have then had to read them down. Eg. Bar Council rules requiring a certification examination and restricting practice have been litigated repeatedly on the ground of statutory competence.
  The Fix: Require every new rule to cite the section of the Advocates Act, 1961 that authorises it, and to be laid before the Centre before it takes effect.
Conclusion
A regulator that cannot reach students has to be told so before it acts, not after it withdraws. The order converts an ad hoc retreat into a settled limit, which is the difference between a grievance resolved and a power denied. What remains unreconciled is the regulator’s continuing authority over legal education alongside a complete absence of authority over the people receiving it. The next test of that line will be whether the body confines itself to prescribing what a law degree must contain, or returns to acting on how students behave during the degree.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements : 1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates. 2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (b)”
September 4, 2026
SC orders oversight of Bar Council decisions
Why in the News

The Supreme Court has held that the Bar Council of India (BCI) chairperson is serving only as a pro tem office holder whose term ends with the next election.

What is the Bar Council of India?
1. Statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961 to regulate advocates, legal education and professional conduct across India.
2. Its legitimacy runs through bar elections: Its members are elected by the State Bar Councils from among their own members, so a lapsed election cycle at the State level freezes the central body too.
3. The two law officers sit on it by office: The Attorney General and the Solicitor General are permanent ex officio members of the Council.
4. A continuity provision guards against a vacuum: The proviso to Section 4(3) of the Advocates Act, 1961 allows the last chairperson or vice chairperson to continue until a new Council is in place.
Why is the chairperson’s continuance in question?
1. The Rules cap the term at two years: Rule 12(2), Chapter I, Part II of the Bar Council of India Rules fixes the maximum tenure of the BCI chairperson at two years, and the current term began on 17 April 2025.
2. A notification stretched it to 2030: A gazette notification of 21 April 2025 notified the tenure of the chairperson and vice chairperson until 16 April 2030.
3. A notification cannot override the parent statute: The Bench observed that a notification cannot go beyond the Rules or empower a body to grant itself additional tenure.
4. Continuity has run for over a decade: Petitioners questioned an uninterrupted term as BCI chairperson of more than 12 years since November 2014.
5. The anti vacuum proviso has been used to postpone elections: Petitioners argued that a provision meant to prevent an administrative vacuum has instead been used to avoid holding fresh elections and to perpetuate the existing office holders.
What allegations were placed before the Court?
1. A trust holding the Council’s assets: Petitioners questioned the formation of the BCI Pearl First Trust in 2020, in which the chairperson and other BCI office bearers are described as “permanent managing trustees”.
2. The earlier trust’s finances were moved into it: The financial assets and incomes of the earlier BCI Trust were transferred to the new Trust.
3. Trusteeship outlasts elected office: The office bearers would continue as permanent managing trustees even after their Council tenures expire, which the Bench questioned as elected members becoming permanent trustees beyond their capacity.
4. A land arrangement with a State government: A tie up between the Trust and the Goa government proposes a university on 56 acres of land in that State.
5. Expenditure on felicitations: Counsel described the financial expenditures pulled from BCI records on felicitations, running into crores, as “jolting”.
6. Concentration of power over successive terms: Counsel for the petitioners argued that what the record shows over the years is a concentration of powers in the same office bearers.
What did the NALSAR episode expose?
1. An enrolment ban aimed at one graduating batch: The BCI made an aborted attempt to bar the professional enrolment of the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR) batch of 2026.
2. The trigger was student dissent: The students had objected to the Chief Justice of India attending their convocation, dissenting against oral remarks that termed youths “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
3. The reaction spread across national law universities: Students of the National Law Universities at Delhi and Bengaluru expressed solidarity with their NALSAR counterparts.
4. The Court itself backed the protest: The Chief Justice of India supported the students’ right to protest, and questions arose over whether the chairperson had acted on his own.
5. The measure was withdrawn: An apology was eventually issued and the enrolment bar did not take effect.
Why has the Court chosen supervision over removal?
1. The Bench declined to adjudicate the allegations now: The Court said it did not want to encourage “shadow boxing” around the allegations at this stage.
2. The stated ground is institutional: It said it would intervene to maintain the “institutional integrity and credibility” of the BCI until the next bar body elections.
3. Routine functioning is left undisturbed: The incumbent office bearers continue pro tem so that the Council’s day to day functioning is not interrupted.
4. The check is prior and external, not appellate: Policy decisions now require prior notice to the two law officers and an invitation to them to participate, rather than review after a decision is taken.
5. The regulator did not resist: Counsel for the BCI told the Court they welcomed the direction to take the concurrence of the highest law officers in policy matters.
What does the election timetable require?
1. Women members are co opted first: The Chief Justices of the High Courts must complete the co option of two women members to the State Bar Councils within a fortnight.
2. Composition is notified next: Each State Bar Council must then notify its new composition within a week.
3. Office bearers and BCI representatives follow: The newly constituted State Bar Councils must elect their chairperson, vice chairperson, other office bearers and one representative to the BCI within three weeks of notification of their composition.
4. The central body is reconstituted last: The BCI is formed from those State representatives, so the pro tem arrangement ends only once the State level cycle finishes.
Challenges to the Bar Council of India
1. Elections are not self executing: Nothing in the statutory scheme compels the Council to go to the polls on schedule, so a continuity proviso can substitute for a mandate indefinitely. Eg. The present dispute reached the Supreme Court only because petitioners moved it, not because any internal trigger fired.
  The Fix: Write a fixed election calendar into the Advocates Act, 1961, with the continuity proviso lapsing automatically on a stated date.
2. The regulator writes the rules it is bound by: The BCI frames the Rules governing tenure, enrolment and legal education, and no external body vets them before they take effect. Eg. The instrument extending the chairperson’s tenure was issued by the Council itself.
  The Fix: Require prior publication and a stated objection window for any Rule affecting tenure, enrolment or recognition.
3. Legal education answers to two regulators: BCI control over law school recognition sits alongside the University Grants Commission’s authority over degree granting universities, so institutions face two sets of standards. Eg. National Law Universities are created by State Acts and funded as universities, yet their graduates’ right to practise depends on BCI enrolment.
  The Fix: Constitute a single joint standard setting body for legal education, with the BCI confined to professional entry.
4. Discipline moves slowly by design: Complaints against advocates go to State Bar Council disciplinary committees, and a case not decided within a year transfers to the BCI, which lengthens the process rather than shortening it. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for that transfer on the expiry of one year.
  The Fix: Publish disposal timelines and pendency data for every disciplinary committee, State and central.
5. Entry testing does not feed back into approval: The All India Bar Examination tests an individual’s eligibility to practise, and it does not evaluate the law college that produced the candidate. Eg. Colleges retain BCI approval regardless of how their graduates perform in that examination.
  The Fix: Link a law college’s continued approval to the disclosed performance of its graduates in the Bar examination.
Conclusion

The Court has not removed the incumbent. It has bounded him. A regulator whose elections had lapsed is now supervised by the two law officers who already sat on it by office, and its bar elections have been put on a calendar the Court set. The unresolved part is structural. Judicial supervision arrived because the profession’s own rules carried no consequence for a Council that simply did not go to the polls. The marker to watch is whether the fresh Councils are constituted on that timetable, or the interim arrangement outlasts it.

[2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements :

1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates.

2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

(a) 1 only

(b) 2 only

(c) Both 1 and 2

(d) Neither 1 nor 2
September 3, 2026