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GS Paper: Governance, Transparency & Accountability, Citizens Charters

  • Opportunity to strengthen the 73rd and 74th amendment

    The article brings to the fore untapped potential held by the panchayats and municipalities. However, there is a need for devolution in letter and spirit by the states to tap this potential. The article explains how the panchayats and municipalities could contribute effectively in the fight against Covid-19.

    Cooperative federalism amid COVID-19

    • An unintended but welcome consequence of the struggle against COVID-19 is that the “confrontational federalism” is on the decline with the revival of “cooperative federalism”.
    • There is a realisation that there is no way the COVID-19 situation can be tackled except through a measure of cooperation between the Centre and the states.
    • Consultative process: The Centre is offering flexibility to states to adopt guidelines to their respective circumstances and states are accepting guidelines from the Centre.
    • A principal reason for Kerala’s amazing performance in “flattening the curve” is their robust system of effective devolution. Such devolution helped the Kudumbashree programme to function in association with the panchayats.

    The concept of 3 tier devolution: Centre-State-Panchayats

    • Article 243G provides that state legislatures “may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government”. 
    • This means state governments cannot and must not treat panchayats as extensions of the state government but as “institutions of (local) self-government”.
    • The logic of “cooperative federalism” is that states must function not as implementation arms of the central government but as autonomous units within the federation.
    • By the same logic panchayats too must be conceived not as an extension of state governments but as “units of self-government”. 
    • It is thus that panchayats need to be brought into the three-tier devolution system envisaged in the Constitution: Centre-State-Panchayats (and municipalities).

    How could devolution help in the fight against Covid-19?

    • In line with the rising cooperation between the Centre and the states, the focus should be on further devolution in keeping with the constitutional obligations under the 73rd and 74th amendments.
    • The starting point could best be Entry 23 of the Eleventh Schedule that reads, “Health, sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries”
    • Entry 23 is among the list of 29 subjects illustratively set out for devolution to the panchayats, subject to conformity legislation being enacted by state legislatures.
    • All state legislation has included this subject for devolution.
    • Therefore, empowering the panchayats in this regard with functions, finances and functionaries is now a statutory obligation under state law under Article 243G.
    • With the migrant workers returning to their native villages, it is important to fully involve village panchayats and municipalities as “institutions of self-government” – 243W in the anti-COVID-19 campaign.
    • Entry 28 of the Eleventh Schedule mentions the “public distribution system” as among the subjects for devolution.
    • There are many other entries in the Schedule that are relevant to this exercise.
    • There is an army of 32 lakh elected representatives in the panchayats and about two lakh more in the municipalities to contribute in the fight against Covid-19.
    • Well over a third of them, some 10-12 lakh, are drawn from the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and, therefore, in touch with the most destitute in every village and town.
    • There are some 14 lakh women who have established themselves by election as village leaders. 
    • Imagine a constructive role such women can play as “front-line workers” in the battle against the coronavirus.
    • The most important requirement is planning to receive the migrant labour influx.
    • Last-mile delivery can only be comprehensively ensured by empowered panchayats and municipalities reporting to their respective gram sabhas and ward sabhas mandated under Articles 243 A and 243 S.
    • Planning for withstanding the ingress of COVID-19 requires the full deployment of the mechanisms for district planning envisaged in Article 243 ZD.

    Consider the question asked by the UPSC in 2018-“Assess the importance of the Panchayat system in India as a part of local government. Apart from government grants, what sources the Panchayat can look out for financing developmental projects?”

    Conclusion

    As the cooperative federalism underlines India’s fight against Covid-19, devolution to the third tier –panchayats and municipalities would give a much needed fillip to the fight against Covid-19.

    Back2Basics: 73rd and 74th Amendments

    • 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments were passed by Parliament in December, 1992.
    • Through these amendments local self-governance was introduced in rural and urban India.
    • The Acts came into force as the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 on April 24, 1993 and the Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992 on June 1, 1993.
    • These amendments added two new parts to the Constitution, namely, 73rd Amendment added Part IX titled “The Panchayats” and 74th Amendment added Part IXA titled “The Municipalities”.
    • The Local bodies–‘Panchayats’ and ‘Municipalities’ came under Part IX and IXA of the Constitution after 43 years of India becoming a republic.

    Salient Features

    • Basic units of democratic system-Gram Sabhas (villages) and Ward Committees (Municipalities) comprising all the adult members registered as voters.
    • Three-tier system of panchayats at village, intermediate block/taluk/mandal and district levels except in States with population is below 20 lakhs (Article 243B).
    • Seats at all levels to be filled by direct elections [Article 243C (2)].
    • Seats reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) and chairpersons of the Panchayats at all levels also shall be reserved for SCs and STs in proportion to their population.
    • One-third of the total number of seats to be reserved for women. Onethird of the seats reserved for SCs and STs also reserved for women. One-third offices of chairpersons at all levels reserved for women (Article 243D)
    • Uniform five year term and elections to constitute new bodies to be completed before the expiry of the term. In the event of dissolution, elections compulsorily within six months (Article 243E).

  • Strategy for calibrated opening of economy

    The article discusses the performance of India so far and the strategy for reopening of the economy. Dividing the districts based on the number of cases and adopting a suitable approach for opening the economy there while keeping the spread of the virus in control is suggested in the article.

    India performing better

    • While the OECD countries are reeling under the COVID-19 impact, India is clearly ahead of the curve.
    • This is not merely in terms of the confirmed cases in the country but is also strongly reflected in very low mortality numbers (8.5 deaths per lakh population) compared to other nations (4,040 in the UK and 1,930 in the US).
    • While the first cases were reported in most hotspot countries and India around the same time (last week of January), today, the outbreak is far more manageable in India than in most other countries.
    • It was pragmatic for a resource-poor country to be pre-emptive and declare a national lockdown when the total number of cases were still low at 500.
    • The subsequent growth of the pandemic clearly shows a perceptible decline in the number of cases due to the lockdown.
    • Though stringent, this was much-needed and a timely policy intervention by the government.
    • It is important, however, to appreciate the high and growing opportunity costs that are involved during a lockdown.
    • We must brace ourselves for long-term pandemic management (18 to 24 months) with significant economic impact on our lives.

    Policy interventions by government and two major concerns

    • The immediate costs of the lockdown are borne by the most economically vulnerable people in society.
    • This perhaps was the rationale behind the first round of economic policy interventions announced by the finance minister within a few days of the lockdown.
    • They targeted front-loading of cash transfers through PM-Kisan, support to construction workers, self-help groups, food distribution through the public distribution system, among others.
    • Two major concerns: Beyond welfare concerns, there are significant growth concerns that are mounting with every day of economic inactivity in the country.
    • Companies are struggling to honour payroll and maintain their workforce against cancelling orders and declining demand for their goods and services.
    • These in turn will lead to greater delays and defaults in loan repayments, thereby further weakening the fragile banking sector and struggling credit markets.

    The RBI’s intervention and increasing damage to the economy

    • The Reserve Bank of India stepped in for some timely monetary interventions.
    • However, the longstanding climate of risk aversion within the banking sector will mean that transmission of these monetary interventions is unlikely to be timely or adequate.
    • All eyes are set expectantly in one direction.
    • Historically, when economies are faced with major calamities, governments step in to stabilise the environment and boost confidence within the business community.
    • We have seen this response from all major economies disrupted by COVID-19 over the last several weeks.
    • India will not be an exception to this as the government fine-tunes its strategy to support and kickstart our immobilised economy.
    • The opportunity cost of time, however, is ballooning with each passing day.
    • Just like the spread of the virus, we are up against the full force and power of compounding.
    • Mindful policy interventions, when timed well, can cut growing losses and the misfortune of many.

    How the states are performing against Covid-19?

    • While we have succeeded in slowing the growth of the virus at the national level, the true gains and pains are at the state and local level.
    • As the data reveals, currently we have three states that have made remarkable gains and “flattened the curve” of COVID cases.
    • These are Kerala, Haryana and Tamil Nadu where recoveries are growing and active cases are rapidly declining.
    • States like Karnataka and Telangana are improving their recovery rates consistently, despite fluctuations.
    • Every state and local administration has to keep eternal vigil and double down on containment and testing.
    • They have to aggressively improve their contact tracing efforts with the help of their police who are trained in debriefing, call record mapping and have more manpower than public health departments of local administrations.

    The article contains the policy and governance aspects which are important from Mains Paper-2, and economic issues such as the size of the package and opportunity cost of time involved are important from the Mains Paper-3 perspective. Take note of these issues.

    What should be the strategy?

    • Given the scale and variation in infection control across the country, our national strategy needs to be informed and calibrated.
    • Currently, there are more than 300 districts in the country which have reported zero COVID-19 cases.
    • This can be confirmed quickly with some random testing and the lockdown can be lifted effective immediately.
    • Then there are about 225 districts which have reported less than 10 cases each.
    • With adequate ring-fencing at the level of the block where these cases are reported, these districts too can afford to lift their lockdowns.
    • There are, however, approximately 30 districts across the country which have reported large numbers of confirmed cases and are identified as “hotspots”.
    • The lockdown in these places needs to continue with some relaxations for basic trade and essential services.
    • Not surprisingly, these “hotspots” are also important economic centres of the country.
    • The capacity of the local administration to develop and enforce appropriate strategies of containment, contact tracing and testing, should determine their decisions to ring-fence and isolate blocks while allowing other parts of the district/city to resume economic activity.

    Way forward

    • Given the uncertainty of the virus, we seem prepared for large hospitalisation and care if the need arises.
    • The efforts now must be to further contain the growth of the infection.
    • Acting against the power of compounding: If the current rate persists, we will reach over lakh cases within three weeks. That is the power of compounding we are against.
    • Public health support team: Beyond knowledge sharing across states and adopting successful containment strategies from each other, there is a role for the central government in providing “NSG-like” public health support teams to states that need them.
    • Economic package: On the economy front similarly, the central government’s timely economic package should flatten the curve of exponentially rising opportunity costs across the sectors.

    Conclusion

    Given the relative scale and virulence of the COVID-19 virus in India, the odds seem stacked in favour of a calibrated opening of the economy.

     

  • What are the concerns around the AarogyaSetu app?

    • Recently the AarogyaSetu app — for pan-India use was launched as the main contact tracing technology endorsed by the Central government.
    • Soon it became one of the most downloaded apps globally and has crossed the 75 million mark.
    • However, there are concerns for more transparency on the inner workings of an app that seeks the personal details of millions.

    RIght to Privacy is a very much contested topic for GS. The Aarogya Setu app which has a lot more to offer, is under the radar due to underlying vacuum of Privacy Law in India.

    AarogyaSetu App

    • The App enables people to assess themselves the risk of their catching the Corona Virus infection.
    • It is designed to keep track of other AarogyaSetu users that a person came in contact with and alert him or her if any of the contacts tests positive for COVID-19.
    • It achieves this using the phone’s Bluetooth and GPS capabilities.
    • Once installed in a smartphone through an easy and user-friendly process, the app detects other devices with AarogyaSetu installed that come in the proximity of that phone.
    • The app can then calculate the risk of infection based on sophisticated parameters if any of these contacts has tested positive.
    • The personal data collected by the App is encrypted using state-of-the-art technology and stays secure on the phone till it is needed for facilitating medical intervention.

    Issues with the app

    • The AarogyaSetu app faces the same issue as every other contact tracing technology that has come up during the pandemic period — it is people dependent.
    • It needs widespread usage and self-reporting to be effective.
    • Given that any number of total users will be a subset of smartphone owners in India, and there are bound to be variations in the levels of self-reporting, the efficacy is not bulletproof.
    • The terms of use of the app also say as much, distancing the government from any failure on the part of the app in correctly identifying COVID-19 patients.

    Are there privacy concerns?

    • First of all, the app exists in the privacy law vacuum that is India.
    • With no legislation that spells out in detail how the online privacy of Indians is to be protected, AarogyaSetu users have little choice but to accept the privacy policy provided by the government.
    • The policy goes into some detail on where and how long the data will be retained, but it leaves the language around who will have access to it vague.
    • As per the policy persons carrying out medical and administrative interventions necessary in relation to COVID-19” will have access to the data.
    • This suggests interdepartmental exchanges of people’s personal information and is more excessive than countries like Singapore and even Israel.

    Technical issue

    • Beyond the legal loopholes, there are technical loopholes as well.
    • The unique digital identity in AarogyaSetu is a static number, which increases the probability of identity breaches.
    • The abundance of data collected is also potentially problematic.
    • AarogyaSetu uses both Bluetooth as well as GPS reference points, which could be seen as overkill whereas other apps such as TraceTogether make do with Bluetooth.

    Other issues

    • Experts emphasise that automated contact tracing is not a panacea.
    • They caution against an over-reliance on technology where a competent human-in-the-loop system with sufficient capacity exists.

  • Public policy dilemma of choosing between lives and livelihood

    This article deals with how the different sections of a society assign different weightage to the various factors they are faced with in life. In the case of Covid-19, one section of society which is well-off might care more about the possible loss of life while other section might end up attaching more weightage to the loss of livelihood than to the possible loss of life due to infection. The article discusses this issue in detail.

    Difference between risk and uncertainty

    • Since the days of Frank Knight, economists have differentiated between the two.
    • Risk has a known probability distribution.
    • For uncertainty, the probability distribution is unknwon.
    • COVID-19 makes us confront uncertainty, not risk.
    • For uncertainty, there is a subjective probability distribution, which can, and does, vary from individual to individual.

    So, how the subjective probability distribution is devised by a person?

    • Through information and experience, one already possesses.
    • There are various rationality assumptions used by economists. They are often violated.
    • Otherwise, behavioural economics wouldn’t have come into existence.
    • Typically, given a situation, when your decision doesn’t agree with someone else, you say they are being irrational.
    • However, with uncertainty, the problem may not be with rationality assumptions, but with differences in subjective probability distributions.

    Lack of data for various factors

    • Because of COVID-19, there is a certain risk of getting infected. Let’s call this the infection rate — total infections divided by the total population.
    • We don’t know this infection rate for India or for any other country for that matter.
    • No country has done universal testing.
    • No testing for random sample: No country has done universal testing for a proper random sample either.
    • The ICMR has told us more than 75 per cent of Indian patients will be asymptomatic.
    • Who do we test? Those who show symptoms, those who have been in contact with confirmed patients and those who suffer from severe respiratory diseases.
    • Most countries do something similar.
    • Sampling bias: In other words, when we work out an infection rate based on those tested, there is a sampling bias.
    • This isn’t a proper infection rate.
    • The only country where we have had something like a random sample is Iceland.
    • There, the infection rate was 0.8 per cent.
    • Data for death rate: There are similar caveats about the death rate.
    • If we mechanically divide the number of deaths by the number of confirmed cases for India, we will get a death rate just over 3 per cent.
    • The global figure is a little less than 7 per cent.
    • But neither of these is a death rate for the total population since only those with severe symptoms are included in infection numbers.
    • Three per cent or seven per cent are over-estimates.
    • In a controlled environment like Diamond Princess, death rate as a ratio of total passengers, and not those infected, was less than 0.4 per cent.
    • The true infection rate and true death rate are not alarming numbers.

    How the lack of data is reflected in subjective probability distribution?

    • There are slices in India’s population pyramid with rural/urban and other spatial differences too.
    • Consider two extreme types-type A and type B.
    • Type A, who are globalised in information access and morbidity.
    • Life expectancy is 80 plus and there are lifestyle diseases like diabetes and high blood pressure.
    • This co-morbidity increases possible death rates and thanks to globalised access to information, certainly increases perceptions about death rates, making them out to be higher than they are.
    • Some of them have fixed incomes, regardless of what happens to lockdown.
    • The high probability assigned to loss of life: In terms of maximising expected payoffs with a subjective distribution, high probability is attached to loss of life and low probability to loss of livelihood.
    • How type B forms a subjective probability?
    • Type B, someone whose life expectancy is 60, without a fixed income stream and whose health concerns are tuberculosis and water-borne diseases, not COVID-19.
    • Nor is access to information that globalised.
    • The high probability assigned to loss of livelihood: High subjective probability will be attached to loss of livelihood and low probability to death from COVID.
    • Both types reflect subjective probabilities. Neither is “irrational”.
    • The tension between the two: Type A would like the lockdown to continue indefinitely, until the long tail of the infection curve tapers off, perhaps beyond September.
    • Type B would like lockdown to be eased soon, with necessary restrictions in hotspots.
    • There is indeed tension between lives and livelihood.
    • Even if health outcomes and information access are like Type A, but income is contingent on growth, preferences might mirror Type B.

    The issues highlighted here can be broadly used in the various scenario where there is uncertainty involved and various stakeholders perceive the probable outcomes in entirely different ways. Various points here can be used to answer the question based on policy making.

    Balancing the differential individual preferences in public policy

    • One set of individuals imposes its choice on the rest.
    • Type A disproportionately influences policy.
    • This determination of aggregate preferences is a dynamic process.
    • Therefore, sooner or later, Type B contests this and as the lockdown is prolonged and livelihood costs mount, discontent surfaces, as it has across a range of countries.
    • There were also welfare economics notions that pre-dated social choice theory, such as compensation principles of Kaldor, Hicks and Scitovsky.
    • The point can be made using the two stereotypes. Specifically, Type A need to compensate Type B for their losses.
    • To state it starkly, livelihood losses suffered by Type B need to be compensated by the government through redistributive measures and this has to be financed by higher taxes imposed on Type-A.
    • The right question for the Type A is not whether they want the lockdown to continue, but whether they are willing to pay a COVID-tax to support lockdown extension.

    A question based on policy formation issues explained here can be framed, for ex. “Risk has a known probability distribution. For uncertainty, the probability distribution is unknown. COVID-19 makes us confront uncertainty, not risk. In this context, there is a debate between saving lives and saving livelihoods. In such a scenario, what can be the most probable solutions that public policy must delve into, in order to maintain the balance between this uncertainty and risk.”

    Conclusion

    Extending or ending the lockdown decision represent the public policy dilemma. Without a revival in growth, the tax-paying capacity of Type B is limited and with job losses, some Type As become Type Bs. The choice is starker.

  • Highlights of the World Press Freedom Index, 2020

     

    India has dropped two places on a global press freedom index to be ranked 142nd out of 180 countries in the annual World Press Freedom Report.

    Press freedom  especially after the abrogation of Art. 370 in J&K was profoundly debated back then.  We can expect a mains question like-

    “Reasonable restrictions to the freedoms enjoyed by media are necessary while addressing the concerns of national security.  Critically comment.”

    World Press Freedom Index

    • The Press Freedom Index is an annual ranking of countries compiled and published by Reporters Without Borders.
    • It is based upon the organization’s own assessment of the countries’ press freedom records.
    • It intends to reflect the degree of freedom that journalists, news organisations, and netizens have in each country, and the efforts made by authorities to respect this freedom.
    • The report is partly based on a questionnaire which asks questions about pluralism media independence, environment and self-censorship, legislative framework, transparency, and infrastructure.

    Highlights on India

    • The report said that with no murders of journalists in India in 2019, as against six in 2018.
    • However, there have been constant press freedom violations, including police violence against journalists, ambushes by political activists, and reprisals instigated by criminal groups or corrupt local officials.

    Global scenario

    • Norway is ranked first in the Index for the fourth year running.
    • India ranked better than its neighbours Pakistan (145) and Bangladesh (151), but worse than Sri Lanka (127) and Nepal (112).
    • China at 177th position is just three places above North Korea, which is at 180th.

    Various threats to press freedom

    • Across the world, press freedom is under pressure from aggressive authoritarian regimes.
    • The media is also facing a technological crisis, due to a lack of democratic guarantees and a democratic crisis following polarization and repressive policies, the report reads.
    • In addition comes a crisis of trust following growing suspicion and even hatred of the media, and an economic crisis and impoverishing of quality journalism.
    • Among other issues, the report has listed coordinated social media hate campaigns against journalists reporting on issues that “annoy right-wing followers”, criminal prosecutions to gag journalists critical of authorities and police violence against journalists.

  • A virus, social democracy, and dividends for Kerala

    This article is an analysis of Kerala’s success in dealing with the Covid-19. Factors that emerge are-strong emphasis on the social democracy, the participation of civil society and strong social compact between the government and citizenry. We have also covered the same subject in a previous article but focus there was more on the administrative level.

    Kerala’s success story

    • Kerala was the first State with a recorded case of coronavirus and once led the country in active cases.
    • It now ranks 10th of all States and the total number of active cases (in a State that has done the most aggressive testing in India) has been declining for over a week and is now below the number of recovered cases.
    • Given Kerala’s population density, deep connections to the global economy and the high international mobility of its citizens, it was primed to be a hotspot.
    • Yet not only has the State flattened the curve but it also rolled out a comprehensive ₹20,000 crore economic package before the Centre even declared the lockdown.

    Why does Kerala stand out in India and internationally?

    • Kerala’s much-heralded success in social development has invited endless theories of its cultural, historical or geographical exceptionalism.
    • But taming a pandemic and rapidly building out a massive and tailored safety net is fundamentally about the relation of the state to its citizens.
    • From its first Assembly election in 1957, through alternating coalitions of Communist and Congress-led governments, iterated cycles of social mobilisation and state responses have forged what is in effect a robust social democracy.
    • The current crisis underscores the comparative advantages of social democracy.

    Kerala’s success is built on social democracy in the state. Following are the factors that constitute the social democracy in the state which is helping it fight against the Covid-19 pandemic with considerable success. These factors are also important from the Mains point of view if the question is framed on Kerala’s success story.

    How social democracy is practised in Kerala?

    • Social democracies are built on an encompassing social pact with a political commitment to providing basic welfare and broad-based opportunity to all citizens.
    • In Kerala, the social pact itself emerged from recurrent episodes of popular mobilisation.
    • Popular mobilisations include the temple entry movement of the 1930s to the most recent various gender and environmental movements.
    • These movements nurtured a strong sense of social citizenship.
    • These movements also drove reforms that have incrementally strengthened the legal and institutional capacity for public action.
    • Second, the emphasis on rights-based welfare has been driven by and in turn has reinforced a vibrant, organised civil society.
    • This civil society demands continuous accountability from front-line state actors.
    • Third, this constant demand-side pressure of a highly mobilised civil society and a competitive party system has pressured all governments in Kerala.
    • The pressure made governments to deliver public services and to constantly expand the social safety net, in particular a public health system that is the best in India.
    • Fourth, that pressure has also fuelled Kerala’s push over the last two decades to empower local government.
    • Nowhere in India are local governments as resourced and as capable as in Kerala.
    • Finally, all of this ties into the greatest asset of any deep democracy, that is the generalised trust that comes from a State that has a wide and deep institutional surface area.
    • That on balance treats people not as subjects or clients, but as rights-bearing citizens.

    How the built-in social democracy is helping in dealing with the pandemic?

    • A government’s capacity to respond to a cascading crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic relies on a very fragile chain of –(1)mobilising financial and societal resources, (2)getting state actors to fulfil directives, (3)coordinating across multiple authorities and jurisdictions and maybe, most importantly, (4)getting citizens to comply.
    • First, an effective response begins with programmatic decision-making.
    • From the moment of the first reported case in Kerala, Chief Minister convened a State response team that coordinated 18 different functional teams.
    • The CM held daily press conferences and communicated constantly with the public.
    • Kerala’s social compact demanded no less.
    • Second, the government was able to leverage a broad and dense health-care system.
    • The health-care system, despite the recent growth of private health services, has maintained a robust public presence.
    • Kerala’s public health-care workers are also of course highly unionised and organised, and from the outset the government lay emphasis on protecting the health of first responders.
    • Third, the government activated an already highly mobilised civil society.
    • As the cases multiplied, the government called on two lakh volunteers to go door to door, identifying those at risk and those in need.
    • A State embedded in civil society — the women’s empowerment Kudumbasree movement being a case in point.
    • Kudumbasree movement was in a good position to co-produce effective interventions, from organising contact tracing to delivering three lakh meals a day through Kudumbasree community kitchens.
    • Fourth, you can get the politics right and you can have a great public health-care system, but its effectiveness in a crisis like this will only be as good as the infamous last kilometre.
    • And this is where two decades of empowering local governments have clearly paid off.

    Conclusion

    At a time when India is dealing with this unprecedented crisis, it is important to be reminded that Kerala has managed the crisis with the most resolve, the most compassion and the best results of any large State in India. And that it has done so precisely by building on legacies of egalitarianism, social rights and public trust. Other states and the Central government must learn from Kerala’s experience.

  • TRAI wants set top boxes to be made interoperable

    The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has recommended that all set-top boxes (STBs) in the country must be interoperable, meaning that consumers should be able to use the same STB across different DTH or cable TV providers.

    The TRAI and Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal are quite often seen in the news.  Most recent was the dispute risen due to AGR dues.

    TRAI has a wide range of jurisdiction over Telecoms. Keep a track on all such news.

    Why such a recommendation?

    • TRAI noted that while the STBs deployed in the cable TV networks are non-interoperable, those by DTH players complied with licence conditions to support common interface module based interoperability.
    • However, in practice, even in the DTH segment the STBs are not readily interoperable.
    • The lack of interoperability of set-top boxes between different service providers deprives the customer of the freedom to change her/his service provider.
    • It also creates a hindrance to technological innovation, improvement in service quality, and the overall sector growth.

    About TRAI

    • The TRAI is a statutory body set up under section 3 of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997.
    • It is the regulator of the telecommunications and its tariffs in India.
    • The TRAI Act was amended by an ordinance, effective from 24 January 2000, establishing a Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) to take over the adjudicatory and disputes functions from TRAI.
    • TRAI regularly issues orders and directions on various subjects such as tariffs, interconnections, quality of service, DTH services and mobile number portability.

  • Covid-19 donations to CM Relief Fund won’t qualify as CSR

    The corporate affairs ministry has clarified that COVID-19 donations to CM Relief Fund won’t qualify as CSR contributions.

    Contributions considered under CSR

    • According to the ministry, contributions made to the State Disaster Management Authority to combat COVID-19 would qualify as CSR expenditure.
    • The contributions by companies to PM-CARES Fund to tackle the pandemic would be considered as CSR.
    • Ex-gratia payments made to temporary, casual and daily wage workers by companies will be considered as CSR expenditure under the company’s law, provided that such payments are over and above disbursement of wages.
    • The contribution towards ‘Chief Minister’s Relief Fund’ or ‘State Relief Fund for COVID-19’ would not be considered as spending towards CSR work.

    Note: Please remember or make note of the various contributions complying for CSR.

    Back2Basics: CSR in India

    • India is the first country in the world to make corporate social responsibility (CSR) mandatory, following an amendment to the Companies Act, 2013 in April 2014.
    • Prior to that, the CSR clause was voluntary for companies, though it was mandatory to disclose their CSR spending to shareholders.
    • Businesses can invest their profits in areas such as education, poverty, gender equality, and hunger as part of any CSR compliance.
    • Under the Companies Act, 2013, certain classes of profitable entities are required to spent at least 2 per cent of their three-year average annual net profit towards CSR activities.
    • Under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, every company having net worth of at least ₹500 crore, turnover of ₹1,000 crore or more, or a minimum net profit of ₹5 crore during the immediately preceding financial year, has to make CSR expenditure.

  • Coronavirus – Health and Governance Issues

  • Let no one go hungry

    Context

    The impact of the lockdown, effected from midnight of March 24, has been particularly severe on migrant workers. The state must utilise FCI stock for those who have ration cards and those who don’t.

    India’s labour force and impact of lockdown on it

    • Nearly one-fifth of India’s labour force consists of internal migrants.
    • As per the 2011 census, a quarter of the urban population consists of migrants.
    • These tend to be predominantly male, from the less developed northern states, in the lower-income strata, and dependent on daily wages or precarious livelihoods.
    • The impact of the lockdown has been particularly severe on migrant workers.
    • Uncertainty and reverse migration: Due to uncertainty over the duration of the lockdown, and about their own livelihoods and food security, the lockdown has led to massive reverse migration from cities back to villages.
    • Further, due to the absence of train and bus services, many of these workers took to simply walking back.
    • The ground reality of inadequate preparation or insufficient provision means that neither their anxiety nor plight is assuaged.
    • Migrant workers tend to depend on public eating places or community arrangements for food.
    • Under a lockdown, there is simply no choice for them, except to depend on the government’s efforts or charitable organisations.

    Utilising the grain stocks with the FCI

    • The government has a large stock of wheat and rice procured over the last three years.
    • Stock in excess of buffer norm: The buffer norm for April 1 is 21.4 million tonnes, against which the country had about 7 million tonnes on March 1: This comprises 27.5 million tonnes of wheat and 50.2 million tonnes of rice.
    • In most districts of India, the Food Corporation of India and state agencies have a storage capacity of more than the three months requirement of the public distribution system.
    • The warehouses are spread across all the districts in every state.
    • The government has already announced that an additional quantity of five kg of foodgrains will be provided, free of cost, to all ration card holders for the next three months.
    • Most of the unorganised labour and families migrating back from their place of work will probably have their ration cards in the villages itself.
    • So, it should not be much of a problem for them to find food during the period of lockdown.

    What should the state do to feed those who do not have ration cards

    • For those who do not have ration cards in the villages, it is the right time to use this extra stock of foodgrains.
    • Using school and Anganwadi infrastructure: In villages, primary schools have facilities for cooking mid-day meals for children. Some Anganwadi also have this facility. This infrastructure can be used to provide cooked meals to those who do not have ration cards in the villages.
    • The government can easily offer to meet their requirement of wheat and rice over the next three weeks and panchayats can be asked to meet a part of the expenditure required to purchase vegetables, spices and cooking oil.
    • The village panchayats which take up such a feeding programme must be provided Rs 20 per person per day from State Disaster Relief Fund for the expenditure on vegetables, cooking oil, spices, which are not covered by the PDS.
    • In some villages, the local community may also be willing to help the panchayats to feed such people.
    • Efforts must also be made by the panchayats to raise donations in kind from the local community for rabi pulses like chana (chickpea), masoor (lentil), matar (field pea) which are available in plenty in pulse-growing states.

    How to feed those who are stuck in the cities

    • A number of labourers and self-employed: In urban areas, as per the Periodic Labour Force Survey, there were about 6 crore casual labourers and four crore self-employed persons in 2017-18.
    • Even after the reverse migration to villages, there would still be millions of them who are stuck in cities at their place of work.
    • These are people who do not have any savings or source of income which can sustain them during the period of the lockdown. These people living in slums, in the poorer areas of cities, are in need of urgent assistance for food, at least for the next three weeks.
    • The most distressed at present are those stuck in the cities, or who have been walking hundreds of kilometres to reach their homes in small towns and villages.
    • Allocating funds form relief funds: The district collectors should be allocated funds from the State Disaster Relief Fund to provide them with food and open all community buildings en route for them.
    • Engaging various players: The states must engage NGOs, factories and charities including religious organisations to raise funds for meeting the expenditure on milk, eggs, cooking oil and vegetables, and even soaps and sanitisers.
    • More than 67,000 NGOs are registered with the Niti Aayog on their NGO Darpan platform — which was created to bring about a greater partnership between the government and the voluntary sector and to foster transparency, efficiency and accountability.
    • This is the time to use such a platform.
    • The Centre can easily provide free rice and wheat to the NGOs from its stock and the NGOs can provide cooked meals in urban areas for the next three weeks.
    • For one crore individuals, for three weeks, the government needs to provide just about 75,000 tonnes of rice. Since the milling of wheat would be difficult due to the closure of flour mills, only rice can be provided at this stage.

    Conclusion

    The rabi harvest is expected to be a bumper one. The utilisation of the FCI stock — for not only the ration card holders but also the non-ration cardholders, and for providing food to the poor stuck in urban areas — is the most appropriate use of the foodgrain stock with the government. This is urgent and must be done.