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GS Paper: GS2

  • India’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations

    Syed Akbaruddin, a fiery spokesperson, who is credited with effectively presenting India’s position on a range of crucial issues at the UN headquarters in New York for the last several years, has retired. A 1985-batch IFS officer T S Tirumurti, currently serving as Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs will succeed him.

    Permanent Missions to the United Nations

    • The Permanent Mission is the diplomatic mission that every member state deputies to the UN, and is headed by a Permanent Representative, who is also referred to as the “UN ambassador”.
    • Article 1 (7) of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States provides for a permanent mission.
    • UN Permanent Representatives are assigned to the UN headquarters in New York City, and can also be appointed to other UN offices in Geneva, Vienna, and Nairobi.
    • The Mission in New York is housed in a 27-story building designed by the noted architect Charles Correa in 1993 and is decorated with MF Hussain paintings.

    The Indian Permanent Mission at the UN

    • According to the website of the Permanent Mission of India in New York, there are currently eight Indians in senior leadership positions at the UN at the levels of Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General.
    • The first Indian delegates at the UN included statesman Arcot Ramasamy Mudaliar, and freedom fighters Hansa Mehta, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, and Lakshmi Menon.
    • Mehta and Pandit were among the 15 women members of the Indian Constituent Assembly.
    • India was among the select members of the United Nations that signed the United Nations Declaration at Washington on January 1, 1942.
    • India also participated in the historic UN Conference of International Organization at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945.

  • Afghan peace and India’s elbow room

    The article discusses India’s exclusion from the Afghan peace process. As India seeks to fight back its exclusion there are certain issues that need to be addressed. India’s reluctance to enter into talks with the Taliban in one such issue, which needs a rethink. And there are several areas in which India needs to continue working like-the goodwill in Afghanistan, participation in assistance work, bringing together the major leaders in that country.

    India left out of the meeting on peace in Afghanistan

    • Earlier this month, the United Nations Secretariat held a meeting of what it calls the “6+2+1” group on regional efforts to support peace in Afghanistan.
    • The group includes six neighbouring countries: China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; global players the United States and Russia, and Afghanistan itself.
    • India was conspicuous by its absence from the meeting on April 16, given its historical and strategic ties with Afghanistan.
    • This has not happened for the first time, India was left out form talks similarly in 2001 and 2010.
    • In both 2001 and 2010, however, India fought back its exclusion
    • At the Bonn agreement of 2010, India played a major role in Northern Alliance accepting Hamid Karzai as the Chairman of the interim arrangement that replaced the Taliban regime.
    • After the 2010 conference, New Delhi redoubled its efforts with Kabul, and in 2011 India signed the historic Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was Afghanistan’s first such agreement with any country.

    Reasons for not inviting India

    • In 2020, the reason given for keeping India out of regional discussions on Afghanistan was ostensibly that it holds no “boundary” with Afghanistan.
    • But in fact, it is because New Delhi has never announced its support for the U.S.-Taliban peace process.
    • As planners in South Block now consider their next steps in Afghanistan, they must fight back against the idea that any lasting solution in Afghanistan can be discussed without India in the room, while also studying the reasons for such exclusions.

    Following are the issues that Indian must consider and act on as it seeks to fight back its exclusion from the peace talks.

    India’s position on Afghan-led peace process and reality

    • India’s resistance to publicly talking to the Taliban has made it an awkward interlocutor at any table.
    • Its position that only an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled process can be allowed is a principled one but has no takers.
    • The Ashraf Ghani government does not lead, own or control the reconciliation process today, comprising the U.S.-Taliban negotiation for an American troops withdrawal, and intra-Afghan talks on power-sharing.
    • The U.S.-Taliban peace deal means that the Taliban, will become more potent as the U.S. withdraws soldiers from the country.
    • Taliban will hold more sway in the inter-Afghan process as well, as the U.S. withdraws funding for the government in Kabul.

    Two effects of India’s position

    • New Delhi’s decision to put all its eggs in the Ghani basket has had a two-fold effect:
    • 1) Its voice in the reconciliation process has been limited.
    • 2) It has weakened India’s position with other leaders of the deeply divided democratic setup in Kabul such as the former chief executive Abdullah Abdullah.

    India should not let its diplomatic strength weaken

    • India painstakingly built up its presence inside Afghanistan since 2001.
    • This presence is being threatened anew by terror groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).
    • ISKP is believed to be backed by Pakistan’s establishment.
    • Intercepts showed that the brutal attack, in March, that killed 25 at a gurudwara in Kabul was meant for the embassy in Kabul.
    • The government cleared out both of its consulates this month.
    • While the government has said that the novel coronavirus pandemic prompted its decision to clear out both consulates.
    • The truth is that a full security reassessment is under way for them.
    • Either way, India’s diplomatic strength in Afghanistan should not appear to be in retreat just when it is needed the most.

    Goodwill in Afghanistan and damage caused due to CAA

    • The government must also consider the damage done to the vast reservoir of goodwill India enjoys in Afghanistan because of recent events in the country, especially the controversy over the Citizenship (Amendment) Act.
    • The building blocks of that goodwill are India’s assistance in infrastructure projects, health care, education, trade and food security, and also in the liberal access to Afghans to study, train and work in India.
    • Above all, it is India’s example as a pluralistic, inclusive democracy that inspires many.
    • Afghanistan’s majority-Muslim citizens have felt cut out of the move to offer fast track citizenship to only Afghan minorities.
    • The damage was also done by reports of anti-Muslim rhetoric and incidents of violence in India.

    Regain upper hand in the narrative in Afghanistan

    • While many of these are problems of perception, New Delhi must move swiftly to regain the upper hand in the narrative in Afghanistan.
    • India has provided the assistance of more than $3 billion in projects.
    • Bilateral trade is about $1 billion.
    • A $20 billion projected development expenditure of an alternate route through Chabahar.
    • And support to the Afghan National Army, bureaucrats, doctors and other professionals for training in India should assure it a leading position in Afghanistan’s regional formulation.
    • Three major projects along with hundreds of small development projects (of schools, hospitals and water projects) have cemented that position in Afghan hearts nationwide, regardless of Pakistan’s attempts to undermine that position, particularly in the South.
    • The three major projects include 1) the Afghan Parliament, 2) the Zaranj-Delaram Highway, 3)the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam (Salma dam).

     Pursue opportunities to fulfil its role in the peace efforts

    • India must also pursue opportunities to fulfil its role in the peace efforts in Afghanistan, starting with efforts to bridge the Ghani-Abdullah divide.
    • India could also play role in bringing together other major leaders with whom India has built ties for decades.
    • It would be an utter tragedy if the Taliban were to enter the government in Kabul as the U.S. deal envisages, to find the opposing front collapse as it did in 1996.
    • An understanding between Iran and the U.S. on Afghanistan is necessary for a lasting peace as well, and India could play a mediatory part, as it did in order for the Chabahar project.

    Return of the Taliban has several implications for India. In 2013, the UPSC asked a question related to developments in Afghanistan against the backdrop of the proposed withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force. Similarly, a question based on the latest development can be asked, for ex-“The return of Taliban after the US-Taliban deal in Afghanistan is fraught with major security implications for the countries in the region. Examine in the light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.”

    Use UN call for peace to put hostilities with Pakistan on hold

    • Finally, New Delhi should use the United Nations’s call for a pause in conflicts during the novel coronavirus pandemic, to ensure a hold on hostilities with Pakistan.
    • This will be even more difficult than it sounds given the abyss that bilateral relations have fallen into in the past year over Kashmir.

    Conclusion

    It would be a mistake, at this point, to tie all India’s support in only to Kabul or the Ghani government; the government must strive to endure that its aid and assistance is broad-based, particularly during the novel coronavirus pandemic to centres outside the capital, even if some lie in areas held by the Taliban.

  • Spanish Plan for Phased Easing of Lockdown

    • Spain’s Prime Minister has presented a four-phase lockdown exit strategy for the country.
    • It’s imperative for India to learn from global examples for easing lockdown without doing away with health concerns.

    With the nearing end of nationwide lockdown, various exit strategies are being discussed for a smooth restart.

    Spain’s exit strategy

    • The opening up of the lockdown will begin with phase 0 throughout Spain, except for a few islands that will already be in phase 1 by then.
    • A week later, provinces will enter phase 1, which will last for two weeks and the remaining phases will also last for two weeks each.
    • In total, the de-escalation will take at least six weeks to be complete.

    Phase 0: The preparation phase

    • De-escalations in this phase include opening up of takeaway facilities at restaurants and opening up of some other establishments such as hair salons.
    • From May 2, individuals will be able to go out for a walk or to exercise alone or with people they stay with. In this phase, professional athletes will be able to access individual training sessions.
    • Children aged 14 years or younger have been allowed to go out for walks from April 26.

    Phase 1: The initial phase

    • Begins on May 11. Small businesses will be allowed to open under strict security measures.
    • For instance, gyms can open for people who want to train individually and by appointment.
    • Further, hotels and tourist accommodations will be allowed to open, excluding the common areas and with certain restrictions in place.
    • Places of worship will also be allowed to open, limiting their capacity to one-third. Owners of terrace bars can open their establishments but with 30 per cent capacity.
    • In this phase, some degree of social contact with a limited number of people may also be allowed, subject to what the conditions are then.

    Phase 2: The intermediate phase

    • Begins on May 25.Will include the resumption of hunting and sport fishing, and the opening of cinemas and auditorium theatres at one-third of their capacity.
    • Visits to monuments and cultural facilities, such as exhibition halls and conference rooms, will resume with one-third occupancy.
    • Cultural shows will be allowed with less than 50 people in closed spaces. In the outdoors, shows and events can be held with less than 400 people provided they are seated.
    • All places of worship will have to limit their capacity to 50 per cent.

    Phase 3: The advanced phase

    • Begins on June 8 and provided the situation is under control, general mobility will be made more flexible.
    • Wearing masks will be recommended when people venture outside, especially on public transport. In commercial settings, capacities will be restricted to 50 per cent.
    • Beaches may also open in this phase. The movement of people into other provinces or islands is restricted until the de-escalation process is complete.

  • Common problems of South Asia call for collective efforts against Covid-19

    The article discusses the various common features shared by the South Asians countries. One of them is the poor public healthcare infrastructure. So, the pandemic offers an opportunity to make the required policy changes. It also offers the opportunity for cooperation among the regional countries in dealing with Covid-19. These issues are discussed in the article.

    South Asian countries: Common features, common problems

    • South Asia, one of the world’s most populous regions, is also affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
    • Both Karachi and Mumbai, among the world’s most densely populated cities, where we live and work, are being overwhelmed by cases.
    • While the death rate in these places may not be as alarming as in Europe and the U.S., the collateral damage of the lockdown is taking its own toll.
    • Common features of South Asia: While there are many differences amongst the countries of the region, there are also common features which impact the health of its people, some of them a result of our shared cultural and geopolitical history.
    • The collective experience of dealing with COVID-19 may provide important lessons, which transcend national boundaries.

    Poor healthcare system: a common problem

    • South Asian countries have invested very little in health.
    • This is reflected in our abysmally low health parameters.
    • It is interesting that Britain, which formulated our health policies before independence, went on to form one of the world’s strongest public health systems, the National Health Service.
    • Whereas its South Asian colonies chose to stray from that path.
    • This resulted in a dysfunctional public healthcare
    • Governments have also relinquished what ought to have been their primary duty, of health care provision, to the private sector.
    • Having become an industry, the focus of healthcare in the private sector is on profit rather than on people’s needs.
    • High treatment costs in private sector: Whilst privatisation has brought in advanced technology and expertise, the high costs of treatment in the private sector have resulted in impoverishment as most of the population has no insurance or third-party coverage, and pays out of pocket.
    • The sector has also been poorly regulated.
    • The result is that it is responsible for several excesses in its quest for profit.

    Other common features of the region

    • Hunger, malnutrition, poor sanitation and large-scale migration are features of this region.
    • Existing infectious diseases like TB, HIV and malaria have been worsened by emerging ones like dengue, chikungunya, healthcare-associated infections and antimicrobial resistance.
    • The region is also an epicentre of an epidemic of lifestyle diseases.
    • Conflicts and expenditure on defence: Constant internal and external conflicts in South Asia not only consume a large portion of national budgets but also divert the attention of the public and policymakers from healthcare needs.
    • Defence budgets take the largest share of national budgets, and obviously adversely impact social sector spending.
    • Underfunded public health is going to hinder region’s capacity to fight COVID-19.
    • The central role of religion: Religion continues to occupy a central space in the society and politics of the region.
    • Though it offers succour to many, religious dogma can impact health policy and health-seeking behaviour.
    • The refusal of devotees across Pakistan to avoid religious congregations during Ramadan despite the government’s orders has significantly fed the community spread of the virus.

    Opportunity for policy changes to address healthcare problems

    • COVID-19 has forced us to seriously reflect on our healthcare system.
    • This is welcome if it results in policy change.
    • Healthcare professionals and bodies must seize this opportunity to push our respective governments to address it seriously and not just as a pre-election strategy.
    • A long-term commitment to universal health care, with not only a national but also a regional and global focus, is needed.

    A question on this theme could be asked by the UPSC, for instance, “South Asian countries share the common problem of poor public healthcare infrastructure, which increases their vulnerability to the pandemic. But corona pandemic also offers an opportunity to improve the shortcoming in the health infrastructure and cooperation among the SAARC countries. Comment.”

    Regional strategy and cooperation needed

    • The SAARC heads of state have already offered help to one another.
    • A regional strategy has a better chance of controlling the pandemic than isolated national-level efforts.
    • The pooling of resources and sharing data may not only help flatten the curve but perhaps even develop into longer-term efforts towards effective treatment.
    • It is being speculated that our populations are behaving differently; that the BCG vaccine may be a protective influence.
    • Joint research into such areas can be a unifying point for SAARC.

    Conclusion

    It is in our collective interest to look at health security and not just national security. By the accident of their birth, South Asians have endured a lot. They merit better.

     

  • New global order in post-Covid-19 world

    The article discusses the changes that the world will experience in the global order in the aftermath of Covid-19. The major changes will be on the economic and geopolitical front. Various changes are discussed in the article. We have read some article on the same topic and the basic theme is the same. Role of China and the US, failure of the international institutions are some of the common themes.

    Failure of international institutions

    • The existing international institutions such as the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council and the World Health Organization (WHO) are seen to have failed to measure up to the grave challenge posed by the pandemic.
    • The UN Security Council is under attack for being slow in dealing with a situation that appears, at least on the surface, far graver than any military threat in recent decades.
    • The WHO has been tarred with the charge of bias and of grossly underestimating the nature of the epidemic.
    • That prestigious global institution should have been singled out for attack at this time speaks volumes about the mood prevailing across the world.

    Economic shock

    • There are many other aspects of the COVID-19 crisis that will drastically impact the globe.
    • Negative growth: On the economic front, the World Bank has already predicted negative growth for most nations. India’s growth forecast for the current fiscal year has been put at 5% to 2.8%.
    • Contraction of the economy and the loss of millions of jobs across all segments will further complicate this situation.

    One of the most important factors that we realised in the corona crisis in the role of the state. Take note of this factor. A question can be asked on the role of the state, for ex. “The COVID-19 pandemic has brought into focus the important role of the state in our lives. comment.”

    The important role of the state in focus

    • What is likely to change even more dramatically are certain other aspects relating to political management and security. Both terms are set to gain new meanings.
    • The role of the state as an enforcer of public goodwill almost certainly become greatly enhanced.
    • The dominant imperative would be to not put limits on the role of the state even where the situation may not be as grave as the present one.
    • Many pieces of legislation of yesteryears that had been relegated to the archives — they were perceived to be anachronistic in a modern democratic set-up — may get a new lease of life.
    • Some pieces of legislation such as the Disaster Management Act already reflect this reality today.
    • Other pieces of legislation could follow in its wake.
    • This trend is already becoming evident to some extent across the world. Europe has shown a willingness to sacrifice personal liberties in favour of greater state control.
    • Post COVID-19, the world may have to pay a heavy price in terms of loss of liberty. An omnipotent state could well become a reality.

    Following are the changes in geo-economics and geo-politics that post-covid world would see.

    Role of China under scrutiny

    • Far-reaching changes can also be anticipated in the realm of geo-economics and geopolitics. The world needs to prepare for a sea change.
    • One nation, viz. China, is presently seeking to take advantage of and benefit from the problems faced by the rest of the world in the wake of the epidemic.
    • Negligence on the part of China: China remains totally unfazed by the stigma that the current world pandemic owes a great deal to its negligence.
    • More importantly, it is seeking to convert its ‘failure’ into a significant opportunity.
    • This is Sino-centrism at its best, or possibly its worst.
    • China now seeks to benefit from the fact of its ‘early recovery’.
    • It wants to take advantage of the travails of the rest of the world, by using its manufacturing capability to its geo-economic advantage.
    • Seeking geopolitical advantage: Simultaneously, it seeks to shift from being a Black Swan (responsible for the pandemic), to masquerade as a White one, by offering medical aid and other palliatives to several Asian and African countries to meet their current pandemic threat.
    • In turn, it seeks to gain a geopolitical advantage by this action.

    Hostile takeover bids by China

    • There are enough reports of China’s intentions to acquire financial assets and stakes in banks and companies across the world amid crisis.
    • Shares in HDFC: India seems to have woken up only recently to this threat after the Peoples’ Bank of China acquired a 1% stake in India’s HDFC.
    • Across the world, meanwhile, the clamour against China’s hostile takeover bids is becoming stronger.
    • Several countries apart from India, such as Australia and Germany, have begun to restrict Chinese foreign direct investment in companies and financial institutions in their countries.
    • These countries recognised the inherent danger of a possible Chinese hostile takeover of their critical assets.

    China taking advantage of RCEP and Belt and Road initiative

    • Restricting hostile takeovers may not be adequate to checkmate China.
    • It is poised to dominate the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
    • Which will enable China to exploit market access across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, East Asian nations, Australia and New Zealand.
    • Together with its Belt and Road Initiative, China is ostensibly preparing the way for a China-centric multilateral globalisation framework.

    The diminishing role of the US’s and Europe

    • The geopolitical fallout of this pandemic could be still more serious.
    • One distinct possibility is that COVID-19 would effectively put paid to the existing global order that has existed since the late 1940s.
    • The United States which is already being touted in some circles as a ‘failing’ state, will be compelled to cede ground.
    • Weakened economically and politically after COVID-19 has ravaged the nation, the U.S.’s capacity to play a critical role in world affairs is certain to diminish.
    • The main beneficiary of this geopolitical turnaround is likely to be China, a country that does not quite believe in playing by the rules of international conduct.
    • Weakened Europe: Europe, in the short and medium-term, will prove incapable of defining and defending its common interests, let alone having any influence in world affairs.
    • Role of Germany: Germany, which may still retain some of its present strength, is already turning insular.
    • Both France and the post-Brexit United Kingdom will be out of the reckoning as of now.

    Problems in West Asia and the possible role of Israel

    • In West Asia, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are set to face difficult times.
    • The oil price meltdown will aggravate an already difficult situation across the region.
    • There may be no victors, but Israel may be one country that is in a position to exploit this situation to its advantage.

    India: Economic and geopolitical challenges

    • In the meantime, the economic downturn greatly reduces India’s room for manoeuvre.
    • In South Asia, India faces the prospect of being isolated, with the Chinese juggernaut winning Beijing new friends and contacts across a region deeply impacted by the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    • Likewise, India’s leverage in West Asia — already greatly diminished — will suffer further.
    • With oil prices going down and the Indian expatriate community (who are among the hardest hit by this downturn) out on a limb.
    • Reduction in remittances: Many of the latter may seek repatriation back to the host country, substantially reducing the inflow of foreign funds to India from the region.

    A question based on the changes in the global order in the post-pandemic world could be asked by the UPSC, for ex- “In the post-Covid-19 world, we are experiencing several changes. What are the changes in the geo-politics that are likely to affect India’s interests?”

    Conclusion

    In the post-Covid-19 world, we are about to see many changes on the economic and geopolitical front. India should prepare itself for the emerging challenges on various fronts.

  • Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973): The judgment that upheld basic structure of India’s constitution

    Exactly 47 years ago, the Supreme Court passed its landmark judgment in Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala, considered among the most significant constitutional cases in India’s judicial history.

    Major judgments of the Supreme Court are mentioned in the newscard. Aspirants are advised to memorize them all with thier key features. UPSC may ask a prelim question mentioning all these judgements and asking which of them are related/not related to the Amendments in the Constitution.  Right from the Shankari Prasad Judgment (1951) to the Ayodhya Judgement (2019), note down all important judgements.

    Background

    Amending  the Constitution

    • The Constitution of a country is the fundamental law of the land. It is based on this document that all other laws are made and enforced.
    • Under some Constitutions, certain parts are immune from amendments and are given a special status compared to other provisions.
    • Since the Indian Constitution was first adopted, debates have raged as to the extent of power that Parliament should have to amend key provisions.

    Early years of Absolute Power

    • In the early years of Independence, the Supreme Court conceded absolute power to Parliament in amending the Constitution, as was seen in the verdicts in Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1965).
    • The reason for this is believed to be that in those initial years, the apex court had reposed faith in the wisdom of the then political leadership when leading freedom fighters were serving as Parliamentarians.
    • In subsequent years, as the Constitution kept being amended at will to suit the interests of the ruling dispensation, the Supreme Court in Golaknath (1967) held that Parliament’s amending power could not touch Fundamental Rights, and this power would be only with a Constituent Assembly.

    Parliament could make any amendment

    • Article 13(2) reads, “The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the right conferred by this Part (Part-III) and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.”
    • In both the cases, the court had ruled that the term “law” in Article 13 must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power under Article 368.
    • This means Parliament had the power to amend any part of the constitution including Fundamental rights.

    The tussle between Parliament and the judiciary

    • In the early 1970s, the government of then PM Indira Gandhi had enacted major amendments to the Constitution (the 24th, 25th, 26th and 29th) to get over the judgments of the Supreme Court in RC Cooper (1970), Madhavrao Scindia (1970) and the earlier mentioned Golaknath.
    • In RC Cooper, the court had struck down Indira Gandhi’s bank nationalization policy, and in Madhavrao Scindia it had annulled the abolition of privy purses of former rulers.

    Background for the Kesavananda Bharati Case

    • All the four amendments, as well as the Golaknath judgment, came under challenge in the Kesavananda Bharati case.
    • Here, relief was sought by the religious figure Swami Kesavananda Bharati against the Kerala government vis-à-vis two state land reform laws.
    • Since Golaknath was decided by eleven judges, a larger bench was required to test its correctness, and thus 13 judges formed the Kesavananda bench.
    • Critics of the doctrine have called it undemocratic since unelected judges can strike down a constitutional amendment. At the same time, its proponents have hailed the concept as a safety valve against majoritarianism and authoritarianism.
    • Noted legal luminaries Nani Palkhivala, Fali Nariman, and Soli Sorabjee presented the case against the government.
    • The majority opinion was delivered by CJI S M Sikri, and Justices K S Hegde, A K Mukherjea, J M Shelat, A N Grover, P Jaganmohan Reddy, and H R Khanna. Justices A N Ray, D G Palekar, K K Mathew, M H Beg, S N Dwivedi, and Y V Chandrachud dissented.

    A closer win

    • By a 7-6 verdict, a 13-judge Constitution Bench ruled that the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution is inviolable, and could not be amended by Parliament.
    • The basic structure doctrine has since been regarded as a tenet of Indian constitutional law.

    The judgment in Kesavananda Bharati

    • The Constitutional Bench, whose members shared serious ideological differences, ruled by a 7-6 verdict that Parliament should be restrained from altering the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution.
    • The court held that under Article 368, which provides Parliament amending powers, something must remain of the original Constitution that the new amendment would change.
    • The court did not define the ‘basic structure’, and only listed a few principles — federalism, secularism, democracy — as being its part.
    • Since then, the court has been adding new features to this concept.

    ‘Basic structure’ since Kesavananda

    • The basic structure doctrine was first introduced by Justice Mudholkar in the Sajjan Singh case (1965).
    • Major features were notably propounded by Justice Hans Raj Khanna in 1973.
    • The ‘basic structure’ doctrine has since been interpreted to include the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, Independence of the judiciary, doctrine of separation of powers, federalism, secularism, sovereign democratic republic, the parliamentary system of government, the principle of free and fair elections, welfare state, etc.
    • An example of its application is SR Bommai (1994), when the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the governments by the President following the demolition of the Babri Masjid, invoking a threat to secularism by these governments.

  • World at the edge of a new nuclear arms race

    The focus of this article is on the possible revival of the nuclear arms race among the US, China and Russia. In this context, the purpose and present status of the CTBT, which was aimed at ending the nuclear arms race is also discussed. The article ends by predicting the beginning of new arms race and possible demise of the CTBT.

    What were the findings of US compliance report?

    • State Department Report: In mid-April, a report was issued by the United States State Department on “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report).
    • Tests with low yields by China: The report raised concerns that China might be conducting nuclear tests with low yields at its Lop Nur test site.
    • And these tests are conducted in violation of its Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty (CTBT)
    • Violation by Russia: The U.S. report also claims that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that produced a nuclear yield and were inconsistent with ‘zero yield’ understanding underlying the CTBT.
    • Though it was uncertain about how many such experiments had been conducted by Russia.
    • Russia and China have rejected the U.S.’s claims.
    • New nuclear arms race: With growing rivalry among major powers the report is a likely harbinger of a new nuclear arms race.
    • The demise of CTBT: This new nuclear arms race would also mark the demise of the CTBT that came into being in 1996 but has failed to enter into force even after a quarter-century.

    Background of the CTBT

    • Test ban-first step: For decades, a ban on nuclear testing was seen as the necessary first step towards curbing the nuclear arms race but Cold War politics made it impossible.
    • A Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 banning underwater and atmospheric tests but this only drove testing underground.
    • By the time the CTBT negotiations began in Geneva in 1994, global politics had changed. The Cold War had ended and the nuclear arms race was over.
    • The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the USSR, had broken up and its principal testing site, Semipalatinsk, was in Kazakhstan (Russia still had access to Novaya Zemlya near the Arctic circle).
    • In 1991, Russia declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, followed by the U.S. in 1992.
    • By this time, the U.S. had conducted 1,054 tests and Russia, 715.
    • Negotiations were often contentious.
    • Eventually, the U.S. came up with the idea of defining the “comprehensive test ban” as a “zero yield” test ban that would prohibit supercritical hydro-nuclear tests but not sub-critical hydrodynamic nuclear tests.

    Make note of the points mentioned under “entry-into-force” provision given below. The reasons for India’s withdrawal from the negotiation are important from the UPSC perspective.

    “Entry-into-force” provision and India’s objections to it

    • Another controversy arose regarding the entry-into-force provisions (Article 14) of the treaty.
    • Why India withdrew from negotiations? After India’s proposals for anchoring the CTBT in a disarmament framework did not find acceptance, in June 1996, India announced its decision to withdraw from the negotiations.
    • Unhappy at this turn, the U.K., China and Pakistan took the lead in revising the entry-into-force provisions.
    • What is “entry-into-force” provision? The new provisions listed 44 countries by name whose ratification was necessary for the treaty to enter into force and included India.
    • India’s objection: India protested that this attempt at arm-twisting violated a country’s sovereign right to decide if it wanted to join a treaty but was ignored.
    • The CTBT was adopted by a majority vote and opened for signature.
    • Of the 44 listed countries, to date, only 36 have ratified the treaty.
    • Signed but not ratified: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the U.S. have signed but not ratified.
    • China maintains that it will only ratify it after the U.S. does so but the Republican-dominated Senate had rejected it in 1999.
    • Not signed, not ratified: In addition, North Korea, India and Pakistan are the three who have not signed.
    • All three have also undertaken tests after 1996; India and Pakistan in May 1998 and North Korea six times between 2006 and 2017.
    • The CTBT has therefore not entered into force and lacks legal authority.

    An organisation to verify CTBT

    • Even though CTBT has not entered into force, an international organisation to verify the CTBT was established in Vienna with a staff of about 230 persons and an annual budget of $130 million.
    • Ironically, the U.S. is the largest contributor with a share of $17 million.
    • The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) runs an elaborate verification system built around a network of over 325 seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic (underwater) monitoring stations.
    • The CTBTO has refrained from backing the U.S.’s allegations.

    The revival of the nuclear arms race

    • End of the unipolar world for the US: The key change from the 1990s is that the S.’s unipolar moment is over and strategic competition among major powers is back.
    • The U.S. now identifies Russia and China as ‘rivals’.
    • Its Nuclear Posture Review asserts that the U.S. faces new nuclear threats because both Russia and China are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons.
    • The U.S., therefore, has to expand the role of its nuclear weapons and have a more usable and diversified nuclear arsenal.
    • The Trump administration has embarked on a 30-year modernisation plan with a price tag of $1.2 trillion, which could go up over the years.
    • Concerns of Russia and China: Russia and China have been concerned about the U.S.’s growing technological lead particularly in missile defence and conventional global precision-strike capabilities.
    • Russia has responded by exploring hypersonic delivery systems and theatre systems while China has embarked on a modernisation programme to enhance the survivability of its arsenal which is considerably smaller.
    • Cyber capabilities being increased: In addition, both countries are also investing heavily in offensive cyber capabilities.
    • The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limits U.S. and Russian arsenals but will expire in 2021
    • And U.S. President Donald Trump has already indicated that he does not plan to extend New START.
    • Instead, the Trump administration would like to bring China into some kind of nuclear arms control talks.
    • But China has avoided such talks by pointing to the fact that the S. and Russia still account for over 90% of global nuclear arsenals.

    Context of the US backtracking from negotiated agreements

    • Both China and Russia have dismissed the U.S.’s allegations.
    • They pointed to the Trump administration’s backtracking from other negotiated agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal or the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
    • Tensions with China are already high with trade and technology disputes, militarisation in the South China Sea and most recently, with the novel coronavirus pandemic.
    • The U.S. could also be preparing the ground for resuming testing at Nevada.

    In the context of the latest developments, a question can be asked by the UPSC, for ex- “In the light of the latest developments on the global platform which are pointing to the revival of the nuclear arms race, how far India’s decision to not sign the CTBT is justified?”

    Conclusion

    New rivalries have already emerged. Resumption of nuclear testing may signal the demise of the ill-fated CTBT, marking the beginnings of a new nuclear arms race. 

    Back2Basics: What is “zero-yield test?”

    • This means that the agreement prohibits all nuclear explosions that produce a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction of any kind whether for weapons or peaceful purposes.
    • The decision not to include a specific definition of scope in the Treaty was a deliberate decision by the negotiating parties, including the United States, made to ensure that no loopholes were created by including a highly technical and specific list of what specific activities were and were not permitted under the Treaty.
    • A thorough review of the history of the Treaty negotiation process, as well as statements by world leaders and the negotiators of the agreement, shows that all states understand and accept the CTBT as a “zero-yield” treaty.

  • What’s behind diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea?

    In the middle of the global coronavirus pandemic, China has been busy increasing its presence in the South China Sea.

    The dispute

    • In the past few years, China has stepped up military aggression and has created artificial islands for military and economic purposes in the South China Sea.
    • This has drawn criticism from neighbouring countries and other western powers.
    • Soon after, Chinese and Australian warships also entered the fray.
    • Following the arrival of American warships, regional observers expressed concern that the US’s presence may only serve to heighten tensions.
    • The US has no territorial claims in the South China Sea but is known to send its naval force into the waters each time there are provocative developments in the waters, particularly angering China.

    Map observations in the South China Sea are must-dos for the CSE aspirants. UPSC often toggles in the Middle East,  West and Central Asian region. This year we can expect a different region for a  map-based question.

    Why in news now?

    China’s advent for islands

    • This past week, Beijing unilaterally renamed 80 islands and other geographical features in the area, drawing criticism from neighbouring countries who have also laid claim to the same territory.
    • The focus of Chinese acquisitory attention is the two disputed archipelagos of the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands in the middle of the South China Sea waters.
    • They lie between the territory of Vietnam and the Philippines.
    • If the dispute were to aggravate, Asia-Pacific researchers believe it could have serious consequences for diplomatic relations and stability in the region.

    What is the Spratly Islands dispute about?

    • There has been an ongoing territorial dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia concerning the ownership of the Spratly Islands archipelago and nearby geographical features like corals reefs, cays etc.
    • Since 1968, these nations have engaged in varying kinds of military occupation of the islands and the surrounding waters, with the exception of Brunei, that has contained its objections to the use of its maritime waters for commercial fishing.
    • Although the Spratly Islands are largely uninhabited, there is a possibility that they may have large reserves of untapped natural resources.
    • However, due to the ongoing dispute, there have been few initiatives to explore the scale of these reserves.

    Quest for Oil

    • Over the years, US government agencies have claimed that there is little to no oil and natural gas in these islands, but these reports have done little to reduce the territorial dispute.
    • In the 1970s, oil was discovered in neighbouring islands, specifically off the coast of Palawan. This discovery ramped up territorial claims by these countries.

    What is the Paracel Islands dispute about?

    • The Paracel Islands dispute is slightly more complex. This archipelago is a collection of 130 islands and coral reefs and is located in the South China Sea, almost equidistant from China and Vietnam.
    • Beijing says that references to the Paracel Islands as a part of China sovereign territory can be found in 14th century writings from the Song Dynasty.
    • Vietnam on the other hand, says that historical texts from at least the 15th century show that the islands were a part of its territory.
    • These islands also find mention in records starting from the 16th century by explorers who led expeditions to the East.
    • Colonial powers of the French-Indochina further accelerated the tensions with regard to the Paracel Islands due to their colonial policies in the 20th century.
    • By 1954, tensions had dramatically increased between China and Vietnam over the archipelago.

    What is the most recent dispute about?

    • Recent China established new administrative districts on both Spratly and Paracel Islands.
    • It also renamed those 80 islands, reefs and other geographical features around the two archipelagos with Chinese names.
    • The last time China had unilaterally engaged in a similar initiative was in 1983 where 287 geographical features had been renamed in the disputed chain of islands.

  • What are the concerns around the AarogyaSetu app?

    • Recently the AarogyaSetu app — for pan-India use was launched as the main contact tracing technology endorsed by the Central government.
    • Soon it became one of the most downloaded apps globally and has crossed the 75 million mark.
    • However, there are concerns for more transparency on the inner workings of an app that seeks the personal details of millions.

    RIght to Privacy is a very much contested topic for GS. The Aarogya Setu app which has a lot more to offer, is under the radar due to underlying vacuum of Privacy Law in India.

    AarogyaSetu App

    • The App enables people to assess themselves the risk of their catching the Corona Virus infection.
    • It is designed to keep track of other AarogyaSetu users that a person came in contact with and alert him or her if any of the contacts tests positive for COVID-19.
    • It achieves this using the phone’s Bluetooth and GPS capabilities.
    • Once installed in a smartphone through an easy and user-friendly process, the app detects other devices with AarogyaSetu installed that come in the proximity of that phone.
    • The app can then calculate the risk of infection based on sophisticated parameters if any of these contacts has tested positive.
    • The personal data collected by the App is encrypted using state-of-the-art technology and stays secure on the phone till it is needed for facilitating medical intervention.

    Issues with the app

    • The AarogyaSetu app faces the same issue as every other contact tracing technology that has come up during the pandemic period — it is people dependent.
    • It needs widespread usage and self-reporting to be effective.
    • Given that any number of total users will be a subset of smartphone owners in India, and there are bound to be variations in the levels of self-reporting, the efficacy is not bulletproof.
    • The terms of use of the app also say as much, distancing the government from any failure on the part of the app in correctly identifying COVID-19 patients.

    Are there privacy concerns?

    • First of all, the app exists in the privacy law vacuum that is India.
    • With no legislation that spells out in detail how the online privacy of Indians is to be protected, AarogyaSetu users have little choice but to accept the privacy policy provided by the government.
    • The policy goes into some detail on where and how long the data will be retained, but it leaves the language around who will have access to it vague.
    • As per the policy persons carrying out medical and administrative interventions necessary in relation to COVID-19” will have access to the data.
    • This suggests interdepartmental exchanges of people’s personal information and is more excessive than countries like Singapore and even Israel.

    Technical issue

    • Beyond the legal loopholes, there are technical loopholes as well.
    • The unique digital identity in AarogyaSetu is a static number, which increases the probability of identity breaches.
    • The abundance of data collected is also potentially problematic.
    • AarogyaSetu uses both Bluetooth as well as GPS reference points, which could be seen as overkill whereas other apps such as TraceTogether make do with Bluetooth.

    Other issues

    • Experts emphasise that automated contact tracing is not a panacea.
    • They caution against an over-reliance on technology where a competent human-in-the-loop system with sufficient capacity exists.

  • Public policy dilemma of choosing between lives and livelihood

    This article deals with how the different sections of a society assign different weightage to the various factors they are faced with in life. In the case of Covid-19, one section of society which is well-off might care more about the possible loss of life while other section might end up attaching more weightage to the loss of livelihood than to the possible loss of life due to infection. The article discusses this issue in detail.

    Difference between risk and uncertainty

    • Since the days of Frank Knight, economists have differentiated between the two.
    • Risk has a known probability distribution.
    • For uncertainty, the probability distribution is unknwon.
    • COVID-19 makes us confront uncertainty, not risk.
    • For uncertainty, there is a subjective probability distribution, which can, and does, vary from individual to individual.

    So, how the subjective probability distribution is devised by a person?

    • Through information and experience, one already possesses.
    • There are various rationality assumptions used by economists. They are often violated.
    • Otherwise, behavioural economics wouldn’t have come into existence.
    • Typically, given a situation, when your decision doesn’t agree with someone else, you say they are being irrational.
    • However, with uncertainty, the problem may not be with rationality assumptions, but with differences in subjective probability distributions.

    Lack of data for various factors

    • Because of COVID-19, there is a certain risk of getting infected. Let’s call this the infection rate — total infections divided by the total population.
    • We don’t know this infection rate for India or for any other country for that matter.
    • No country has done universal testing.
    • No testing for random sample: No country has done universal testing for a proper random sample either.
    • The ICMR has told us more than 75 per cent of Indian patients will be asymptomatic.
    • Who do we test? Those who show symptoms, those who have been in contact with confirmed patients and those who suffer from severe respiratory diseases.
    • Most countries do something similar.
    • Sampling bias: In other words, when we work out an infection rate based on those tested, there is a sampling bias.
    • This isn’t a proper infection rate.
    • The only country where we have had something like a random sample is Iceland.
    • There, the infection rate was 0.8 per cent.
    • Data for death rate: There are similar caveats about the death rate.
    • If we mechanically divide the number of deaths by the number of confirmed cases for India, we will get a death rate just over 3 per cent.
    • The global figure is a little less than 7 per cent.
    • But neither of these is a death rate for the total population since only those with severe symptoms are included in infection numbers.
    • Three per cent or seven per cent are over-estimates.
    • In a controlled environment like Diamond Princess, death rate as a ratio of total passengers, and not those infected, was less than 0.4 per cent.
    • The true infection rate and true death rate are not alarming numbers.

    How the lack of data is reflected in subjective probability distribution?

    • There are slices in India’s population pyramid with rural/urban and other spatial differences too.
    • Consider two extreme types-type A and type B.
    • Type A, who are globalised in information access and morbidity.
    • Life expectancy is 80 plus and there are lifestyle diseases like diabetes and high blood pressure.
    • This co-morbidity increases possible death rates and thanks to globalised access to information, certainly increases perceptions about death rates, making them out to be higher than they are.
    • Some of them have fixed incomes, regardless of what happens to lockdown.
    • The high probability assigned to loss of life: In terms of maximising expected payoffs with a subjective distribution, high probability is attached to loss of life and low probability to loss of livelihood.
    • How type B forms a subjective probability?
    • Type B, someone whose life expectancy is 60, without a fixed income stream and whose health concerns are tuberculosis and water-borne diseases, not COVID-19.
    • Nor is access to information that globalised.
    • The high probability assigned to loss of livelihood: High subjective probability will be attached to loss of livelihood and low probability to death from COVID.
    • Both types reflect subjective probabilities. Neither is “irrational”.
    • The tension between the two: Type A would like the lockdown to continue indefinitely, until the long tail of the infection curve tapers off, perhaps beyond September.
    • Type B would like lockdown to be eased soon, with necessary restrictions in hotspots.
    • There is indeed tension between lives and livelihood.
    • Even if health outcomes and information access are like Type A, but income is contingent on growth, preferences might mirror Type B.

    The issues highlighted here can be broadly used in the various scenario where there is uncertainty involved and various stakeholders perceive the probable outcomes in entirely different ways. Various points here can be used to answer the question based on policy making.

    Balancing the differential individual preferences in public policy

    • One set of individuals imposes its choice on the rest.
    • Type A disproportionately influences policy.
    • This determination of aggregate preferences is a dynamic process.
    • Therefore, sooner or later, Type B contests this and as the lockdown is prolonged and livelihood costs mount, discontent surfaces, as it has across a range of countries.
    • There were also welfare economics notions that pre-dated social choice theory, such as compensation principles of Kaldor, Hicks and Scitovsky.
    • The point can be made using the two stereotypes. Specifically, Type A need to compensate Type B for their losses.
    • To state it starkly, livelihood losses suffered by Type B need to be compensated by the government through redistributive measures and this has to be financed by higher taxes imposed on Type-A.
    • The right question for the Type A is not whether they want the lockdown to continue, but whether they are willing to pay a COVID-tax to support lockdown extension.

    A question based on policy formation issues explained here can be framed, for ex. “Risk has a known probability distribution. For uncertainty, the probability distribution is unknown. COVID-19 makes us confront uncertainty, not risk. In this context, there is a debate between saving lives and saving livelihoods. In such a scenario, what can be the most probable solutions that public policy must delve into, in order to maintain the balance between this uncertainty and risk.”

    Conclusion

    Extending or ending the lockdown decision represent the public policy dilemma. Without a revival in growth, the tax-paying capacity of Type B is limited and with job losses, some Type As become Type Bs. The choice is starker.