‘No permanent geographic split of fighter assets under theaterisation plan’

Why in the News

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has moved from cautioning against a hurried theaterisation plan to setting out, for the first time in full, its own model: full jointness but no permanent geographic split of fighter assets. The Chief of Air Staff argued for “centralised control” where necessary and “decentralised execution” where appropriate. The plan for joint theatre commands remains stalled over differences among the services.

What is theaterisation, and why has it stalled?

1. What it is: Theaterisation would merge the Army, Navy and Air Force into joint commands, each responsible for one front. It is like placing every unit facing one border under one command, not three.
2. Most ambitious reform: The plan was announced in 2019 as India’s most ambitious military reform since Independence.
3. Three proposed commands: A Northern Theatre Command at Lucknow focused on China, a Western Theatre Command at Jaipur to address Pakistan, and a Maritime Theatre Command at Thiruvananthapuram.
4. Why it stalled: The three services disagree on the proposed command structures. The IAF has strong reservations about splitting its fighter squadrons among the commands.
5. The takeaway: Integration is accepted in principle, so the reform now turns on how scarce air power is shared among the new commands.

What model does the IAF propose instead?

1. No permanent split: The IAF is “fully committed to jointness and integration”. It is “not viewing theaterisation as an exercise to permanently divide fighter assets geographically”.
2. Centralised control, decentralised execution: Central control lets air power be concentrated where it is needed most. Commanders on the ground keep the agility to act swiftly.
3. Strengths of air power: Speed, reach, flexibility and rapid concentration of combat power at the point of decision define air power. The IAF holds it is India’s primary responder to any security challenge.
4. Phased implementation: A “transformation of this scale” should be implemented in phases, so that operational readiness is “never compromised”.
5. Built for India: Structures should be judged against India’s specific security requirements, not copied from other countries, because each nation operates in its own strategic, geographical, technological and operational environment.

What evidence does the IAF cite for its model?

1. Operation Sindoor: During Operation Sindoor, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the three service chiefs ran a joint command arrangement. Centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources “proved decisive”.
2. Ongoing conflicts abroad: The IAF chief cited ongoing conflicts in various geographies to argue that air power can decisively shape military outcomes.
3. Uncertain future battlefield: The IAF warns against the “trap” of predicting future war with “excessive certainty”. The next conflict is likely to be faster, more autonomous yet more network-dependent, more transparent yet more deceptive.
4. Adaptable structures: Future war is likely to be more precise in some respects and marked by mass in others, so command structures must be able to absorb that shift.

Challenges

1. Limited fighter fleet: Dividing a limited fighter force among fronts leaves each command with less to concentrate at the decisive point.
2. Readiness during transition: Restructuring all three services at once risks gaps in operational readiness while the change is under way.
3. Unknown future war: Structures fixed for today’s threats may fail in a conflict that is faster and more network-dependent.

Way Forward

1. Central pool of air assets: Keep fighter squadrons under centralised control and allocate them to theatre commands by need, as during Operation Sindoor.
2. Phased roll-out: Raise the commands in stages, testing readiness after each stage before the next begins.
3. Settle structures first: The CDS and the three service chiefs should agree on command structures before any command is notified.

Conclusion

The IAF accepts integration but wants its fighters pooled, which leaves command of scarce air power as the real dispute. The plan can move only when the services agree on a structure that keeps fighters under central control and still gives theatre commanders room to act.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2024] What are the duties of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as Head of the Department of Military Affairs? 1. Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee. 2. Exercise military command over the three Service Chiefs. 3. Principal Military Advisor to Defence Minister on all tri-service matters. Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1,2,3 (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1 and 3 only* ANSWER: (d)”