
Why in the News
A collective defence pact signed in Mecca between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan has altered the security architecture of West Asia. The pact pools Saudi capital, Pakistani military strength and Turkish defence technology, and is aimed at deterring Israel rather than Iran. India built a decade of gains in the region and now has no declared strategy to answer this realignment.
What did India build in West Asia over the past decade?
- 2016, Saudi recognition: Saudi Arabia awarded India’s Prime Minister its highest civilian honour, marking a shift in the political relationship.
- 2021, I2U2: The I2U2 agreement was signed, tying India into a grouping with Israel, the United States and the UAE.
- 2024, Chabahar: Iran leased Chabahar port to India, giving overland access towards Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan.
- The UAE relationship: India cultivated a special relationship with the UAE built on remittances from Indian expatriate workers, investments by Indian business in the UAE, and UAE strategic investments in India.
- Where they stand now: These are gains from the past, and India’s footprint is contracting one country at a time.
Why is the region’s security order breaking down now?
- A war that spread: In the last four months the United States and Israel war with Iran escalated into a regional conflict.
- Iran against the Gulf: Iran attacked GCC countries, ending the assumption that the Gulf monarchies sit outside the fighting.
- Saudi strikes in Iraq: Saudi Arabia hit Iraqi militias.
- Attacks at sea: The Houthis attacked Saudi ships.
- Israeli strikes: Israel carried out strikes in multiple countries.
- The American umbrella in doubt: Gulf states are rethinking the efficacy of the United States security umbrella and now see a threat from both Iran and Israel.
- A schism over method: The Gulf is split between handling that threat through engagement, the UAE approach, and through deterrence, which Saudi Arabia is contemplating.
How has Pakistan converted the regional crisis into diplomatic capital?
- The mediator role: Pakistan’s role as mediator in the United States and Iran conflict is earning it reputational benefits across the region.
- The timing: It entered when no one else could bring the United States President and the Iranians to the table.
- Who had failed first: Turkiye, Qatar and Egypt had all attempted mediation without success.
- The pact as the payoff: The Mecca collective defence pact follows directly from that diplomatic moment.
- The Israel risk for India: A future Israel and Pakistan war would draw India in, given the close India Israel partnership.
- The Turkiye risk for India: Greater Turkish support for Pakistan in a future India Pakistan conflict cannot be ruled out.
What do the positions of individual regional states reveal about the new architecture?
- Saudi Arabia, deterrence and a new maritime force: Riyadh is moving from engagement to deterrence, supplies the capital leg of the Mecca pact, and is raising a Saudi led maritime force for the Red Sea that India is not part of.
- Turkiye, technology as leverage: Ankara contributes defence technology to the pact and runs a deepening military relationship with Pakistan that India has no channel to discuss.
- Pakistan, military manpower as currency: Islamabad supplies the military strength the pact rests on, converting an army into diplomatic capital with Gulf financiers.
- United Arab Emirates, engagement over deterrence: Abu Dhabi manages the Iran and Israel threat through engagement, and carries mounting differences with Saudi Arabia plus positions against United Nations recognised governments in conflicts as far away as Sudan.
- Iran, from partner to belligerent: Tehran leased Chabahar to India in 2024 and has since attacked GCC states, putting India’s connectivity asset inside an active war zone.
- Israel, strikes that created the pact: Israeli operations across multiple countries made three regional states conclude they are next, which is the design logic of the Mecca pact.
Why does India’s current posture carry risk?
- The Israel bet: India’s approach rests on confidence in Israel’s victory, drawn from Israel’s proximity to the United States.
- The American consensus is shifting: Both Make America Great Again Republicans and Democratic Socialists now question the once unquestioned United States support for Israel.
- Israel alone: Whether Israel can prevail without assured American backing is unsettled.
- The UAE bet: The second pillar of India’s regional position is the UAE relationship, resting on remittances, elite investment and Emirati investment in India.
- UAE exposure: The UAE’s differences with Saudi Arabia and its Sudan positions place that pillar at risk.
What are the choices before India?
- Formal alignment: India can sign military alliances with Israel and the UAE.
- The cost of alignment: That would damage what is left of India’s relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia.
- Continued inaction: India can do nothing, which is the current position.
- Cost of inaction, seafarers: Indian merchant mariners continue to be killed in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Cost of inaction, shipping: More Indian ships sink in the Bab-el-Mandeb.
- Reputational cost: A great power in the making appears hobbled in its own immediate maritime neighbourhood.
- The third way: India can devise an active regional political strategy instead of choosing between alignment and drift.
What would an active Indian regional strategy involve?
- Renewed engagement with Saudi Arabia: India has no explicit differences with Riyadh, which makes it the cheapest relationship to rebuild.
- Arab and Iran trust building: India can work to rebuild trust between Arab states and Iran, beginning with the UAE and Iran relationship.
- Jordan’s security: India can offer defensive technologies to Jordan at a time when United States munitions are running low.
- Lebanon peacekeeping: India can take a role in the future UN peacekeeping presence in Lebanon, with UNIFIL forecast to end.
- A back channel with Turkiye: India can share its red lines on Turkiye’s relationship with Pakistan through a quiet channel.
- Red Sea shipping with Egypt: If India cannot join the Saudi led maritime force, it can work with Egypt on a parallel effort to protect India bound shipping from the Suez Canal to Bab-el-Mandeb.
- A military presence: India can examine a presence in the Red Sea region, in Somaliland or Socotra.
- Exercises with the region: Existing military training exchanges can be scaled into joint drills and exercises with a range of regional states.
- A Special Envoy for West Asia: India can appoint one who draws all the threads together, rather than one confined to the Israel and Palestine peace process.
Challenges to India’s West Asia Strategy
- The alliance trap: Any formal military alignment with one camp forecloses the other, since Iran and Saudi Arabia both read Indian alignment as a choice against them. e.g. India’s Chabahar development slowed each time United States sanctions pressure on Iran tightened.
- The Turkiye and Pakistan axis: Turkish defence technology transfers to Pakistan directly degrade India’s conventional edge. e.g. Turkish origin Songar armed drones were used against Indian positions during the May 2025 hostilities.
- Chokepoint exposure: India’s trade and energy routes converge on two narrow straits it cannot secure alone. e.g. Houthi attacks from late 2023 forced Indian bound shipping to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, raising freight and insurance costs.
- Attacks on Indian crewed shipping: Indian seafarers crew a large share of global merchant vessels and absorb the human cost of regional escalation. e.g. the drone strike on MV Chem Pluto off Porbandar in December 2023.
- Evacuation burden: Every escalation converts India’s diaspora presence into a mass evacuation operation. e.g. Operation Kaveri from Sudan in 2023 and Operation Sindhu from Iran and Israel in June 2025.
- No standing regional mechanism: India has no dedicated envoy or regional platform to convert bilateral goodwill into collective influence. e.g. the piece’s own recommendation for a Special Envoy for West Asia has no existing counterpart in the Indian system.
- Exclusion from new regional security structures: New arrangements are being built without Indian participation. e.g. the Saudi led Red Sea maritime force, which India is not part of.
Conclusion
West Asia’s security architecture is being rebuilt around a Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan pact designed to deter Israel, and India has no strategy that matches the scale of that change. Formal alignment with Israel and the UAE costs India Iran and Saudi Arabia, and inaction costs it seafarers, ships and standing. The workable route is an active regional political strategy built on renewed engagement with Riyadh, trust building between the Arab states and Iran, and a dedicated envoy. India’s capacity to shape the region survives, its window does not.
West Asia in India’s Foreign Policy
- About: West Asia covers the Gulf monarchies, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Turkiye and the Levant, treated in Indian policy as an extended neighbourhood rather than a distant theatre.
- Policy label: India’s approach shifted from Look West to Link West, moving beyond oil and labour transactions towards defence, technology and investment partnerships.
- Energy: West Asia remains a principal source of India’s crude oil imports, and Qatar is India’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas.
- Diaspora: About 9 million Indians live and work in the Gulf, the largest concentration of the Indian diaspora anywhere.
- Remittances: India is the world’s largest recipient of remittances, receiving over 100 billion dollars annually, with the Gulf a major contributor.
- Trade: The UAE is among India’s top three trading partners, and the India UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement took effect in May 2022.
- Connectivity: The India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was announced on the margins of the G20 New Delhi Summit in September 2023.
Back2Basics: Gulf Cooperation Council
- Formation: Established in 1981 at Abu Dhabi.
- Headquarters: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
- Members: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.
- Mandate: Coordination and integration among members in economic, defence, security and cultural affairs.
- Military arm: The Peninsula Shield Force, a joint military force raised in 1984.
- Economic instrument: A unified economic agreement and a customs union among the six members.
- India link: India is not a member, and engages the bloc through bilateral strategic partnerships and an India GCC ministerial mechanism.
Government Initiatives for India’s West Asia Engagement
- Link West Policy: Reframes the Gulf and West Asia as a zone of strategic partnership rather than an energy and labour market alone.
- I2U2: Joint investment platform with Israel, the United States and the UAE across food security, clean energy and health.
- India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor: Rail and shipping corridor linking India to Europe through the Gulf, announced in September 2023.
- India UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, 2022: India’s first Gulf trade agreement, cutting tariffs on the bulk of traded goods.
- Chabahar long term contract, 2024: A ten year agreement for operating the Shahid Beheshti terminal, giving India a port outside the Strait of Hormuz.
- eMigrate portal and Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana: Registration and mandatory insurance cover for Indian workers emigrating to Gulf destinations.
- Evacuation operations: Operation Sindhu, Operation Ajay and Operation Kaveri, evacuating Indians from Iran and Israel, Israel and Sudan respectively.
- Operation Sankalp: Indian Navy deployment in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf to escort Indian flagged merchant shipping.
Key Facts about India and West Asia
- The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of global oil consumption and has no practical bypass for most Gulf exporters.
- The Bab-el-Mandeb is the southern gate of the Red Sea and the compulsory approach to the Suez Canal.
- Chabahar is Iran’s only oceanic port, on the Gulf of Oman, and lies outside the Strait of Hormuz.
- India’s overseas military logistics access includes Duqm in Oman, agreed in 2018.
- I2U2 was agreed in 2021 and held its first leaders summit in July 2022.
- India is not a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and was invited as guest of honour to its foreign ministers meeting at Abu Dhabi in 2019.
- The GCC has six members; the wider Arab League has 22.
“[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”
