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  • Stem cell therapy for autism only in approved clinical trials: Centre

    Why in the News

    The Union Health Ministry has directed States and Union Territories to ensure that stem cell therapy is offered as standard clinical care only for disease conditions and indications the Ministry has approved, with its use for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) restricted to duly approved clinical trials. The advisory, issued on September 16, follows the Supreme Court’s judgment of January 30, 2026 in Yash Charitable Trust & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., and reiterates the existing regulatory framework rather than creating a new one. The problem it addresses is a gap between practice and evidence. Stem cell interventions have continued to be offered for autism as commercial clinical services even though an Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) review found the available evidence does not support them.

    What does the advisory direct?

    1. Approved indications only: Stem cell therapy may be offered as standard clinical care only for disease conditions and indications approved by the Ministry.
    2. Autism confined to trials: For ASD, therapeutic use of any type of stem cell must remain confined to duly approved clinical trials.
    3. The governing guidelines: Such trials must accord with the National Guidelines for Stem Cell Research, 2017, issued by the ICMR and the Department of Biotechnology.
    4. The commercial bar: Interventions not approved for routine clinical use, including those offered for autism, must not be provided as routine, standard or commercial clinical services.

    What prompted the advisory?

    1. The judgment behind it: The advisory follows the Supreme Court’s January 30, 2026 judgment in Yash Charitable Trust & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
    2. Who it was issued to: It was issued to States and Union Territories that have adopted the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010, which is the statute through which clinical establishments are registered and regulated.
    3. The dissemination duty: States and Union Territories have been asked to pass the Court’s directions down to State and district regulatory authorities, and to government and private clinical establishments involved in stem cell research, treatment, promotion or administration.

    Why does the evidence not support stem cell therapy for autism?

    1. The ICMR finding: An ICMR review concluded that the available evidence does not support stem cell therapy over behavioural and supportive therapies for ASD.
    2. The review’s own recommendation: It recommended that such therapy be restricted to approved clinical trials rather than offered as care.
    3. The practice that continues: Stem cell interventions for autism have continued despite the absence of established evidence supporting them as a standard treatment, which is the conduct the advisory is directed at.

    Challenges to regulating unproven stem cell therapy

    1. Adoption of the governing Act is voluntary: The Clinical Establishments Act applies only in States that have adopted it, so an advisory routed through it does not reach every clinical establishment in the country. Eg. Several large States have their own clinical establishment legislation and have not adopted the central Act.
      The Fix: Route the same directions through each State’s own clinical establishment law, so coverage does not depend on adoption of the central statute.
    2. Guidelines carry no penalty of their own: The National Guidelines for Stem Cell Research, 2017 are guidance rather than statute, so breach is punished only through registration action against the establishment. Eg. Clinics offering unapproved stem cell interventions have continued operating while guidance was in force.
      The Fix: Attach defined penalties for offering unapproved cell based interventions to the rules under the clinical establishment framework.
    3. Advertising reaches patients before regulators do: Families encounter claims for stem cell treatment through direct marketing rather than through referral, so demand is created outside the clinical system. Eg. The Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 lists conditions for which advertising cures is barred, and enforcement against online claims is thin.
      The Fix: Bring digital advertising of cell based therapies under a prior approval requirement tied to the approved indications list.
    4. Desperation drives cross border and unregulated demand: Where no curative treatment exists, families pursue interventions regardless of the evidence, including outside the country. Eg. Stem cell tourism to jurisdictions with weaker oversight is a documented pattern for neurological conditions.
      The Fix: Publish and maintain a public registry of approved indications and approved trial sites, so families can check a claim before paying for it.

    Conclusion

    The advisory settles the legal position rather than changing it: stem cell therapy for autism is a research question, not a clinical service, and the distinction is now to be enforced through the registration authorities in each State. The instrument’s reach depends on how many States have adopted the Clinical Establishments Act and on whether district regulators act on the directions passed to them. The next measurable step is registration action against establishments that continue to offer the intervention commercially.

    Back2Basics: Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010

    1. Purpose: It provides for the registration and regulation of clinical establishments, with a view to prescribing minimum standards of facilities and services.
    2. Coverage: It applies to all recognised systems of medicine and to both government and private establishments, excluding those run by the armed forces.
    3. How it extends to States: It applies directly in Union Territories and in States that adopt it by resolution, since public health is a State subject.
    4. Institutional structure: It establishes a National Council for Clinical Establishments and requires State Councils and District Registering Authorities to maintain a national register.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS3, 10] Stem cell therapy is gaining popularity in India to treat a wide variety of medical conditions including Leukaemia, Thalassemia, damaged cornea and several burns. Describe briefly what stem cell therapy is and what advantages it has over other treatments?”

  • Private participation not at the cost of ISRO’s capabilities: Staff in fresh note

    Why in the News

    A group of employee associations of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has asserted in a fresh statement that private participation in the space sector must not weaken the agency’s own capabilities. The four page note, issued by a Joint Action Council (JAC) of the associations and circulated among ISRO staff, states that technologies and facilities developed by the agency must not be transferred to private parties at “throwaway prices”. It follows a September 4 letter to the ISRO Chairman, sent a day after the successful launch of the GSLV-F17 mission, which sought clarifications on the agency’s future role. The Chairman had responded that there was no move to privatise the agency. The disagreement is over the boundary, not the principle: the associations accept private participation while demanding that the full capability chain for the agency’s launch vehicles stay in house.

    What does the Joint Action Council note demand?

    1. A return on public investment: The note states that ISRO’s capabilities have been built on public money and cannot become a source of private profit without an adequate return to the nation.
    2. No transfer at throwaway prices: It states that public wealth cannot be transferred at throwaway prices or treated as a freebie for private entities.
    3. Conditions on the transfer process: It demands a level playing field, transparency and accountability in how technology developed with public money is passed on.

    What prompted the associations to write?

    1. The September 4 letter: The associations first flagged their concerns in a letter to the ISRO Chairman on September 4, a day after the successful GSLV-F17 launch.
    2. The reports behind the concern: The letter responded to reports that the agency was being readied to focus its energies only on a few strategic missions, while ceding the rest of the space sector to private companies.
    3. The Chairman’s response: The Chairman stated there was no move to privatise the agency, and that it would continue to build and strengthen capabilities as it partners with the private sector to expand the space economy.
    4. The follow up engagement: He later addressed ISRO employees in a video conference to allay the concerns raised.

    Where does the note accept private participation?

    1. Not opposed in principle: The note states plainly that the associations are not opposed to private participation in the space sector.
    2. Who has a role: It names Indian industry, Public Sector Units and startups as having an important role in expanding India’s space ecosystem.
    3. The launch rate argument: It accepts a legitimate need to increase the number of mission launches, and that this cannot be achieved without private players.
    4. The stated limit: Accepting private players does not mean that mature technologies developed by ISRO are all transferred to outside entities.

    Which capabilities does the note want ring fenced?

    1. Two launch vehicles named: The note names the LVM3, ISRO’s heaviest operational launch vehicle, and the under development Next Generation Launch Vehicle (NGLV).
    2. The complete chain: It states that ISRO must retain the complete chain of capability, from research and development to realisation, integration, testing and launch.
    3. Why the chain matters: Retaining every stage rather than only design keeps the ability to build and fly a vehicle inside the agency, which is what the associations treat as core function rather than transferable technology.

    Challenges to private participation in India’s space sector

    1. Valuing publicly funded technology: There is no settled method for pricing a technology whose development cost was borne entirely by the exchequer, which is the precise objection the note raises. Eg. Technology transfer agreements for launch vehicle systems have been signed without a published valuation basis.
      The Fix: Publish a standard valuation and royalty framework for transferred space technology, so each agreement is measured against a stated method.
    2. A single customer market: Demand for Indian launch and satellite services is dominated by government programmes, so private entrants depend on public orders rather than on a commercial market. Eg. Indian small satellite launch startups have relied substantially on government and institutional payloads for early missions.
      The Fix: Commit multi year anchor procurement volumes in advance, so private capacity is built against a visible order book.
    3. Regulatory clearance timelines: Authorisation for launches, spectrum and frequency coordination and ground station approvals involve multiple agencies, which lengthens project cycles for private firms. Eg. Satellite communications operators have waited through extended spectrum allocation decisions before beginning commercial service in India.
      The Fix: Fix statutory outer limits for each authorisation stage under the single window mechanism, with deemed clearance on expiry.
    4. Loss of institutional skill: Transferring production of mature systems moves the engineers who build them out of the agency, which erodes the capability the agency is asked to retain. Eg. The note’s own demand covers realisation, integration and testing, not only design.
      The Fix: Tie every technology transfer to a retained in house production line for the same system, so the skill is duplicated rather than handed over.
    5. Liability for damage: India is liable under international space law for damage caused by objects launched from its territory, including those of private operators. Eg. The Liability Convention of 1972 places responsibility on the launching State rather than on the private entity.
      The Fix: Make insurance cover and indemnity terms a condition of authorisation, scaled to the mission’s risk class.

    Conclusion

    The dispute has narrowed from whether the agency is being privatised to where the boundary of its core function lies. The employee associations have accepted private participation and the launch rate argument behind it, and have drawn the line at the complete capability chain for the LVM3 and the NGLV. The Chairman’s assurance answers the question of intent but not the question of pricing, which is what the note actually asks. What to watch is whether a stated valuation basis accompanies the next transfer of an ISRO developed system.

    Back2Basics: Next Generation Launch Vehicle (NGLV)

    1. What it is: A heavy lift launch vehicle under development by ISRO, intended to succeed the current generation of operational vehicles.
    2. Approval: Its development was approved by the Union Cabinet in September 2024, with an outlay of about Rs 8,240 crore.
    3. Capability: It is designed to place roughly 30 tonnes into low Earth orbit, around three times the LVM3’s capacity, with a partially reusable first stage.
    4. Purpose: It is intended to support the Bharatiya Antariksh Station and India’s stated goal of a crewed lunar landing by 2040.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Consider the following statements about involvement of private entities in India’s space programme: 1. IN-SPACe is an autonomous agency formed to facilitate participation of private entities. 2. Agnikul Cosmos launched the world’s first flight using 3D-printed rocket engine. 3. Skyroot Aerospace has developed liquid fuel for GSLV. (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 2 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: C”

  • For AI governance, hard laws and strong guardrails

    Why in the News

    A 154 page threat intelligence report published by Anthropic has documented nine months of artificial intelligence (AI) misuse, covering December 2025 to August 2026 across seven harm categories, from state sponsored operations to lone actors. Two days later the company’s chief executive published a blog post calling on the industry to slow the development of frontier AI, and the heads of two rival AI firms agreed within hours. The report’s significance is structural rather than evidentiary. AI is described as having moved from a tool that generates harmful content to an orchestration layer connected to other software and running multiple stages of an operation at once. The tension is that a voluntary slowdown is being proposed by the same firms whose competitive position it would protect, in a field where one major jurisdiction sits outside any such agreement.

    What is AI ‘uplift’?

    1. The term: Uplift is the capability boost AI gives to an attacker, measured in the speed, scale and depth of the harm produced.
    2. The mechanism: AI sits as an orchestration layer across other software, running several stages of an operation simultaneously rather than performing a single task.
    3. What it changes: Sophisticated attacks become possible with fewer people and less expertise than were previously required.

    What did the threat intelligence report document?

    1. A near fully automated disinformation operation: A flagged operation in Bangladesh was almost entirely automated. AI generated the content, other software turned it into videos, and scheduling algorithms published them at optimised times.
    2. The scale one person achieved: That single operation ran one person, 29 accounts and 1,500 fabricated stories.
    3. A distillation campaign: An Alibaba campaign used 151 million AI exchanges to copy a competitor’s capabilities.
    4. Surveillance uses: The report records AI being used as an instrument of control by those who possess it, rather than as a means of communication.
    5. The biological weapons admission: The company states that for its most capable current models it can no longer assure that a sophisticated actor could not receive meaningful assistance in biological weapons research.
    6. An incomplete picture: What was caught is a subset of what was attempted, so the documented cases set a floor rather than a total.

    Why is the voluntary slowdown the wrong frame?

    1. The stated warning: The slowdown call rested on the claim that AI has been advancing far faster since the middle of the year, and that swarms of rogue AI agents could take over the internet within six to 12 months.
    2. Three obstacles to a unilateral slowdown: Competitive pressure, capital and geopolitics make a one sided pause difficult to sustain, with China operating outside any such agreement.
    3. The incentive problem: A market leader calling for a slowdown is also calling for an arrangement that protects its own lead, a point made publicly by a venture capitalist during the exchange.
    4. The reframing: The operative question is not how to slow development but how to accelerate governance, since voluntary disclosure is not a governance system.

    Why is the Bangladesh case directly relevant to India?

    1. Transferable techniques: Automated account creation, AI generated content at scale and optimisation for rural low literacy audiences apply to any democracy with a large and linguistically diverse electorate.
    2. The Indian exposure: India has 950 million eligible voters and continuous State elections, so the target surface is permanent rather than episodic.
    3. Detection asymmetry: AI generated disinformation in multiple Indian languages is easy to produce and difficult to detect, which places the burden on platforms rather than on individual users.
    4. Distillation and surveillance: The Alibaba style distillation campaign will be run against Indian AI models, and the surveillance cases bear directly on the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.

    What guardrails are proposed for India?

    1. Mandatory misuse reporting: Every AI platform above a defined scale threshold would be required to report detected misuse to the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) and to a designated AI Safety Authority.
    2. Watermarking in political contexts: Mandatory watermarking of AI generated content in political and public interest contexts is proposed as the direct answer to the Bangladesh style operation.
    3. Covering agentic AI: Platform accountability rules must explicitly cover agentic AI, meaning systems that act in the world rather than only generate text.
    4. Criminalising distillation and API abuse: New legislation would explicitly prohibit and criminalise systematic distillation and fraudulent mass API access.
    5. A statutory regulator: A statutory body is proposed with powers to compel disclosure, audit systems and impose restrictions, on the position that governance risks can only be addressed by law.

    What do the American and European positions show about India’s opening?

    1. The United States: The American position is described as constrained by a deregulatory administration, so federal statutory guardrails are not the near term route there.
    2. The European Union: The European position is described as one where regulatory ambition has at times outrun technical understanding, which limits it as a model to copy.
    3. India’s claimed advantage: India is presented as the world’s largest democracy with a record of building technology policy at scale, naming Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), Unified Payments Interface (UPI), Aadhaar and the Information Technology Rules of 2021, and with a direct stake in AI serving 1.4 billion citizens.

    Challenges to AI governance through hard law

    1. Compute and models sit outside national jurisdiction: A statutory duty binds the platform’s Indian operations while the model weights, training compute and developer sit abroad. Eg. The most capable frontier models in use in India are trained and hosted by firms headquartered in the United States and China.
      The Fix: Anchor obligations to the point of service to Indian users, so scale in India rather than location of training triggers the duty.
    2. Watermarks are removable: Provenance marking on AI generated media can be stripped by re encoding, cropping or screen capture before redistribution. Eg. Synthetic political audio clips circulate on messaging platforms as re recorded files carrying no original metadata.
      The Fix: Pair content watermarking with cryptographic provenance at capture and upload, so an absent signature is itself a detectable signal.
    3. Open weight models escape platform duties: Rules written for large platforms do not reach a model downloaded and run privately on local hardware. Eg. Open weight large language models are distributed freely and fine tuned offline without any platform intermediary.
      The Fix: Place release stage obligations on the entity publishing model weights, including safety evaluation and disclosure before public release.
    4. Regulatory capacity lags the technology: A statutory authority needs evaluation infrastructure and staff able to audit frontier systems, which is scarce and expensive. Eg. Existing Indian technology regulators depend heavily on deputation and contractual staffing for specialised roles.
      The Fix: Fund a standing model evaluation facility attached to the authority, so audits rest on in house testing rather than on developer self reporting.
    5. Overbroad drafting reaches lawful speech: A duty to detect and disrupt coordinated content operations can be applied to ordinary political campaigning and satire. Eg. Content takedown obligations under existing intermediary rules have been contested in court for their effect on lawful expression.
      The Fix: Define the triggering conduct by automation and inauthenticity of accounts rather than by the content’s subject matter.

    Conclusion

    The governance question has shifted from what a model outputs to what a system does across other software, and no Indian statute currently addresses that second thing. A statutory authority with audit and disclosure powers is the route proposed, and it would need enforcement reach over entities whose models are built outside India. The live tension is between a detection duty broad enough to catch automated influence operations and one narrow enough to leave political speech alone. The near term marker is whether a scale threshold and an AI specific reporting duty appear in Indian law rather than in advisories.

    Government Initiatives on AI Governance in India

    1. IndiaAI Mission: Approved in 2024 under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, it funds shared computing capacity, datasets, application development and a safety pillar for trusted AI.
    2. National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence: Released by NITI Aayog in 2018 under the framing of AI for All, it identified healthcare, agriculture, education, smart cities and mobility as priority sectors.
    3. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: It governs the processing of digital personal data, which is the input layer for model training and for profiling.
    4. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: These create due diligence and grievance obligations for intermediaries and significant social media intermediaries operating at scale.
    5. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team: Designated under the Information Technology Act, 2000 as the national agency for cyber incident response, collection and reporting.

    Back2Basics: Distillation of AI models

    1. What it is: Distillation trains a smaller model to reproduce the behaviour of a larger one by learning from the larger model’s outputs.
    2. Legitimate use: It is a standard technique for producing cheaper and faster models for deployment on limited hardware.
    3. The misuse form: Systematic querying of a competitor’s model at very large volume can be used to copy its capabilities without access to its weights or training data.
    4. Why it is hard to police: The queries are individually ordinary, so the abuse is visible only in the aggregate pattern of account and API use.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS3, 10] Introduce the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI). How does AI help clinical diagnosis? Do you perceive any threat to privacy of the individual in the use of AI in healthcare?”

  • NEET-SS qualifying percentile will be reduced to 30: govt.

    Why in the News

    The Centre has agreed to reduce the qualifying percentile for National Eligibility cum Entrance Test Super Speciality (NEET-SS) seats from the existing 50th percentile to the 30th percentile for a proposed Special Stray Vacancy Round. It has also agreed to return 40 vacant in service seats pertaining to Tamil Nadu to the State government. The position was recorded before a Supreme Court Bench headed by Justice P.S. Narasimha, and follows the Centre’s own statement that 1,857 super speciality seats remain vacant after the second round of counselling. The contest is over how far the bar should fall. The petitioner association sought a zero cut off percentile, as had been done in the previous two years, while the Centre has stopped at 30.

    What is NEET-SS?

    1. Purpose: It is the single national entrance examination for admission to super speciality medical courses, meaning the DM and MCh programmes taken after a postgraduate degree.
    2. Qualifying percentile: Eligibility is fixed by a percentile cut off rather than a fixed mark, so the bar moves with the performance of the candidate pool in that year.
    3. Counselling structure: Admission runs through successive counselling rounds, with seats left unfilled after the regular rounds handled through stray vacancy rounds.

    What has the Centre agreed to change?

    1. The percentile cut: The qualifying percentile for NEET-SS is to fall from the 50th percentile to the 30th percentile, limited to the purpose of the proposed Special Stray Vacancy Round.
    2. The stated reason: The change is intended to ensure that available super speciality seats do not remain vacant and that available training capacity is optimally utilised.
    3. Who becomes eligible: Candidates securing the 30th percentile and above in NEET-SS become eligible to take part in the special stray vacancy round.
    4. How the position was reached: The Centre recorded that the matter had been reconsidered in consultation with the concerned stakeholders before the decision was taken.

    Why are super speciality seats going vacant?

    1. The vacancy count: 1,857 super speciality seats were lying vacant after the completion of the second round of NEET-SS counselling.
    2. Training capacity is the cost: A vacant super speciality seat is idle teaching capacity in a discipline with very few trained practitioners, which is the ground the Centre itself cites for lowering the bar.
    3. The demand for a zero cut off: The petitioner, the Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association, sought a zero cut off percentile, pointing to the same relaxation having been granted in the past two years.

    What does the return of the Tamil Nadu in service seats settle?

    1. The reversion: 40 vacant in service seats pertaining to Tamil Nadu are to be reverted to the State government, a decision the Centre said was taken in compliance with Supreme Court orders.
    2. A bounded window: The reversion is for the limited purpose of enabling the State to conduct and complete its own stray vacancy round, over a period of one week.
    3. Upgradation permitted: The court additionally allowed Tamil Nadu to permit candidate upgradation during that one week special stray vacancy round.

    Challenges to filling seats by lowering the percentile

    1. A recurring relaxation becomes the norm: Reducing the bar every year turns an emergency measure into the standing eligibility threshold, so the percentile stops signalling anything about preparedness. Eg. A zero cut off percentile was applied in the two years before this one, and a zero cut off is what the petitioner sought again.
      The Fix: Fix the relaxation to the specific stray vacancy round by notification each year, with the regular rounds held at the standard percentile.
    2. Vacancy is concentrated, not general: Seats go unfilled in specific disciplines and specific institutions rather than across the board, so a uniform percentile cut does not target the shortage. Eg. Super speciality vacancies cluster in less preferred branches and in institutions away from metropolitan centres.
      The Fix: Publish discipline wise and institution wise vacancy data before each round so relaxation can be targeted at the branches actually going empty.
    3. In service and open quota seats move on different clocks: State in service seats and the all India pool are counselled separately, so a seat surrendered late in one stream cannot be recovered in the other. Eg. The 40 Tamil Nadu in service seats needed a court directed reversion and a separate one week State round to be usable at all.
      The Fix: Synchronise the State in service and all India counselling calendars so surrendered seats return to a common pool within the same round.
    4. Bond and service conditions deter takers: Compulsory service bonds and penalty clauses attached to super speciality seats reduce willingness to take a seat even when eligibility is not the barrier. Eg. Several States attach multi year rural or government service obligations with financial penalties to postgraduate and super speciality admissions.
      The Fix: Standardise bond duration and penalty ceilings across States so a candidate can compare obligations before choosing a seat.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not about the merit bar as a principle but about whether the annual relaxation has become the real eligibility rule. The Centre has taken the percentile to 30 for a single stray round and returned the Tamil Nadu in service seats for a one week State round, while the petitioner’s demand for a zero cut off remains unaccepted. Whether the training capacity argument continues to justify a fresh cut each admission cycle is what the next counselling season will show.

    Back2Basics: The in service quota in medical admissions

    1. What it is: A reservation of postgraduate and super speciality seats for doctors already serving in State government health services.
    2. Purpose: It is designed to retain doctors in public service by linking higher specialisation to time served in government posts.
    3. Legal position: The Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association v. Union of India (2020) upheld the competence of States to provide in service reservation in postgraduate medical courses.
    4. Administration: In service seats are counselled by the State government, separately from the all India quota seats counselled centrally.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12] Should the premier institutes like IITs/IIMs be allowed to retain premier status, allowed more academic independence in designing courses and also decide mode/criteria of selection of students. Discuss in light of the growing challenges.”

  • How melting glaciers could ‘put 20% of GDP at risk’

    Why in the News

    A new assessment of the Himalayas has put a monetary value on India’s dependence on the mountain range, estimating that Rs 64.8 lakh crore, or 21.5% of India’s FY24 GDP, rests on Himalayan water and Himalayan economies. The report, ‘A resilient Himalaya: protecting a region at risk and securing future prosperity’, follows the Nepal floods that placed the warming Himalayas under public attention. It converts glacier retreat from an environmental concern into a measurable macroeconomic exposure. The tension it exposes is one of timing. Meltwater flows are rising now and are expected to peak around the middle of this century before declining, while the one driver India can act on quickly, black carbon, is being tackled unevenly across States.

    What is the ‘A resilient Himalaya’ report?

    1. Compiling body: The report was compiled by the consultancy Systemiq, in partnership with the Integrated Mountain Initiative.
    2. Supporting institutions: It was supported by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Nepal, and the GB Pant National Institute of Himalayan Environment, Uttarakhand.
    3. Core estimate: It places Rs 64.8 lakh crore, equal to 21.5% of India’s FY24 GDP, as dependent on the Himalayas.

    How was the 20% of GDP figure arrived at?

    1. Direct layer: The Gross State Domestic Product of the Himalayan States is counted in full as Himalaya dependent output.
    2. Indirect layer: Downstream agriculture, manufacturing, hydropower and services reliant on Himalayan fed rivers and on groundwater recharge are added. Rain fed production is expressly excluded from this layer.
    3. Induced layer: Supply chain and wage spending effects are counted, such as tractors sold from southern States into the Indo Gangetic Plains, and wages spent on food and services.

    Why does glacier retreat translate into economic risk?

    1. Three river systems: The Himalayas feed the Indus, Ganga and Brahmaputra systems, which support agriculture, cities and industry downstream.
    2. Named dependent economies: The report ties these flows to wheat and rice across the Indo Gangetic plain, tea in Assam and Bengal, hydropower in the Northeast, and pilgrimage economies in downstream towns.
    3. Disaster concentration: The Himalayas account for 18% of India’s land but roughly 35% of its disasters, making them a standing disaster hotspot rather than an occasional one.
    4. The reconstruction trap: Disasters create food and water insecurity, disrupt supply chains, displace people and raise macroeconomic and sovereign debt pressure. Reconstruction spending then leaves less money available for building future resilience.

    Why do meltwater flows rise before they fall?

    1. Glaciers as storage: Glaciers hold water as ice and release meltwater into rivers, particularly during the dry season when rainfall contributes least.
    2. Peak Water: Himalayan river basins are expected to reach ‘Peak Water’ around the middle of this century, the point at which glacier meltwater reaches its maximum.
    3. The decline after the peak: Flows begin to fall after that point as the ice reserve shrinks, so today’s higher flows are not a durable supply.

    Why is black carbon the driver India can act on fastest?

    1. What black carbon is: Black carbon is soot produced by incomplete combustion, and unlike global warming as a whole it is a pollutant India can act on quickly on its own.
    2. The snow darkening effect: When black carbon lands on snow it darkens the surface, so the snow absorbs more sunlight instead of reflecting it. Modelling shows this adds about 40 watts per square metre of surface heating in the spring season across the Himalaya.
    3. Zigzag kiln technology: Converting brick kilns to zigzag firing, a method that burns fuel more efficiently, cuts black carbon and particulate emissions by roughly 70% and fuel use by 20% to 30%.
    4. Uneven adoption: Punjab and Haryana have completed the switch to zigzag kilns. Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest brick producer, is at only 56%, and the rest of India runs on traditional technology.
    5. Kilns are not the whole story: Real progress requires kilns, cookstoves, transport and crop residue burning to be tackled together rather than one source at a time.

    Challenges to securing the Himalayan economy

    1. Transboundary river dependence: The three river systems the estimate rests on originate outside India in whole or in part, so flow security is not a purely domestic policy variable. Eg. The Indus system is governed by a treaty arrangement with Pakistan, and the Brahmaputra rises in Tibet where upstream storage decisions are not disclosed to India.
      The Fix: Build hydrological data sharing into existing basin level dialogues so flow changes are detected upstream rather than inferred from downstream damage.
    2. Gaps in glacier monitoring: India monitors only a small fraction of its glaciers on the ground, so mass balance estimates rest heavily on modelling. Eg. Glacier and lake monitoring shortfalls were flagged after the February 2021 Chamoli disaster in Uttarakhand.
      The Fix: Expand automated weather station and mass balance networks across benchmark glaciers in each Himalayan basin.
    3. Glacial lake outburst risk: Warming creates and expands moraine dammed lakes whose failure sends a flood wave downstream with little warning time. Eg. The October 2023 South Lhonak lake outburst in Sikkim destroyed the Teesta III hydropower project at Chungthang.
      The Fix: Attach early warning instrumentation and drawdown works to every high risk lake identified in the national expansion inventory.
    4. Construction in a fragile zone: Hydropower, highway and tunnel projects add load and cut slopes in terrain that is already seismically active and steep. Eg. Land subsidence in Joshimath, Uttarakhand, in January 2023 forced the evacuation of hundreds of households.
      The Fix: Make cumulative basin level impact assessment, rather than project by project clearance, the condition for approving new infrastructure in the Himalayan States.
    5. Fiscal asymmetry between hill and plain States: Himalayan States carry the cost of protecting catchments while the economic benefit accrues largely downstream. Eg. Forest cover in the Himalayan States supports irrigation and power generation in the plains without a matching transfer for that service.
      The Fix: Widen ecological and forest cover weightage in Finance Commission devolution so catchment protection is financed rather than assumed.

    Conclusion

    The estimate changes the category of the problem rather than the facts of it. A mountain range treated as an environmental subject now carries a fifth of national output as a stated exposure, which places it inside fiscal and investment planning rather than only inside climate policy. Two things cannot both hold: flows rising toward a mid century peak are being planned against as though they were permanent, while the ice reserve that produces them is shrinking. The near term marker is whether brick kiln conversion moves beyond the two States that have completed it.

    Back2Basics: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD)

    1. Nature: An intergovernmental knowledge and learning centre for the Hindu Kush Himalaya region.
    2. Establishment and headquarters: Founded in 1983, with its headquarters at Kathmandu, Nepal.
    3. Membership: Its eight regional member countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan.
    4. Mandate: It supports mountain research, cryosphere monitoring and transboundary cooperation across the Hindu Kush Himalaya.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS1, 10] How will the melting of Himalayan glaciers have a far-reaching impact on the water resources of India? (हिमालय के हिमनदों के पिघलने का भारत के जल-संसाधनों पर किस प्रकार दूरगामी प्रभाव होगा ?)”

  • Orangutans in Odisha: The laws governing animal trade and repatriation

    Why in the News

    The Odisha Forest department has rescued five baby orangutans, a critically endangered animal, from a forest in Balasore district. Orangutans are native to the rainforests of Indonesia and Malaysia, and the animals found in Odisha are suspected to be from Sumatra. All three orangutan species are listed under Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which restricts their movement to non commercial purposes. The tension is that a suspected commercial trafficking case creates an obligation to secure the animals’ welfare but no obligation to return them. The case also marks a shift that wildlife crime control experts have repeatedly flagged, that India is no longer only a transit route but is itself fuelling demand for exotic pets.

    What is CITES?

    1. Regulation rather than prohibition: International trade in wildlife, their body parts and trophies is not prohibited, and the treaty instead regulates it strictly. Its aim is that cross border trade in wildlife and plants is legal, sustainable and traceable without harming survival in the wild.
    2. How it operates: It is essentially a licensing system that places checks and controls on the import, export and re export of live animals and plants, wildlife body parts and trophies.
    3. The three appendices: Controls run through an exhaustive CITES species list divided into three appendices, and the appendix a species sits in determines the level of protection it is accorded.
    4. Coverage: The treaty protects around 6,700 animal species, comprising 339 mammals, 159 birds, 113 reptiles, 24 amphibians, 26 fish and 69 invertebrates.

    What does Appendix I listing mean for the orangutans?

    1. The Appendix I threshold: Appendix I lists species that face the threat of extinction.
    2. What trade remains permitted: Such species can be traded only with valid permits, provided the specimens are captive bred and the purpose is conservation.
    3. Contested allowances: Trade permitted for some charismatic species includes elephant ivory, rhino horn, elephant and lion trophy hunting, and crocodile skin.
    4. The three orangutan species: The Bornean, Sumatran and Tapanuli orangutans are all Appendix I listed, so their movement is confined to research, transfers between recognised zoos and breeding projects.
    5. The alleged breach: The Odisha animals appear to have been traded for commercial purposes, which would place the consignment in violation of the treaty.

    How does Indian law connect to the treaty?

    1. Treaty membership: CITES came into force in 1975 and India became a party to it in 1976.
    2. The harmonising amendment: The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 was amended in 2022 to harmonise it with the treaty. The amendment added a Schedule covering CITES listed species.
    3. What the amended Act requires: It calls for consultation with the country of export for the animal’s return. Where return is not possible it provides for the animal’s welfare at a recognised zoo or rescue centre.

    Does India have to send the orangutans back?

    1. No obligation to return: The treaty does not make it obligatory to return confiscated animals to the wild.
    2. Survival comes first: The first task facing enforcement agencies is the survival of the trafficked animals.
    3. Who decides: The management authority implementing the treaty’s provisions, here the Environment Ministry, is recommended to consult the scientific authorities and, where possible, the state of export or origin before taking a call on repatriation.
    4. Who pays: Where repatriation is feasible it has to be carried out at the expense of the state of origin. Where it is not feasible the animal goes to a rescue centre or such other place as the management authority deems appropriate.
    5. Indonesia’s approach: Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry has reached out to Indian authorities and is preparing technical requirements for repatriation if investigations confirm the animals came from there.
    6. Informed receipt: The confiscating authority must ensure that recipient states are aware of the impacts of a repatriation before it happens.

    Why is repatriation difficult in practice?

    1. Establishing origin: A repatriation requires the country of origin to be established, the protocols to be followed and the legal tangles to be resolved first.
    2. Animal health through the process: Maintaining the health of confiscated animals across that period is the hardest part of it.
    3. Consignments change hands: Wildlife consignments pass through multiple holders and geographies, which makes a return to the wild rarely feasible.
    4. Captive bred specimens: Many species in this trade are captive bred and carry no known geographic origin at all.
    5. Origin is not the same as habitat: The place of origin is frequently not the range or the habitat where the species is found in the wild.
    6. Airport seizures work differently: Most seizures at airports are returned immediately to the place of origin, under the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) guidelines of July 2025.

    What does India’s exotic pet trade now look like?

    1. From transit route to demand market: The appeal of unique and unusual pets is driving rising trade in exotic wildlife within India rather than only through it.
    2. Two routes: Seizures indicate overland movement through the North East’s borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, and movement by air through the international airports at Chennai, Bengaluru and Mumbai.
    3. Trade beyond the treaty list: Indians are acquiring many CITES listed species, and there is also a large trade in species that carry no CITES listing at all.
    4. What the amnesty revealed: A voluntary disclosure scheme in 2021 drew 43,693 applications for amnesty from 30 States and Union Territories, on data obtained under the Right to Information Act, 2005. Lemurs, kangaroos and rhinoceros iguanas were among the species declared.
    5. How a typical seizure looks: Consignments intercepted at airports, sea ports and land border posts usually carry multiple animals in bulk, with small mammals, reptiles and amphibians stuffed into gunny sacks, small cages or plastic boxes.
    6. Why Odisha is atypical: A rescue of five animals from a forested area does not fit that pattern. Eg. Authorities in Mizoram’s Champhai district near the Myanmar border seized 468 animals from six or seven different species in May 2022.

    Challenges to enforcing CITES in India

    1. Exotic species sat outside Indian law until 2022: Foreign species held in India had no schedule under domestic wildlife law, so possession itself could not be penalised. Eg. The 2021 scheme offered voluntary amnesty to holders rather than prosecution.
      The Fix: Require registration and microchipping of every CITES listed exotic animal in private possession, with periodic physical verification.
    2. Porous land borders: The North East’s forested international borders are hard to police against small consignments moved on foot. Eg. Cross border movement along the India Myanmar border has long been governed by a special regime for border residents.
      The Fix: Station Wildlife Crime Control Bureau officers alongside customs at the main land border posts rather than only at international airports.
    3. Welfare during custody: Recognised rescue and holding facilities are scarce, so confiscated animals die before any decision on their future is taken. Eg. Trafficked reptiles and small mammals arrive dehydrated and injured after transport in sacks and boxes.
      The Fix: Designate and fund a national network of rescue centres with species specific quarantine capacity.
    4. Demand generated online: Listings on social media normalise exotic pet ownership and create buyers faster than enforcement can identify sellers. Eg. Data drawn from social media and seizures shows Indian buyers acquiring many treaty listed species.
      The Fix: Place exotic wildlife listings under a takedown obligation for online intermediaries, with mandatory reporting to the Wildlife Crime Control Bureau.
    5. The treaty list does not cover the whole trade: CITES controls reach only species in its appendices, so a large part of the exotic pet trade is lawful to import. Eg. Many small reptiles and amphibians sold as pets carry no listing under the treaty.
      The Fix: Extend the domestic Schedule to species assessed as threatened by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) even where CITES does not list them.

    Conclusion

    The case sits at the point where a rescue turns into a legal question with no default answer. The treaty and the amended Act both supply a procedure and neither supplies an outcome, so the decision rests on what can be established about origin and on what the animals can survive. The unresolved part is the demand side, because enforcement acts on consignments while the market pulling them in keeps growing. The immediate marker is whether the consultation between the Environment Ministry and Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry ends in a repatriation or in placement at a domestic rescue centre.

    Back2Basics: Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972

    1. Purpose: It provides for the protection of wild animals, birds and plants, and for the regulation of hunting and of trade in wildlife and its derivatives.
    2. Protected areas: It is the statutory basis for national parks, wildlife sanctuaries, conservation reserves and community reserves.
    3. Institutions: It provides for the National Board for Wild Life and the State Boards for Wild Life, and it is the Act under which the Wildlife Crime Control Bureau functions.
    4. Schedules after 2022: The 2022 amendment reduced the schedules of protected species to four, the fourth of which covers specimens listed in the appendices of CITES.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015] With reference to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which of the following statements is/are correct? (1) IUCN is an organ of the United Nations and CITES is an international agreement between governments. (2) IUCN runs thousands of field projects around the world to better manage natural environments. (3) CITES is legally binding on the States that have joined it, but this Convention does not take the place of national laws. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: (b)”

  • New fault lines

    Why in the News

    Violence between the Naga and Kuki-Zo communities has spread across Manipur’s hill districts since February, opening a second ethnic fault line in the State. It follows three years in which the conflagration of May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities had slowly begun to abate. Nearly a year of President’s Rule gave way in February 2026 to a Bharatiya Janata Party led government, and two Kuki-Zo legislators have since returned to the Assembly for the first time since the community’s boycott began. The tension is that political space is reopening between the valley and the hills at the same moment as a new conflict is closing it inside the hills.

    What has moved towards normalcy since 2023?

    1. A new State government: President’s Rule ended in February 2026 with the formation of a Bharatiya Janata Party led government under a new Chief Minister. Attempts to engineer a thaw between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities gathered pace after it.
    2. Everyday violence abating: Routine violence between the two communities has reduced over the three years since the May 2023 conflagration.
    3. Return to the Assembly: Two Kuki-Zo MLAs attended the Assembly session this month, the first attendance since legislators from the community began boycotting it after the attacks in Imphal at the start of the ethnic conflict.
    4. Defiance of the boycott directive: The two legislators acted against a directive of the Kuki Inpi Manipur, the Kuki-Zo civil society organisation, to continue the boycott until there was a concession on the demand for a separate administration.
    5. What the attendance signals: Their presence represents an acknowledgement that the political space should reopen even while the underlying differences persist.

    What does the new Naga and Kuki-Zo conflict look like?

    1. Spread from localised disputes: Violence that began as local disputes has spread across the hill districts since February.
    2. The toll to July: At least 15 Kuki-Zo people, 11 Nagas, three security personnel and a truck driver were killed till July. More have died in the two months since.
    3. Villages burnt: Houses in both Naga and Kuki-Zo villages have been burnt down, and the newly displaced have moved into camps.
    4. Armed groups as the driver: Armed groups claiming to act on behalf of their respective communities have revived the conflict rather than the communities having drifted into it.

    Why do the hill districts keep returning to the same dispute?

    1. A 1990s precedent: The present violence echoes the Naga and Kuki violence of the 1990s, which was fought over the same questions.
    2. Control of the hills: The dispute resurrects the argument over which community controls the hill areas.
    3. Customary law: It also resurrects the question of whose customary laws prevail in those areas, which no settlement between the valley and the hills addresses.

    What are civilians bearing?

    1. Displacement that has not ended: Many of those displaced in 2023 remain in relief camps three years later.
    2. Deaths inside the camps: A reply under the Right to Information Act, 2005 puts the number who have died in these camps at over 700, many for want of access to basic health care and adequate nutrition.
    3. Blockades on essentials: Blockades imposed by partisans of each community against the other have held up essentials and medicines. The smaller Kuki-Zo community is the worse affected by them.
    4. Health system in the hills: Health centres in the hills have been left dysfunctional, so the blockades fall on a system with no reserve capacity.

    Challenges to restoring peace in Manipur

    1. Armed groups outside any political process: Groups claiming a community mandate operate without being party to a settlement, so no agreement binds them. Eg. The Suspension of Operations arrangement with Kuki militant groups has been in dispute since 2023.
      The Fix: Make continued security force restraint conditional on verified cantonment and weapons accounting for every group claiming a community mandate.
    2. Blockades used as routine leverage: Economic blockades on the highways are a standing bargaining tool, and they fall hardest on the hill districts. Eg. National Highway 2 and National Highway 37 are the only supply lifelines into the State.
      The Fix: Treat every blockade as a criminal offence with named organisers, and run dedicated escort convoys on the two national highways.
    3. Relief camps becoming permanent: A camp population that persists for years accumulates health and nutrition failures that no relief budget corrects. Eg. Residents displaced in 2023 are entering a fourth year without returning home.
      The Fix: Publish a dated resettlement plan with security guarantees for each village of return, instead of open ended camp maintenance.
    4. Land and customary rights left unsettled: Hill administration and customary village authority run alongside each other with no forum to resolve a conflict between them. Eg. The Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971 governs the district councils while village chiefs exercise customary authority over land.
      The Fix: Convene a statutory settlement process on boundaries and customary rights through the Hill Areas Committee of the Legislative Assembly.
    5. Electoral timing narrows the window: Assembly elections are due next year and the government’s tenure ends soon, so a contested campaign will overlap the containment effort. Eg. Displaced residents will vote while still living in relief camps.
      The Fix: Secure an all party agreement on ground rules for communal rhetoric before campaigning opens.

    Conclusion

    Manipur’s peace effort is now being asked to hold two fronts at once. The divide between the valley and the hills is easing at the level of political participation, while a conflict inside the hills is hardening beneath it, and the arrangements built for the first do not reach the second. What the State can supply is even handedness: criminal law applied identically across communities, and protection of civilians that does not vary by ethnicity. Whether that standard survives an election campaign is the thing to watch.

    Back2Basics: The hill and valley administration of Manipur

    1. Article 371C: It carries a special provision for Manipur, empowering the President to constitute a Hill Areas Committee of the Legislative Assembly drawn from members representing the hill constituencies.
    2. What the Committee does: It considers legislation and administration affecting the hill areas, and the Governor reports annually to the President on the administration of those areas.
    3. District Councils: Six autonomous district councils function in the hill districts under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, outside the Sixth Schedule framework used in some other North Eastern States.
    4. The demographic split: The Imphal valley holds the bulk of the State’s population and is largely Meitei, while the surrounding hill districts are home to the Naga and Kuki-Zo communities.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Does the BRICS summit signify a shift for Indian foreign policy?

    Why in the News

    The New Delhi Declaration of 2026, adopted at the BRICS summit hosted by India, pushes back against unilateral western sanctions, criticises Israel over the killing of civilians, the attacks on Lebanon and the forced occupation of Palestinian territory, and supports United Nations reform together with a BRICS payment mechanism. The declaration has been likened to the foreign policy of India’s non aligned past. It is also the first BRICS declaration since 2022 to carry no reference to Ukraine. The tension is whether the text marks an actual shift in Indian foreign policy, or is multilateral language that a national position is not expected to follow.

    Is the New Delhi Declaration a return to non alignment?

    1. Continuity, not a shift: The declaration is in keeping with Indian foreign policy, whether that is described as strategic autonomy and multi alignment or as multi vector engagement. What has changed is optics, with India on the front foot and less apologetic about being emphatically part of a non western forum.
    2. Non alignment does not describe the present aim: Non alignment was a strategy for a weak state in a bipolar world. The declared ambition in India today is to become one of the poles in a multipolar world.
    3. The Bandung reference: The declaration invokes the Bandung Spirit in pursuit of a fairer, more inclusive and representative multilateral system. On the second reading that invocation is nostalgia rather than operative policy.
    4. What the platform is: BRICS is a political platform and not a security platform, so a declaration adopted in it cannot commit a member to anything it would not do bilaterally.

    What did the summit’s optics carry, and what did they not?

    1. A return after seven years: The Chinese President had not travelled to India in nearly seven years before this summit.
    2. Who else was at the table: The Abu Dhabi Crown Prince sat at the same table, and the outreach session brought in powers that do not otherwise enter great power conversations.
    3. Socialisation as the actual product: What the platform generated was contact inside it and on its margins rather than agreement, and that contact is not by itself shaping the world order.
    4. National positions expressly preserved: The declaration calls for exercising restraint and for protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure. It also pointedly recalls the respective national positions of each member.
    5. Why a multilateral text can go further than a national one: A country can say in a high level multilateral document what it will not say in a national statement. Eg. The phrase “unilateral coercive measures” is understood to mean US actions, without naming a measure or a date.

    Why did the declaration drop Ukraine?

    1. A break in precedent: Every BRICS summit declaration since 2022, including the 2024 summit held in Russia, carried a reference to Ukraine.
    2. Attributed to Russian insistence: The omission is attributed to a Russian veto exercised to preserve consensus. The Rio declaration last year had condemned a Ukrainian attack on Russia with no equivalent condemnation of anything Russia had done, and dropping the subject entirely replaced that one sided formulation.
    3. An error of omission: A major multilateral geopolitical forum that stays silent, rather than calling on the belligerents to end the war, has left the central question unaddressed.
    4. India’s own incentive: India had little reason to press for the language, having sided with the Russian Federation in this war indirectly if not directly.
    5. The option not taken: Neutral language on Ukraine was available on the precedent of the earlier joint declarations, and was not used.

    How does the Israel language sit with India’s bilateral position?

    1. The bilateral signal: The Prime Minister told the Israeli parliament during a visit in February 2026 that India stood “shoulder to shoulder” with Israel.
    2. The disjunction: The declaration’s condemnation of Israel is strong, which creates a clear break between the multilateral text and that bilateral statement. The text may be intended to counter the perception that India was drawing too close to Israel.
    3. Shelter in United Nations language: The declaration cites UN Security Council Resolution 2803 of November 2025, which provided for an International Stabilisation Force and a Board of Peace. Some of the declaration’s language is drawn from that resolution.
    4. No contradiction of settled policy: The two state solution has been India’s standing position, so the text does not contradict Indian policy on Palestine.
    5. The room shaped the text: With the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran and Indonesia at the table, there was a limit to how far India could push back against the harshness of the language.
    6. Where the balance actually sits: The partnership with Israel remains the weightier commitment, since a bilateral address to a parliament is consequential while a multilateral declaration is symbolic.

    What does the economic agenda amount to?

    1. The bloc’s weight: The grouping’s membership accounts for 40 percent of the global economy and 25 percent of global trade.
    2. Two different propositions in payments: India supports local currency payment mechanisms for bilateral trade. India has not supported a permanent payment mechanism operating under the BRICS umbrella.
    3. Why a common settlement currency is resisted: There is no single approach to currency settlement that suits every pair of trading partners. A non dollar mechanism would in practice elevate the next dominant currency, and on present weight that currency would be China’s.
    4. BRICS against the Group of Seven: BRICS is a counterpoint to the Group of Seven (G7), an economic grouping that also carries geopolitical responsibilities.
    5. India sits on both sides of that line: India is a standing invitee to the G7 along with Australia and South Korea. One proposal is that the G7 dissolve itself into a Democratic 10 (D10) including those three, with India as the bridge between east and west and a voice of the south.

    Where should India spend its diplomatic capital next?

    1. The immediate calendar: The ASEAN East Asia Summit in the Philippines falls in November. Visits by the Prime Minister to the United States, Canada and Brussels follow, with three trade agreements potentially in reach.
    2. Multi vector engagement as the method: The approach is to keep all stakeholders engaged in multiple directions at once rather than to choose a camp.
    3. Diplomatic capital is finite: India has only so much of it, so battles, forums and partners have to be picked rather than attended to uniformly.
    4. The rooms that will decide the next order: The forums framing global rules on artificial intelligence and the governance of space are where the next world order will be made, rather than a platform such as BRICS.

    Challenges to BRICS as a vehicle for Indian foreign policy

    1. The consensus rule produces silence: A single member’s objection removes a subject from the declaration altogether instead of producing balanced language. Eg. The complete absence of any reference to Ukraine from the New Delhi Declaration.
      The Fix: Issue a chair’s summary alongside the declaration, so positions that fail consensus are still on the record.
    2. Expansion dilutes coherence: Members with opposed interests make a common position harder to reach as the grouping grows. Eg. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025.
      The Fix: Anchor the agenda in a small set of deliverables such as development finance, where the members’ interests already converge.
    3. Moving off the dollar substitutes one dependence for another: Replacing the dollar as a settlement currency hands the same structural leverage to whichever currency takes its place. Eg. The New Development Bank suspended new transactions in Russia in 2022 to protect its own access to international capital markets.
      The Fix: Expand bilateral local currency settlement arrangements rather than build a single common currency mechanism.
    4. The platform cannot handle its members’ own disputes: A grouping with no security function offers no channel for a conflict between two of its members. Eg. India and China are both members while their boundary dispute is handled entirely bilaterally.
      The Fix: Keep security questions in the bilateral and plurilateral formats built for them, and hold the grouping to economic and governance reform.
    5. Declarations carry no implementing mechanism: A position agreed in a summit text has no follow through between summits. Eg. Calls for Security Council reform recur in these declarations while two of the grouping’s own members do not support expanding permanent membership.
      The Fix: Attach a named working group and a reporting deadline to each declaration commitment.

    Conclusion

    The declaration reads as a shift and functions as a signal. What a grouping’s text says and what its members do bilaterally have been allowed to diverge, and India’s positions on Israel and on Russia both sit inside that gap. The unresolved question is whether multi vector engagement can keep both registers running once a partner insists on consistency between them. The next test is the sequence of bilateral visits and trade negotiations that follows the summit, where the same positions have to survive contact with a single counterpart.

    About BRICS

    1. Formation: The grouping began as BRIC, with Brazil, Russia, India and China holding their first leaders’ summit in 2009. South Africa joined in 2010 and the grouping became BRICS.
    2. Expansion: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates were admitted as members in 2024, and Indonesia joined in 2025.
    3. New Development Bank: Agreed at the 2014 Fortaleza summit and headquartered in Shanghai, it finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member states and other developing countries.
    4. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: Also agreed in 2014, it is a currency swap framework members can draw on to meet short term balance of payments pressure.

    Back2Basics: Non-Aligned Movement

    1. Origin: The Bandung Conference of 1955 brought together Asian and African states and set out principles of sovereignty, non interference and peaceful coexistence.
    2. Founding: The Movement was formally established at the Belgrade Conference of 1961.
    3. Core idea: Member states declined formal military alignment with either Cold War bloc while retaining the freedom to engage both.
    4. India’s role: India was among its founding members and hosted the seventh summit at New Delhi in 1983.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • A war room for India in an age of sanctions

    Why in the News

    The United States has sanctioned four companies based in India and three Indian nationals over alleged trade in Iranian oil and petrochemicals. Iran has separately listed an LNG carrier serving India and an Indian flagged bulk carrier for possible fines, detention or confiscation in the Strait of Hormuz. One order travels through bank wires and the other waits at sea. The US Congress has also passed a sanctions Bill authorising the President to impose tariffs as a form of economic coercion. The tension is that foreign pressure now arrives as one connected system running from a listing to a payment to a berth, while India’s answer is assembled after the fact from separate Ministries.

    What is weaponised interdependence?

    1. The mechanism: Whoever controls a network that others depend on can exert pressure on them through it, because withdrawal of access costs the dependent party more than the dispute is worth.
    2. Where India sits in that network: An Indian company may need an American bank for payment, a foreign insurer for its ship and safe passage through a strait that another state can disrupt.
    3. Secondary sanctions: These instruct a foreign business to abandon a targeted transaction or risk losing access to American finance. The instruction operates on a business that is not itself in the sanctioning country’s jurisdiction.

    How have sanctions widened from the seller to the whole transaction?

    1. Sectoral widening: The US widened the secondary sanctions threat under Operation Economic Outcast across five Iranian sectors: digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping.
    2. Reaching a bank with an Indian branch: Washington imposed Iran related sanctions on Russia’s VTB Bank, which has a Delhi branch. Banks dealing with it face sanctions risk even where the transaction is permitted under Indian law.
    3. Export controls on third country suppliers: Sanctions against Russia widened after 2022, and export controls began pursuing foreign suppliers of chips and machine tools.
    4. The whole oil chain: Oil restrictions reached tankers, insurers, ship managers and traders, so the measure followed the transaction rather than stopping with the seller.
    5. Tariffs as a sanctions instrument: Indian exports to the US could face tariffs of up to 100 percent over India’s purchases of Russian oil. The Indian government is monitoring developments and has said it will work with industry to protect India’s trade and economic interests.

    How is Iran turning the Strait of Hormuz into a second chokepoint?

    1. The non compliance list: Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority published a list of 45 vessels it called non compliant, and the list had grown to 77 within three weeks.
    2. Indian linked vessels named: The list included Disha, chartered by Petronet LNG and managed by the Shipping Corporation of India. It also included Maha Roos, an Indian flagged bulk carrier.
    3. No stated grounds: The authority did not explain the alleged breaches behind any listing.
    4. Insurance as the pressure point: The authority warned insurers against covering the listed ships, which removes a vessel’s ability to trade without touching it physically.
    5. The trap for a shipowner: Washington has already sanctioned the authority and warned that seeking passage guarantees from it could carry sanctions risk, even where no payment is made.

    Why does India’s sanctions response have no single owner?

    1. Split jurisdiction: Diplomacy, law, banking, trade, shipping and fuel supplies sit in different parts of government. No Ministry can see the whole chain on its own.
    2. The chain ends in the domestic economy: Economic coercion ties foreign policy directly to household consumption, and its consequences reach households, farmers and seafarers.
    3. Crisis coordination already exists: During the current West Asia crisis the government coordinated Ministries, monitored vessels and supplies, raised LPG production and found alternative cargoes. It kept pumps open and kitchens supplied.
    4. That coordination is temporary: The arrangement was assembled for one emergency and has no institutional form that outlasts it.

    What do the European and Chinese responses show about the limits of legal defiance?

    1. European Union, the Blocking Statute: Europe answered American laws of the 1990s that threatened foreign companies with penalties for conduct abroad by enacting a Blocking Statute.
    2. What the Blocking Statute could not do: Several European companies withdrew from Iran when secondary sanctions returned in 2018, despite holding legal protection at home. The possible loss of access to American banking and dollar payments choked off trade that remained lawful in Europe.
    3. China, an instruction not to comply: Beijing told Chinese businesses not to recognise, enforce or comply with American sanctions against five Chinese refining companies. China has said the American measures had no basis in international law or authorisation from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
    4. Why China can hold that line: Its market power, state directed economy and leverage over critical supply chains give it room to resist that India does not have.
    5. India’s stated position: India upholds sanctions mandated by the UNSC and does not accept unilateral sanctions.
    6. Why the Chinese route is costly for India: India’s financial and commercial ties with the US make that approach expensive, and a legal objection alone offers no comfort if Indian firms still bear the cost.

    What would an Economic Security and Sanctions Office do?

    1. Location and composition: A permanent office under the Cabinet Secretariat would bring together officials responsible for foreign policy, finance, commerce, energy, shipping, law and defence. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the market regulators would sit in it alongside them.
    2. Mapping the failure points: Its staff would track where a transaction could fail, from payment and insurance through to shipping and delivery.
    3. Contesting listings: It would seek the evidence behind foreign listings and support legitimate requests for removal.
    4. Negotiating relief: It would negotiate written exemptions and transition periods and issue clear Indian guidance on what is prohibited.
    5. Separating law from caution: Banks would be required to distinguish a legal prohibition from their own commercial caution before refusing a payment.
    6. Early warning to firms: Companies would be told in advance when a payment route, an insurer or a port is at risk.

    What capacity does India need alongside coordination?

    1. Fuel storage: More LPG storage is needed, so a supply interruption does not immediately reach kitchens.
    2. Indian controlled shipping: An expanded Indian controlled tanker fleet reduces reliance on foreign owners who can be pressured by a third country.
    3. Marine insurance: A stronger Bharat Maritime Insurance Pool gives Indian cargo an alternative when foreign insurers withdraw cover.
    4. Contracting around the chokepoint: Long term LNG contracts sourced outside Hormuz reduce the volume exposed to a single strait.
    5. Rupee settlement and its limit: Rupee settlement can preserve lawful trade where the seller accepts it. It cannot shield a bank that still needs access to New York.

    Challenges to an Economic Security and Sanctions Office

    1. A coordinating body without statutory teeth: An office under the Cabinet Secretariat can convene Ministries but cannot override a line Ministry’s own statutory decision. Eg. The National Security Council Secretariat coordinates across Ministries without displacing their individual powers.
      The Fix: Write its mandate into the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, so its guidance binds the participating Ministries.
    2. Banks overcomply to protect correspondent access: A bank will refuse a lawful transaction rather than risk its dollar clearing relationship, and no guidance note reverses that calculation. Eg. Payment routes for Russian crude shifted repeatedly to third country banks and intermediaries after 2022.
      The Fix: Create a formal channel for an Indian bank to obtain a written comfort opinion before it declines a lawful payment.
    3. Foreign listings arrive without evidence: A designating authority often publishes no grounds, so a listed Indian entity has nothing to rebut. Eg. The vessel list issued by Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority carried no explanation of the alleged breaches.
      The Fix: Open a delisting case file for every listed Indian entity and route it through one named office rather than through whichever Ministry is approached.
    4. Seafarers carry the personal cost: Crew on a listed or detained vessel face wage loss, prolonged detention and abandonment far from home. Eg. Indian nationals crew a large share of the merchant vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
      The Fix: Extend consular support, legal representation and wage protection to Indian seafarers on any vessel named by a foreign authority.
    5. Physical capacity cannot be built inside a crisis: Storage, tankers and insurance capacity take years to create and cannot be summoned once a chokepoint closes. Eg. Long term LNG supply contracts run for a decade or more and cannot be re sourced at short notice.
      The Fix: Set dated targets for storage, fleet and insurance pool capacity and review them annually against a standing map of coercion risk.

    Conclusion

    Sanctions have stopped being a question of diplomatic position and become an operational one, because the pressure lands on a payment, an insurance policy or a berth rather than on a statement. India cannot move the chokepoints it depends on, so the variable it does control is whether a decision is taken with the whole journey in view. The unresolved part is authority: a coordinating office can map the exposure, but the Ministry that owns the decision still owns the cost of it. Whether the coordination improvised for the current emergency is given a permanent institutional home is the marker to watch.

    Back2Basics: Security Council sanctions and unilateral sanctions

    1. Security Council sanctions: The United Nations Security Council imposes sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides for measures not involving the use of armed force.
    2. Their binding force: Member States are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council under Article 25 of the Charter.
    3. Unilateral or autonomous sanctions: These are imposed by a single state or a regional bloc outside the Security Council, and they place no legal obligation on any other state.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS2, 15] In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?”

  • Russia sanctions Bill: Tool for Trump, worry for India

    Why in the News

    The United States House of Representatives has passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, a Bill aimed at squeezing Russia’s revenue from oil and gas exports amid the war in Ukraine. The US Senate approved it last month, so the Bill now needs only the US President’s signature to become law. India is the second biggest export market for Russian crude, and Russia currently accounts for nearly half of India’s crude oil imports. The Bill authorises tariffs of up to 100 percent on the top five buyers of Russian energy, and it leaves both implementation and waiver to the President’s discretion. The tension is that a law written to cut Russia’s energy revenue arrives while West Asian supply is constrained, so its most immediate value to Washington is leverage in a trade negotiation India has not yet concluded.

    What is the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026?

    1. Object of the law: It targets the revenue Russia earns from oil and gas exports while the war in Ukraine continues.
    2. The tariff instrument: It authorises tariffs of up to 100 percent on the top five buyers of Russian oil and natural gas. This is a watered down version of an original proposal for a blanket 500 percent tariff on all buyers of Russian energy.
    3. Presidential discretion: The Bill hands the President discretionary power over whether to implement its provisions, and a separate power to waive their application.
    4. Enforcement sequence: If the Act is signed, the US Trade Representative identifies the targeted countries. It then recommends the tariff rates to be applied to them.

    Why is Russian crude difficult for India to replace?

    1. Import dependence: India depends on imports to meet over 88 percent of its crude oil needs.
    2. Scale of the Russian share: India imported 2.08 million barrels per day of Russian oil in August, 45 percent of its total oil imports, on vessel tracking data from Kpler. The share stood at 23.3 percent in January.
    3. How Russia became the main supplier: Much of the West shunned Russian crude after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and Russia began offering discounts to willing buyers. A peripheral supplier thereby displaced traditional West Asian suppliers as India’s biggest source.
    4. No alternative of scale: The West Asia conflict has cut supply from India’s traditional sources, leaving Russia the only viable supplier of scale for an import dependent refining system.
    5. A reversal already tested: Penal tariffs imposed by the US last year over Russian oil imports were followed by a sizeable reduction in India’s purchases of Russian crude. The West Asia war then turned that trend on its head.

    Why would full enforcement hurt the United States itself?

    1. Supply is already stifled: The US President has called on Ukraine to halt strikes on Russian refineries, because oil and petroleum product prices have run away amid constrained global supplies.
    2. Refining margins: US diesel crack spreads, the gap between the price of crude and the price of the diesel refined from it, have reached $114 per barrel, largely because Russian diesel is absent from the market.
    3. Volume effect of enforcement: Tariffing the largest buyers would push millions of barrels of Russian oil out of a market that is already tight, sending oil and fuel prices higher.
    4. Electoral timing: US midterm polls fall later this year, and a fuel price spike before them is an outcome the administration would want to avoid.

    How does the Bill strengthen Washington’s hand in the trade negotiation?

    1. No trade agreement yet: India and the US signed a framework agreement in February and have not concluded a trade agreement since.
    2. The tariff power the President lost: The US Supreme Court ruled that the President lacked authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 1977 to impose broad import duties. That ruling closed the reciprocal tariff route in February, and the administration has been finding newer ways to impose trade restrictions since.
    3. Congressional approval changes the footing: A tariff grounded in a statute passed by Congress stands on firmer legal ground than one resting on executive emergency powers.
    4. Leverage over negotiators: A signed law gives the administration an additional lever to apply to Indian negotiators at a crucial stage of the bilateral trade talks.

    What room does the Bill leave for India?

    1. A compliance window: Countries identified as targets would normally have 180 days to reduce Russian energy imports or to negotiate with Washington.
    2. Waivers: The Bill empowers the President to waive the application of its provisions, and India is expected to press for one if the Bill comes into force.
    3. Engagement already under way: The Ministry of External Affairs has said the issue has been discussed at high levels in recent months with various US interlocutors. Its potential implications for the bilateral relationship and for the international energy market have been articulated by the Indian side.
    4. The stated policy line: The government has said it remains committed to the country’s energy security “through diversified sourcing and on the basis of evolving market dynamics”.
    5. A tested channel: India communicated its energy concerns to Washington last year as well, when the original draft of the Bill was first mooted.

    Challenges to the Russia sanctions Bill

    1. The ceiling is still punitive: A 100 percent duty remains too high for Indian exporters to absorb, whatever the reduction from the original proposal. Eg. Penal tariffs imposed last year over Russian oil purchases were enough to cut India’s imports of that crude.
      The Fix: Convert the threat into a written exemption tied to a verified reduction schedule, so exporters can price the risk.
    2. Discretion makes the threat unpredictable: The law’s force depends entirely on a choice to implement or to waive, so no targeted country can plan around it. Eg. Compliance today carries no assurance against designation in a later quarter.
      The Fix: Publish the criteria and the timeline governing waivers, so a targeted country knows what compliance actually buys.
    3. Sanctions displace trade rather than end it: Restrictions push flows to intermediaries, opaque shipping and discounted channels instead of reducing the exporter’s volumes. Eg. A shadow fleet of ageing tankers with opaque ownership has carried Russian crude since the Group of Seven price cap of December 2022.
      The Fix: Pair any tariff measure with vessel, insurance and ship management level enforcement, so the volume actually moved falls.
    4. Coercion pushes the target toward rival blocs: Tariffing an energy importer for its sourcing decisions strengthens the case within that country for settlement and supply arrangements outside Western networks. Eg. Rupee and third currency settlement channels for oil payments expanded after the post 2022 restrictions on Russian banking.
      The Fix: Offer the targeted buyer an alternative supply arrangement at comparable landed cost rather than a penalty alone.

    Conclusion

    The Bill converts a discretionary pressure tactic into a statutory one, and that conversion is the actual change. India’s exposure now runs through two channels at once, its crude sourcing and an unfinished trade negotiation, and a single signature links them. The thing to watch is not whether the law is signed but whether it is enforced, waived or simply held in reserve. The first marker is whether the US Trade Representative names India among the targeted buyers.

    Back2Basics: International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 1977

    1. What it is: A United States statute that lets the President regulate international commerce after declaring a national emergency over an unusual and extraordinary threat originating outside the country.
    2. What it is used for: Most US sanctions programmes, including asset freezes and bans on transactions with designated foreign persons and entities, are administered under its authority.
    3. Who operates it: The Office of Foreign Assets Control, in the US Treasury Department, designates targets and issues licences under it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”

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