💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Search results for: “”

  • Good governance is when state, society and markets deliver together

    Why in the News

    Chief executive officers of district councils, and the municipal commissioners of the cities ranked highest in the Swachhata Sarvekshan cleanliness survey, attribute their results to the same two things, decentralised community action and collaborative governance. The argument built on that record is that six factors, rather than additional schemes, decide whether outcomes improve at scale, and that the state, society and markets have to deliver together. The sectors where delivery still fails are described as “wicked problems”, meaning problems with too many interacting variables for one agency to control on its own. The claim that follows runs against the way the system is organised. Centralisation is the default in precisely those sectors, and the reform that would displace it, an elected authority below the ward with funds and functionaries attached, has not been made.

    Which six factors decide whether outcomes change at scale?

    1. Decentralised community action: Delivery improves where planning and management move down to the smallest viable unit, reaching below the block to the cluster level.
    2. Collaborative governance: The state, community organisations and market actors work on one outcome together rather than through parallel programmes.
    3. Women’s agency: Women’s collectives supply the standing local presence that holds a public service to account between elections.
    4. Technology as enabler: Digital systems are treated as support for local decision making rather than as a substitute for it.
    5. Accountability and public trust: Results improve where citizens hold a consensual decision making role and where data is validated by the community it describes.
    6. Professionals and community resource persons: Trained professionals and locally resident resource persons together carry the technical load that elected representatives cannot.

    What does the delivery record show?

    1. The largest instance: The National Rural Livelihood Mission organised a hundred million women into 10 million self help groups, with decentralised management running down to the cluster level below blocks.
    2. Administrators converge on one explanation: Over a hundred chief executive officers of zila parishads gave the same answer as the research, that decentralised community action and collaborative governance deliver better where a problem carries too many variables for quality outcomes.
    3. Where the approach has already worked: The Green and White revolutions, the Rural Livelihoods Mission, the Swachh Bharat Mission Grameen, the total literacy campaigns, and collaborative work in watershed development and livelihoods diversification all rest on professionals combined with citizen centric accountability.
    4. The States that show the gains: Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Goa and Sikkim report improvements in multidimensional poverty and human development indicators where local governments and women’s collectives work together.

    Why have two decades of gains not moved social indicators faster?

    1. Poverty fell without becoming durable: Extreme poverty declined sharply over the past two decades, and many households remain vulnerable to slipping back into it.
    2. The quality of work is the gap: Productivity gains and wages of dignity have been elusive in many employment opportunities, which slows the rate of improvement in social indicators.
    3. The new rails are in place: Digital public infrastructure, women’s bank accounts, direct benefit transfers and access to retail credit have all created new opportunities for growth and development.
    4. Rails are not outcomes: The persistent wicked problem sectors have not responded to those gains, which is what makes a different approach necessary rather than optional.

    Why does centralisation remain the default?

    1. Electoral compulsions: The demands of democratic electoral processes push decisions upward to the level where visible credit is assigned.
    2. A bureaucracy built for other work: The administrative machinery is not geared to the qualitative outcomes these sectors require.
    3. Institutions and processes that do not function: Systems of institutions and management processes are inadequate, and in places dysfunctional.
    4. Accountability without community validation: Accountability stays weak wherever data is never validated by the community it purports to describe.

    What is the binding constraint now that mobilisation is done?

    1. The first task is largely complete: The heavy lifting of community mobilisation and social capital has been achieved in most parts of rural India.
    2. What is needed next: Higher order education and skills that raise productivity and allow the effort to scale.
    3. The systems now to be opened up: School, health and nutrition systems have been expanded, with real gains in social participation, and are the ones to be subjected to citizen centric impactful governance.
    4. What makes that possible locally: Untied and adequate funds, professionals posted below the block level alongside local governments, and a large body of community resource persons.
    5. The countervailing presence: Local government institutions standing alongside women’s collectives and their social capital create the conditions for accountable governance.

    What does the record of frontline workers teach?

    1. A cadre that changed its own role: ASHA workers, the accredited social health activists based in villages, have made primary healthcare facilities more accountable, and improvements in their capabilities have moved many of them toward the work of community health workers.
    2. The transferable lesson: Accountable public systems need well trained frontline workers who live in the locality they serve.
    3. The effect on hired expertise: Where community resource persons exist, professionals recruited from the market also become more accountable and gain the scale to implement new approaches.

    What would change in urban governance?

    1. An elected tier below the ward: Direct elections at the basti level, below the large ward level, would create a legitimate accountable authority close to the community.
    2. Authority without resources fails: Those who carry the responsibility must also hold the resources.
    3. Collectives working with elected leaders: Women’s and youth collectives working with elected basti level leaders can provide accountable governance at the doorstep, with funds, functions and functionaries in place.

    What would full devolution change?

    1. Interconnected sectors need one authority: Given the interconnectedness of the wicked problem sectors, the responsibilities listed for local governments in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules should be accepted in full.
    2. The effect it produces: Such an adoption generates community convergent action from below rather than convergence ordered from above.
    3. A ranking already exists: The Panchayat Advancement Index, which ranks local governments, can be made better by community validation of every outcome it records.
    4. Financing should follow the deficit: The financing of local governance must be commensurate with the size and the shape of the deficit the Index reveals.

    Challenges to collaborative governance

    1. Devolution stops at the list: States accept the schedules in name and retain the functions in practice. Eg. Fewer than ten States have transferred all 29 subjects listed for panchayats, and the overall devolution index stands at about 44 percent.
      The Fix: Require activity mapping for every transferred subject, naming the tier that plans, the tier that spends and the tier that answers for the result.
    2. There is nobody below the block to collaborate with: Local governments lack the staff to hold a professional cadre to account. Eg. Panchayats average well under one secretary each, and in some large States the figure is close to a third of one per panchayat.
      The Fix: Create a dedicated local government cadre, recruited and paid at district level, with untied funds attached to each sanctioned post.
    3. Elected city leadership has no executive power: Urban collaboration fails where the elected head is ceremonial and the executive is appointed by the State. Eg. Parastatal agencies run water supply and transport in most large cities, leaving the municipal body answerable for services it does not control.
      The Fix: Transfer parastatal functions to municipal bodies together with the staff and the revenue streams that fund them.
    4. Community validation is missing where it matters most: Accountability tools collapse where the community never sees the record made in its name. Eg. Ward committees and area sabhas are non functional or absent in most States, and only a handful have legally mandated participatory bodies.
      The Fix: Make a social audit by the gram sabha or area sabha a condition for releasing the next tranche of performance linked grants.

    Conclusion

    The gap in these sectors is not a shortage of programmes or of community capacity. It is the absence of an elected authority small enough to be answerable and resourced enough to act, sitting next to the people who use the service. Every proposal in this space arrives at the same precondition, that a State has to give up functions, funds and staff it currently holds, and no State has yet faced a cost for declining to. What to watch is whether any fiscal transfer to a State is ever made conditional on measured devolution to its local governments, since nothing else makes retention expensive.

    Participatory Governance in India

    1. What it means: Governance is participatory where citizens hold a decision making role in planning, execution and audit, rather than only receiving a service designed elsewhere.
    2. The two values it rests on: Local institutions are justified on efficiency in public service delivery and on the deepening of democracy through proximity to citizens.
    3. The architecture on the community side: Self help groups are federated upward into village organisations and then into cluster level federations at panchayat or block level, which gives very small groups scale.
    4. The scale of women’s representation: Over 14.5 lakh elected women representatives sit in local bodies, and 21 States provide 50 percent reservation for women.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Local Self Government

    1. Article 243G: Empowers a State legislature to endow panchayats with the powers and authority to function as institutions of self government, with reference to the subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule.
    2. Article 243W: Does the same for municipalities, with reference to the subjects listed in the Twelfth Schedule.
    3. Article 243I and Article 243Y: Require a State Finance Commission every five years to review the financial position of panchayats and municipalities and recommend the devolution of taxes, duties and grants.
    4. Article 243ZD: Provides for a District Planning Committee to consolidate the plans of panchayats and municipalities into a draft development plan for the district.

    Government Initiatives for Community Institutions

    1. Lakhpati Didi: Aims to enable 3 crore women members of self help groups to earn over ₹1 lakh a year through livelihood diversification, skilling and enterprise scaling.
    2. Namo Drone Didi: Provides drones to women’s self help groups for agricultural rental services, creating a new income stream and a route into technology use.
    3. Kudumbashree, Kerala: A State network of over 45 lakh members in more than 3 lakh groups, integrated with local self government and treated internationally as a benchmark.

    Key Facts about Participatory Governance

    1. The bank linkage programme: The Self Help Group Bank Linkage Programme was launched in 1992 and was pioneered by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD).
    2. Its standing: It is the world’s largest microfinance programme by volume, with a loan repayment rate above 96 percent.
    3. The People’s Plan Campaign: Kerala’s campaign gives local bodies control over roughly 40 percent of the State’s plan budget.

    Challenges in Community Institutions

    1. Most groups never reach credit: A majority remain at the savings stage, and full credit linkage stays incomplete decades after bank linkage began. Eg. A significant share of groups are recorded as defunct, formed but inactive in meetings, savings and lending.
      The Fix: Make bank linkage, rather than group formation, the reported output against which a district’s performance is assessed.
    2. Weak market linkage caps incomes: Products lack quality, branding, packaging and access to organised markets, so most groups sell only locally. Eg. Public procurement routes such as the Womaniya initiative on the Government e Marketplace reach only a small share of producers.
      The Fix: Attach branding, logistics and quality certification support to cluster level federations rather than to individual groups.
    3. Entry capital is too small to build an enterprise: The revolving fund and community investment fund provided at formation cannot finance a business beyond subsistence. Eg. A revolving fund of ₹20,000 to ₹30,000 per group is the standard starting support.
      The Fix: Move to a credit plus model that adds technical consultancy and business incubation instead of only enlarging the loan.
    4. Women’s time is the unpriced constraint: Domestic responsibility limits the hours available for meetings and for enterprise work. Eg. Women spend upward of seven hours a day on unpaid domestic work against roughly one and a half hours for men.
      The Fix: Fund childcare and drudgery reducing shared infrastructure at federation level as part of livelihood spending rather than as welfare.

    Back2Basics: Panchayat Advancement Index

    1. Who publishes it: The Ministry of Panchayati Raj.
    2. What it ranks: Gram panchayats, on measured progress toward development outcomes rather than on expenditure incurred.
    3. How it is built: It is organised around nine themes of the Localised Sustainable Development Goals, covering poverty, health, water, infrastructure, social justice and governance among others.
    4. How panchayats are graded: Each is placed in a performance category, ranging from Achiever at the top down to Beginner.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following statements: 1. The Self-Help Group (SHG) Programme was originally initiated by the State Bank of India by providing microcredit to the financial deprived. 2. In an SHG, all members of a group take responsibility for a loan that an individual member takes. 3. The Regional Rural Banks and Scheduled Commercial Banks support SHGs. How many of the above statements are correct? (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) All three (d) None ANSWER: (b)”

  • After DGCA cracks whip, dope tests begin on all pilots of Indian airlines

    Why in the News

    The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the civil aviation regulator, has ordered every Indian airline to conduct a one time test for psychoactive substances on all its pilots by July next year. The direction was issued in August and testing has already begun. Indian airlines are estimated to employ close to 14,000 pilots. The order follows an Air India pilot testing positive for drugs after the aircraft he was commanding lost altitude suddenly on a Phuket to Delhi flight. The standing requirement is annual random testing of 10% of pilots, so the response to a single detected case is a census rather than a tighter sample.

    How does a psychoactive substance test work?

    1. The sample is split at collection: The employee’s urine sample is divided and stored in two separate containers.
    2. The first container is screened at once: A screening test is run on that sample immediately after it is collected.
    3. A non negative screening result grounds the pilot: A result indicating the presence of psychoactive substances takes the pilot off flying duty immediately, pending the confirmatory result.
    4. The second container decides the case: It is sent to a designated laboratory for a confirmatory test using high complexity instrumentation, because screening can return false positives from certain medications, food items and technical errors.

    What happens after a confirmed positive?

    1. A medical review comes first: The organisation’s medical in charge must consult a medical review officer to establish whether the result arose from legitimate therapeutic treatment or another innocuous source rather than from drug abuse. Eg. Pain relief medication containing codeine can trigger a positive result for opiates.
    2. A first offence is treated as a health problem: The employee is referred by the organisation to a specialist doctor, counsellor or de addiction centre for a rehabilitation programme.
    3. Return to duty is conditional: The employee must undergo fresh testing, obtain a negative report, and obtain a fitness certificate from the organisation’s medical in charge.
    4. The ladder then turns punitive: A positive result after return to duty suspends the licence for three years. A third positive result leads to cancellation of the licence.

    Why has the regulator moved from a sample to a census?

    1. The rule it is working around: The Civil Aviation Requirements on testing for psychoactive substances, effected in January 2022, make annual random testing of a tenth of pilots and air traffic controllers mandatory.
    2. The ministry asked for more: The Ministry of Civil Aviation suggested to the regulator that every pilot undergo a test once a year in place of the random sample.
    3. The revision was already under way: Consultations to revise the rules on testing aviation personnel were in progress when the incident occurred, and the incident produced calls for a stricter testing protocol and stricter disciplinary action in proven cases of drug abuse.
    4. The census is an interim step: With consultations still open, the regulator chose to put all airline pilots through a single test spread over nearly 12 months. A draft of the new and more stringent norms is expected by the end of this month, per the Union Civil Aviation Minister.

    Who else does the testing regime cover?

    1. Air traffic controllers sit alongside pilots: The existing rules treat both groups as the primary focus segments for testing, and the one time census covers pilots alone.
    2. The rules reach further than the cockpit: Aircraft maintenance engineers and certifying staff, trainee pilots, and instructors and examiners are all covered as personnel engaged in safety sensitive functions.
    3. Their testing is event based: That wider group is tested at the time of hiring or after specific incidents rather than on an annual cycle.

    What did the airline do before the regulator acted?

    1. A voluntary round came first: The Air India Group had already initiated one time random drug tests on an estimated 5,000 pilots employed by Air India and Air India Express, before the regulator’s direction was issued.
    2. Dismissal followed the investigator’s disclosure: Hours after the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau flagged the positive drug test of the pilot in command of that flight, the airline said it had terminated the pilot’s employment.

    Challenges to psychoactive substance testing of aviation personnel

    1. A one time census tests a date, not a habit: A single sweep across a year detects use in a narrow window and creates a predictable gap on either side of it. Eg. A pilot already tested knows that no further test is due until the revised norms take effect.
      The Fix: Move to unannounced random testing at a high annual coverage rate, so the probability of being tested stays constant instead of being exhausted.
    2. A test detects consumption, not impairment in the cockpit: A positive result establishes that a substance was consumed and does not establish that performance was degraded on a particular flight. Eg. Alcohol is handled separately through pre flight breath analyser checks, precisely because impairment there is measured at the point of duty.
      The Fix: Link the regime to flight data monitoring, so a recorded performance anomaly triggers a test as readily as a test triggers an inquiry.
    3. A punitive ladder suppresses self reporting: A regime in which a repeat finding costs the licence discourages a pilot from disclosing a dependency or a prescribed medication. Eg. Aviation medicine practice elsewhere pairs testing with a confidential peer support route back to the cockpit.
      The Fix: Create a protected disclosure channel with treatment and monitored return, entered voluntarily rather than after a failed test.
    4. Laboratory and custody capacity is the binding constraint: Confirmatory testing needs accredited laboratories and an unbroken chain of custody, and a census multiplies both demands at the same time. Eg. A mishandled sample cannot be tested again, so a disputed result becomes unresolvable for the employee and the regulator alike.
      The Fix: Notify the designated laboratories with their assessed capacity, and audit custody records rather than only test outcomes.

    Conclusion

    The regulator has answered a detection failure with coverage. Testing everyone once establishes a baseline, and it does not change the odds a user faces on any given day, which is what actually deters use. The substantive decisions sit in the rules still being drafted, namely the annual coverage rate, whether testing is unannounced, and whether a pilot who comes forward is treated as a patient or as a case. Those three choices, and not the size of the first sweep, will decide whether the regime catches impairment before a flight rather than after one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12 marks] For achieving the desired objectives, it is necessary to ensure that the regulatory institutions remain independent and autonomous. Discuss in the light of the experiences in recent past.”

  • Draft SIR poll roll: names flagged for 11 ‘logical’ discrepancies in Delhi

    Why in the News

    Over a third of the electorate included in Delhi’s newly published draft electoral roll is being served notices to verify documents and attend hearings. The drive is part of the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of the roll. The Election Commission’s software flagged 19.33 lakh electors under 11 different “logical discrepancies”, and they form the bulk of the 33.1 lakh voters now facing scrutiny. A software flag is an inference drawn from a mismatch between two databases, not a finding that an entry is false. The elector nonetheless carries the burden of answering it within a fixed calendar.

    What is a Special Intensive Revision?

    1. What it revises: It is a full re enumeration of the electoral roll, in which every existing elector is covered afresh rather than only additions, deletions and corrections being processed.
    2. How it differs from the routine exercise: A summary revision updates an existing roll on the basis of applications received from citizens. An intensive revision rebuilds the roll through house to house enumeration.
    3. What it produces: A draft roll is published first, a period for claims and objections follows, and a final roll is published at the end.

    What do the 11 discrepancies actually test?

    1. The first category, relationships inside a household: Flags arise where more than six children are linked to one parent, where the age gap between a child and a parent is under 15 or over 50 years, where the gap between a child and a grandparent is under 40 years, or where two children are less than nine months apart.
    2. The first category also covers changed relative details: Flags arise on mismatched parent names, on a change of relative type from father to mother, and on a shift from “father” to “husband” between the current and the previous SIR rolls.
    3. The second category, age inconsistency: Electors were flagged where the age difference between the current and the last SIR does not reconcile.
    4. The third category, name mismatch: Flags arise from a discrepancy in either the elector’s own name or the father’s name between the two rolls.

    How large is the verification load, and where does it fall?

    1. The base: Delhi has a total electorate of 1.45 crore registered voters.
    2. What the draft actually carries: The draft roll published on 31 August holds around 97.5 lakh voters whose enumeration forms were successfully digitised.
    3. A second and larger category of notices: Over 13.79 lakh electors remain “unmapped” on the draft roll and face notices for lacking mapping details from previous rolls.
    4. Concentration by district: North East district will see the highest volume of action, with over 3 lakh voters set to receive notices.

    What does the calendar allow at each stage?

    1. For those left out of the draft: Claims and objections can be filed until 30 September.
    2. For those included in the draft: All notices must be served, and all claims and objections disposed of, by 29 October.
    3. The end point: The final electoral roll is scheduled for publication on 4 November.

    Why is the flagged elector at a disadvantage?

    1. The list is not public: The full list of flagged electors has not been uploaded publicly. Booth Level Officers, the field staff who maintain a polling station’s roll, can see the names through their own application.
    2. The documentary standard is discretionary: Where none of the 11 prescribed documents is available, the matter rests on the satisfaction of the Electoral Registration Officer, the officer who decides inclusion for an assembly constituency, and varies with the anomaly involved.
    3. Flexibility cuts both ways: A standard looser than the one applied to unmapped electors is also a standard that is not written down, so two electors with the same gap in records can be treated differently.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. Field capacity decides accuracy: A house to house exercise rests on a single Booth Level Officer covering an entire polling station inside a fixed calendar. Eg. In the revision carried out in Bihar in 2025, officers were reported completing enumeration forms themselves where households were not found at home.
      The Fix: Publish the workload per officer, cap it, and sanction temporary staff wherever a polling station exceeds the cap.
    2. Mobile and migrant electors are the likeliest to be dropped: A person absent from the registered address during enumeration has no way to be counted in place. Eg. Tenants and daily wage migrants in urban constituencies routinely hold a roll entry at one address and live at another.
      The Fix: Allow a flagged elector to complete verification at any electoral office in the State, and through a documented online submission.
    3. A software flag carries no reasoning the elector can rebut: A person told that an entry is inconsistent is not told which record produced the inconsistency. Eg. Transliteration of one name across two scripts generates mismatches between rolls without anything about the person having changed.
      The Fix: Serve the specific field and the two conflicting values with every notice, so the reply can address the actual mismatch.
    4. The remedy is slower than the roll: Appeals against exclusion run to the District Magistrate and then to the Chief Electoral Officer, on a timeline unconnected to the election calendar. Eg. An elector wrongly excluded shortly before a poll regains the entry only after that poll is over.
      The Fix: Fix outer time limits for the first and second appeal that close before the final roll is published, not after it.

    Conclusion

    The revision has quietly reversed the default. An entry on the roll is now provisional until the elector re establishes it, and what triggers that is a mismatch between two databases rather than an objection raised by a person. A cleaner roll may well result, and it does so by moving the cost of administrative error onto the individual least equipped to absorb it. What to watch is the disposal record, specifically how many flagged electors were restored and on what proof, because that ratio is the only measure of whether the drive corrected the roll or shrank it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • SC seeks clarity on FSSAI’s warning label norms

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has questioned the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), the statutory food regulator, on how it proposes to determine whether a packaged food is “high” in sugar, salt or fat for the purpose of front of pack warning labels. The regulator had proposed such labels a month earlier, after the Court questioned its reluctance to introduce them. Its affidavit sets the thresholds by reference to the Dietary Guidelines for Indians, 2024 issued by the ICMR National Institute of Nutrition, without stating the triggering level itself. The Court described food safety as a cause of “national interest” and said it would pass a detailed order seeking further information from stakeholders. A warning label operates entirely through the number that switches it on, and that number is the one part of the proposal not yet on record.

    What is a front of pack warning label?

    1. Where it sits, and why that matters: It is a mark printed on the front of a package rather than inside the nutrition panel on the back, so a purchaser sees the risk before choosing to read anything.
    2. The form proposed: A red hexagonal warning would appear on the front of the pack.
    3. The trigger proposed: It would apply where a product is found to be high in two or more of the specified nutrients of concern, namely added fat, added sugar and salt.

    What did the Court ask that the affidavit does not answer?

    1. The threshold question: A two judge Bench asked how the regulator would fix the level beyond which a packaged food is classified as high in sugar, salt or fat.
    2. Whether any standard exists at all: The Bench asked directly whether guidelines had been laid down for making that determination.
    3. The answer on record: The Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Centre and the regulator, said the regulator was adhering to the guidelines issued by the ICMR National Institute of Nutrition.
    4. A dietary guideline is not a labelling standard: Those guidelines advise individuals on what to eat. A labelling rule needs a numeric limit stated per unit of food, which a manufacturer can apply and an inspector can test.

    How did the case reach this point?

    1. The petition behind it: The proceeding is a public interest litigation filed by non profit organisations seeking warning labels that indicate high levels of salt, sugar and saturated fats.
    2. The regulator moved only under scrutiny: The proposal for prominent red warnings marked a regulatory pivot, and it arrived after judicial questioning rather than from the regulator’s own standard setting cycle.
    3. The Court’s stated ground: The Bench said it had undertaken its own study, asked the regulator to treat its directions seriously, and grounded its concern in the health of the population and of growing children in particular.

    Challenges to front of pack warning labels

    1. The threshold decides the policy, and it is the contested part: Industry attention concentrates on the cut off rather than on the label, because a lenient limit leaves most products unmarked. Eg. An earlier Indian proposal offered an Indian Nutrition Rating awarding stars, which public health bodies criticised for rewarding marginal reformulation instead of warning about risk.
      The Fix: Notify numeric limits per 100 g for solids and per 100 ml for liquids, separately for each nutrient, so the standard is testable rather than advisory.
    2. A two nutrient trigger lets single nutrient products pass: A food extremely high in one nutrient alone would carry no mark at all. Eg. A sugar sweetened beverage low in fat and salt escapes a label that requires two breaches.
      The Fix: Apply one warning mark for each nutrient breached, so the label scales with the risk rather than with the count of risks.
    3. Enforcement reaches only the packaged segment: Loose and unbranded food sold without a package falls outside any labelling rule. Eg. Fried snacks and sweets sold by weight carry no nutrition declaration whatsoever.
      The Fix: Pair the label with mandatory menu and point of sale declarations for chain food outlets, where the product is standardised and traceable.
    4. A label changes purchase only if it is understood: Nutrient information fails where the reader cannot convert a figure into a judgement. Eg. Chile adopted a black octagonal mark carrying the words “high in” in 2016 precisely because numeric panels were going unread.
      The Fix: Test the mark for comprehension among low literacy consumers before notification, and pair it with restrictions on marketing such products to children.

    Conclusion

    The regulator has conceded the principle and left the operative part open. A warning is a binary statement, so it cannot be issued out of advice about balanced diets, it needs a limit written per unit of food. What follows is that the useful output of this litigation is not a further affidavit accepting labels but a notified numeric standard, with a compliance date and a named enforcement authority behind it. Until that exists, the label is a design and not a rule.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] With reference to pre-packaged items in India, it is mandatory to the manufacturer to put which of the following information on the main label, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011? 1. List of ingredients including additives 2. Nutrition information 3. Recommendation, if any, made by the medical profession about the possibility of any allergic reactions 4. Vegetarian/non-vegetarian Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1, 2 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 only ANSWER: (c)”

  • Manipur’s demand for a 1951 baseline for NRC: Why the date is contentious

    Why in the News

    The State’s Home Minister has told the Manipur Assembly that 1951 will be the base year for updating the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in the State, a register of residents against which claims to belonging are tested. The State cannot implement an NRC without the Centre’s approval, and officials are tracing the records of the register prepared in 1951. The choice of year is not an administrative detail. Manipur’s own permit system controlling entry from outside lapsed in 1950, which is why valley based organisations treat 1951 as the point from which outsiders must be identified. The Kuki Zo Council has challenged the reliability of that baseline, since the hill districts were barely enumerated in that year. A baseline that one set of claimants treats as the earliest honest record is the same baseline another treats as a record of its own absence.

    Why does 1951 have a claim as Manipur’s baseline?

    1. The permit system lapsed just before it: The erstwhile princely State ran a permit system regulating the entry of people from outside, and that system was abolished in 1950.
    2. 1951 produced both a count and a register: The first Census of independent India was conducted in 1951, and an NRC was prepared alongside it carrying names, parentage and residence.
    3. The earliest available demographic baseline: The Joint Committee on Inner Line Permit System (JCILPS), the umbrella body that led the agitation for an Inner Line Permit, argues that 1951 is the earliest point against which later migration and population change can be measured.
    4. The growth figure it relies on: The same body cites recorded decadal population growth rising from 12.80% in 1951 to 35.04% in 1961. A rise of that size does not by itself establish illegal immigration as its cause.

    What earlier settlements already named 1951?

    1. The 1980 understanding: The “Proceedings of Understanding” between the State government and student organisations named 1951 as the baseline.
    2. The 1994 agreement: A further agreement between the Lieutenant Governor and student organisations, concluded under President’s Rule in the State, carried the same year.
    3. The 2018 Bill: The Manipur People’s Protection Bill, 2018 named 1951 and classified as “non Manipuris” those who were not Meitei, not Meitei Pangal, not members of the Scheduled Tribes, and not resident in Manipur before 1951.
    4. Passed but never law: The Assembly passed that Bill unanimously and it did not become law.

    Why did Assam settle on a 1971 cut off instead?

    1. A longer agitation produced it: Assam had a far longer and more intense history of agitation over illegal immigration, culminating in the Assam Movement of 1979 to 1985.
    2. The Accord fixed a base date: Under the Assam Accord, 1 January 1966 was fixed as the base date. Those who entered before it were to be regularised.
    3. Two further brackets followed: Entrants between 1 January 1966 and 24 March 1971 were to be detected and registered under the law. Those entering on or after 25 March 1971 were to be detected and expelled.
    4. The date came from a settlement, not a survey: The 1971 date emerged from that specific political settlement, shaped by migration from East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh.
    5. Manipur’s proponents distinguish their case: They argue their problem arises from the abolition of the permit system and later demographic change rather than from partition era migration.

    Why has the demand gained urgency now?

    1. It predates the current conflict: The demand existed before the ethnic violence that began in May 2023.
    2. A cross border influx added a security dimension: The movement of people from Myanmar after the 2021 military coup gave the demand a security framing it did not previously carry.
    3. Representation is the new stake: The 2027 Census and the prospect of delimitation have made the sequence of the two exercises politically significant.
    4. Valley organisations want the register first: Meitei and Naga organisations want the NRC completed before the Census, arguing that population figures should not influence future political representation until illegal immigration has been addressed.

    Why do the hill based organisations reject a 1951 baseline?

    1. The 1951 enumeration was incomplete in the hills: The Kuki Zo Council says most hill areas of Manipur had virtually no road connectivity in 1951, which made comprehensive population enumeration difficult.
    2. An incomplete record excludes rather than verifies: On that reading, a 1951 benchmark could exclude indigenous communities who were never fully counted in the first place.
    3. A community older than the boundary: Kuki, Zomi and Chin communities have historically lived on both sides of the India Myanmar border, so organisations representing them fear that a 75 year old baseline would fall hardest on them.

    Challenges to a 1951 baseline for the Manipur NRC

    1. The State has already reversed itself on the year: A shift in the proposed base year from 1971 to 1951 in 2018 triggered protests. Eg. In Jiribam, people from communities with longstanding links to neighbouring Assam feared exclusion, and the Bill was never brought into force.
      The Fix: Settle the base year through a published inquiry into record availability district by district before it is announced as policy.
    2. Its own operational choice was a different year: When the government had to operationalise the Inner Line Permit system, the Cabinet chose 1961 as the base year in 2022. Eg. The then Chief Minister said the choice followed consideration of the interests of the State’s 34 recognised tribes, and the 2024 recommendation of an NRC to the Centre also proposed 1961.
      The Fix: Align the NRC base year with the year already in force for the permit system, so one State does not operate two definitions of residence.
    3. Proof falls on those least able to furnish it: A baseline that old cannot distinguish a recent migrant from a long settled resident who simply cannot produce records. Eg. Assam’s own exercise left over 19 lakh applicants out of the final register published in 2019, largely on documentary grounds.
      The Fix: Accept a defined ladder of alternative proof, including school, land and ration records and village level certification, rather than a single documentary standard.
    4. The legal consequence of exclusion is undefined: The Centre would have to prescribe the evidentiary and appeals framework and clarify what exclusion means in law. Eg. Applicants excluded in Assam were left to Foreigners Tribunals, a forum whose orders have been criticised for inconsistent standards.
      The Fix: Publish the appeal forum, the time limit and the legal status of an excluded person before any enumeration begins.
    5. Displacement compounds verification: In a State where conflict has displaced thousands, documentary verification becomes harder still. Eg. Households moved into relief camps after the violence left property and identity records behind.
      The Fix: Treat a State certified displacement record as admissible proof of prior residence.

    Conclusion

    A base year is a political settlement presented as a date. Manipur’s valley and hill organisations both accept a register in principle and cannot agree on the year that defines belonging, because each candidate year redistributes the burden of proof. What to watch is the order of steps. If a base year is announced before the rules of evidence and appeal are written, the exercise will start producing exclusions before it has defined what exclusion means.

    Back2Basics: Inner Line Permit

    1. What it is: A travel document that an Indian citizen from another State must obtain to enter a protected State, valid for a limited period and purpose.
    2. Its legal source: It operates under the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, which empowered the authorities to restrict entry into designated frontier areas.
    3. Where it applies: Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram have long required it, and Manipur was brought under the regime in 2019.
    4. What it does not decide: It regulates entry and stay by citizens of other States and does not by itself determine citizenship or residence for any other purpose.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements: 1.There is only one citizenship and one domicile. 2.A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State. 3.A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 (d) 2 and 3 ANSWER: (a)”

  • Court protects space for protest, it needs to

    Why in the News

    The Chief Justice of India has rebuked a Greater Noida executive magistrate for issuing a notice to a student over his alleged participation in the Cockroach Janta Party led protests over examination paper leaks. The notice went out after the Supreme Court had already quashed cases against student protesters, other than those carrying a criminal history. It was revoked afterwards, and the Court has demanded accountability for its having been issued at all. Days earlier the Allahabad High Court quashed charges under the National Security Act, 1980 against another student arising from workers’ protests in Noida. Both orders grant relief to students and both uphold the right to protest. The space for protest is being preserved case by case through judicial relief, rather than by the state defining the limits on protest narrowly in the first place.

    What did the two court interventions actually decide?

    1. The earlier Supreme Court order: An order of 1 September quashed cases against student protesters, with an exception carved out for those carrying a criminal history.
    2. Accountability for a notice already withdrawn: Withdrawal of the magistrate’s notice was not treated as closing the matter, and an explanation for its issue was sought.
    3. The High Court’s characterisation: Invocation of the National Security Act, 1980 was described as “arbitrary and vague”, and the decision to invoke it as “worthy of derision”.
    4. Officials named in a chain: Responsibility was fixed on officials from the District Magistrate down to the Station House Officer.
    5. Compensation as the remedy: The student was ordered to be paid compensation for the “casual and cavalier exercise of authority by the state”.
    6. Why the wording matters: The order locates the failure in the application of an extraordinary law to ordinary protest, not in any dispute about the facts.

    Why does the right to protest need active protection?

    1. Protest is the channel for those outside institutions: In a democracy with a young population, the ability to speak and to talk back to power has to be protected and widened rather than merely tolerated.
    2. The protests produced a response: Student agitations at Jantar Mantar and beyond forced those in authority to listen, which is the function protest performs.
    3. Amplification changes the stakes on both sides: A young population with a voice and a phone to carry it makes suppression both more visible and more tempting.
    4. The record the courts are drawing on: Judicial review has been used to widen the constitutional promise of civil liberties, including the scope of the freedom of speech and expression.

    Where should the limits on protest be drawn?

    1. Limits exist and are not in dispute: Protest cannot extend to violence, vandalism or incitement to violence.
    2. The burden of definition sits with the state: Those restrictions must be framed reasonably, precisely and narrowly rather than at large.
    3. Overbreadth is the mechanism of abuse: Loose and wide definitions allow ordinary protest to be recast as an offence, which the use of a preventive detention law against a student illustrates.
    4. The stated risk: Abuse of power on that scale risks reducing a state to an “Orwellian dystopia”, a landscape denuded of freedom and marked by severe government control.

    Why is relief in individual cases not a sufficient answer?

    1. Relief arrives after the cost has been imposed: A notice or a detention order does its work in the interval before a court reaches it, through legal expense, interrupted study and the deterrent it sets for others.
    2. The incentive facing the official is unchanged: Where an overbroad order is set aside without consequence for the officer who signed it, the calculation that produced it survives intact.
    3. The guarantee has to travel downward: A constitutional promise is worth what it is worth at the police station and in the office of the local politician, not only in a constitutional court.
    4. Judicial capacity is finite: Intervention one case at a time cannot match the volume of orders a wide statute permits, so the remedy has to sit in the definition of the offence.

    Challenges to protecting the freedom to protest

    1. Preventive detention is constitutionally permitted: Detention without trial for a limited period is contemplated by the Constitution itself, so its use is a question of proportionality rather than of legality. Eg. Article 22 expressly provides for preventive detention laws and regulates only the procedure around them.
      The Fix: Require a written and reasoned satisfaction naming the specific apprehended act before a detention order takes effect, and make that record reviewable.
    2. Prohibitory orders substitute for a ban on protest: Standing orders against assembly convert a gathering into an offence without any judgment on what it is about. Eg. Orders under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are renewed for long stretches in parts of the capital.
      The Fix: Cap the duration and the geographic extent of such orders and require publication of the reasons for every renewal.
    3. The process itself is the punishment: Bail applications, hearings and travel impose a cost that does not depend on any conviction. Eg. Undertrials make up the large majority of India’s prison population.
      The Fix: Provide for compensatory costs against the state as the default where a case against a protester is quashed for overbreadth.
    4. Space to assemble is shrinking: Where a city permits assembly at a single notified site, the state controls the audience a protest can reach. Eg. Ramlila Maidan and the Boat Club lawns in Delhi have progressively been closed to routine demonstrations.
      The Fix: Notify several protest sites in every city with a transparent and time bound permission process.
    5. Communication restrictions accompany protest policing: Suspension of mobile data around a protest site limits coordination and documentation together. Eg. India has recorded among the highest numbers of internet shutdowns of any country over the past decade.
      The Fix: Require every suspension order to be published with its duration and reasons, and to lapse automatically unless a review committee renews it.

    Conclusion

    The pattern in both orders is the same. An extraordinary power was turned on an ordinary protest, and a court had to say so. That is a working check and a poor system, because it places the burden of defending a constitutional guarantee on the person who was first denied it. The durable answer is a narrower statutory definition of what the state may prohibit, so that the question stops arriving in court at all.

    Back2Basics: National Security Act, 1980

    1. What it allows: It permits preventive detention of a person in order to stop an anticipated act, without charge or trial.
    2. Who may order it: The Central Government, a State Government, and a District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police so empowered may issue a detention order.
    3. Grounds: Detention may be ordered on grounds including the security of the State, the maintenance of public order, and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
    4. Duration and review: Detention may extend up to twelve months, and an advisory board must examine the order within a fixed period for it to continue.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “Constitutional morality is the fulcrum which acts as an essential check upon the high functionaries and citizens alike…” In view of the above observation of the Supreme Court, explain the concept of constitutional morality and its application to ensure balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability in India.”

  • How should RUPPs be regulated?

    Why in the News

    Six Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPP) based in Gujarat received donations of about Rs 1,700 crore in the 2023 to 2024 financial year. A RUPP is a party registered with the Election Commission of India (EC) that has not met the vote and seat tests for recognition as a State or a national party. That single figure exceeds the Rs 1,480 crore received in the same period by five nationally recognised parties other than the Bharatiya Janata Party. The six remain on the list of active parties because they fielded candidates in the last general election. Registration brings tax exemption and a common symbol, and the law gives the Election Commission almost no power to remove a party that does nothing else.

    What is a Registered Unrecognised Political Party?

    1. The registering provision: Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act) sets out the requirements for registering a political party with the Election Commission.
    2. How registration happens: The Commission registers a party as a RUPP after satisfactory scrutiny of the documents submitted to it.
    3. Tax exemption on donations: Donations received are exempt under Section 12 of the Income Tax Act, 2025.
    4. Electoral privileges: A RUPP gets a common symbol for contesting general elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies, and is allowed 20 star campaigners during a campaign.

    What must a RUPP disclose, and what follows if it does not?

    1. Donor records above a threshold: Details of individual donors giving more than twenty thousand rupees in a financial year must be maintained and submitted to the Election Commission every year.
    2. The penalty for non disclosure: Under Section 29C of the RP Act, failure to furnish those details results in loss of income tax exemption.
    3. A cap on cash: Donations above two thousand rupees may be accepted only by cheque or bank transfer under the Income Tax Act, 2025.

    Why do parties that never seriously contest stay on the register?

    1. The gap between registration and contest: India had more than 2,800 RUPPs as of July, and only around 750 contested the 2024 general elections.
    2. The label that followed: The remainder are described as “letter pad parties”, since registration is all they maintain.
    3. No power to deregister: The RP Act confers no explicit power on the Election Commission to remove a party from the register for failing to contest elections, hold internal elections or lodge required returns.
    4. The position in law: In Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare and Others (2002) the Supreme Court held that the Commission has no power to deregister a political party under the RP Act.
    5. The narrow exceptions: Removal is available only where registration was obtained by fraud, where the party ceases to have allegiance to the Constitution, or where it is declared unlawful by the government.
    6. Delisting is not removal from the register: The Commission periodically publishes a list of delisted RUPPs, and its notification of October 2025 carried over 800 such parties.
    7. A minimal contest keeps a party active: The six Gujarat based parties stayed on the active list by fielding a total of 15 candidates in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. Eg. They are the Aam Janmat Party, Bharatiya National Janata Dal, Garib Kalyan Party, New India United Party, Satyawadi Rakshak Party and Swatantrata Abhivyakti Party.

    What does the compliance record show?

    1. Most annual reports never reach the public: A July 2025 report of the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), analysing annual reports for 2022 to 2023, found reports of only 26% of RUPPs available in the public domain.
    2. What weak compliance enables: Poor compliance with statutory requirements together with low transparency lets these parties serve as an opaque channel for tax evasion and money laundering.
    3. The scale problem: A register of thousands of entities, most of which never contest, cannot be policed through annual return scrutiny alone.

    What reforms have been proposed?

    1. The Law Commission’s recommendation: The 255th report of the Law Commission recommended amendments allowing removal from the register of a party that fails to contest elections for ten consecutive years.
    2. The Election Commission’s own proposal: Its memorandum on electoral reforms of 2016 sought an amendment to the RP Act empowering it to deregister a party.
    3. Enforcement rather than registration alone: Transaction level monitoring by the Income Tax Department and other enforcement agencies is feasible with digital records and would act as a deterrent against misuse of exemptions.
    4. Linking exemption to electoral success: The Election Commission has suggested that tax exemption be confined to parties that win seats in the Lok Sabha or a Legislative Assembly.
    5. Why that proposal is contested: Confining exemption to winners is open to the objection that it is undemocratic and extreme, since parties contest consistently without electoral success.
    6. A vote share threshold instead: A vote percentage threshold fixed by law could govern eligibility for tax exemption, on the model of the 1% vote threshold already used for allotting common symbols to RUPPs.

    Challenges to regulating Registered Unrecognised Political Parties

    1. Entry is easy and exit is absent: The statute sets a documentary threshold for entry and provides almost no route out, so the register only grows. Eg. The number of registered parties has risen steadily across successive general elections.
      The Fix: Provide for statutory lapse of registration where a party files no return and contests no election within a fixed period.
    2. Token candidature defeats a contest based test: A party that fields a handful of candidates satisfies any rule keyed to mere participation while doing nothing else. Eg. A large share of candidates in a general election forfeit their security deposit for polling below one sixth of valid votes.
      The Fix: Key the test to a minimum vote share rather than to the act of contesting.
    3. Tax exemption is the actual prize: Exemption on donations makes registration valuable to entities with no electoral purpose at all. Eg. Tax investigations into registered unrecognised parties have found arrangements in which most of a donation was returned to the donor in cash against a commission.
      The Fix: Make exemption conditional on an audited annual return filed on time, rather than automatic on registration.
    4. Disclosure thresholds leave most money invisible: Only contributions above the reporting threshold must be itemised, so funds can be split into smaller amounts. Eg. Parties routinely report large sums under the head of voluntary contributions from unnamed donors.
      The Fix: Require itemised reporting of every contribution above the cash limit, aligning the disclosure threshold with the banking channel threshold.
    5. Enforcement is split across agencies with different mandates: The Election Commission holds the register and the Income Tax Department holds the financial trail, and neither can act on the other’s finding. Eg. Delisting by the Commission does not by itself withdraw an exemption already claimed.
      The Fix: Provide for automatic reference from the Commission to the tax authority on default, with a statutory timeline for action.

    Conclusion

    Regulation here has been treated as a records problem when it is a design problem. The register was built to be easy to enter, because a democracy should not gate the formation of parties, and nothing was built to remove an entity that stops behaving like one. Every measure repeatedly proposed shifts the test from whether a party exists on paper to whether it seeks votes. Whether Parliament is willing to give the Election Commission that power, having left the position untouched since the Court described the gap, is what decides the outcome.

    Back2Basics: Recognition of political parties in India

    1. Who decides: The Election Commission recognises a party as a State party or a national party under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968.
    2. State party test: Recognition in a State requires a fixed share of valid votes together with seats in the Assembly or the Lok Sabha from that State, or a minimum number of Lok Sabha seats from it.
    3. National party test: Recognition as a national party requires recognition as a State party in at least four States, or a fixed vote share along with Lok Sabha seats from several States.
    4. What recognition brings: A recognised party gets a reserved symbol, free broadcast time on public service media, a larger number of star campaigners and copies of the electoral roll.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “one nation-one election” principle.”

  • No Statehood, Ladakh to get unique elected body, says Chief Secretary

    Why in the News

    The Ladakh Chief Secretary has stated that neither Statehood nor a Union Territory with a legislature is on offer for Ladakh. What is being offered instead is a *sui generis* body under the Constitution, carrying legislative, executive and financial powers. The proposal follows the reorganisation that made Ladakh a Union Territory without a legislature, and the sustained agitation since then for an elected tier with real powers. The Union Home Ministry has discussed the structure of the proposed Union Territory level body under Article 371 of the Constitution with the Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA). Both called the discussion disappointing and said the Union Territory administration and the Home Ministry are not on the same page. The nomenclature of the new body has not been settled, which is the immediate reason the talks remain open.

    What is the body being offered to Ladakh?

    1. Not Statehood: Ladakh was never a State, having been part of Jammu and Kashmir before becoming a Union Territory, so the proposal is not framed as a restoration.
    2. Not a Union Territory with a legislature: The model is stated to be neither Statehood nor the Union Territory with legislature form that already exists elsewhere in the country.
    3. What it is to carry: The body is to hold legislative, executive and financial powers, which the Centre describes as the aspiration it is answering.
    4. Direct election through constituencies: Members of the two Ladakh bodies recorded their consensus that the Union Territory level body should be filled by direct election through constituencies.

    Why is Article 371 the route being used?

    1. Special provisions as the vehicle: Article 371 carries special provisions for particular States and regions, and the proposed structure is being discussed under it.
    2. A constitutional amendment is required: Constitutional safeguards of this kind require a detailed and established legal and parliamentary process rather than an executive order.
    3. The stated preconditions: Any such amendment needs broad political consensus, consultation and parliamentary consideration.
    4. No imposition: The Centre’s stated position is that no framework will be imposed on Ladakh without due consultation with stakeholders.

    What is still unresolved between the new body and the existing councils?

    1. A list of questions to answer: The Ladakh representatives have been handed eight to nine questions to examine.
    2. The substance of those questions: They cover the structural relationship and the distribution of powers between the existing hill councils and the proposed Union Territory level body.
    3. The designation is undecided: Whether the head of the elected body will be called a Chief Minister has not been settled, and discussions continue for that reason.
    4. The next step: The next round of discussions is expected in October.

    Why do the Ladakh bodies call the process unsatisfactory?

    1. Two arms of government reading it differently: Both bodies said the Union Territory administration under the Lieutenant Governor and the Union Home Ministry were not on the same page.
    2. No agenda circulated in advance: A Leh Apex Body representative said the questions involve legal issues and cannot be answered on the spot, and that the agenda should have been shared beforehand.
    3. No concrete progress on core demands: A member of the delegation that met Ministry officials said no concrete progress has been made on the key demands.
    4. A threat to resume agitation: The same delegation cautioned that protests would resume if assurances were not provided within a week.
    5. A charge of divide and rule: The delegation also said efforts have been made to drive wedges between communities and regions and to tire the leadership out.

    Challenges to the proposed Ladakh elected body

    1. A body with no precedent has no settled template: A structure that exists nowhere else must define its relationship with Parliament, the Lieutenant Governor and the courts from the beginning. Eg. The Union Territory of Delhi has spent decades litigating the division of executive power between its elected government and the Centre.
      The Fix: Write the division of legislative and executive subjects into the enabling amendment itself rather than leaving it to rules framed later.
    2. Three tiers competing for the same functions: An elected Union Territory level body layered above the existing hill councils risks duplicating their subjects and their budgets. Eg. The councils already administer land allotment, local development planning and village level works in Leh and Kargil.
      The Fix: Fix a clear subject list for each tier, with the councils retaining village level administration and the new body taking Union Territory wide legislation.
    3. Financial powers without an assured revenue base: A legislature that cannot raise its own revenue depends on central allocation for every decision it takes. Eg. Ladakh has a small population, a short working season and almost no industrial tax base.
      The Fix: Attach a formula linked share of central transfers to the new body, so its budget is not an annual negotiation.
    4. Leh and Kargil press different core demands: A single settlement has to satisfy two regions that differ on representation and on the weight given to religious and ethnic composition. Eg. The two have separately pressed for reserved seats and for safeguards on land and employment.
      The Fix: Provide for guaranteed regional representation inside the new body rather than leaving the balance to constituency delimitation alone.
    5. An elected tier is not a land and jobs safeguard: Representation does not by itself restrict outside purchase of land or reserve employment for residents. Eg. Sixth Schedule status, which the Ladakh bodies have demanded, carries land and forest protections that an ordinary legislature does not.
      The Fix: Pair the new body with a statutory domicile rule and a restriction on land transfer, so representation and protection arrive together.

    Conclusion

    The offer settles one question and leaves the harder one open. The Centre has accepted that Ladakh will get an elected tier with real powers, and has ruled out both of the forms that already exist in the constitutional scheme. What has not been agreed is how much power that tier holds against the administration currently exercising it, and how it sits alongside the councils already in place. Those are the questions the next round has to answer, and the Ladakh leadership has tied its restraint to visible progress on them.

    Back2Basics: Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils

    1. Statutory basis: They were created under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council Act, 1995, enacted by the Jammu and Kashmir legislature.
    2. Two councils: One functions for Leh, set up in 1995, and a second for Kargil, set up in 2003.
    3. What they do: Each council handles local development planning, allotment of land and execution of village level works within its district.
    4. Composition: Members are directly elected from territorial constituencies alongside a few nominated members, and the council is headed by a Chief Executive Councillor.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss the nature of Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly after the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019. Briefly describe the powers and functions of the Assembly of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • Mining, money & federalism: Why a new law is at the centre of a political tussle in Odisha

    Why in the News

    Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026. It sets a uniform national tax framework for major minerals and limits the power of States to levy taxes on mining lands. The step overrides the financial effect of Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024). A nine judge Constitution Bench had held there, by a majority of 8 to 1, that States hold the power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The contest is over who collects the revenue that mining generates, and Odisha is where it is sharpest. Three States have taken the amendment to the Supreme Court, so a question the largest Bench to hear it had settled is open again.

    What does the 2026 amendment change about who can tax mining?

    1. A bar on State levies: The new Section 9D provides that no tax, cess or other levy shall be imposed by a State on mineral rights or on mineral bearing lands, whether computed on mineral quantity, mineral value, royalty payable or otherwise.
    2. A conditional exception only: A State may levy only in accordance with such conditions or restrictions as the Central Government prescribes.
    3. Wider central reach: Amendments to Section 2 and Section 13 extend the Centre’s control to mineral bearing lands.
    4. Rule making is centralised: The Centre is given sole authority to frame the rules that restrict the taxing power of States over minerals.

    What did the Supreme Court hold in 2024?

    1. Royalty on extraction: States were held competent to levy royalty on the extraction of minerals from land within the State.
    2. Tax on mineral bearing land: The same ruling held that States may tax the lands which comprise mines and quarries.
    3. The central law was read as no bar: The Bench held that the parent mining statute did not take away the taxing competence of the States in this field.
    4. Past dues were opened up: Recovery of dues for earlier years was permitted in staggered instalments, which is the origin of the arrears claims now in dispute.

    Why is Odisha the sharpest site of the dispute?

    1. The stakes as the Opposition states them: The Biju Janata Dal (BJD) puts the cost to Odisha at Rs 12,000 crore a year in foregone revenue and Rs 1 lakh crore in arrears.
    2. The procedural objection: A letter from the former Chief Minister of Odisha to the State’s ruling party Members of Parliament records that the Bill was passed with less than 10 minutes of discussion in the Lok Sabha.
    3. The framing of the contest: The Opposition presents the law as an attack on federalism and on the financial rights of the State rather than as a technical tax measure.
    4. Street level escalation: The Congress and the Left have announced a gherao of the Odisha Assembly on 29 September.
    5. The legal challenge is already under way: Karnataka, Kerala and Telangana have moved the Supreme Court against the amendment, and the Odisha unit of the Congress has said it will do the same.
    6. Why the State is so exposed: The economy and the politics of Odisha are closely tied to mining, so a change in mineral taxation reaches its budget directly.

    What is the case made for a uniform national framework?

    1. Multiple levies deter industry: On the State government’s own argument, arbitrary and multi level levies on mineral bearing land would cause extensive damage to the industrial ecosystem of the State.
    2. Mining revenue has already risen sharply: The State’s Steel and Mines Minister puts earnings from the mining sector at about Rs 50,000 crore, against about Rs 5,000 crore before 2014.
    3. A second channel already reaches States: States continue to receive money for mining affected areas through the District Mineral Foundation (DMF), a non profit trust set up by the State government.
    4. The earlier reform is offered as the cause: That rise in receipts is attributed to the last amendment of the parent Act in 2015, which moved major mineral concessions to competitive auction.

    Challenges to the MMDR Amendment Act, 2026

    1. A statute answering a constitutional finding invites a second round: Where a Bench locates a taxing power in the State List, an ordinary central law restricting its exercise raises the question of legislative competence rather than settling it. Eg. Royalty and cess on minerals has been litigated repeatedly since the India Cement judgment of 1990.
      The Fix: Route the change through a constitutional amendment or a Finance Commission mediated compensation formula rather than through a bar inserted by ordinary law.
    2. Producing districts carry the costs of mining and lose the levy: Land degradation, displacement and water stress sit in the mining district, with the taxing power moving upward. Eg. The iron ore districts of Keonjhar and Sundargarh in Odisha carry heavy overburden dumping and haulage traffic.
      The Fix: Make a fixed share of central mineral receipts a statutory entitlement of the producing district rather than a discretionary allocation.
    3. Revenue predictability for States falls: A levy that can be permitted or withdrawn through prescribed central conditions cannot be budgeted for with confidence. Eg. Mineral rich States had already built projected receipts into their medium term fiscal statements.
      The Fix: Fix the permitted State levy in the Act itself with a floor, so it is not alterable by executive prescription.
    4. Uniformity ignores unequal mineral endowment: A single national framework treats a State with large reserves and a State with none as comparable for taxation purposes. Eg. Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh together account for the bulk of India’s iron ore and coal output.
      The Fix: Build an endowment weighted transfer into the framework so producing States are not equalised downward.
    5. Litigation freezes investment decisions: A pending challenge to the taxing framework leaves both States and lessees uncertain about liability for the interim period. Eg. The 2024 ruling itself came at the end of litigation running over three decades on the same question.
      The Fix: Seek an early and time bound hearing along with an interim arrangement on collection, so liability does not accumulate unresolved.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is no longer about the rate at which minerals are taxed. It is about whether a fiscal power the Court located with the States can be narrowed by ordinary central legislation. Until the challenge is decided, mineral rich States must budget for revenue they may not be permitted to collect. The marker to watch is whether the Court treats the new bar as a permissible exercise of the Union’s mining power or as an encroachment on a State legislative field.

    Back2Basics: Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

    1. What it governs: It is India’s principal law for the development and regulation of mines and minerals.
    2. The Union’s declared control: The Act declares that the Union should take control of mining and mineral development to the extent provided by the Act.
    3. Major and minor minerals: Major minerals are regulated centrally under this Act, and minor minerals such as sand, building stone and ordinary clay are governed by State rules.
    4. The 2015 overhaul: That amendment moved allocation of major mineral concessions to auction, created the District Mineral Foundation and the National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET), and strengthened penalties for illegal mining.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: I. India has joined the Minerals Security Partnership as a member. II. India is a resource-rich country in all the 30 critical minerals that it has identified. III. The Parliament in 2023 has amended the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 empowering the Central Government to exclusively auction mining lease and composite license for certain critical minerals. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) II and III only (c) I and III only (d) I, II and III ANSWER: (c)”

  • Why India must rethink the way it values skills, jobs and productive work

    Why in the News

    India has become the world’s fourth largest economy and is treated as the next engine of global growth. The assessment now placed against that record is that the country is drifting toward the middle income trap, where an economy exhausts its gains from cheap labour and rapid catch up and fails to move to productivity led growth. Weak job creation, stagnant wages, sluggish private investment and low productivity are named as reinforcing one another. Youth protests across the country are read as the visible sign of that distress. The two standard explanations, another round of market reform and a larger public spending push, both treat this as a supply or a demand problem. The argument placed against both is that the binding constraint is institutional, meaning social norms that decide how the market prices skills and how the State allocates resources.

    Why do the standard explanations of the slowdown fall short?

    1. The pro market reading: Economists trained in market orthodoxy call for a second round of reform on the scale of 1991, covering labour flexibility, agricultural reform, deregulation and infrastructure investment.
    2. The Keynesian reading: Economists in the Keynesian tradition locate the problem in weak aggregate demand and prescribe higher public spending, redistribution and social protection.
    3. What both miss: Each treats the constraint as one of supply or of demand. Institutions shaped by social norms decide both how markets set incentives and prices and how the State allocates resources and supplies public goods.

    What does the present pattern of growth look like?

    1. Jobless growth: Productivity gains stay concentrated in narrow capital intensive and skill intensive enclaves that generate little employment.
    2. Weak domestic demand: Private investment remains sluggish, wage growth is stagnant and household consumption is weak.
    3. Manufacturing has not absorbed labour: The sector has failed to generate enough jobs for the workforce moving out of agriculture.
    4. An uneven recovery: Growth after the pandemic favoured large corporations and the digital economy and left the informal sector barely touched.
    5. Inequality and low productivity together: Rising inequality alongside low productivity is the specific combination that makes the trap dangerous, since neither corrects the other.

    How do social norms distort what the market and the State each do?

    1. Competitiveness through cost cutting: Private capital, freer from regulation than at any earlier point, competes by cutting costs rather than by innovating.
    2. Knowledge does not travel: Firms have failed to absorb the knowledge that arrives with foreign direct investment (FDI). Productivity has risen neither through movement between sectors nor through innovation inside them.
    3. Capital is priced below labour: Heavy subsidy to capital lowers its price relative to labour in an economy with surplus labour, which pushes firms toward machines over workers.
    4. Innovation is thin: Research and development spending stands at 0.65% of GDP, and technology adoption remains weak rather than spontaneous.
    5. State capacity is low despite size: Government has grown in size, and the ability to deliver basic services such as health centres and schooling remains among the lowest anywhere.
    6. Spending is tilted toward the privileged: Mass education has been historically underfunded. Higher education for elites was subsidised.
    7. The elite bias carried into the growth pattern: That same bias produced service sector heavy growth after the reforms, letting upper castes monopolise better occupations and relegating low productivity work to others.

    What does India’s vocational training record show?

    1. Almost no formal skilling: Fewer than 3% of the workforce has any formal vocational education.
    2. Seats go unfilled: Roughly 14,000 Industrial Training Institutes (ITI) offer about 25 lakh seats, and actual intake is only about 48%.
    3. Placement is weak even for those who finish: The employment rate among graduates is 63%, against over 90% in many other countries.
    4. The system is badly run: Vocational training remains poorly managed and chronically underfunded, which follows from the long neglect of mass education.

    Why does the social valuation of skills decide productivity?

    1. Useful knowledge drives modern growth: Sustained growth rests on the coevolution of science, technology and the spread of “useful knowledge”, meaning the practical skills that let a society innovate, adapt and raise productivity. Eg. The economic historian Joel Mokyr, a Nobel laureate in economics, treats the diffusion of such knowledge as the taproot of entrepreneurial success.
    2. India privileged the abstract: University degrees command prestige. Courses training electricians, welders, machinists and carpenters do not.
    3. The hierarchy has a source: That ranking reflects centuries of caste based occupational stratification in which manual and artisanal work was systematically undervalued despite its role in industrial development.
    4. The visible result: Skilled manufacturing workers are chronically short even as millions of educated young people fail to find decent work.
    5. Valuation shapes choices before markets do: Social premiums attached to some occupations, visible in the marriage market, shape educational choices and occupational aspirations and therefore the allocation of labour.
    6. Official advice runs against the norm: The Chief Economic Adviser has urged young people to take up trades such as welding and plumbing rather than software jobs or management degrees.
    7. Labour intensity is falling: Data show a persistent decline in the labour intensity of production technology across sectors, including traditionally labour intensive ones, and artificial intelligence is expected to accelerate the trend.

    What separates the countries that escaped the trap from those that did not?

    1. South Korea: Escape came from building institutions capable of creating and diffusing useful knowledge across domains, not from building factories alone.
    2. China: Early state led industrialisation was paired with large investment in technical education, local manufacturing capability and technological learning, and earlier interventions in education and health laid the productive base.
    3. Brazil, Argentina, Thailand and the Philippines: All four failed to build or sustain such institutions and remain stuck in the middle income trap.
    4. The shared symptom of failure: In those four, as in India, large sections of the population depend on public transfers and handouts for the basic requirements of a decent living.

    What does productivism propose instead?

    1. The core shift: Productivism, proposed by the economist Dani Rodrik, moves policy attention from redistribution after the fact to the creation of productive employment.
    2. Where it parts from market orthodoxy: It gives government a leading role over markets in shaping economic opportunity rather than leaving that to prices alone.
    3. Its stated priorities: It places the real economy above finance, jobs above redistribution and production above consumption.
    4. Dignity as an economic output: An inclusive economy on this reading gives people social recognition as productive members of society, which requires changing the norms underpinning institutions rather than only the policy framework.

    Challenges to escaping the middle income trap

    1. Industrial policy without skilled labour stalls: Incentives for manufacturing cannot be used if the plants receiving them cannot staff skilled lines. Eg. Electronics units in India remain concentrated in final assembly rather than component fabrication.
      The Fix: Tie incentive disbursement to verified apprenticeship and skilling numbers at the receiving plant.
    2. Training is disconnected from employers: Curricula and equipment in public training institutes lag the technology used on the shop floor, so a certificate does not signal usable skill. Eg. Many public institutes still train on machine tools several generations behind those in contract manufacturing plants.
      The Fix: Give industry associations a decisive voice in course content and equipment upgrades at each institute, with annual revision.
    3. Skilling is measured as enrolment, not as employment: Targets reward seats filled and certificates issued rather than wages earned afterwards. Eg. Short duration certification under national skilling programmes has repeatedly recorded low conversion into formal jobs.
      The Fix: Shift reporting to wage outcomes after training, tracked through provident fund records.
    4. Cheap capital keeps displacing labour: Accelerated depreciation, concessional credit and duty exemptions lower the effective price of machinery against workers, so firms automate ahead of demand. Eg. Garment units have moved to automated cutting and spreading, with employment in the sector staying flat.
      The Fix: Rebalance the incentive structure toward employment linked support rather than capital linked support.
    5. State capacity limits the very services the strategy needs: Schooling and primary health are the inputs into a productive workforce and are delivered most thinly where they are needed most. Eg. Teacher and doctor vacancies persist across the districts with the youngest populations.
      The Fix: Fill sanctioned posts in the lowest performing districts first rather than distributing recruitment evenly.

    Conclusion

    The diagnosis places the binding constraint outside the familiar argument about how much the State should spend and how far markets should be freed. What follows from it is that a skilling target or a manufacturing incentive will not move productivity for as long as the social ranking of occupations stays where it is. The difficulty is that a norm of that kind is not amenable to a budget line or a notification. Whether policy can change the standing of skilled manual work, and not only its supply, is what decides where the economy settles.

    Back2Basics: Industrial Training Institutes

    1. What they are: Post school vocational institutions that train candidates in designated trades such as fitter, electrician, welder and machinist.
    2. Who runs them: They function under the Directorate General of Training in the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, and are set up by State governments and by private promoters.
    3. The qualification awarded: Trainees who clear the All India Trade Test receive the National Trade Certificate.
    4. Statutory anchor: Trade training and apprenticeship in these institutes operate within the framework of the Apprentices Act, 1961.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS3, 15 marks] “Economic growth in the recent past has been led by increase in labour productivity.”Explain this statement. Suggest the growth pattern that will lead to creation of more jobs without compromising labour productivity.”

More posts