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Subject: “Choke Points,Connectivity Projects,Pipelines”

  • 60 days on, a disturbing US-Iran stalemate

    Why in the News

    The 60 day window for the United States and Iran to agree a long term peace framework expired on 17 August 2026 with no agreement. Both sides had already shut that window through late June and July while trading strikes, and the Strait of Hormuz remains blockaded by Iran and counterblockaded by the United States. A deadlock that neither side can end now holds global oil and gas movement hostage.

    What is the US Iran Memorandum of Understanding of 17 June?

    1. What it was: An interim understanding signed on 17 June 2026 that declared the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts.
    2. The clock: It set a 60 day timeframe, extendable by mutual consent, within which a broader agreement was to be reached.
    3. What the broader deal covered: Limits on Iran’s nuclear programme on one side and the lifting of United States sanctions on the other.
    4. The disputed clause: Point 5 was read by Tehran as giving it the right to manage the Strait of Hormuz, which it shares with Oman. Washington rejected that reading.
    5. How it collapsed: Hostilities resumed once Iran began firing on vessels it said were using an unapproved route through the waterway.
    6. Status on expiry: No long term framework exists. The interim text is the only agreed document and it is no longer being observed.

    What is the Strait of Hormuz?

    1. Location: A narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, bordered by Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south.
    2. Why it matters: About a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas moved through it before the war, with no overland route able to absorb that volume.

    What is a naval blockade?

    1. Definition: A blockade is the use of warships to stop shipping from entering or leaving a coast or a waterway.
    2. The two sided version here: Iran has closed the strait to traffic it has not approved. The United States has answered with a counterblockade of Iranian ports that it says it can sustain indefinitely by rotating ships.

    What is the Bab el Mandeb Strait?

    1. Location: The passage between Yemen and Djibouti that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and so links Suez traffic to the Indian Ocean.
    2. Current state: The Yemen based Houthi group enforces a partial blockade there, which puts a second chokepoint on the same route at risk.

    What are strategic petroleum reserves?

    1. Definition: Underground crude oil stocks held by the State to cover consumption when imports are cut off by war, sanctions or a supply shock.
    2. How they work: The reserve is filled when prices are low and released into refineries when supply stops, so the shock reaches the economy slowly rather than at once.

    Why did the 60 day framework fail to hold?

    1. Interpretation, not intent: The understanding began to unravel largely over disagreement on how its own terms should be read, not over a refusal to talk.
    2. The strait stayed shut: The framework never reopened the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively blockaded since the Israel and United States attack of 28 February 2026.
    3. The war widened instead: The 60 day period saw the Houthis and Saudi Arabia begin attacking each other, extending the conflict to a second waterway.
    4. Escalation on the ground: Iranian drones struck the office of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s prime minister in northern Iraq on 17 August.
    5. Policy shift in Tehran: A senior Iranian official stated that Iran has moved from a defensive to a fully offensive posture and would strike to break the American naval blockade if diplomacy failed.
    6. Parallel track: Iran and Oman have separately negotiated the coordinates of a jointly managed route through the strait, and progress there has been slow.

    Which figures define the scale of the disruption?

    1. Transit collapse: Traffic through the strait fell to two vessels in a day against more than 130 daily before the conflict.
    2. Share of world energy: About one fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flowed through the strait before the war.
    3. Timeline: The war was launched on 28 February 2026. The Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 17 June and its window closed on 17 August.
    4. Second chokepoint: Seven missiles were fired at the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Mokha coastline in a single day, alongside Houthi claims of striking a Saudi landing ship and four patrol boats.
    5. Spillover count: The Kurdistan region of Iraq has been targeted more than 1,000 times by Iran and pro Iran armed groups since the war began.
    6. Environmental cost: A 160 km oil slick from a bulk carrier struck by a projectile spread off Qeshm island and threatened the Hara mangrove forests, a UNESCO biosphere reserve.
    7. India’s gas shift: Indian liquefied natural gas imports rose 15.4 percent to 7.08 million tonnes over May to July as Qatari supply collapsed.

    Why are both sides doubling down on economic warfare?

    1. Lesson learned in Washington: Bombing alone has not dislodged the government in Tehran, and the United States is running low on munitions.
    2. Lesson learned in Tehran: The United States has come to stay in the region, and ballistic missiles fired at American bases or at Israel will not change that.
    3. American instruments: Washington has rescinded sanction waivers on Iranian oil in the international market and threatens to hold its naval blockade of Iranian ports indefinitely.
    4. Iranian instrument: Tehran’s single point of leverage is the strait itself, which it can keep closed at low cost to its own military.
    5. Iran’s political bet: Tehran calculates that it can squeeze the American administration until the midterm elections and treats the stalemate as the new balance of power.
    6. The American constraint: With a midterm election approaching, the United States President must show that the pressure campaign is producing results without trapping the country in another foreign war.

    What do the positions of other States in the conflict demonstrate?

    1. Oman: It shares the strait with Iran and is negotiating a jointly managed route with Tehran, which makes a small mediating State the only working channel. The United States President has threatened to bomb Oman if it gets in the way of a deal.
    2. Gulf States and the Malacca model: Oman, backed by Gulf States, offered Iran a scheme of voluntary transit fees for using the strait, modelled on the arrangement used in the Strait of Malacca.
    3. Israel: It launched the war jointly with the United States on 28 February, which is why the closure of the strait is treated in Tehran as a response to an attack rather than an independent act.
    4. Saudi Arabia: It is now in direct exchange of fire with the Houthis, which shows how a bilateral war spreads to a second chokepoint through proxies.
    5. Yemen and the Houthis: A non State armed group enforces a partial blockade of the Bab el Mandeb using ballistic missiles and drones against naval and commercial shipping.
    6. Iraq and the Kurdistan region: Iranian drones and pro Iran armed groups have struck the autonomous region’s leadership more than 1,000 times, showing that the conflict travels through weak neighbouring States.
    7. Qatar: Its liquefied natural gas exports must cross the strait, which is why the shutdown forced buyers such as India to switch to United States, Nigerian, Omani and Angolan cargoes.

    Where does the stalemate turn against both sides?

    1. Each side believes time favours it: Tehran is waiting out the American electoral calendar. Washington is waiting for economic pain to force a concession.
    2. Neither can convert leverage: Neither party has gained decisive leverage to force a settlement, and neither can end the conflict on its own terms.
    3. Rhetoric against interest: The American position swings between threatening to bomb a mediating State and insisting that a negotiated settlement is possible.
    4. Cost falls on third parties: The deadlock means the rest of the world remains hostage to a conflict that neither side is capable of ending.
    5. Stalemate as an outcome: The likeliest result is not victory for either side but the deadlock itself becoming the new normal.
    6. Diplomacy is not a hedge: For States dependent on the strait, waiting for a settlement is a bet on two governments that have both chosen to wait.

    What does the stalemate demand of India?

    1. Managed so far: India has absorbed the consequences of the closure to date without a visible supply failure.
    2. Three interests exposed: A persisting stalemate puts India’s economic, energy and strategic interests at risk together, not one at a time.
    3. Diplomacy alone is insufficient: Negotiating access with either party does not remove the underlying dependence on a single waterway.
    4. Cut import dependence: India must reduce its overwhelming dependence on imported oil rather than manage each disruption as it arrives.
    5. Build larger reserves: Strategic petroleum reserve capacity has to be expanded well beyond present levels. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation is to reserve half of its 1.75 million tonne Mangaluru facility for strategic storage.
    6. Diversify and substitute: Gas sourcing has already shifted to the United States, Nigeria, Oman and Angola, and investment in alternative energy is the only durable substitute.

    Challenges to India’s energy security in a Hormuz disruption

    1. Single route concentration: A large share of Indian crude and gas passes one 21 nautical mile wide passage with no overland alternative. e.g. Qatari liquefied natural gas supply to India collapsed once the strait shut.
    2. Reserve cover is thin: Indian strategic reserves cover only a few days of national consumption against the 90 day standard used by International Energy Agency members. e.g. phase one caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur hold 5.33 million tonnes in total.
    3. Freight and insurance shock: War risk premiums and rerouting raise the landed cost of every cargo even when volumes are secured. e.g. Red Sea diversions around the Cape of Good Hope from 2024 added roughly two weeks to voyages from Europe.
    4. Currency and fiscal transmission: An oil price spike widens the current account deficit and pushes up subsidy and inflation pressure together. e.g. every $10 rise in the crude price is estimated to add close to 0.4 percent of gross domestic product to India’s import bill.
    5. Refinery configuration: Indian refineries are tuned to specific crude grades, so substitution is not simply a question of finding any seller. e.g. sour heavy Gulf grades cannot be replaced one for one by lighter Nigerian or United States crude.
    6. Diaspora and remittance exposure: About nine million Indians work in the Gulf, and a wider war puts both their safety and their transfers at risk. e.g. evacuation operations of the scale of Operation Ajay in 2023.
    7. Shipping and seafarer risk: Indian crews form a large share of global merchant manning and are directly exposed to attacks on commercial vessels. e.g. the drone strike on a merchant vessel in the Arabian Sea in December 2023.

    Conclusion

    The lapse of the 60 day window confirms that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is no longer a temporary interruption but the working balance of power between two governments that both expect the other to break first. For India the practical consequence is that the exposure is structural and cannot be negotiated away one shipment at a time. Reduced dependence on imported crude, a materially larger strategic reserve and a faster shift to alternative energy are the only responses that survive whichever way the deadlock ends.

    About Global Maritime Chokepoints

    1. Definition: A chokepoint is a narrow shipping channel through which a large share of world trade must pass, so a closure at that point reroutes or halts global flows.
    2. Strait of Hormuz: The single largest oil chokepoint, carrying roughly 20 million barrels a day of petroleum liquids before the war, about a fifth of world consumption.
    3. Strait of Malacca: The busiest passage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, carrying most of the crude bound for China, Japan and South Korea.
    4. Bab el Mandeb: The Red Sea entrance that connects Suez traffic to the Indian Ocean, about 18 nautical miles wide at its narrowest.
    5. Suez Canal and Panama Canal: Artificial chokepoints whose closure adds thousands of nautical miles to a voyage. e.g. the Ever Given grounding blocked Suez for six days in March 2021.
    6. Turkish Straits and Danish Straits: The Bosphorus and Dardanelles carry Black Sea grain and Russian crude. The Danish Straits carry Baltic exports.
    7. India’s position: India lies alongside the Indian Ocean sea lanes that connect Hormuz and Malacca, which makes it both exposed to and capable of policing these routes.

    Treaty Framework Governing Passage Through International Straits

    1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: The framework treaty governing maritime zones, navigation rights and the settlement of maritime disputes.
    2. Article 3: Allows a coastal State a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, which is why the Strait of Hormuz falls within Iranian and Omani waters.
    3. Article 37: Applies the transit passage regime to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another.
    4. Article 38: Guarantees all ships and aircraft the right of transit passage, which cannot be suspended by the bordering States.
    5. Article 44: Bars States bordering a strait from hampering or suspending transit passage and requires them to publicise navigational hazards.
    6. Article 88 and Article 301: Reserve the high seas for peaceful purposes and bar the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any State.
    7. Iran’s position: Iran signed but has not ratified the Convention, and argues that the transit passage regime does not bind a non party.

    Laws and Rules Governing India’s Oil and Gas Security

    1. Petroleum Act, 1934: Regulates the import, transport, storage, production and refining of petroleum and petroleum products.
    2. Oilfields (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948: Governs the grant of exploration and production rights over petroleum and natural gas.
    3. Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976: Defines India’s maritime zones and the rights India exercises in each of them.
    4. Merchant Shipping Act, 1958: Governs registration, safety and manning of Indian flag vessels and the protection of Indian seafarers.
    5. Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006: Creates the downstream regulator for refining, transport, distribution and marketing, other than production.
    6. Essential Commodities Act, 1955: Allows the Union government to control the production, supply and distribution of petroleum products in a scarcity.
    7. Energy Conservation Act, 2001: Provides the legal base for efficiency standards and, after the 2022 amendment, for a domestic carbon credit trading scheme.

    Back2Basics: Strait of Hormuz

    1. Designation: A maritime chokepoint, tracked in the Places in News list as a strategic waterway rather than a protected area.
    2. Location: Between Iran on the north and Oman’s Musandam peninsula and the United Arab Emirates on the south.
    3. Connects: The Persian Gulf on one side to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea on the other.
    4. Dimensions: About 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, with inbound and outbound shipping lanes of about two miles each separated by a buffer.
    5. Littoral States: Iran, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq have no route to the open ocean except through it.
    6. Islands: Qeshm, Hormuz, Larak, and the disputed Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, held by Iran and claimed by the United Arab Emirates.
    7. Ecology: The Hara mangrove forests off Qeshm island, dominated by grey mangrove, form a UNESCO biosphere reserve.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited: Builds and operates India’s underground crude caverns. Phase one covers Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur with a combined 5.33 million tonnes.
    2. Strategic reserve phase two: Approved caverns at Chandikhol in Odisha and a second Padur facility, adding about 6.5 million tonnes of capacity.
    3. Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy and Open Acreage Licensing Policy: Replace production sharing with a revenue sharing model and let bidders select blocks on their own initiative to raise domestic output.
    4. National Green Hydrogen Mission: Approved in 2023 to build five million tonnes of annual green hydrogen capacity by 2030 and cut fossil fuel imports.
    5. Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme: Substitutes imported crude with domestic ethanol. The 20 percent blending target was advanced to 2025 and met.
    6. PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana: Supports rooftop solar in one crore households, shifting household demand away from fossil generation.
    7. Overseas equity oil: ONGC Videsh Limited holds producing assets abroad so that a share of India’s crude comes from equity rather than the spot market.

    Key Facts about India’s Oil and Gas Dependence

    1. Import dependence: India imports over 85 percent of the crude oil it consumes and about half of its natural gas.
    2. Consumption rank: India is the third largest consumer of crude oil in the world after the United States and China.
    3. Refining capacity: India is the fourth largest refiner globally, with Jamnagar in Gujarat the largest single refining complex in the world.
    4. Main suppliers: Russia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States are the largest sources of Indian crude imports.
    5. Gas sources: Qatar has been India’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, delivered under long term contracts through Hormuz.
    6. Reserve benchmark: International Energy Agency members hold 90 days of net import cover. India’s strategic reserves cover only a small fraction of that.
    7. Institutional link: India became an Association country of the International Energy Agency in 2017 and has sought full membership.

    Challenges in India’s Energy Security

    1. Import concentration by geography: A single region supplies a majority of Indian crude, so one regional conflict moves the whole import basket. e.g. West Asian suppliers accounted for the bulk of Indian crude before Russian barrels rose after 2022.
    2. Payment and sanctions exposure: Secondary sanctions can strand a supply relationship that is otherwise commercially sound. e.g. Indian refiners halted Iranian crude purchases in 2019 after the United States ended sanction waivers.
    3. Domestic production decline: Output from ageing fields keeps falling even as demand rises, widening the import gap. e.g. Mumbai High output has fallen steadily from its peak levels.
    4. Storage and pipeline gaps: Gas cannot reach demand centres without a completed grid, so imported cargoes are stranded at terminals. e.g. sections of the Urja Ganga pipeline in eastern India took over a decade to commission.
    5. Critical mineral dependence in the transition: A shift to electric mobility replaces oil dependence with lithium, cobalt and rare earth dependence. e.g. India imports nearly all of its lithium and cobalt requirement.
    6. Grid readiness for renewables: Variable solar and wind output needs storage and balancing capacity that does not yet exist at scale. e.g. curtailment of renewable generation in high output states during low demand hours.
    7. Price pass through politics: Retail fuel prices are politically managed, so a crude spike lands on oil marketing company balance sheets rather than consumers. e.g. under recoveries absorbed by public sector oil marketing companies during 2021 and 2022.

    Way Forward

    1. Expand strategic storage: Complete the phase two caverns and move Indian cover toward the 90 day benchmark used by International Energy Agency members.
    2. Commercialise reserve operation: Allow foreign and private participation in cavern filling so storage is built and rotated without full budgetary funding.
    3. Diversify supply geography: Hold standing contracts across West Asia, West Africa, the Americas and Russia so no single waterway carries a majority of volumes.
    4. Accelerate substitution: Scale ethanol blending, compressed biogas, green hydrogen and electric mobility so demand growth is not met by imported crude.
    5. Secure the sea lanes: Sustain Indian naval deployments for merchant escort in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and expand maritime domain awareness sharing.
    6. Build the gas grid: Complete the national gas grid and city gas networks so imported and domestic gas reaches demand centres.
    7. Deepen mineral supply chains: Secure lithium, cobalt and rare earth supply through overseas assets and domestic processing so the energy transition does not create a fresh chokepoint.

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?
    1. Bahrain
    2. Syria
    3. Qatar
    4. Egypt
    (a) 1 and 2
    (b) 1 and 3
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 and 4

  • Strait of Hormuz transit collapses to two vessels a day as the naval blockade hardens

    Why in the News

    Transit through the Strait of Hormuz fell to two vessels on Friday after two more ships were attacked in the waterway, against more than 130 crossings a day before the war began in February. The near standstill has turned Iran’s ability to close the strait into the decisive bargaining instrument of the war, and has pushed the United States to place cheaper fuel above nuclear denial as its first stated war aim.

    What is the Strait of Hormuz?

    1. Location: The strait connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, with Iran on the northern shore and Oman’s Musandam peninsula and the United Arab Emirates on the southern shore.
    2. Dimensions: It narrows to about 21 nautical miles, with inbound and outbound traffic separated into lanes about two nautical miles wide each.
    3. Volume carried: About a fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption passes through it, along with a large share of the world’s seaborne liquefied natural gas.
    4. Why it cannot be bypassed: Gulf producers hold limited pipeline capacity that avoids the strait, so most Gulf crude has no alternative route to the open ocean.
    5. Legal position of the lanes: The shipping lanes lie inside the territorial seas of Iran and Oman, so passage rests on the transit passage regime rather than on high seas freedom of navigation.

    What is a maritime chokepoint?

    1. About: A chokepoint is a narrow channel on a high volume shipping route where traffic must converge and cannot be economically rerouted.
    2. Why it matters: Closure at a chokepoint raises freight and insurance costs across an entire trade, because the alternative is a far longer voyage or no voyage at all.

    What is a naval blockade?

    1. About: A naval blockade is the use of warships to prevent vessels from entering or leaving an adversary’s ports or coastline.
    2. Its object here: The United States blockade is aimed at stopping Iran from selling oil and at inflicting economic damage rather than at seizing territory.

    Who is the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)?

    1. About: ADNOC is the state owned oil and gas company of the United Arab Emirates and one of the largest producers in the Gulf.
    2. Its role in the news: Two vessels affiliated to ADNOC were attacked while transiting the strait, and the UAE government blamed Iran for the attack.

    What is going dark on the Automatic Identification System?

    1. About: Merchant ships broadcast their identity and position through a transponder, and switching it off removes them from public tracking.
    2. Effect on the count: Vessel counts drawn from tracking data understate real traffic, because ships moving with transponders off are not recorded.

    How far has traffic through the strait actually fallen?

    1. Friday count: Two vessels passed through the waterway, a grain ship entering Iranian waters and an empty dry bulk ship moving in the opposite direction.
    2. A third movement: A separate empty liquefied petroleum products tanker was sailing into the Gulf through the strait on the same day.
    3. No crude at all: No crude oil shipments were visible on Friday.
    4. Preceding days: Nine vessels passed through on Thursday, up from five on Wednesday.
    5. Benchmark for the month: The August average stands at 12 vessels a day.
    6. Pre war benchmark: More than 130 ships traversed the strait daily before the war launched by the United States and Israel on Iran in February.
    7. Measurement caveat: Some ships may pass undetected with their transponders switched off, so the recorded figures are a floor rather than a full count.

    Why is control of the strait Iran’s main leverage?

    1. Analyst assessment: The principal Middle East analyst at a risk intelligence firm assessed that Iran’s ability to restrict shipping through the strait is its main source of leverage in negotiations, alongside the threat to regional energy infrastructure.
    2. A permission regime at sea: Iran has resumed attacks on ships it accuses of trying to transit the strait without its permission.
    3. Talks stalled: A senior Iranian source stated on Wednesday that there had been no progress in talks to build on the June agreement to end the war.
    4. Collapse of the ceasefire: The ceasefire renewed under the June deal has broken down, which preceded the resumption of attacks on shipping.
    5. Conditions for reopening: Iran has said it will not allow the waterway to reopen until economic sanctions are removed and frozen Iranian assets are released.
    6. Legislative backing: An Iranian parliamentary committee approved a plan for the strait on Thursday that bans the transit of United States, Israeli and other hostile countries’ assets and equipment.
    7. Attack on Emirati vessels: ADNOC said two of its vessels were attacked while transiting the strait on Thursday evening, and Iran made no immediate comment on the Emirati accusation.

    How has the closure reordered United States war aims?

    1. Stated reversal of priorities: The Vice President stated that goal number one is to keep oil and gas cheap for Americans and that goal number two is to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon.
    2. The original justification: Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon had been the consistently stated main reason for the war.
    3. Domestic pressure: The war is unpopular, the President’s approval rating is falling and midterm elections are due in November.
    4. Party calculation: Republicans fear that the war and the gasoline prices it has driven up will cost them control of Congress.
    5. Military constraint: The United States military burned through stockpiles of costly high technology missiles and is running low, which limits the option of resuming large scale attacks.
    6. Blockade endurance: The Defence Secretary stated that the navy can maintain the blockade indefinitely by rotating ships in and out of the region.
    7. Negotiating posture: The President described the approach as low keying it and only semi negotiating, days after saying an agreement to reopen the strait was imminent.
    8. Economic track: The Treasury Secretary announced measures of economic isolation without precedent, with further announcements expected next week.

    What do the positions of the other parties show about the cost of the closure?

    1. United Arab Emirates: Its state oil company had two vessels attacked in the strait and the government publicly blamed Iran, which shows that Gulf producers outside the war are absorbing its shipping costs.
    2. Iran: Its parliamentary committee converted the closure into a formal transit ban on the assets and equipment of hostile states, which shows the closure is now settled policy rather than episodic reprisal.
    3. United States: It has moved from strikes to a naval blockade of Iranian ports and a bar on Iranian oil sales, which shows the war has become an economic siege rather than a military campaign.
    4. Israel: It launched the war jointly with the United States in February and is named in Iran’s transit ban, which shows the strait is being used to impose costs directly on the belligerents.
    5. Limits of the evidence: These are the only national positions the reporting supplies, so the effect on Asian importers is documented through prices rather than through stated country positions.

    How exposed is India to a prolonged closure of the strait?

    1. Crude dependence: India imports over 85 percent of the crude oil it consumes and is the third largest crude importer in the world.
    2. Route concentration: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are among India’s largest suppliers, and cargoes from all four leave the Gulf through Hormuz.
    3. Gas contracts: Qatar supplies close to half of India’s liquefied natural gas under long term contracts, and every one of those cargoes transits the strait.
    4. Fertiliser inputs: Urea, ammonia and phosphatic raw material contracted from Oman, Saudi Arabia and Qatar move on the same route, which links the strait directly to the fertiliser subsidy bill.
    5. Seafarers: Indians form a large share of the global seafaring workforce and crew a substantial part of Gulf trade, so attacks on merchant shipping place Indian crews directly at risk.
    6. Price transmission: A sustained rise in crude prices widens the current account deficit, raises the oil import bill and feeds into domestic fuel and freight costs.
    7. Insurance and freight: War risk premiums on Gulf voyages rise sharply during a closure, which adds a cost to every cargo that does move.
    8. Remittances and diaspora: About nine million Indians live and work in the Gulf, so a prolonged war in the region carries an employment and remittance risk alongside the energy risk.

    Challenges to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open

    1. Narrow lanes inside territorial waters: The shipping lanes run through Iranian and Omani territorial seas, which lets a littoral state interfere with passage at short notice. e.g. Iranian forces seized the container ship MSC Aries near the strait in April 2024.
    2. Mines and fast attack craft: Sea mines and small armed boats can close a channel at very low cost against far more expensive warships. e.g. the mining of the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts in 1988 triggered Operation Praying Mantis.
    3. Limited bypass pipeline capacity: Existing pipelines that avoid the strait can carry only a fraction of Gulf export volumes. e.g. Saudi Arabia’s East West pipeline to Yanbu and the Emirati line to Fujairah together fall well short of normal Hormuz throughput.
    4. Insurance and crew availability: War risk premiums and crew refusal can halt trade even where warships keep a route physically open. e.g. attacks on shipping in the Red Sea from late 2023 pushed premiums up several fold and diverted traffic around the Cape of Good Hope.
    5. Attribution difficulties in attacks at sea: Limpet mines and drones leave little evidence, which delays any collective response. e.g. the 2019 attacks on tankers near Fujairah were denied by Iran and never conclusively attributed.
    6. Escalation risk from convoy operations: Naval escorting draws external navies into direct contact with a littoral state’s forces. e.g. the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers under Operation Earnest Will in 1987 led to repeated armed clashes.
    7. Thin strategic buffers for importers: Importing countries hold limited emergency stocks, so a closure of a few weeks becomes a fiscal event. e.g. India’s strategic petroleum reserves hold about 5.33 million tonnes, close to nine to ten days of imports.

    Conclusion

    Control of the Strait of Hormuz, and not the nuclear programme, now sets the terms of the war. Iran has converted a waterway into a bargaining instrument, and the United States has answered with a blockade it says it can sustain indefinitely and sanctions it says will be without precedent. Transit stands at two vessels a day against more than 130 before February, and reopening rests on sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets that neither side has conceded.

    Maritime Chokepoints and Global Energy Security

    1. About: A small number of narrow sea passages carry most of the world’s traded oil and gas, which makes energy security a function of a few points on the map.
    2. Strait of Hormuz: It carries roughly 20 million barrels of oil a day and the bulk of Qatari liquefied natural gas, and it has no adequate bypass.
    3. Strait of Malacca: It links the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and carries a comparable volume of oil, mostly bound for China, Japan and South Korea.
    4. Bab el Mandeb: It connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and is the approach to the Suez Canal for Asia to Europe trade.
    5. Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline: Together they move Gulf and Red Sea crude to the Mediterranean without the Cape route.
    6. Turkish Straits: The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles carry Russian and Caspian crude out of the Black Sea.
    7. Cape of Good Hope: It is the fallback route when Suez or Bab el Mandeb is unusable, adding roughly two weeks to an Asia to Europe voyage.
    8. India’s position: India is the third largest oil consumer and importer in the world, and its imports pass through Hormuz on the western side and Malacca on the eastern side.

    Legal Framework Governing Transit Through International Straits

    1. Article 3 of UNCLOS, 1982: Allows a coastal state a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles, which is why the Hormuz lanes fall within national waters.
    2. Article 37 of UNCLOS, 1982: Applies the transit passage regime to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another.
    3. Article 38 of UNCLOS, 1982: Grants all ships and aircraft the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded.
    4. Article 39 of UNCLOS, 1982: Requires ships in transit passage to proceed without delay and to refrain from any threat or use of force against the bordering state.
    5. Article 44 of UNCLOS, 1982: Bars states bordering straits from hampering transit passage and from suspending it.
    6. Article 45 of UNCLOS, 1982: Applies non suspendable innocent passage to straits excluded from the transit passage regime.
    7. SUA Convention, 1988: Criminalises seizure of and violence against ships and obliges parties to prosecute or extradite offenders.
    8. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: Preserves the right of individual and collective self defence against an armed attack, which is the ground invoked for naval action.

    Back2Basics: Strait of Hormuz

    1. Type: It is a maritime chokepoint and the only sea route from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean.
    2. Connects: It joins the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and further with the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
    3. Littoral states: Iran lies to the north, and Oman and the United Arab Emirates lie to the south.
    4. Width: Its narrowest point is about 21 nautical miles, roughly 39 kilometres.
    5. Key islands: Qeshm, Hormuz and Larak are Iranian, and Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are held by Iran and claimed by the United Arab Emirates.
    6. Peninsula on the southern shore: The Musandam peninsula belongs to Oman and is separated from the rest of the country by Emirati territory.
    7. Users: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran export their oil and gas through it.
    8. Volume: It handles roughly a fifth of the world’s petroleum liquids consumption and about a fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade.

    Government Initiatives for India’s Energy Security

    1. Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves: Underground caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur hold about 5.33 million tonnes of crude for emergency use, with a second phase planned at Chandikhol and Padur.
    2. Diversification of crude sources: Refiners have expanded purchases from Russia, West Africa, the United States and Latin America to reduce dependence on Gulf cargoes.
    3. Chabahar port and the International North South Transport Corridor: These provide a route to Central Asia and Russia that avoids the Suez and Hormuz corridors.
    4. India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor: A rail and shipping corridor announced in 2023 to link India to the Gulf and Europe with reduced maritime dependence.
    5. National Green Hydrogen Mission: Targets 5 million tonnes of annual green hydrogen production by 2030 to displace imported fossil fuel in industry and transport.
    6. Ethanol Blended Petrol Programme: Raises the ethanol share in petrol to cut crude import volumes and the import bill.
    7. Open Acreage Licensing Policy and the Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy: Expand domestic exploration acreage to raise indigenous production.
    8. Maritime India Vision 2030 and Sagarmala: Expand port capacity, coastal shipping and shipbuilding to strengthen India’s own maritime logistics.

    Key Facts about World Maritime Chokepoints

    1. Hormuz volume: Roughly 20 million barrels of oil a day pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
    2. Malacca volume: The Strait of Malacca carries a comparable oil volume and is the shortest route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
    3. Suez Canal: Opened in 1869 and nationalised in 1956, it links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
    4. Panama Canal: Opened in 1914, it links the Atlantic and the Pacific and is constrained by fresh water availability at Gatun Lake.
    5. Bab el Mandeb: Its name means the Gate of Tears, and it separates Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea.
    6. Turkish Straits regime: Transit is governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulates warship passage into the Black Sea.
    7. India’s maritime footprint: About 95 percent of India’s trade by volume and 70 percent by value moves by sea.
    8. Observance: World Maritime Day is observed by the International Maritime Organization in the last week of September.

    Challenges in India’s Energy Security

    1. Import dependence in crude: More than four fifths of consumption is met by imports, so any supply shock transmits straight to the fiscal position. e.g. the oil import bill crossed 130 billion dollars in a single year when Brent averaged above 100 dollars a barrel in 2022 and 2023.
    2. Concentration of gas supply: A single supplier accounts for close to half of contracted liquefied natural gas imports. e.g. the long term Qatari contracts renewed in 2024 run to 2048 and all of that volume transits Hormuz.
    3. Thin emergency stocks: Strategic reserves cover only a few days of consumption against the 90 day norm followed by International Energy Agency members. e.g. India’s reserves at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur total about 5.33 million tonnes.
    4. Payment and sanctions exposure: Sanctions on suppliers disrupt settlement channels and shipping insurance for Indian refiners. e.g. tightened sanctions on Russian crude in 2025 forced refiners to switch cargoes and payment routes at short notice.
    5. Fertiliser and petrochemical linkage: Gas priced off oil raises the urea subsidy and petrochemical feedstock costs at the same time. e.g. imported urea contracted at 390 dollars a tonne this year illustrates how a Gulf disruption reaches farm input prices.
    6. Domestic production stagnation: Crude and gas output from ageing fields has not risen with demand. e.g. Mumbai High and the Krishna Godavari basin have seen declining production profiles despite repeated bid rounds.
    7. Renewable intermittency and storage gap: Solar and wind capacity growth is not matched by storage, which keeps thermal and imported fuel in the base load. e.g. peak evening demand in northern States is still met largely by coal and imported gas.

    Way Forward

    1. Expand strategic petroleum reserves: Complete the Chandikhol and Padur phase two caverns and move coverage towards the 90 day international norm.
    2. Diversify supply and routes: Extend term contracts to non Gulf suppliers and build storage and refuelling arrangements outside the Hormuz corridor.
    3. Invest in bypass connectivity: Operationalise Chabahar, the International North South Transport Corridor and the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor so a single chokepoint does not carry all trade.
    4. Strengthen naval escort and maritime domain awareness: Sustain deployments and the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region to protect Indian flagged and Indian crewed shipping.
    5. Support seafarers and shipping insurance: Extend war risk cover arrangements and evacuation protocols for Indian crews on Gulf routes.
    6. Accelerate demand substitution: Raise ethanol blending, electric mobility and green hydrogen use to cut the volume of crude that must be imported at all.
    7. Build a price shock buffer in the Budget: Maintain an explicit fiscal cushion for the fuel and fertiliser subsidy so a chokepoint closure does not force mid year expenditure cuts.

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?

    1. Bahrain

    2. Syria

    3. Qatar

    4. Egypt

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 1 and 3

    (c) 2 and 3

    (d) 3 and 4

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    Statement-I: Sumed pipeline is a strategic route for Persian Gulf oil and natural gas shipments to Europe.
    Statement-II: Sumed pipeline connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

  • Which one of the following can one come across if one travels through the Strait of Malacca

    Which one of the following can one come across if one travels through the Strait of Malacca ?

  • Between India and East Asia, the navigation time and distance can be greatly reduced by which of the following

    Between India and East Asia, the navigation time and distance can be greatly reduced by which of the following?
    1. Deepeing the Malacca straits between Malaysia and Indonesia.
    2. Opening a new canal across the Kraisthmus between the Gulf of Siam and Andaman Sea.

  • With reference to India’s projects on connectivity, consider the following statements

    With reference to India’s projects on connectivity, consider the following statements :
    1. East-West Corridor under Golden Quadrilateral Project connects Dibrugarh and Surat.
    2. Trilateral Highway connects Moreh in Manipur and Chiang Mai in Thailand via Myanmar.
    3. Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor connects Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh with Kunming in China.
    How many of the above statements are correct?

  • India is one of the founding members of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal transportation corridor, which will connect

    India is one of the founding members of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal transportation corridor, which will connect

  • Which of the following connectivity projects is/are a part of cooperation between India and the ASEAN member countries

    Which of the following connectivity projects is/are a part of cooperation between India and the ASEAN member countries?
    1. Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project
    2. IMT Trilateral Highway
    3. Agartala-Akhaura Rail Line

  • Consider the following statements about India with river bridges connecting with neighbouring countries

    Consider the following statements about India with river bridges connecting with neighbouring countries:
    1. ‘Maitri Setu’, built over Feni river, connects Ramgarh in India with Sabroom in Bangladesh.
    2. Jhulaghat suspension bridge connects India with Myanmar.
    3. Mechi bridge and its approaches connect Panitanki Bypass in India with Kakarvitta in Nepal.

  • Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean

    Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?
    1. Bahrain
    2. Syria
    3. Qatar
    4. Egypt