Subject: Non-Constitutional/Statutory Bodies

Why in the News

The 31st meeting of the Southern Zonal Council was held at Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu on 20 August 2026, chaired by the Union Home Minister, who described South India as the biggest contributor to the country’s development. Every demand the southern States tabled at the same meeting asked that this contribution not cost them seats, funds or control over shared resources. The praise and the agenda therefore pointed in opposite directions.

What are the Zonal Councils?

1. What they are: Zonal Councils are advisory bodies that bring the States and Union Territories of a region together with the Centre to discuss matters of common interest. There are five Zonal Councils, covering the Northern, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern zones.
2. Their legal basis: They were created by Sections 15 to 22 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, so they are statutory bodies and not constitutional ones.
3. Who sits on them: The Union Home Minister is the chairman of each Zonal Council. The Chief Ministers of the member States are members, with the office of vice chairman rotating annually among them, and each State also nominates two other ministers.
4. What they can do: They discuss and make recommendations on inter State disputes, economic and social planning, border and linguistic minority issues, and matters arising from State reorganisation. Their conclusions are recommendatory and carry no binding force.

What did the Union Home Minister set out as the South’s contribution?

1. The three pillars named: The development journey of South India was attributed to three pillars, namely a high literacy rate, trained manpower, and technical expertise in the utilisation of deep seas.
2. The sectors credited: The region was said to have contributed across literature, research and development, space, information technology, artificial intelligence, industrial development and agriculture, with the automobile, pharmaceutical and infrastructure sectors also named.
3. The instruction drawn from it: The rest of the country was asked to learn from South India on innovation and revenue generation.
4. The timeframe set: The Independence Day message that what has not been achieved in the last seven decades must be accomplished in the next five to seven years was underlined, with every State asked to contribute.
5. Water framed as the region’s constraint: Water was described as the soul of the region across four areas, namely agriculture, industry, healthy citizens and the environment.
6. The proposal on rivers: Linking major rivers from the Brahmaputra to the Kaveri and the Godavari was put forward as a way to ensure the country faces no water shortage for the next 100 years.
7. The nutrition point: Malnutrition and stunted growth were described as snowballing into a national problem, with the fight against malnutrition credited to Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh before it was accepted across India.

What did each southern State place before the Council?

1. Kerala: The State sought State specific premiums for the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana in place of a uniform national premium, eligibility aligned with the National Food Security Act, 2013 database, and a revised central share reflecting actual expenditure incurred on centrally sponsored families. It also sought a more equitable and flexible funding approach for centrally sponsored schemes and asked that auctioning of mineral blocks along the Kerala coast be put on hold.
2. Kerala on Mullaperiyar: The State reaffirmed its willingness to supply water to Tamil Nadu from a new dam it has proposed at Mullaperiyar in Idukki district in place of the existing structure, offering to bear the construction expense while leaving construction and location to Tamil Nadu.
3. Karnataka: The State argued that success in population control must not be allowed to diminish southern political representation, urged the Centre to reconsider the recently passed Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, and pressed for fairness in funds, voice and respect.
4. Karnataka on delimitation: The State urged the Council to adopt a resolution calling on the Centre to honour the 1971 Census as the basis for delimitation.
5. Tamil Nadu: The State conveyed its concerns on delimitation and pressed that the existing freeze on the number of Lok Sabha seats should continue. It asserted its position on increasing the storage height of the Mullaperiyar Dam.
6. Tamil Nadu on the terms of the relationship: The State stated that southern States seek not preferential treatment but fair and equitable treatment that respects fiscal autonomy and rewards performance alongside equity.
7. Andhra Pradesh: The State projected that the southern economy could reach $10 trillion by 2047, sought greater cooperation among States in the region and urged the Centre to expedite resolution of bifurcation related issues.
8. Telangana: The State stated that established adjudicatory mechanisms on Krishna waters must be respected and reiterated that it retains lower riparian rights over surplus waters. It stated that it sought no special privilege but only its fair entitlement through the legal mechanisms already established.
9. Telangana on the method: The State stated that cooperative federalism should provide a framework for resolving inter State issues in a fair, time bound and legally sustainable manner.
10. The demand two States made jointly: Tamil Nadu and Karnataka both urged that the existing number of Lok Sabha seats be frozen and that women’s reservation be accommodated within the current number of seats.
11. What the Council recorded as agreed: On the division of assets and liabilities between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, both States agreed to resolve the matters in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs. On pending water issues, the southern States agreed to early resolution through meetings involving the ministries concerned, the Inter-State Council and the respective States.

Why does delimitation dominate the southern agenda?

1. The freeze is the source of the current seat distribution: The number of Lok Sabha seats allotted to each State has been held at the 1971 Census population, so States that reduced fertility fastest have not lost seats for doing so.
2. The freeze has an expiry: The freeze runs until the first Census taken after 2026, after which readjustment on current population becomes constitutionally due.
3. Performance and representation move in opposite directions: States that completed the demographic transition earliest have the slowest population growth, so a population based readjustment reduces their share of the House.
4. The demand is for the freeze to be extended, not for a new formula: Tamil Nadu and Karnataka both asked that the existing number of seats continue rather than proposing an alternative allocation rule.
5. Women’s reservation raises the stakes: Accommodating the reserved seats within the current total, as both States asked, keeps the reservation from becoming a reason to expand the House on a population basis.

Why do water disputes keep returning to the Council table?

1. The rivers are inter State and the users are not: The Krishna, the Kaveri and the Godavari cross State boundaries, so every allocation decision transfers water from one electorate to another.
2. Adjudication and negotiation run in parallel: Telangana pressed that established adjudicatory mechanisms be respected on Krishna waters, which places a tribunal award and a Council discussion on the same question at the same time.
3. A structure can outlive its settlement: The Mullaperiyar dispute turns on the storage height of an ageing structure, with Kerala proposing a replacement dam and Tamil Nadu asserting a claim over storage in the existing one.
4. Ownership and operation are split: Kerala offered to bear the cost of a new dam while leaving construction and location to Tamil Nadu, which separates who pays from who controls.
5. Interlinking is offered as the way past allocation: The proposal to link the Brahmaputra to the Kaveri and the Godavari reframes a distribution dispute as a supply problem, which shifts it out of the tribunal system and into a capital project.

Can a body without binding power settle demands of this kind?

1. The Council can only recommend: Nothing decided at a Zonal Council binds the Centre or any State, so agreement at the table is a statement of intent rather than a settlement.
2. The demands are not within its gift: Delimitation is fixed by the Constitution and by Parliament, mineral taxation by a central Act, and river water allocation by tribunals under a separate statute.
3. What it did settle was procedural: The two outcomes recorded, on Andhra Pradesh and Telangana assets and on pending water issues, were agreements to hold further consultations rather than agreements on substance.
4. The forum multiplies rather than converges: Water issues were referred onward to the ministries concerned, the Inter-State Council and the States, which adds forums to a dispute rather than closing it.
5. The tension the meeting exposed: The southern States were praised for performance and simultaneously asked the Centre to ensure that performance does not reduce their seats, their scheme funding or their control over coastal minerals.

Challenges to the Zonal Council as a forum for resolving these demands

1. Meetings are irregular and agenda driven: A Council that meets once in a year or longer cannot track an issue between sittings, so items are carried forward rather than closed. Eg. The Southern Zonal Council reached only its 31st meeting in 2026, seven decades after the Councils were created in 1956.
2. Recommendations carry no enforcement: There is no mechanism to compel a member State or the Centre to act on a resolution the Council adopts. Eg. Karnataka’s request that the Council resolve to honour the 1971 Census for delimitation would bind neither Parliament nor the Centre even if adopted.
3. The Council has no dispute settlement power over water: Inter State river water disputes are reserved to tribunals by statute, so the Council can discuss but not decide them. Eg. The Krishna waters question was placed before the Council even as Telangana insisted that established adjudicatory mechanisms be respected.
4. Fiscal questions sit outside its mandate: Scheme design and the central share are decided by the Union ministries and the Finance Commission, not by a regional council. Eg. Kerala’s request for State specific Ayushman Bharat premiums has to be settled by the health ministry, not by the Council.
5. Asymmetry of the chair: The Union Home Minister chairs the Council, so the Centre presides over a forum where the principal counterparty in most disputes is the Centre itself. Eg. Karnataka used the meeting to ask the Centre to reconsider a central Act on mineral taxation.
6. Overlapping bodies dilute accountability: The Inter-State Council, the NITI Aayog Governing Council, the Goods and Services Tax Council and the Zonal Councils all handle Centre State coordination without a clear division of subjects. Eg. The pending water issues were referred simultaneously to the concerned ministries, the Inter-State Council and the States.

Conclusion

The Council closed with agreement on two procedural points, namely further consultation on the division of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana assets and further meetings on pending water issues, and the next step lies with the Ministry of Home Affairs. The substantive demands raised, on delimitation, on the freeze on Lok Sabha seats, on centrally sponsored scheme funding and on coastal mineral auctions, remain with Parliament and the Union ministries. The meeting confirmed that the southern States are asking to be held harmless for the very performance they were praised for. That question cannot be answered by a body whose conclusions are recommendatory.

What is Cooperative Federalism?

1. About: Cooperative federalism is a working arrangement in which the Union and the States act as collaborating levels of the same government rather than as rival sovereigns, coordinating through joint institutions on subjects that neither can handle alone.
2. Rationale: It exists because the Indian Constitution distributes powers between two levels while leaving many problems, such as river water, internal migration, public health and taxation of a single national market, indivisible across those levels.
3. The institutional forms it takes:
4. Constitutional coordination bodies: The Inter-State Council and the Finance Commission are created by the Constitution itself rather than by statute.
5. Statutory coordination bodies: The Zonal Councils under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 and the North Eastern Council under its own 1971 statute are created by Parliament.
6. Executive coordination bodies: The NITI Aayog Governing Council and its Regional Councils operate through executive resolution rather than statute.
7. Constitutionally mandated joint decision bodies: The Goods and Services Tax Council under Article 279A takes decisions binding in practice on both levels through a weighted vote.
8. The doctrinal companion: Competitive federalism describes States competing on outcome indicators for investment and rank, and operates alongside cooperative federalism rather than replacing it.

Key Concerns Regarding Cooperative Federalism

1. The Governor’s office as a point of friction: Reservation of Bills for the President’s consideration and indefinite withholding of assent place an appointee of the Centre inside the State legislative process.
2. Central agencies operating in State subjects: Police and public order are State List subjects, while central investigative agencies operate within States, and several States have withdrawn general consent for such operations.
3. Unilateral legislation on Concurrent List subjects: Parliament can legislate on Concurrent List entries without State agreement, and central law prevails over State law under Article 254 in the event of repugnancy.
4. Central control over the higher civil service: All India Service officers serve in the States but are governed by central cadre rules, so deputation and disciplinary control sit with the Centre.
5. Coordination bodies meet at the Centre’s discretion: The Inter-State Council and the Zonal Councils have no fixed calendar in the Constitution or the statute, so their frequency depends on the Union executive.
6. Reorganisation obligations remain open for years: Division of assets and liabilities after State bifurcation is left to be settled by consultation, which leaves successor States negotiating long after reorganisation.

Constitutional Framework Governing Centre State Coordination

1. Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distributes legislative power across the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List.
2. Article 254: Provides that central law prevails over a repugnant State law on a Concurrent List subject, subject to Presidential assent for the State law.
3. Article 262: Empowers Parliament to provide for adjudication of disputes over the waters of inter State rivers and to bar the jurisdiction of courts, including the Supreme Court, over such disputes.
4. Article 263: Empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council to inquire into and advise upon inter State disputes and to investigate and discuss subjects of common interest.
5. Article 279A: Establishes the Goods and Services Tax Council as a joint forum of the Centre and the States with a weighted voting formula.
6. Article 280: Establishes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of net tax proceeds between the Union and the States and the principles governing grants in aid.
7. Article 281 and Article 282: Require Finance Commission recommendations to be laid before Parliament, and allow the Union and the States to make grants for any public purpose, which is the constitutional basis for centrally sponsored schemes.
8. Article 81 and Article 82: Fix the composition of the Lok Sabha and require readjustment of seat allocation among States after each Census, on the terms Parliament determines.
9. Article 293: Places conditions on State borrowing where a State is indebted to the Union.
10. Article 131: Confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in disputes between the Government of India and one or more States.

Laws and Rules Governing Inter State Coordination

1. States Reorganisation Act, 1956: Reorganised the States on a linguistic basis and created the five Zonal Councils.
2. Sections 15 to 22 establish the Councils, fix their composition and define their advisory functions on inter State and Centre State matters.
3. North Eastern Council Act, 1971: Created a sixth regional council for the north eastern States, later amended in 2002 to add Sikkim and to make the Council a regional planning body.
4. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides for the constitution of a tribunal where a State complains that its interests in an inter State river are affected.
5. The 2002 amendment fixed a one year deadline for constituting a tribunal and a three year deadline for its award, with a further two year extension permitted.
6. Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014: Governs the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, including the division of assets, liabilities and institutions still under negotiation.
7. Inter-State Council Order, 1990: The Presidential order that constituted the Inter-State Council on a recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre State relations, and defined its duties.
8. It makes the Prime Minister the chairman, with the Chief Ministers of all States, the Chief Ministers of Union Territories with legislatures, administrators of other Union Territories and six Union Cabinet Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister as members.
9. A Standing Committee chaired by the Union Home Minister handles continuous consultation, and the Council Secretariat functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
10. Its recommendations are not binding on the Centre or on any State.

Challenges in Centre State Fiscal and Resource Relations

1. The divisible pool is smaller than the tax collected: Cesses and surcharges are not shared with the States, so revenue can rise without the States’ share rising with it. Eg. Kerala pressed at the Council for a revised central share reflecting actual expenditure incurred on centrally sponsored families.
2. Centrally sponsored schemes carry uniform design across unequal States: A single national parameter ignores differences in cost, disease burden and delivery capacity across States. Eg. Kerala asked for State specific premiums under the Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana in place of a uniform national premium.
3. Resource decisions on State territory are taken centrally: Auction and regulation of major minerals sit with the Centre while the resource and its social costs sit in the State. Eg. Kerala asked that auctioning of mineral blocks along its coast be put on hold, and Karnataka asked the Centre to reconsider the 2026 mineral law amendment.
4. River water adjudication is slow enough to become a political dispute: Tribunal timelines stretch across electoral cycles, so States negotiate politically while adjudication is pending. Eg. The Krishna waters allocation between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana remained live at the Council table.
5. Bifurcation settlements remain unfinished for years: Division of assets, liabilities and institutions is left to consultation without a deadline. Eg. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana agreed at this meeting to resolve asset and liability division in consultation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, twelve years after reorganisation.
6. Fiscal performance is not rewarded in the transfer formula: Devolution weights population and income distance heavily, so States with better demographic and fiscal outcomes receive a smaller share. Eg. Tamil Nadu stated at the meeting that it seeks treatment that rewards performance alongside equity.
7. Borrowing headroom is set by the Centre: State borrowing limits are fixed centrally under Article 293 and under the fiscal responsibility framework, which caps State led capital spending. Eg. Andhra Pradesh projected a $10 trillion southern economy by 2047, a target that depends on capital expenditure the States do not independently control.

Way Forward

1. Fix a statutory meeting calendar for the Councils: Require the Zonal Councils and the Inter-State Council to meet at a defined minimum frequency, with published agendas and action taken reports on earlier resolutions.
2. Create an action taken mechanism: Record each Council recommendation against a named ministry with a response deadline, so a recommendation produces a documented decision rather than a carry forward.
3. Settle the delimitation question before the freeze lapses: Resolve the basis for readjustment through a parliamentary process now, rather than allowing the constitutional deadline to force it.
4. Cap cesses and surcharges as a share of gross tax revenue: Limit the proportion of central tax revenue kept outside the divisible pool so that devolution tracks actual collections.
5. Allow State specific parameters within national schemes: Permit variation in premium, unit cost and beneficiary definition within centrally sponsored schemes where a State demonstrates a different cost structure.
6. Enforce the statutory timelines for water tribunals: Apply the one year constitution and three year award deadlines strictly, and use a single permanent tribunal with benches to prevent each dispute restarting from the beginning.
7. Close reorganisation settlements with a deadline: Fix an outer date for completing the division of assets, liabilities and institutions under reorganisation statutes, with an arbitral mechanism where consultation fails.

“[2025] With reference to India, consider the following:

I. The Inter-State Council

II. The National Security Council

III. Zonal Councils

How many of the above were established as per the provisions of the Constitution of India?

(a) Only one

(b) Only two

(c) All the three

(d) None