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Subject: Nuclear Energy Policy

  • Indigenous N-reactors top pick for companies in nuclear power expansion

    Why in the News

    The indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) is emerging as the preferred technology for new entrants into India’s civil nuclear power sector, as the tightly regulated strategic sector opens to private players. Representatives of the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), Adani Atomic Energy and Jindal Steel said at a panel discussion at the BloombergNEF Summit in New Delhi that the existing 700 megawatt electric (MWe) PHWR is the right starting point, given established design standards, a mature domestic supply chain and an existing ecosystem of vendors. The discussion followed the release of the draft rules under the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 (SHANTI Act, 2025), about a week earlier. The choice is revealing: entrants are picking the reactor with the least regulatory and supply risk rather than the one that scales fastest, and that reactor alone cannot deliver the 100 gigawatt electric target set for 2047.

    What is a Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor?

    1. Design: A pressurised heavy water reactor uses heavy water as both moderator and coolant, which lets it run on natural uranium without any enrichment step.
    2. Why it suited India: Natural uranium fuelling matched a country with limited enrichment capacity that long stood outside international fuel supply arrangements.
    3. Place in the programme: It is Stage 1 of the three stage nuclear programme designed by Homi Bhabha, producing plutonium 239 as a by product for the fast breeder stage that follows.
    4. The Indian standard unit: The 700 MWe variant is the largest indigenous design in the series.

    What is a Small Modular Reactor?

    1. Definition: A small modular reactor (SMR) is an advanced reactor of up to 300 MWe, built as factory made modules and transported to site for assembly.
    2. Use case: The smaller unit size suits captive industrial power and the replacement of retiring coal units on existing sites.

    Why are private entrants choosing the 700 MWe PHWR?

    1. Design certainty: The 700 MWe design is standard, approved, operational and already carries regulatory clearance, in the assessment of the business head of Adani Atomic Energy.
    2. Supply chain depth: The supply chain for that design in India is almost fully indigenised, at 90 per cent to 95 per cent.
    3. What the sector is short of: The two major constraints named for the sector are the availability of a robust supply chain and the lack of standardised reactor designs, and the 700 MWe unit is the one design that resolves both.
    4. A second entrant agrees: Jindal Steel plans to go with 700 MWe PHWRs in its initial phase for the same reason, moving to other technologies in later phases as clarity emerges on supply chains, regulatory approvals and standardisation.

    What capacity are the new entrants targeting?

    1. The national target: India aims to scale domestic civil nuclear capacity to 100 gigawatt electric (GWe) by 2047.
    2. Corporate targets: NTPC’s capacity target is 30 GWe, the Adani group’s is 10 GWe, and Jindal Steel’s is 18 GWe in the coming years.

    What has opened the sector to private entrants?

    1. Statutory replacement: The SHANTI Act, 2025 supersedes the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010.
    2. End of the state monopoly: It permits private and foreign firms to build, own and operate reactors, which no earlier law allowed.
    3. Regulator strengthened: It gives the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board independent statutory status for safety oversight.
    4. Liability rewritten: It removes statutory supplier liability and sets tiered damage caps, with a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission to adjudicate compensation after an incident.
    5. What the Centre keeps: Enrichment, reprocessing and uranium and thorium exploration remain with the Union government.
    6. What the draft rules cover: The rules released in August 2026 set out the framework for private participation, captive generation, licensing, safety oversight and nuclear liability.

    Why will the PHWR alone not deliver 100 GWe?

    1. The stated limit: PHWRs alone will not be sufficient to reach 100 GWe by 2047, in the assessment of the Adani Atomic Energy business head.
    2. The intended sequence: Deploy 700 MWe PHWRs in fleet mode first, follow with pressurised water reactors (PWRs), and bring in small modular reactors at a later point.
    3. Where foreign designs fit: Foreign reactor technologies and SMRs are expected to play a role only at a later stage, once the sector matures.
    4. The phasing is deliberate: Later phases are contingent on clarity around supply chains, regulatory approvals and design standardisation, not on a fixed date.

    What will decide whether imported designs work in India?

    1. Localisation is the condition: Global reactor technologies, including PWRs and SMRs, would need to maximise localisation in India to stay commercially viable.
    2. Cost sets the ceiling: Cost matters a great deal in the Indian market, and any technology has to reach a price the buyer of the electricity will commit to.
    3. The buyer decides: For a project to make commercial sense the consumer has to accept the tariff, which puts affordability ahead of technology preference in the selection.

    Challenges to India’s 100 GWe nuclear target

    1. The heavy component vendor base is shallow: Only a handful of Indian firms can forge and supply large reactor components, so a fleet order queues behind them. Eg. Larsen and Toubro and Bharat Heavy Electricals supply most large forgings and steam generators for the domestic programme. Fix. Qualify a second tier of suppliers through advance purchase commitments tied to the sanctioned fleet order book.
    2. No certified standard design outside the heavy water line: A project without a frozen design spends years in negotiation before construction. Eg. The Jaitapur project with the European Pressurised Reactor has been under negotiation since 2010 without first pour of concrete. Fix. Certify one design per technology class through the regulator before any commercial order is placed.
    3. Tariff acceptance by distribution utilities: Nuclear power has to clear the price a distribution company will sign a purchase agreement at. Eg. Around 42 gigawatts of renewable capacity currently sits without a power purchase agreement on price grounds. Fix. Create a separate payment for firm, dispatchable low carbon power so the grid pays for reliability rather than for energy alone.
    4. Insurance capacity is thin: Liability caps do not create the underwriting capacity a reactor needs. Eg. The India Nuclear Insurance Pool formed in 2015 carries a capacity of ₹1,500 crore. Fix. Expand the pool with reinsurance from global nuclear insurance pools, now that supplier liability has been removed.
    5. Licensed operator manpower: A fleet of reactors needs certified control room staff that only one training system currently produces. Eg. Operator training runs almost entirely through the Department of Atomic Energy’s own training schools. Fix. Accredit private and university training programmes against a regulator certified curriculum and examination.

    Conclusion

    Private entry into nuclear power has reached the point where entrants are naming capacity targets and choosing a reactor, and all three have chosen the indigenous 700 MWe pressurised heavy water reactor over imported designs. The regulatory framework is at the draft rules stage under the SHANTI Act, 2025, released by the Department of Atomic Energy, with comments closing on 4 September 2026. Whether the 100 GWe target is reachable turns on the technologies after the first fleet, and on whether foreign designs localise enough to reach a tariff a distribution utility will sign.

    “[2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

  • Panel to review nuclear liability caps every 5 years

    Why in the News

    Draft rules released by the Department of Atomic Energy on 14 August 2026 require an expert group to review the graded caps on nuclear operators’ civil liability once every five years. The review reaches only the operator’s cap, and leaves untouched the removal of the supplier’s statutory liability that is now the subject of a challenge in the Supreme Court.

    What is the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancing Nuclear Energy for Transitioning India (SHANTI) Act, 2025?

    1. About: The SHANTI Act, 2025 replaces both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA) in a single unified statute, and is the first comprehensive overhaul of India’s nuclear power regime since independence.
    2. What it opens: The Act allows private entities to own and operate nuclear power plants for the first time, covering construction, transport, storage, import, export and handling of nuclear material, with mandatory authorisation from the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board for every activity.
    3. What it retains for the State: The government keeps an exclusive monopoly over enrichment, isotope separation, spent fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste management, so the fuel cycle remains entirely in the public sector.
    4. What it changed on liability: The Act’s Second Schedule introduced graded liability caps based on the size of a nuclear installation, replacing the earlier flat cap of Rs 1,500 crore under the CLNDA.

    What is an operator’s right of recourse?

    1. About: A right of recourse is the operator’s ability, after paying compensation for nuclear damage, to recover that amount from another party responsible for the incident.
    2. Why it is contested: The scope of this right decides whether the financial consequence of a defective component rests with the plant operator or travels back to the equipment supplier.

    What does Rule 78 of the draft rules provide?

    1. A standing review, not an occasional one: Rule 78 requires the Central government to constitute a group of experts to review the maximum limits of the operator’s civil liability for nuclear damage once every five years.
    2. Composition of the expert group: The group draws from nuclear science and engineering, actuarial science, insurance and law, together with public-interest representatives.
    3. What it can recommend: The group may propose amendments to the Second Schedule of the Act, which is where the graded caps sit.
    4. How this differs from the earlier law: Section 6 of the now-repealed CLNDA also allowed the Centre to periodically review the operator’s liability and notify a higher amount. The draft rules add a defined time period within which that review must happen.

    What are the graded liability caps under the Second Schedule?

    1. Above 3,600 Megawatt-electric (MWe): Operators of reactors above 3,600 MWe face a maximum liability of Rs 3,000 crore. MWe measures the electrical output of a reactor as distinct from its thermal output.
    2. 1,500 MWe to 3,600 MWe: Operators in this band face a cap of Rs 1,500 crore.
    3. 750 MWe to 1,500 MWe: The cap falls to Rs 750 crore.
    4. 150 MWe to 750 MWe: The cap falls to Rs 300 crore.
    5. Up to 150 MWe and other facilities: For reactors up to 150 MWe, for fuel-cycle facilities other than spent-fuel reprocessing plants, and for the transportation of nuclear material, liability is capped at Rs 100 crore.

    How has the operator’s right of recourse against suppliers changed?

    1. The three grounds under the old law: Section 17 of the CLNDA gave the operator a right of recourse where the right was expressly provided for in a written contract, where the incident resulted from an act of the supplier or the supplier’s employee including supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services, and where the incident resulted from an act or omission of an individual done with intent to cause nuclear damage.
    2. What survives: The new law retains the contractual ground and the intentional damage ground.
    3. What has been dropped: The supplier defect ground has been omitted, and it was the provision that exposed nuclear equipment vendors to long-term and uncertain liability risk in the event of an accident.
    4. What replaces it: Operators may now seek recourse from suppliers only through what they negotiate into a contract, which moves the question from statute to bargaining power.
    5. What it unblocks: Removing the statutory supplier exposure directly addresses the objection that kept foreign vendors out of Indian projects for over a decade.

    Why is the liability framework being challenged in the Supreme Court?

    1. The grounds pleaded: A petition challenges the Act for allowing private sector and foreign companies to operate nuclear power plants in India, for capping the liability of these operators at what it calls an absurdly low level, and for exempting the supplier from any liability, in violation of the Constitution.
    2. The accountability objection: Opening the sector to private operators while capping their exposure shifts residual risk from the operator to the exchequer and ultimately to victims.
    3. The five-yearly review does not answer it: Rule 78 allows the operator’s cap to be revised upward over time. It creates no mechanism to restore a supplier’s statutory liability, which the Act has removed from the framework entirely.
    4. The competing objective: Liability certainty is the precondition foreign vendors set for entering Indian projects, so the same provision that draws the petition is the one that makes the capacity expansion arithmetic feasible.

    What challenges does India’s civil nuclear liability framework face?

    1. A cap fixed in nominal terms erodes with inflation: A rupee figure written into a Schedule loses real value between revisions, so the five-year cycle sets the pace at which protection decays. Eg. The flat cap under the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 stood unrevised from 2010 until the SHANTI Act, 2025 replaced it with graded caps.
    2. Caps far below the actual cost of a severe accident: Graded caps measured in thousands of crores do not approach the cost of a major release. Eg. Cleanup and compensation costs after the 2011 Fukushima accident in Japan ran to tens of trillions of yen, orders of magnitude above any cap in the Second Schedule.
    3. Thin domestic insurance capacity for nuclear risk: Operators must place cover for the capped amount in a market with few underwriters willing to carry nuclear exposure. Eg. The India Nuclear Insurance Pool was created in 2015 precisely because individual insurers would not write the risk alone.
    4. Contractual recourse depends on bargaining power: With the statutory supplier ground removed, a smaller operator negotiating with a global vendor has little leverage to secure recourse in the contract. Eg. Jaitapur negotiations with the French vendor stalled for years over tariff and liability terms even while the statutory provision was in force.
    5. Regulatory independence still being built out: The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board has only now received statutory authority, having previously reported to the Department of Atomic Energy it was meant to regulate. Eg. The SHANTI Act, 2025 grants the Board statutory status for the first time and places its expenditure under the Comptroller and Auditor General.
    6. Claims machinery untested at scale: A dedicated claims commission exists on paper without a demonstrated record of settling mass claims quickly. Eg. The Act establishes a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission with appeals to the Electricity Appellate Tribunal, neither of which has adjudicated a nuclear damage claim.
    7. Public acceptance and siting resistance: Liability caps read as a transfer of risk to communities near installations, which hardens local opposition to siting. Eg. Sustained local protest at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu delayed commissioning of the first units for years.

    Conclusion

    The five-yearly expert review converts a static Schedule of liability caps into a periodically revisable one, which is a real improvement on a flat figure left unrevised for fifteen years. It does not address the change that drew the litigation, since the supplier’s statutory exposure has been removed rather than capped, and no review clause can restore it. The measure currently stands at the draft rules stage, and the source states no date for the close of the comment window or for notification of the final rules, with the constitutional challenge to the Act pending before the Supreme Court.

    “[2018, GS3, 15] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

  • Can SHANTI Act override court on compensation for nuclear disasters, asks SC

    Why in the News

    A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court issued notice to the Union government and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) on whether the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 can bar constitutional courts from awarding fair compensation to victims of a nuclear accident. The Act caps operator and government liability and exempts suppliers, which sets a statutory ceiling against the constitutional power to award damages for a legal wrong. The Bench also asked whether Section 17(4), which lets the government appoint the AERB Chairperson and Members, creates a conflict of interest.

    What is the SHANTI Act, 2025?

    1. About: The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 is the statute that replaced the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 as the law governing liability for nuclear damage in India.
    2. Core function: It fixes who pays for a nuclear accident, how much they pay, and the outer financial limit of that obligation.
    3. Operator ceiling: Liability of the largest plant operator in India is capped at Rs 3,000 crore.
    4. Government residual liability: The Union government’s residual liability is capped at 300 million Special Drawing Rights, stated in the proceedings as about Rs 4,500 crore.
    5. Supplier position: Suppliers, manufacturers and similar entities are exempted from liability under the Act.
    6. Regulatory provision: Section 17(4) vests in the government the power to appoint the Chairperson and Members of the AERB.

    What are Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)?

    1. About: Special Drawing Rights are an international reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose value is set by a basket of major currencies.
    2. Use here: Nuclear liability ceilings are expressed in SDRs because international nuclear liability conventions use the unit, which keeps the ceiling insulated from movement in any single national currency.

    What is the doctrine of absolute liability?

    1. About: Absolute liability holds an enterprise carrying on a hazardous activity fully liable for harm caused by that activity, with no exceptions and no ceiling on the amount.
    2. Origin: The Supreme Court laid it down in the oleum gas leak case, M.C. Mehta v Union of India (1987), rejecting the older English rule that allowed defences such as an act of a stranger.
    3. Relevance to the case: The petitioners argue that capping the liability of a nuclear operator directly contradicts this settled principle.

    What is channelling of liability?

    1. About: Channelling means directing all legal liability for a nuclear accident to one named party, the operator, so that victims sue a single identified entity instead of tracing fault across the supply chain.
    2. The trade off: Channelling gives victims a quick and certain defendant, and it simultaneously insulates equipment suppliers from any claim for a defective part.

    Who is the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)?

    1. About: The AERB is the national regulator for radiation and nuclear safety, constituted in 1983 under the powers of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
    2. Mandate: It frames safety codes, licenses nuclear installations and enforces radiation safety across nuclear and non nuclear users of radioactive material.
    3. Structural feature: It is a body created by executive notification rather than by a standalone statute, and it reports to the Atomic Energy Commission.

    What exactly did the Supreme Court ask?

    1. The compensation question: The Bench asked whether the statutory thresholds in the SHANTI Act preclude constitutional courts from determining a fair and just compensation after a nuclear mishap.
    2. The reasoning offered: The Chief Justice of India observed that a constitutional court can always grant suitable compensation against a legal tort, and that a cap imposed by Parliament does not by itself bar the courts.
    3. The regulator question: The Bench separately asked whether the power under Section 17(4) to appoint the AERB Chairperson and Members creates a conflict of interest.
    4. Parties noticed: Notice was issued to the Union government and the AERB on both issues.
    5. The petition: The challenge is to the provisions limiting the liability of operators, suppliers and manufacturers of nuclear installations.

    Why do the petitioners say the caps are inadequate?

    1. The Chernobyl comparison: The loss from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster has been estimated at between $235 billion and $700 billion.
    2. The Fukushima comparison: Cleanup costs at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident of 2011 in Japan have been estimated at approximately $400 billion to $445 billion.
    3. The mismatch: Against these magnitudes, the Act caps the largest Indian operator’s liability at Rs 3,000 crore.
    4. The residual cap: The government’s residual liability of 300 million Special Drawing Rights was described as ensuring that victims of death, injury or property damage cannot recover even a small fraction of actual losses.
    5. The supplier exemption: Exempting suppliers from any liability is argued to encourage manufacturers and suppliers to maximise profit without bearing accident risk.

    How does a liability cap change operator behaviour?

    1. The moral hazard argument: A known ceiling converts an unlimited risk into a budgeted cost, so the incentive to spend beyond that ceiling on safety falls away.
    2. The submission made: Petitioners argued that unless the court states that the liability of operators, suppliers and the government will be judicially determined regardless of the cap, operators and suppliers will cut corners that endanger lives.
    3. The precedent invoked: Indian law has held that a person running a hazardous industry bears absolute and unlimited liability for an accident arising from it.
    4. The claimed violation: Petitioners submitted that this principle has been clearly violated by the statutory ceiling.
    5. Concentration of exposure: With suppliers exempt and the operator capped, the residual cost of a large accident falls on the exchequer and on victims.

    Why is the regulator’s independence in question?

    1. Appointment power: Section 17(4) gives the government the power to appoint the Chairperson and Members of the AERB, and the government is also the promoter of nuclear power in India.
    2. Operator and regulator overlap: The AERB itself has a role connected to nuclear plants while also playing a significant role in regulating them.
    3. International benchmark: Petitioners submitted that this arrangement violates the principle of independence of the regulatory body laid down in international conventions.
    4. Long standing criticism: The absence of a statutorily independent nuclear regulator has been flagged in India for over a decade, including by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
    5. Consequence: A regulator dependent on the promoter for appointments has weaker authority to halt or penalise a plant it supervises.

    Does a liability cap serve investment or does it shift risk to victims?

    1. The investment rationale: The court observed that the limit may exist only to make the nuclear project more attractive to foreign investors.
    2. The counter position: Petitioners argued that investment should not come at the cost of the safety of thousands of lives.
    3. The design logic of caps: Nuclear vendors demand a liability ceiling because unlimited exposure makes an insurance market for the risk impossible to build.
    4. The distributional effect: A cap does not reduce the cost of an accident, it decides who absorbs the part of the cost above the ceiling.
    5. The constitutional question this raises: The dispute is whether Parliament can, by fixing a financial ceiling, foreclose the remedy a constitutional court can grant under Article 32 or Article 226.

    What alternative did the petitioners place before the court?

    1. Solar potential: The government’s own assessment puts India’s solar power potential at 3,343 gigawatts (GW) using 6 per cent of wasteland.
    2. Scale comparison: That potential is 14 times India’s peak power demand of 256 GW.
    3. Build time: Solar capacity can be built in about three months, against the multi year construction cycle of a nuclear plant.
    4. Cost comparison: The per unit cost of solar power was stated as one fifth that of nuclear energy.
    5. Risk comparison: Solar generation carries no comparable accident hazard, so it raises no liability question at all.

    Challenges to the SHANTI Act, 2025 framework

    1. Insurance market depth: The Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool has limited capacity, so even the capped liability may not be fully insurable domestically. e.g. the pool set up in 2015 was capitalised at only about Rs 1,500 crore at inception.
    2. Supplier exemption and quality control: Removing supplier liability weakens the commercial incentive to guarantee component quality. e.g. the supplier recourse clause of the 2010 law was the reason foreign vendors stayed away from Jaitapur and Kovvada for over a decade.
    3. Claims administration capacity: A nuclear claims process needs medical registries and long term follow up that India has struggled to sustain. e.g. Bhopal gas leak claims took decades of adjudication and revision of the settlement figure.
    4. Absence of a statutory regulator: The AERB derives authority from executive notification rather than its own Act. e.g. the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, 2011 lapsed and was never re enacted.
    5. Land acquisition and local consent: New reactor sites face sustained local opposition that liability caps do not address. e.g. the protests at Kudankulam delayed commissioning of the first unit by several years.
    6. Radioactive waste management: India has no operating deep geological repository for high level waste. e.g. spent fuel from operating reactors is stored on site in pools and in away from reactor storage facilities.
    7. Private entry and accountability: Opening the sector to private operators multiplies the number of entities whose safety culture the regulator must supervise. e.g. the sector so far has been run almost entirely by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited and its joint ventures.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is whether a statutory financial ceiling can displace the constitutional power of a court to award compensation for a legal wrong. The Act does not reduce the cost of a nuclear accident, it decides who bears the part of that cost above the ceiling, and at present that is the victim and the exchequer. The measure has reached the stage of an enacted and operating law facing a constitutional challenge, having already replaced the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010. The next milestone is the response of the Union government and the AERB to the notice issued on the compensation and Section 17(4) questions.

    Nuclear Energy in India

    1. About: Nuclear energy is generated by fission of heavy nuclei such as uranium 235 and plutonium 239, releasing heat that raises steam to drive a turbine.
    2. Three stage programme: India follows a three stage programme designed by the founder of its atomic energy programme, moving from pressurised heavy water reactors, to fast breeder reactors, to thorium based reactors.
    3. Resource logic: The design exists because India has modest uranium reserves and among the world’s largest thorium reserves, concentrated in the monazite sands of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Odisha.
    4. Installed base: India operates around 24 nuclear power reactors with an installed capacity of about 8.18 GW, contributing roughly 3 per cent of total electricity generation.
    5. Stated target: The government has set a target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 as part of the energy transition plan.
    6. Institutional structure: The Department of Atomic Energy administers the sector, NPCIL builds and operates plants, and the AERB regulates safety.
    7. Global position: India is among the few countries operating a closed fuel cycle with reprocessing, and it operates outside the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty while holding a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Constitutional and Statutory Framework Governing Nuclear Liability

    1. Entry 6 of the Union List: Places atomic energy and mineral resources necessary for its production exclusively with Parliament.
    2. Article 21: Guarantees the right to life, read to include a right to compensation for violation caused by a hazardous activity.
    3. Article 32: Empowers the Supreme Court to issue writs and award compensation for violation of fundamental rights.
    4. Article 226: Gives High Courts a parallel and wider writ power, including the award of compensation in public law.
    5. Article 48A and Article 51A(g): Direct the State and citizens respectively to protect and improve the environment.
    6. Article 253: Enables Parliament to legislate to implement international conventions, the basis for aligning Indian liability law with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation.
    7. Article 246 with Entry 13 of the Union List: Covers participation in international conferences and implementation of decisions taken there.

    Laws and Rules Governing Nuclear Energy in India

    1. Atomic Energy Act, 1962: Gives the Union exclusive control over atomic minerals, production and use of atomic energy, and the licensing of nuclear installations.
    2. Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004: Set radiation dose limits and licensing conditions for radiation facilities.
    3. Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996: Govern safety in factories handling radioactive material.
    4. Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010: Created a no fault liability regime channelled to the operator, with a right of recourse against the supplier.
    5. Section 17(b): Allowed the operator recourse against a supplier for a patent or latent defect, the clause foreign vendors objected to.
    6. Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025: Replaced the 2010 Act, capped operator and government liability and exempted suppliers.
    7. Draft rules under the Act: Released by the Department of Atomic Energy for public comment, with the comment window closing on 4 September 2026.
    8. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: Provides the environmental clearance and pollution control regime applicable to nuclear installations.
    9. Disaster Management Act, 2005: Places nuclear and radiological emergencies within the national disaster response framework.
    10. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: Ratified by India in 2016, providing a tier of international funds after national compensation is exhausted.

    Back2Basics: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)

    1. Governing Act: Constituted under the powers conferred by the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
    2. Year established: 1983, by an executive order of the Government of India.
    3. Headquarters: Mumbai.
    4. Reporting line: Reports to the Atomic Energy Commission, and its Chairperson is appointed by the government.
    5. Jurisdiction: Covers nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and every industrial and medical user of radiation sources in India.
    6. Mandate: Frames safety codes and standards, grants consent at each stage from siting to decommissioning, conducts regulatory inspections and enforces compliance.
    7. Enforcement powers: Can suspend or cancel authorisation and direct shutdown of a facility that violates safety conditions.

    Government Initiatives in the Nuclear Sector

    1. Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat: Announced with an outlay of about Rs 20,000 crore for research and development of small modular reactors, targeting five indigenously designed reactors by 2033.
    2. Bharat Small Reactors: Compact reactors planned for captive use by energy intensive industry, to be set up in partnership with private players on their own land.
    3. Three Stage Nuclear Programme: The long term plan to use natural uranium, then plutonium in fast breeder reactors, and finally the domestic thorium reserve.
    4. Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam: The stage two demonstration project built by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited.
    5. Joint venture route: ASHVINI, the joint venture of NPCIL and NTPC, was created to add nuclear capacity using public sector balance sheets.
    6. Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool: Formed by general insurers with GIC Re to provide insurance cover for operator and supplier liability.
    7. Fleet mode construction: Bulk approval of ten pressurised heavy water reactors of 700 MW each to build in series and cut per unit cost.

    Key Facts about Nuclear Energy in India

    1. First reactor: Apsara, commissioned in 1956 at Trombay, was Asia’s first research reactor.
    2. First power station: The Tarapur Atomic Power Station in Maharashtra, commissioned in 1969, is India’s oldest nuclear power plant.
    3. Largest station: Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, built with Russian cooperation, is India’s largest nuclear power station by capacity.
    4. Indigenous workhorse: The 700 MW pressurised heavy water reactor, first at Kakrapar in Gujarat, is the indigenous standard design.
    5. Fuel type: Indian pressurised heavy water reactors use natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as moderator and coolant.
    6. Safeguards status: India signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2009 after the civil nuclear cooperation waiver.
    7. Sector regulator: AERB, with the Directorate of Radiation Safety in some States handling medical radiation sources.

    Challenges in India’s Nuclear Energy Sector

    1. Slow capacity addition: Nuclear capacity has grown far slower than the targets repeatedly announced. e.g. installed capacity remains near 8 GW against a 2047 target of 100 GW.
    2. Fuel supply constraint: Domestic uranium is limited and of low grade, forcing dependence on imports. e.g. India imports uranium from Kazakhstan, Russia, Canada, France and Uzbekistan under bilateral agreements.
    3. Cost and time overruns: Long gestation and heavy civil works push project costs well beyond estimates. e.g. the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam has slipped many years past its original commissioning date.
    4. Public opposition and land acquisition: Communities near proposed sites resist acquisition and fear radiation exposure. e.g. the Jaitapur project in Maharashtra has faced sustained local opposition since 2010.
    5. Waste management gap: No permanent disposal route exists for high level radioactive waste. e.g. spent fuel remains in interim storage rather than a deep geological repository.
    6. Regulatory independence: The safety regulator lacks statutory autonomy from the promoter of the sector. e.g. the Comptroller and Auditor General flagged the AERB’s dependence on the Department of Atomic Energy in a 2012 performance audit.
    7. Liability and vendor hesitation: Uncertainty over the liability regime has stalled foreign built projects. e.g. the Kovvada and Jaitapur projects agreed with United States and French vendors have not reached financial close.
    8. Human resource pipeline: Reactor operations need specialised health physicists and reactor engineers trained over years. e.g. a fleet mode expansion to 100 GW would require a multiple of the current trained workforce.

    Way Forward

    1. Enact a statutory nuclear regulator: Replace the executive constituted AERB with an authority created by its own Act, with fixed tenure and financial autonomy.
    2. Index and review the liability ceiling: Provide a statutory mechanism to revise the operator and government caps periodically, so the figures do not lose meaning with inflation.
    3. Preserve judicial remedy expressly: Clarify that the statutory ceiling governs the no fault claim route and does not oust the writ jurisdiction of constitutional courts.
    4. Deepen the insurance pool: Expand the Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool with reinsurance support so the capped liability is genuinely backed by paid capacity.
    5. Build a claims administration system: Establish standing medical registries and a claims commissioner framework in advance rather than after an accident.
    6. Commit to a waste repository programme: Begin site characterisation for a deep geological repository with a published timeline.
    7. Balance the energy mix: Pair nuclear expansion with the far faster and cheaper solar build out, treating nuclear as firm baseload rather than the primary route to the clean energy target.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

  • Why India needs more power for AI, chips and datacentres

    Why in the News

    The Department of Atomic Energy released draft rules covering private participation, captive generation, licensing, safety oversight and nuclear liability under the SHANTI Act. The rules follow a stated target of 100 GWe of nuclear capacity by 2047 against an operating base of 8.7 GWe. The tension is between opening a sector historically closed to private capital and retaining state control over fissile material, safety and liability.

    What is the SHANTI Act?

    1. About: The SHANTI Act is the legislation passed last year that opens nuclear power generation to private participation, ending the state monopoly on reactor operation.
    2. What it changes: It creates a licensing route for private operators and permits captive nuclear generation for industrial users.
    3. What it retains: Fuel cycle control, safety regulation and the liability framework stay with the state.
    4. Status: Draft rules under the Act have been released, so the operating framework is now in the consultation stage rather than in force.

    What is a Small Modular Reactor?

    1. About: A Small Modular Reactor (SMR) is a reactor of up to about 300 MWe built from factory fabricated modules rather than constructed entirely on site.
    2. Why it matters: Factory fabrication shortens construction time and lowers the upfront capital block that makes large reactors hard to finance.

    Where does India’s nuclear capacity actually stand?

    1. Operating fleet: 25 reactors in operation with a combined capacity of 8.7 GWe.
    2. Under construction: 10 reactors adding about 8 GWe.
    3. Pre project stage: 10 further reactors accounting for about 66 GWe, which is where most of the 100 GWe target sits.
    4. Commissioning plan: Five new reactors are to be commissioned this decade.
    5. Backbone technology: Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors remain the mainstay of the operating fleet.

    What is the indigenous small reactor programme?

    1. Bharat Small Modular Reactor: A 200 MWe design (BSMR-200) intended for grid and captive industrial supply.
    2. Compact variant: A 55 MWe small modular reactor for smaller loads and remote siting.
    3. High temperature design: A 5 MWt high temperature gas cooled reactor aimed at hydrogen production through a thermochemical process.
    4. Deployment target: At least five indigenous small modular reactors operational by 2033.
    5. Mission funding: The Nuclear Energy Mission carries an outlay of Rs 20,000 crore.
    6. Site reuse: Retiring thermal plant sites are being studied for repurposing, since they already carry grid connection and cooling water access.

    Why is demand growth driving the target now?

    1. Datacentre load: Artificial intelligence and datacentre expansion require firm, round the clock power that intermittent renewables cannot supply alone.
    2. Capacity addition: Operational datacentre stock stands at 1.8 GW of information technology load, with about 500 MW projected to be added in 2026.
    3. Industrial decarbonisation: Semiconductor fabrication and green hydrogen electrolysis both need continuous low carbon power.
    4. Grid character: Nuclear supplies baseload, which is the specific gap left by a renewables heavy addition profile.

    Where does foreign collaboration fit?

    1. Russia: The existing large light water reactor partnership at Kudankulam is the deepest supplier relationship.
    2. United States: Collaboration is expected to centre on small modular designs rather than large units.
    3. France: Large reactor negotiations have run for over a decade without financial closure.
    4. Design economics: Foreign collaboration is shifting toward small modular reactors because large light water reactors carry costs India has not been able to close on.

    Challenges to the 100 GWe nuclear target

    1. Liability deterrence: Supplier liability provisions have kept foreign vendors from signing commercial contracts. e.g. the Jaitapur project’s unresolved negotiation with the French supplier since 2010.
    2. Construction schedule slippage: Indian reactors have historically overrun their commissioning schedules by years. e.g. the Kudankulam units commissioned well past their original dates.
    3. Land acquisition and local resistance: Reactor siting has triggered sustained local opposition. e.g. the prolonged protests at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu.
    4. Fuel supply: Domestic uranium output is insufficient, leaving the fleet dependent on imported fuel under safeguards. e.g. supply agreements with Kazakhstan, Canada and Russia.
    5. Regulatory independence: The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is not a statutory body independent of the Department of Atomic Energy. e.g. the Comptroller and Auditor General’s 2012 audit flagging this exact conflict.
    6. Cooling water availability: Reactor cooling depends on assured water, which climate stress is making less reliable. e.g. Hungary running the Paks plant at a quarter of capacity in 2026 because Danube levels fell.

    Conclusion

    The draft rules are the point at which the SHANTI Act stops being an enabling statute and becomes an operating framework, which is what private capital has been waiting for. The 100 GWe target is arithmetically dominated by reactors still at the pre project stage, so the binding question is licensing throughput rather than intent. The next milestone is the finalisation of the draft rules and the first private licence issued under them.

    Nuclear Energy in India

    1. Three stage programme: India’s programme runs from pressurised heavy water reactors using natural uranium, to fast breeder reactors using plutonium, to thorium based reactors exploiting India’s large thorium reserves.
    2. Thorium position: India holds among the world’s largest monazite bearing thorium reserves, concentrated in the beach sands of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Odisha.
    3. Share of generation: Nuclear supplies about 3 per cent of India’s electricity generation.
    4. Institutional structure: The Department of Atomic Energy reports directly to the Prime Minister, and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited operates the commercial fleet.
    5. Safeguards status: India operates a separated civil and military nuclear programme, with civil facilities placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after the 2008 waiver.

    Laws and Rules Governing Nuclear Energy

    1. Atomic Energy Act, 1962: Vests control of atomic minerals, fissile material and reactor operation in the central government. Reserved commercial nuclear generation to public sector entities until the SHANTI Act.
    2. Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010: Channels liability to the operator and creates a right of recourse against the supplier. Section 17(b) is the specific provision that foreign suppliers have objected to.
    3. Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004: Govern radiation safety, licensing of radiation installations and occupational exposure limits.
    4. SHANTI Act: Opens generation to private participation and provides for captive nuclear generation. Draft rules covering licensing, captive generation, safety oversight and liability were released on 14 August 2026.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Nuclear Energy Mission: Carries an outlay of Rs 20,000 crore for research and deployment of small modular reactors.
    2. Bharat Small Modular Reactor programme: Develops a 200 MWe indigenous design for grid and captive industrial supply.
    3. Nuclear Power Corporation of India fleet mode procurement: Approves multiple pressurised heavy water reactors together to compress procurement and construction timelines.
    4. India based Neutrino Observatory and allied research: Supports the domestic research base underpinning the three stage programme.

    Way Forward

    1. Finalise the liability rules: Settle supplier recourse in the notified rules so vendor contracts can reach financial closure.
    2. Make the regulator statutory: Give the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board statutory independence from the Department of Atomic Energy.
    3. Standardise the small reactor design: Freeze one design for repeat build so factory fabrication delivers its cost advantage.
    4. Use retiring thermal sites: Convert closed thermal plant land, which already has grid and water access, into small reactor sites.
    5. Publish a licensing timeline: Give applicants a defined statutory clock for licence decisions, since 66 GWe of the target sits in reactors not yet approved.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

  • Draft rules under the SHANTI Act open nuclear power to captive industrial use and a composite licence

    Why in the News

    The Department of Atomic Energy released draft rules under the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act on 14 August 2026, opening nuclear power generation to private and captive users. Comments are invited until 4 September 2026.

    What is the SHANTI Act?

    • Replaces the earlier state monopoly framework with a licensing regime for non-government operators.
    • Covers private participation, captive generation, foreign reactor technology, safety and nuclear liability.
    • Provides a single composite licence for building, owning, operating and decommissioning a reactor.

    Key Provisions

    1. Captive nuclear power: Industries can generate nuclear electricity mainly for their own consumption.
    2. In-principle approval: Allows land acquisition and vendor negotiations before final licensing.
    3. Foreign technology: Imported designs must be certified by the regulator in the country of origin and already operational.
    4. Nuclear liability: Operators must maintain insurance or financial security; a Nuclear Liability Fund is proposed.
    5. Eligible users: Aluminium, cement, data centres, semiconductor fabs and Artificial Intelligence (AI) facilities.

    Key Concern

    • The country-of-origin certification may speed up safety approval but restrict technology sourcing to a few countries. Requiring continued support and retaining Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) with foreign developers could also limit technology transfer and indigenous reactor design.

    India’s Nuclear Programme

    • Stage 1: Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) using natural uranium.
    • Stage 2: Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) using plutonium.
    • Stage 3: Thorium-based reactors using Uranium-233 (U-233).
    • Target: 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047.

    Challenges

    • Supplier liability concerns
    • Limited regulatory independence
    • Land and public acceptance
    • Uranium and fuel constraints
    • Nuclear waste management
    • High project costs and long construction timelines

    Prelims Pointers

    • DAE: Department of Atomic Energy
    • AERB: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
    • NPCIL: Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited
    • BHAVINI: Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited
    • NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
    • NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group
    • India is not a signatory to NPT and received an NSG waiver in 2008.

    [2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

    [2020]  In India, why are some nuclear reactors kept under “IAEA safeguards” while others are not ?

    a) Some use uranium and others use thorium
    b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies
    c) Some are operated by foreign enterprises and others are operated by domestic enterprises
    d) Some are State-owned and others are privately-owned

  • [14th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: The Right Path for India’s Nuclear Power Development 

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2018] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy?
    Linkage: This PYQ directly tests the growth-versus-safety balance that is the article’s central tension.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The Government has opened India’s nuclear sector to public and private entrants, targeting 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047. This expansion has revived the debate on whether India should scale up using its own cost-competitive, indigenously developed reactor technology or turn to costlier foreign technology and untested small modular reactors (SMRs).

    Why did India’s nuclear programme become self-reliant instead of import-dependent?

    1. Sanctions after 1974: International sanctions followed India’s peaceful nuclear test of 1974, cutting off external technology and material supply.
    2. Partial opening in 2008: The India-United States civil nuclear deal ended restrictions on uranium and nuclear plant imports, but retained critical exceptions.
    3. Failed import route: Negotiations with major western nuclear plant suppliers were abandoned because their plants were far too expensive.
    4. AEC-industry partnership model: Every component of India’s nuclear plants was designed, developed, tested, and manufactured domestically through partnerships between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Indian firms.
    5. Capacity growth: Unit size rose from 220 MW to 500 MW, and 700 MW units are now operational; four units are under construction and ten more are being developed.
    6. Cost leadership: India’s nuclear plants now cost approximately $1,700 per kW, the cheapest in the world.

    Does India’s technological self-reliance weaken the case for importing foreign nuclear technology?

    1. Import proposals reflect a knowledge gap: Reports of plans to import nuclear power plants and technology indicate insufficient awareness of India’s own capabilities and price competitiveness.
    2. Market size does not equal optimal choice: India’s large potential nuclear market gives foreign suppliers a strong incentive to compete for a share of it, but supplier interest is not the same as national interest.
    3. Cost risk of importing: Importing technology at costs far higher than India’s domestic $1,700 per kW benchmark would erode the existing cost advantage.
    4. Technological vulnerability risk: Reliance on imported technology could create a new stream of dependence on foreign suppliers, reversing decades of self-reliance built after 1974.

    What technological path can deepen India’s self-reliance further?

    1. Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) milestone: India’s 500 MW commercial fast breeder reactor is nearing commissioning after overcoming significant technical challenges.
    2. Current mainstay technology: India presently builds Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), which use natural uranium as fuel.
    3. Global mainstream technology: Light Water Reactors (LWR) use enriched uranium and are based on uranium enrichment technology, which is more widely used internationally than the PHWR route.
    4. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver constraint: NSG waiver was the 2008 exemption permitting India nuclear trade despite being outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This waiver permanently prohibits the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology to India.
    5. Case for indigenous LWR development: India should build its own LWR capability given adequate resources and a dedicated programme, rather than depend on a technology transfer route that is permanently closed.

    What is India’s institutional plan to scale nuclear capacity to 100 GW by 2047?

    1. 2047 target: The Government has decided that India will develop 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047.
    2. Sector opened to new entrants: Both public and private sector players can now enter nuclear power generation.
    3. Enabling legislation: The Government has enacted legislation to open the sector that is described as well-crafted and investor-friendly.
    4. AEC technology-sharing for new entrants: The AEC has offered its 200 MW nuclear plant technology to new entrants.
    5. Smaller unit development: Smaller reactor unit sizes suited to emerging market needs can also be developed domestically through AEC-Indian firm partnerships.
    6. SMR market structure: Small Modular Reactors (SMRs): compact nuclear reactors, typically under 300 MW, designed for faster deployment than conventional plants. The Indian SMR market would function as a bilateral contractual matter between generator and buyer.

    Is scaling through domestic technology more feasible than importing small modular reactors?

    1. Price competitiveness achieved: Nuclear power in India is now price-competitive against thermal power.
    2. Scale economies favour domestic technology: A large domestic programme has scale effects that lower production costs further as it expands.
    3. Execution gains from new entrants: New entrants using proven domestic technology could reduce project execution costs and time.
    4. Imported technology raises costs: Bringing in foreign technology streams and equipment that produce far more expensive electricity does not merit serious consideration.
    5. SMRs remain unproven globally: Western SMR designs remain under development, with commercial deployment yet to begin, despite being proposed as a solution for the power demands of artificial intelligence data centres.
    6. Regulatory caution on foreign SMRs: A foreign-designed SMR should have operated satisfactorily for a few years elsewhere before deployment in India; there is little justification for deploying an untested SMR in India experimentally.

    What do international cost and safety examples show for India’s nuclear expansion?

    1. South Korea (cost benchmark): South Korean nuclear plants cost around $2,200 per kW, higher than India’s $1,700 per kW despite South Korea’s mature nuclear industry.
    2. France (mature-economy cost escalation): French nuclear plants cost over $5,500 per kW, reflecting higher costs even in a country with a long-established nuclear programme.
    3. United States (highest-cost comparator): US nuclear plants cost $15,000 per kW, the highest among the countries compared, underlining India’s relative cost advantage.
    4. Chernobyl, USSR (1986) (safety-incident precedent): A single nuclear accident at Chernobyl triggered strong public backlash across the West, bringing nuclear power development to a virtual standstill in many western countries for decades. This is the specific precedent cited as the safety risk India’s new entrants must guard against.

    Why must India’s nuclear expansion prioritise safety culture over speed?

    1. Exemplary record at stake: India’s record on nuclear plant safety has been exemplary till now, and this must be preserved as expansion proceeds.
    2. Industrial safety culture risk: Rapid expansion and the entry of new players is a major challenge given India’s prevailing industrial culture, where accidents at construction sites and operating industrial plants continue to occur.
    3. Backlash risk from a single mishap: A single nuclear mishap could trigger a strong public backlash similar to the post-Chernobyl reaction in the West, capable of stalling India’s nuclear programme.
    4. Recommended sequencing for new entrants: New entrants should initially develop only a few plants and establish a rigorous internal safety culture, subject to continuous external auditing, before scaling up.
    5. Gradual scaling preserves both goals: Scaling up can then take place gradually, without needlessly risking safety, while still working toward the 100 GW target by 2047.

    Conclusion

    India’s cost and technological self-reliance in nuclear power, built through decades of AEC-industry partnership after the 1974 sanctions, gives it little reason to import costlier foreign reactor technology or untested SMRs as it opens the sector to new entrants. The unresolved question is whether India’s weak general industrial safety culture can be reformed fast enough to match the pace of an expansion aiming for 100 GW by 2047; the article’s recommendation is that new entrants build a proven internal safety culture on a few plants first, scaling gradually rather than aggressively, so that self-reliance and safety are not sacrificed for speed.

  • With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.

    India has installed nuclear capacity of around 8,180 MW. With the government aiming to triple this capacity to 22,480 MW by 2031-2032, the debate centers on balancing India’s soaring base-load energy demands with the strategic, financial, and environmental complexities of nuclear expansion.

    Need to Keep Expanding the Nuclear Energy Programme

    Reliable Base-Load Power: Unlike intermittent solar and wind energy, nuclear plants operate at very high capacity factors (85-90%).

    Supports Net-Zero Goals: Nuclear energy is a low-carbon source that helps reduce dependence on coal and supports India’s 2070 Net-Zero and Glasgow Panchamrit commitments.

    Advancing the Three-Stage Programme: With the PFBR at Kalpakkam attaining criticality, India can progress toward thorium-based long-term energy security.

    Low Land Requirement: Nuclear plants generate large amounts of electricity within a compact area, unlike extensive solar parks and wind farms.

    Private Investment through the SHANTI Act: Allows regulated private and foreign participation, including up to 49% equity in civilian nuclear projects.

    Commercialization of SMRs: India aims to operationalize indigenous Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) like the Bharat SMR-200 by 2033, offering lower costs and enhanced safety.

    Ensures Grid Stability: Nuclear power provides stable base-load support essential for integrating large-scale renewable energy into the national grid.

    Enhances Strategic Autonomy: Post-2008 NSG waiver, nuclear expansion strengthens India’s geopolitical standing and civil nuclear partnerships with countries like France, Russia, and the United States.

    Employment: The sector boosts advanced manufacturing and skilled employment through firms like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited and Larsen & Toubro under the Make in India initiative.

    Fears and Challenges Associated with Nuclear Energy

    Import Dependence in Supply Chains: Despite progress in domestic manufacturing, India still relies on imports for critical high-precision nuclear components and instrumentation.

    Financial and Market Risks: High capital costs, long payback periods, tariff uncertainty, and lack of assured long-term PPAs reduce investor confidence in nuclear projects.

    Public Resistance and Safety Concerns: Projects like Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant and Jaitapur have witnessed protests over radiation fears and displacement.

    Regulatory Uncertainty for SMRs: The absence of a dedicated regulatory framework for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) creates uncertainty for new technology developers.

    Concerns over Supplier Liability: Changes under the SHANTI Act reducing supplier liability have raised concerns about weakening accountability and quality control standards.

    The “Act of God” Indemnity Gap: The SHANTI Act indemnifies operators for accidents caused by “grave natural disasters” marking a shift away from India’s traditional absolute liability principle.

    Fear of Nuclear Disasters: Incidents such as the Chernobyl disaster and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster continue to shape public anxiety regarding reactor safety.

    Radioactive Waste Disposal: Safe long-term storage of high-level radioactive waste remains technologically and politically challenging worldwide.

    Security Vulnerabilities: Nuclear facilities face risks from cyberattacks, sabotage, drone strikes, and other asymmetric security threats. Eg- Kudankulam Plant Malware attack.

    Land Acquisition: Environmental concerns, local protests, and legal disputes continue to delay projects at sites like Jaitapur and Kovvada.

    Water Use and Thermal Pollution: Reactors require large quantities of cooling water, while discharge of heated water can harm nearby aquatic ecosystems.

    Human Capital Crisis: Declining academic interest has led many institutions, including IIT, Madras and IIT Bombay, to discontinue nuclear engineering programmes.

    Supply Chain and Execution Bottlenecks: Domestic suppliers face cash-flow shortages, skilled labour gaps, and quality compliance issues, causing delays in NPCIL’s fleet-mode construction projects.

    Way Forward

    Dedicated SMR Regulatory Framework: The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board should create a specialized framework for SMRs to accelerate safe commercialization.

    Develop Innovative Financing Mechanisms: Eg- Long-term low-interest financing, green bonds, Viability Gap Funding (VGF), and specialized insurance mechanisms.

    Strengthen Domestic Supply Chains: Should expand fleet-mode procurement and support domestic industries in producing advanced nuclear components to reduce import dependence and project costs.

    Ensure Independent Nuclear Regulation: The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board must be given greater functional and financial autonomy to ensure credible safety oversight.

    Revive Nuclear Talent Pipelines: Support nuclear engineering programmes through scholarships, research grants, and assured internships to build skilled manpower.

    Expand the Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP): Strengthening INIP through General Insurance Corporation of India can provide better coverage for accident liability.

    With the SHANTI Act and the Kalpakkam breakthrough, India has gained strong momentum for nuclear expansion. Effective implementation can help build a sustainable, self-reliant, and resilient clean energy future.

  • [8th June 2026] The Hindu OpED: From borderland to India’s strategic resource frontier

    Mentor’s Comment

    India’s search for critical minerals has brought the Northeast into the national strategic spotlight. Government narratives increasingly portray states such as Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Mizoram as resource-rich frontiers capable of supporting India’s clean energy transition and industrial ambitions. This highlights a significant shift in how India views the Northeast. Traditionally it was framed through the lens of borders, security, insurgency, and connectivity.

    Why is the Northeast Emerging as India’s Strategic Resource Frontier?

    1. Critical Mineral Demand: Expanding demand for lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, and rare earth elements is reshaping global industrial and geopolitical competition.
    2. Energy Transition: Batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy technologies, and energy storage systems depend heavily on critical minerals.
    3. Technological Manufacturing: Semiconductors and advanced manufacturing require secure access to strategic minerals.
    4. Defence Applications: Defence technologies increasingly rely on mineral-intensive supply chains.
    5. Strategic Autonomy: Reduces dependence on external suppliers and strengthens supply-chain resilience.
    6. Resource Potential: Geological surveys indicate significant mineral potential across several Northeastern states.

    How Has Government Discourse on the Northeast Changed?

    1. Borderland Narrative: The Northeast was historically discussed through issues of insurgency, territorial security, border management, and connectivity.
    2. Security-Centric Approach: Infrastructure projects were often justified as instruments of strategic access and territorial integration.
    3. Resource Frontier Narrative: The region is increasingly portrayed as a source of strategic minerals critical for national development.
    4. Expanded Strategic Significance: Discussions now combine security, resource access, industrial policy, and geopolitical competitiveness.
    5. National Economic Integration: Resource development is becoming central to how the region is represented in national policymaking.

    What Is the Scale of Critical Mineral Exploration in the Northeast?

    1. Exploration Expansion: Geological Survey of India undertook 43 critical mineral exploration projects in northeastern states during the 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25 field seasons.
    2. Minerals Covered: Exploration focused on graphite, vanadium, lithium, rare earth elements, nickel and cobalt.
    3. Geographical Spread: Activities expanded across Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Assam, Nagaland and Manipur.
    4. Manipur Projects: Recent exploration initiatives involve nickel, cobalt and chromium deposits.
    5. Long-Term Potential: Geological surveys have consistently pointed toward significant mineral prospects in the region.

    Why Does the ‘Resource Frontier’ Narrative Oversimplify the Northeast’s Reality?

    1. Frontier Concept: The term suggests empty spaces waiting for discovery, development, and extraction.
    2. Historical Assumption: Frontiers are often portrayed as regions awaiting integration into the national economy.
    3. Social Reality: The Northeast already contains complex social, political, cultural, and economic systems.
    4. Existing Institutions: Local governance structures, customary institutions, and traditional land-management systems are already deeply embedded.
    5. Identity and Memory: Land carries historical, cultural, and political significance beyond its economic value.
    6. Political Meaning: Resource extraction enters territories that already possess established histories and institutions.

    Why Are Land and Ownership Questions Central to Resource Development?

    1. Customary Land Systems: Many communities maintain long-standing customary ownership arrangements.
    2. Authority Structures: Land is closely linked to local political authority and governance.
    3. Identity Linkages: Ownership often forms part of community identity and historical memory.
    4. Representation Concerns: Resource decisions raise questions regarding who participates in decision-making.
    5. Trust Deficit: Development projects are frequently assessed through local perceptions of trust and inclusion.
    6. Beyond Economics: Land debates encompass social legitimacy, rights, and political recognition.

    How Do Existing Regional Conflicts Influence Resource Politics?

    1. Manipur Experience: Years of violence and displacement have intensified debates over land and territorial arrangements.
    2. Ecological Vulnerability: Communities increasingly raise concerns regarding environmental impacts of extraction.
    3. Ownership Disputes: Resource projects often intersect with unresolved questions of land rights.
    4. Political Inclusion: Communities evaluate projects through the lens of representation and participation.
    5. Conflict Sensitivity: Resource development in fragile regions may acquire meanings beyond economic development.

    Can Resource Development Create New Governance Challenges?

    1. Institutional Capacity: Extraction may proceed faster than institutions capable of managing its consequences.
    2. Uneven Development: The Northeast has historically experienced uneven infrastructure and economic growth.
    3. Connectivity Mismatch: Infrastructure projects have sometimes emerged without corresponding economic ecosystems.
    4. Participation Deficit: Strategic priorities have often overshadowed local participation and consultation.
    5. Social Risks: Rapid extraction may reproduce tensions if benefits are unevenly distributed.
    6. Governance Imperative: Resource development requires strong institutions, transparency, and social safeguards.

    Why Is Inclusion as Important as Extraction?

    1. Benefit Sharing: Local communities seek meaningful economic participation.
    2. Employment Opportunities: Resource projects can address long-standing developmental deficits.
    3. Political Legitimacy: Inclusive governance strengthens acceptance of projects.
    4. Community Ownership: Participation improves trust and reduces conflict.
    5. Sustainable Development: Long-term success depends on balancing strategic objectives with local aspirations.

    Conclusion

    The Northeast’s emergence as a critical mineral hub presents India with a strategic opportunity to strengthen resource security, support the energy transition, and reduce external dependence. However, the region cannot be treated merely as a repository of minerals waiting for extraction. Sustainable success will depend on reconciling national developmental priorities with local aspirations, customary land rights, ecological safeguards, and participatory governance. The real challenge is not only to extract resources from the Northeast, but to ensure that its people become equal stakeholders in the region’s transformation from a borderland to a strategic resource frontier.

  • Consider the following organisations

    Consider the following organisations :
    I. Atomic Minerals Directorate for Research and Exploration
    II. Heavy Water Board
    III. Indian Rare Earths Limited
    IV. Uranium Corporation of India
    Which of these is/are under the Department of Atomic Energy ?

  • Under the administration of which- one of the following is the Department of Atomic Energy

    Under the administration of which- one of the following is the Department of Atomic Energy ?