Why in the News?
The present Prime Minister of India completed 8,931 days in elected office, surpassing the long-standing tenure of Pawan Kumar Chamling (The longest serving Chief Minister in India from the state of Sikkim). This milestone is not merely personal or political, it exposes a constitutional asymmetry: while India has developed an informal convention limiting presidential tenure, no constitutional restriction exists on the Prime Minister’s tenure. This becomes a major issue because, unlike earlier eras marked by leadership turnover, India is witnessing prolonged executive dominance under a single leader, raising concerns about institutional balance.
What does the Constitution say about the Prime Minister’s appointment, tenure, and removal?
- Appointment (Article 75): Ensures selection of Prime Minister by the President based on majority support in the Lok Sabha; establishes parliamentary legitimacy of executive authority
- Council of Ministers: Facilitates collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha; requires Prime Minister to lead a team accountable to elected representatives
- Tenure (“Pleasure of the President”): Operates in practice as continuation based on Lok Sabha majority; ensures flexibility instead of fixed tenure limits
- No Fixed Term: Enables indefinite continuation in office subject to electoral and parliamentary support; distinguishes Indian system from presidential models
- Removal Mechanism: Ensures accountability through loss of majority in Lok Sabha; operationalized via no-confidence motion or defeat in key legislative votes
- Resignation Convention: Requires Prime Minister to resign if majority is lost; maintains constitutional morality and democratic norms
- Dissolution Power (Indirect): Allows Prime Minister to advise President to dissolve Lok Sabha; facilitates fresh mandate from electorate
- Judicial Position: Establishes that courts do not interfere in political confidence of House; preserves separation of powers and parliamentary supremacy.
Why does India lack a formal term limit for the Prime Minister?
- Constitutional Design: Ensures executive continuity through parliamentary confidence rather than fixed tenure limits
- Assembly Rationale: Distinguished between “daily accountability” (via Parliament) and “periodic accountability” (via elections)
- Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s View: Rejected term limits; emphasized no-confidence motion as a corrective mechanism
- Institutional Mechanism: Allows removal of PM through legislative majority rather than time-bound exit
How has the Tenth Schedule altered executive accountability?
The 10th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, known as the Anti-Defection Law, was added by the 52nd Amendment Act of 1985 to curb political defections and ensure government stability. It outlines provisions for disqualifying members of Parliament or State Legislatures who defect to another party or disobey party whips
- Anti-Defection Law: Enforces party discipline; restricts independent voting by legislators
- Reduced Legislative Oversight: Weakens no-confidence motions as effective accountability tools
- Shift in Loyalty: Transfers allegiance from electorate to party leadership
- Outcome: Converts parliamentary system into leadership-centric structure
What does comparative global evidence suggest about term limits?
- United States: 22nd Amendment limits President to two terms
- Brazil and Colombia: Constitutional term limits for executive offices
- Scholarly Findings (Elkins, Ginsburg, Huq): Leaders often extend tenure through constitutional manipulation
- Inference: Term limits are not foolproof; require strong institutional backing
What structural factors enable prolonged executive dominance in India?
- Electoral Advantage: Incumbency benefits from visibility and resource access
- Institutional Influence: Control over regulatory bodies, Election Commission, and policy narrative
- Weak Checks: Parliament weakened by anti-defection; judiciary and media face indirect pressures
- Information Control: Ability to shape public discourse and electoral outcomes
Why is the ‘presidential irony’ significant in India?
- Constitutional Convention: Informal restriction on Presidential tenure (max two terms)
- Nature of Office: President is ceremonial; PM holds real executive power
- Irony: Greater restriction on nominal executive; none on real executive authority
- Implication: Reflects imbalance in constitutional evolution and political practice
What reforms can address the issue of executive overreach?
- Tenth Schedule Reform: Exempts no-confidence motions from disqualification provisions
- Term Limit Proposal: Introduces cap on consecutive PM or CM terms
- Return Provision: Allows re-entry after a cooling-off period
- Federal Extension: Applies similar limits at state level
- System Strengthening: Restores Parliament’s centrality in accountability
Conclusion
India’s constitutional framework relies on parliamentary accountability rather than term limits. However, structural changes have weakened this mechanism. Reforming accountability tools is essential to maintain democratic balance.
PYQ Relevance
[UPSC 2021] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?
Linkage: The PYQ highlights weakening of parliamentary accountability due to anti-defection law and executive dominance, directly linking to absence of term limits for Prime Minister. It connects to debate on concentration of executive power and effectiveness of constitutional checks in India’s parliamentary system.

