[18th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Promise of Chips: India Semiconductor Mission Phase 2  

Mentor’s Comment

The Union government has approved Phase 2 of the India Semiconductor Mission with a ₹1.27 lakh crore outlay, exceeding the first phase’s allocation. The scale-up commits India to a decades-long strategic bet in chipmaking even as returns from Phase 1 remain unproven and frontier fabrication capability stays out of reach for most advanced economies.

What changes has India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) Phase 2 introduced to the incentive structure for chipmaking?

1. Larger corpus: The outlay stands at ₹1.27 lakh crore, exceeding the first phase’s allocation by a wide margin.
2. Reduced capital subsidy share: The government’s contribution to capital subsidy is smaller than Phase 1’s 50%, shifting more upfront investment risk to private players.
3. Output-linked incentives: Manufacturing-linked incentives are disbursed at a per-unit level only once sales occur, tying public support to actual production rather than capacity creation alone.
4. Domestic-content boosters: Incremental incentive boosters are promised for products that use domestic capabilities and components, pushing backward integration into the supply chain.
5. Strategic positioning goal: The scheme aims to make India a destination for the global electronics value chain and to build domestic human capital and intellectual property in areas where a few countries currently dominate.

Why does the government consider continued public spending justified despite unproven returns and limited employment potential?

1. Long policy horizon: The government has held that the Semiconductor Mission is a decades-long project; a larger second corpus signals continuity rather than a one-time bet.
2. Limited job creation: Chipmaking is unlikely to become a mass employer, unlike labour-intensive manufacturing sectors.
3. Geopolitical justification: In a geopolitically fraught environment, spending on strategic technological capability is treated as justified even without large-scale job creation.
4. Unproven Phase 1 returns: Most facilities and projects approved in the first phase are yet to begin commercial production, so the actual returns on the initial chipmaking bet remain unknown.
5. Sequencing risk: Public money for Phase 2 is being committed before performance data from Phase 1 becomes available.

Can capital outlay alone secure India’s position in frontier chipmaking capability? 

1. Technology ceiling: Extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, needed for advanced chip fabrication, remain so complex that even the most advanced economies struggle to master them.
2. Strategic leverage: Advanced economies treat frontier chipmaking capability as a source of hard strategic leverage over rivals, not merely as an industrial output.
3. Deliberate resistance: Holding this leverage gives incumbent economies an incentive to resist India’s efforts to attract talent and build matching capability, rather than a neutral market response.
4. Resource asymmetry: Advanced economies are prepared to draw on deeper pockets to defend their position in the technology hierarchy, an asymmetry that a single corpus does not easily close.
5. AI dependency link: Artificial intelligence development itself depends on memory and processing infrastructure that India hopes to manufacture domestically, tying the semiconductor bet to a wider technology dependency.

Does India’s talent ecosystem support or undermine its chipmaking ambitions?

1. Global demand for Indian talent: Indian semiconductor engineers and designers are sought worldwide amid a looming global talent shortage, indicating a genuine human capital strength.
2. Retention risk: Without worthwhile domestic work and academic opportunities in highly technical fields, this talent risks moving abroad rather than building capacity at home.
3. Historical pattern: India has previously developed technical human capital that was absorbed by Western economies rather than retained domestically.
4. Ecosystem-building requirement: Converting available talent into retained capability requires deliberate provision of high-skill work and research opportunities within India, not funding for fabrication plants alone.

Conclusion

India Semiconductor Mission Phase 2 commits significantly larger public funds to chipmaking, but capital alone does not secure India’s place in the global value chain. Frontier technological capability is guarded by incumbent economies as strategic leverage, and these economies have both the incentive and the resources to resist India’s rise. The binding constraint is therefore not the size of the corpus but whether India retains and deploys its technical talent at home instead of repeating its past pattern of exporting human capital to the West. Whether the coming decades produce an Asian Tigers-style economic boom or a repeat of past talent drain depends on this retention question, not on outlay size alone.