Is Yashwant Varma still a judge?

Why in the News?

Parliament is set to take up, in the Monsoon Session, the report of the Judges (Inquiry) Act committee that investigated misbehaviour charges against former judge Yashwant Varma, who resigned in April 2026 after burnt currency notes were found at his residence. Three months later, he is still listed as a sitting judge by the Allahabad High Court and the Union Department of Justice, exposing a gap between judicial independence and judicial accountability.

Why does the Constitution let judges resign without anyone’s acceptance?

1. Resign at will power: Thirteen constitutional functionaries, including Supreme Court and High Court judges, may resign merely by writing to the specified authority, with no acceptance required.
2. Contrast with legislators: Article 101(3)(b) and Article 190(3)(b) make resignation of MPs and MLAs subject to acceptance by the Speaker or Chairman, unlike judges.
3. Judicial precedent: A five judge Constitution Bench in Union of India vs Gopal Chandra Misra (1978) unanimously held that a judge’s resignation takes effect ex proprio vigore, automatically, without needing acceptance.
4. Purpose: The power shields judges from being coerced to continue in office, protecting judicial independence.
5. Track record: At least 12 High Court judges have resigned since 2017, and one Supreme Court judge, Justice Dalveer Bhandari, resigned in 2012; these resignations were reportedly handled in compliance with the law.

Is Varma still officially a judge on paper?

1. Legal status: Varma ceased to be a judge on April 9, 2026, making any later listing of him as a sitting judge incorrect.
2. Administrative lapse: The Allahabad High Court and the Department of Justice have continued to list him as a sitting judge for over three months.
3. Bar record: His status at the Bar was reportedly changed to “active” and some dues and benefits as a sitting judge have reportedly stopped, showing the system elsewhere treats him as having exited office.
4. Correction needed: It would be illegal for him to draw any salary or benefit as a sitting judge, and his name should be deleted from official lists.

Does judicial accountability survive when the judge quits before removal?

1. Statutory duty: The report concerns Varma’s conduct before resignation, so it must still be laid before both Houses and made public under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
2. Public interest: Citizens have a legitimate right to know whether the committee found proven misbehaviour against a judge of a constitutional court.
3. If exonerated: If the report finds no misbehaviour, the matter ends there.
4. If found guilty: The removal motion can no longer be moved because Varma no longer holds the office he would be removed from.
5. Procedural gap: Under Section 6, the report is to be discussed together with the removal motion; since the motion lapses, the report itself cannot be discussed by Parliament under the Act.

Can the resignation loophole be closed without amending the Constitution?

1. Nature of the gap: Judges may resign at will before Parliament even takes up the removal motion, halting the entire accountability process.
2. Preferred fix: The loophole should be closed through constitutional amendment, not executive or judicial reinterpretation.
3. Design of fix: The amendment could make a judge’s resignation subject to acceptance during the pendency of removal proceedings.
4. Who accepts: To protect judicial independence, that acceptance power should vest in the Chief Justice of India, not the President.
5. Separate remedy for debate: If Parliament wants to discuss the report despite resignation, the 1968 Act itself would need to be amended to enable this.
6. Rule of law caution: Interpreting constitutional or statutory silences to suit Parliament’s or the executive’s convenience would be against the rule of law.

Conclusion:

The resign at will power, designed to protect judicial independence, can be exploited to halt removal proceedings once they are underway, leaving accountability incomplete even when misconduct is established. Varma’s continued listing as a sitting judge is a correctable administrative error, but the deeper gap is structural: the Inquiry Committee report must still be tabled even though the removal motion has lapsed. Closing this requires a constitutional amendment vesting the CJI, not the President, with the power to accept a judge’s resignation while removal proceedings are pending