India rejects Hague court’s Indus Waters Treaty ruling, says it has no jurisdiction

Why in the News

The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague has held that the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 remains “fully in force”. The award directs India to observe its obligations under the treaty, including those on the design and operation of its hydro-electric projects on the Western Rivers. It also imposes interim measures barring India from concreting the Ratle Hydro-Electric Plant dam wall and power intake structure above certain levels until 90 days after the Neutral Expert’s final decision, expected in July 2027. The award answers India’s decision to hold the treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam terror attack, a decision the tribunal examined and found unsupported by any of the grounds advanced. The Ministry of External Affairs has rejected the award in full and described the tribunal as illegally constituted in breach of the treaty. The tension is that the award’s own expiry is keyed to the Neutral Expert, the one forum India does take part in, so two processes now govern the same dam on incompatible terms.

What did the arbitral award decide?

1. The treaty was held to remain in force: The Court of Arbitration found that the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 continues to bind both parties in full.
2. No ground for abeyance was accepted: It examined the reasons India advanced for placing the treaty in abeyance and held that none of them could justify suspension or termination.
3. The award covers status and interim relief together: It was issued as the Status of the Indus Waters Treaty and Order on Interim Measures concerning the Ratle Hydro-Electric Plant.
4. The construction limits were unanimous: The Court decided without dissent to bar concreting of the Ratle dam wall and power intake structure above specified levels.
5. The relief was granted on Pakistan’s application: The tribunal was acting on Pakistan’s plea both on the status of the treaty and on measures concerning the Ratle project.

On what grounds does India reject the tribunal?

1. The tribunal’s establishment is itself called a treaty violation: The Ministry of External Affairs holds that the very establishment of the arbitral body is a grave violation of the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
2. The World Bank is said to have acted beyond the treaty: The Ministry states that the court was constituted by the World Bank in patent breach of the terms of the treaty.
3. Non-participation has been consistent: India has never recognised this body in law. It has never appeared before the tribunal and takes no cognisance of its pronouncements.
4. Jurisdiction over a sovereign decision is denied: The Ministry holds that the court cannot pronounce on India’s sovereign decisions, and that its orders will have no effect on the projects India is undertaking.
5. The abeyance decision stands: India has reiterated that its decision to hold the treaty in abeyance remains in force.

Why does the treaty’s dispute ladder produce two forums at once?

1. The Permanent Indus Commission is the first step: The treaty requires the commissioners of both countries to take up a question before any external forum is approached.
2. A Neutral Expert settles a technical difference: Article IX sends a listed technical question to a Neutral Expert appointed by the World Bank, whose decision is final and binding on the points referred.
3. A Court of Arbitration settles a legal dispute: A matter outside the Neutral Expert’s list goes to a seven member Court of Arbitration under Annexure G, with two arbitrators named by each country and three umpires.
4. Both forums were seized of the same projects: The World Bank appointed a Neutral Expert and constituted a Court of Arbitration in 2022 over the Kishenganga and Ratle projects, on separate requests made by India and by Pakistan.
5. The award defers to the forum India accepts: The tribunal tied the expiry of its own interim measures to the Neutral Expert’s ruling, so the body India rejects has made its order run on the timetable of the process India joined.

Challenges to India’s abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty

1. The treaty text carries no exit or suspension clause: Article XII permits termination only through a ratified treaty between both governments, so abeyance is a position asserted outside the instrument rather than a right within it. Eg. The treaty survived the conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999 without either side suspending it.
   The Fix: Convert the position into a formal proposal for modification under Article XII and open the negotiation that article provides for, so the claim rests on a treaty route rather than outside one.
2. Storage capacity does not exist to give the position effect: India’s permitted storage on the Western Rivers is largely unbuilt, so withholding water is not physically available even where it is legally asserted. Eg. The Indus system carries roughly 135 million acre feet a year, and India’s live storage on the Western Rivers is a small fraction of that volume.
   The Fix: Complete the permitted storage and flushing works on the Chenab and the Jhelum first, so the legal position is matched by works that can act on it.
3. Non-appearance leaves the record to one side: A tribunal proceeding in the absence of a party decides on the evidence only the other party filed. Eg. India did participate in the Kishenganga arbitration, and the 2013 award fixed a minimum environmental flow India was able to build to.
   The Fix: Enter a limited appearance contesting jurisdiction alone, which preserves the objection and still puts India’s technical record before the tribunal.
4. India is a lower riparian on another transboundary system: A precedent for unilateral suspension by an upper riparian is one India is exposed to on the rivers that reach it from Tibet. Eg. The Brahmaputra rises in Tibet and India has no water sharing treaty with China, only memoranda on hydrological data sharing.
   The Fix: Pair the treaty position with a push for a binding flow and data guarantee on the Brahmaputra, so the standard India asserts is one it also demands.
5. The first cost of restricting flows lands inside India: Holding back water without storage backs it up in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab rather than in Pakistan. Eg. Reservoir flushing at Salal and Baglihar in May 2025 altered flows on the Chenab for a matter of days before normal releases resumed.
   The Fix: Confine any restriction to the desilting and flushing operations the treaty already permits, which recover generation capacity without creating an upstream flood risk.

Conclusion

India and the tribunal are now operating on premises that cannot both hold. One holds that the treaty binds and that the abeyance changes nothing. The other holds that the tribunal has no legal existence and that its orders change nothing. The unresolved tension is that both positions point at the same dam, and neither side controls a mechanism that can make the other’s position irrelevant.

Back2Basics: Permanent Court of Arbitration

1. Establishment: Created by the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1899, making it the oldest standing institution for international dispute settlement.
2. Seat: It is headquartered at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands.
3. What it is not: It is neither a court with sitting judges nor a United Nations body. It supplies a registry and a panel of arbitrators for tribunals the parties themselves constitute.
4. India’s link to it: India is a party to the 1899 Convention, and the institution provides registry services for tribunals formed under the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2016, GS1, 12.5 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”