Forces comb Pir Panjal to stop terrorist movement between Jammu, Kashmir

Why in the News

Security forces have adopted a sustained deployment across the Pir Panjal range, operating from Temporary Operational Bases (TOBs) instead of withdrawing after each operation. The change was visible in an operation in which a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist was killed at Ashdar Gali in the upper reaches, after a four month joint effort by the Army, its para forces, the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces. Terrorists had for four years used the high altitude transit routes through the dense forests to move between the Kashmir Valley and the Jammu region. Pressure applied on one side of the range simply moved them to the other. The tension is that a terrain which gave observation and concealment to small armed groups is now being answered by keeping troops inside it through the season, at a cost in exposure and logistics that a raid never carried.

What is a Temporary Operational Base?

1. What it is: A Temporary Operational Base is a forward position from which a joint team stays deployed in the mountains for an extended period, rather than returning to a garrison once an operation ends.
2. Duration: Deployments run from more than ten days to several months, decided by the security situation and intelligence inputs.
3. Shelter: Where a natural shelter exists, such as a Gujjar dhok, a herder’s seasonal shack, or a cave, it is used as the base. Otherwise the team operates in the dense forest without shelter.
4. Siting: The bases are scattered across the range on intelligence inputs and ground situation analysis, and the one above the Doodhpathri meadow at Ashdar Gali has been held for several months.

Why is the Pir Panjal strategically decisive?

1. What the range divides: The Pir Panjal separates the Jammu region from the Kashmir Valley.
2. Southern approaches: To its south lie the Poonch and Rajouri districts, which run up to the Line of Control (LoC).
3. The two corridors: The range connects Kashmir to Poonch and Rajouri on one side, and to the Chenab Valley districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban on the other.
4. The northern stretch: Inside Kashmir the range extends to Gulmarg and Baramulla, connecting the Valley back to the Line of Control.
5. Why that matters operationally: A single mountain system linking the infiltration frontier to both halves of the Union Territory makes the range a transit corridor rather than a destination.

How is the deployment organised across the range?

1. Three zones: The mountains are divided into the upper reaches, the middle range and the lower reaches.
2. Upper reaches: The Army’s paratroopers hold the highest ground, trained and equipped for high altitude warfare, and are stationed at mountain tops from where drones monitor large stretches of terrain.
3. Middle range: The middle range is manned either by the Rashtriya Rifles, the Army’s counter insurgency force, or by joint teams of the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces, depending on the requirement.
4. Lower reaches: The lower ranges are usually held by the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces.
5. Closing the weapons gap: Militants at height held stationary positions from which they could watch soldiers, and carried weapons such as the American M4 carbine, efficient in close combat. Special troops now carry comparable weapons and night vision devices for patrolling after dark.

What new units has the Jammu and Kashmir Police raised?

1. The trigger: The Pahalgam attack on tourists in April last year killed twenty five tourists and one local.
2. A new elite tier: The Jammu and Kashmir Police raised a new elite unit within its Special Operations Group (SOG) to strengthen operations in challenging terrain.
3. Snow Leopards: The Snow Leopards unit is trained for high altitude warfare in rough terrain during the winter.
4. Markhor: The Markhor unit is trained for gunfights in dense forest.

What does the earlier record in Poonch and Rajouri show?

1. A former hotbed: The Poonch and Rajouri axis carried a large number of militants, mostly foreigners, moving openly through the forests.
2. Operation Sarp Vinash: The Indian Army launched Operation Sarp Vinash in 2003, with the help of local residents, to flush militants out of the area.
3. The clearance held for a decade: The region was declared militant free in 2012.
4. The return: The forested mountains have become a major challenge again over the last few years, with a series of setbacks recorded in the last three.

Challenges to the Pir Panjal deployment model

1. Support networks reconstitute faster than they are mapped: Overground worker networks change composition and new hideouts appear, so intelligence on a valley goes stale between operations. Eg. Officials record newer terrorist hideouts in the same forest belts that earlier operations had cleared.
   The Fix: Tie the base siting cycle to a rolling review of the support network in each valley, rather than to the location of the last contact.
2. Winter attrition falls on the force: Holding high ground through a Himalayan winter produces cold injury and altitude illness that no contact with an adversary causes. Eg. Non battle casualties have historically exceeded combat casualties on India’s high altitude deployments.
   The Fix: Rotate upper reach detachments on a fixed acclimatisation cycle and pre position winter stores before the passes close.
3. The herding population uses the same routes: A standing armed presence in grazing areas cuts across the seasonal movement of the Gujjar and Bakarwal communities. Eg. The dhoks used as temporary bases are the herders’ own seasonal shelters.
   The Fix: Compensate the use of private dhoks and issue transit passes to registered herders, so ordinary seasonal movement is not read as suspicious.
4. Infiltration sits upstream of the model: Sustained presence inside the range does not change the supply of armed entrants crossing into it. Eg. Foreign militants moving through these forests enter from launch pads across the Line of Control.
   The Fix: Pair the deployment with counter infiltration grid upgrades on the Line of Control, so the corridor is contested at entry and not only in transit.
5. Aerial observation fails where it is most needed: Drone surveillance from mountain tops loses effect under forest canopy and in cloud, which is when movement is attempted. Eg. Dense deodar and pine cover in the Poonch forests blocks overhead observation for most of the day.
   The Fix: Combine aerial observation with ground sensors and human sources in the canopy belts, rather than relying on the aerial picture alone.

Conclusion

The range’s value to an armed group was never its height. It was the ability to leave one side the moment pressure arrived on the other, and a standing presence is what removes that option. The deployment answers movement. It does not answer entry, and the supply of armed entrants is decided at the frontier rather than in the forest. What to watch is whether the bases are held through the coming winter, since a presence that thins with the snow restores the very transit option it was raised to deny.

Back2Basics: Overground Worker (OGW)

1. What the term means: An overground worker is a person who supports an armed group without taking part in armed action.
2. What the support covers: Shelter, food, movement of weapons and money, and reconnaissance of security force movement.
3. Why the category matters: An infiltrated group cannot sustain itself between operations without a local support layer, so dismantling the network is treated as equivalent to an operational success.
4. How it is handled: Police in Jammu and Kashmir maintain lists of suspected overground workers and periodically detain and prosecute them under criminal and preventive detention law.

Matching Previous Year Question

“Winning of ‘Hearts and Minds’ in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.”