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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • On marital rape, regressive notions undermine autonomy of women

    Context

    On 11 May, two judges of the Delhi High Court handed down separate judgments in RIT Foundation v Union of India.

    Background

    • Section 375 of the IPC defines “rape” as when a man has sex with a woman without her consent.
    • Exception to Section 375 of IPC:  An exception to Section 375 provides that it is not rape for a husband to have sex with his wife, regardless of consent.

    The two judgements

    1] Violation of rights:

    • In his judgment, Justice Rajiv Shakdher concluded that the marital rape exception violated the rights to life, equality, non-discrimination, and freedom of speech and expression under the Constitution.
    • There is no reasonable basis to distinguish between married and unmarried women.
    • Marriage is a relationship of equals, and women do not forfeit their agency and sexual autonomy upon marriage.

    2] Issues with Constitutional validity of exception

    • Justice C Hari Shankar took a different view, concluding that the marital rape exception is constitutionally valid.
    • First, the judge held that it is the wrong starting point to assume that a husband who has sex with his wife without her consent “commits rape”.
    • 1] Exclusion from definition argument: The judge noted that the effect of the exception to Section 375 of the IPC is that any sex between a husband and wife, whether or not consensual, is excluded from the definition of rape.
    • That analysis does not bear scrutiny.
    • It makes little difference whether the starting point is that non-consensual sex within marriage should be characterised as rape or, for example, sexual assault.
    • The critical question is whether it is unconstitutional to exclude non-consensual sex from the definition of rape.
    • 2] Preservation of marital institution argument: The judge held that the marital rape exception was “aimed at preservation of the marital institution, on which the entire bedrock of society rests”.
    • The difficulty with that proposition is obvious — is it the policy of the law that marriage is to be preserved at all costs?
    • If so, does that withstand constitutional scrutiny?
    • 3] Impact argument: the judge rejected the challenge to the martial rape exception based on the right to equality on the spurious assumption that the impact on a woman who is raped by her husband cannot “be equated with the impact of a woman who is raped by a stranger”.
    •  No evidence is cited in support of those claims.
    • They also defy logic. Being raped by someone in whom you have reposed trust is likely to have an indelible emotional impact.
    • 4] Reluctance to file complaint: The judge concluded that, as a practical matter, a “majority of Indian women” would be reluctant to file a complaint of rape against their husbands in any event.
    • Even if that were true, it is no reason to disempower, by the operation of the law, women who do have the resolve to make a rape complaint against their husbands from doing so.
    • 5] Creation of new offence: Justice Shankar held that it is not within the court’s power to create a new offence, and striking down the marital rape exception would have that effect.
    • There is no question of creating a new offence — the court would simply be striking down an exception carved out of an existing offence.
    • The only principled basis for the judge’s objection is that it may be unfair to punish someone for rape for conduct that was excluded from the definition of rape when it was undertaken.
    • But that is not a reason to avoid striking down the marital rape exception.
    • The easy solution is for the court to declare that its judgment will apply only to conduct after the date of the judgment.

    Conclusion

    Whether the marital rape exception violates fundamental rights under the Constitution is a question that falls within the Court’s core competency. There is only one reasonable answer to that question.

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  • A war that is shrinking India’s geopolitical options

    Context

    What was initially assumed in New Delhi to be a quick confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, the war in Europe is now raging on with no end in sight, and with its long-term implications yet unknown.

    Why Ukraine war may reduce India’s options

    • For several weeks during late March and April, it seemed as though the Ukraine war presented a number of geopolitical options for New Delhi to choose from.
    • War may limit India’s options: Instead of enhancing New Delhi’s ability to make strategic choices in its broader region, the Ukraine war may actually limit the number of options available to New Delhi for at least three reasons.
    • 1]Absence of Russia for balancing purposes: Russia as a key strategic partner is no longer available to India for balancing purposes.
    • 2] Increased Chinese influence in the region:  Russia’s sudden absence from the Asian balance of power equations has further enhanced Chinese influence in the region.
    • By the time the war ends, whatever may be the shape of the global balance of power, the regional balance of power would have irretrievably shifted in Beijing’s favour.
    • 3] Indo-Pacific region moving out of focus: Given that the United States and its western partners are more interested on the Ukraine theatre today, their focus on China is already taking a hit, if not yet on the Indo-Pacific.

    India’s dilemmas in medium to long term

    1] Managing China

    • Weakened US influence in South Asia: While the Ukraine war has strengthened and revitalised the U.S.-led military and political coalition globally, it is bound to weaken the American influence in the Southern Asian region.
    • China is the biggest beneficiary of the U.S./western retrenchment from the region which gives it a free hand in it.
    • Russia not available: For New Delhi, Moscow is no longer available for its pursuit of its regional interests, and the U.S.’s ability to produce favourable geopolitical outcomes for India in the region is shrinking as well.
    • While there is little doubt that in the longer run, a war-fatigued and weakened Russia will become a junior partner to China, India today does have an opportunity to get Moscow to nudge Beijing to stop its irredentism on the LAC.
    • If the Chinese side, taking advantage of the Ukraine distraction, heats up the LAC, India would have to turn to the West and the U.S. for support (political, diplomatic, intelligence, etc.).
    • This would invariably hurt Russian interests. 
    • Russia, it is important that two of its Asian friends — China and India — do not clash at least while the war is still on.
    • While this may be a useful way to manage the Chinese aggression on the LAC in the short term, this will depend on how China views its dynamics with Russia and that of Russia with India.
    • Herein lies the challenge for India.
    • India’s engagement with Indo-Pacific region: If China were to stabilise the LAC at the nudging of Russia, it would also expect India to go slow on the Indo-Pacific, something India can ill-afford to do.
    • Inability to exploit contradictions: While, under normal circumstances, India could have utilised the many inherent contradictions between Moscow and Beijing, the Ukraine war has suspended those contradictions.

    2] How Ukraine war affected India’s north-western continental strategy

    • India’s north-western continental strategy, in particular towards Afghanistan and Central Asia, too will get complicated due to the Ukraine war.
    • For over a year now, the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan is calm and the violence in Kashmir has come down.
    • More pertinently, New Delhi’s presence from Afghanistan has entirely disappeared.
    • So, it appears that the calm in Kashmir and along the LoC is a quid pro quo for the Indian withdrawal from Afghanistan.
    • If this is a bargain New Delhi accepts, it will not only mean giving up its strategic interests in Afghanistan but also reducing its engagement in the Central Asian region as well at a time China is making feverish inroads into the region, right in the backyard of the Russian sphere of influence.
    • Had Moscow not been caught in the Ukraine war, it would have fended off Beijing’s attempts to take over its backyard (in one sense, China is doing to Russia using economic means what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been doing to Russia using military means).
    • During the December summit, India and Russia had decided on a number of initiatives focusing on Central Asia and Afghanistan.
    • They are unlikely to be revived anytime soon, ceding further ground to China and Pakistan.

    Conclusion

    The combined geopolitical impact of the ill-timed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia’s Ukraine war, and the rapid expansion of Chinese influence goes to show how New Delhi’s geopolitical choices have suddenly shrunk due to the Ukraine war.

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  • For a better South Asian neighbourhood

    Context

    Recent developments — in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Pakistan — underline the geographic imperative that binds India to its neighbours in the Subcontinent.

    Need for intensive regional cooperation for managing the new dangers

    • Working with the logic of geography has become an unavoidable necessity amidst the deepening regional and global crises accentuated by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
    • As higher oil and food prices trigger inflation and popular unrest across the region, more intensive regional cooperation is one of the tools for managing the new dangers.

    Hope for transcending internal divide between India and Sri Lanka

    • India’s relations with Sri Lanka underline the importance of continuous tending of political geography.
    • Tradition of hosting political exile: India has had a long tradition of hosting political exiles from the region.
    • Whether it was the Dalai Lama from Tibet or Prachanda from Nepal, Delhi has welcomed leaders from the neighbourhood taking shelter in India.
    • Negative consequences: There is a dangerous flip side to this positive tradition in the Subcontinent.
    • India has paid a high price for the decision in the early 1980s to train and arm Sri Lankan Tamil rebels.
    • Hope for transcending internal divide: The current crisis in Sri Lanka raised hopes for transcending the internal ethnic divide in the island nation and rebuilding political confidence between Colombo and Delhi.
    • Material and financial support to Sri Lanka: Delhi’s unstinting support — both material and financial — for Colombo during this unprecedented economic and political crisis has generated much goodwill in Sri Lanka.

    Relations with Nepal and role of cultural ties

    • Possibilities in cultural geography: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha in Nepal, highlights the immense possibilities of cultural geography in reshaping the Subcontinent’s regional relations.
    • The idea of a “Buddhist circuit” connecting the various pilgrimage sites across the India-Nepal border has been around for a long time.
    • India and Nepal have come together in developing the Buddhist circuit.
    • Religion and culture are deeply interconnected in South Asia.
    • Developing all religious pilgrimage sites across the region, and improving the transborder access to them could not only improve tourist revenues of all the South Asian nations, but could also have a calming effect on the troubled political relations
    • That China has built a new airport near Lumbini and Modi is avoiding it points to the turbulent triangular dynamic between Delhi, Kathmandu, and Beijing.
    • Revitalising the shared cultural geography inevitably involves better management of economic geography.
    • Infrastructure development on Indian side: The last few years have seen the Indian government step up on infrastructure development on the Indian side and accelerate transborder transport and energy connectivity in the eastern subcontinent.

    Recent trends in India-Pakistan relations

    • Cultural ties: Despite their frozen bilateral political relationship, Delhi and Islamabad had agreed to open the Kartarpur corridor at the end of 2019 across their militarised Punjab border.
    • There is much more to be done on reconnecting the Subcontinent’s sacred geographies — including the Ramayana trail and Sufi shrines.
    • While parts of the region are aligning their policies with the geographic imperative, Pakistan would seem to be an exception.
    • Ignoring the geographic imperative: Given the depth of its macro economic crisis and massive inflation, one might have thought Pakistan would want to expand trade ties with India in its own economic interest.
    • But Pakistan’s politics are hard-wired against the logic of geography.
    • Delhi had little reason to believe that Pakistan’s new government can alter its self-defeating policy towards India.
    • But it must continue to bet that the geographic imperative will eventually prevail over Islamabad’s policies.

    Conclusion

    Realists might want to argue that current trends in the Subcontinent point to India’s growing agency in shaping its neighbourhood and that Pakistan will not forever remain an exception. For Delhi, the policy question is whether India can do something to hasten the inevitable change in Pakistan.

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  • US to host ASEAN leaders

    US President Joe Biden will host leaders and top officials of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Washington DC.

    About ASEAN

    • ASEAN is a political and economic union of 10 member states in Southeast Asia.
    • It brings together ten Southeast Asian states – Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – into one organisation.
    • It was established on 8th August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by the founding fathers of the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines.
    • The preceding organisation was the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) comprising of Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
    • Five other nations joined the ASEAN in subsequent years making the current membership to ten countries.

    Why in news?

    (A) Political purpose

    • ASEAN’s ‘Five Point Consensus’ to end the turmoil in Myanmar has not progressed since it was released in April last year.
    • In addition to discussing Myanmar, leaders are also expected to discuss Ukraine as well as regional issues.

    (B) Economic purpose

    • It is expected to discuss his administration’s economic plan for the region — the Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) — during this week’s summit.
    • The framework will structure cooperation across several pillars from infrastructure and supply chains to taxation.

    What is Indo Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)?

    • The proposed IPEF is the Biden administration’s answer to questions about the United States’ economic commitment to the vital Indo-Pacific region.
    • IPEF will consist of four “pillars” of work:
    1. Fair and resilient trade (encompassing seven subtopics, including labor, environmental, and digital standards)
    2. Supply chain resilience
    3. Infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization
    4. Tax and anti-corruption

     

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  • Ukraine conflict won’t make the US abandon Indo-Pacific strategy

    Context

    When Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine at the end of February, it was widely asked in Delhi if the new challenges of European security would result in a dilution of the US’s strategic commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

    The Challenge of balancing China and Russia

    • There are two parts of Biden’s answer to the Europe-Asia or Russia-China question.
    • 1] Engagement with allies: When Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine at the end of February, it was widely asked in Delhi if the new challenges of European security would result in a dilution of the US’s strategic commitment to the Indo-Pacific.
    • Biden came to power with a determination to make the Indo-Pacific the highest priority of his foreign policy.
    • He is not going to abandon that objective in dealing with the unexpected crisis in Europe.
    • The assumption that China was the principal challenge and Russia was less of a threat led Biden to meet Putin in June 2021 to offer prospects for a reasonable relationship with Russia in order to devote US energies to the China question.
    • But Putin’s calculations led him towards a deeper strategic partnership with China
    • But America’s assessment of the Russian and Chinese threats has not changed since the war began in Ukraine.
    • The idea that China will gain from the Russian war in Ukraine has also proven to be false.
    • Expectations that Russia’s triumph in Ukraine will be followed by a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan have begun to dissipate.
    • Meanwhile, China is reeling under self-inflicted problems, most notably Xi Jinping’s zero Covid strategy and his crackdown on the large internet companies.
    • The costly foreign policy of China: Beijing’s prospects look a lot less rosy than before as the Chinese economy slows down and XI’s foreign policy turns out to be quite costly for China.
    • The muscular approach of China: In Asia, China’s muscular approach to disputes with its neighbours has helped strengthen the US alliances, create new forums like the AUKUS, elevate old ones like the Quad to a higher level, and consolidate the strategic conception of the Indo-Pacific.
    • 2] Coordination with allies and partners: Biden’s lemma to the theorem on a two-front strategy is a simple one — that Washington will address the simultaneous challenge in Europe and Asia not by acting alone but in coordination with allies and partners. 
    • The idea was rooted in the recognition that alliances and partnerships are America’s greatest strength and most important advantage over Russia and China.

    Engagement with Asia

    • ASEAN: This week’s summit level engagement with the ASEAN comes after sustained high-level US outreach to the region since the Biden Administration took charge.
    • In northeast Asia, the election of Yoon Suk-yeol as the president of South Korea has tilted the scales slightly towards the US in the continuing battle for influence between Beijing and Washington.
    • The US is also actively trying to reduce the differences between its two treaty allies in the region — South Korea and Japan.
    • Asia’s new coalitions are a response to Xi Jinping’s unilateralism and his quest for regional hegemony.
    • India’s enthusiasm for the Quad can be directly correlated to Xi’s military coercion on the disputed frontiers with India.

    Implications for India

    • The two parts of Biden’s answer to the Europe-Asia or Russia-China question have worked well for India.
    • Tolerance toward India-Russia engagement: For one, the US’s emphasis on the long-term challenge from China has meant that Washington is willing to tolerate India’s engagement with Russia.
    • Time for the diversification of defence ties: This gives India time to diversify its defence ties that have been heavily dependent on Russia.
    • The US emphasis on partnerships rather than unilateralism in dealing with the China challenge means India’s agency in the region can only grow.
    • The Quad allows Delhi to carve out a larger role for itself in Asia and the Indo-Pacific in collaboration with the US and its allies.

    Conclusion

    Contrary to the initial assumptions that America is on the retreat and the West is in disarray, it is Moscow and Beijing that are on the defensive as the war in Ukraine completes three months.

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  • The challenge for Middle Powers like India, France and Germany

    Context

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to European capitals should help both sides acquire a better understanding of each other’s security concerns. Whether it will fundamentally alter equations remains to be seen.

    New India-EU equation

    • As “Middle Powers”, countries like France, Germany and India should seek policy space for themselves and not be forced into taking positions by the Big Powers — the United States, China and Russia.
    • The EU is understandably concerned about Russian aggressiveness in Europe.
    •  ndia is equally concerned about Chinese aggressiveness in Asia. 
    • Even after Russia has sought to tear down the post-Cold War security structure in Europe, India has stayed the course in its equations both with Russia and the European Union.

    Division of national and group agenda and its implications for India

    • While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the context in which Modi visited Europe and the head of the European Union visited India, the fact is that the agenda at bilateral meetings with individual European countries has generally been very different from the agenda that the EU prefers to focus on.
    • While individual European nations, especially Germany and France, focus on their own strategic and business interests, including defence equipment sales, the EU retains the remit for negotiating trade and investment rules.
    • Problem for India: This division of national and group agendas has often posed a problem for India because individual countries cannot offer bilateral market access in exchange for bilateral defence deals.
    • So the French will sell Rafale jets in the name of strategic partnership but they cannot offer a trade and investment deal that Brussels will not allow Paris to strike with India.
    • While the EU and G7 may now wish to derisk, if not decouple, from aggressively rising China, how much they would be able to do in this regard and what they would be willing to do to help a slowly rising India remains to be seen.

    Way forward

    • For India’s part, it is not clear at the moment how much and what it can unilaterally offer Europe beyond the promise of standing up to China or reducing dependence on Russia.
    • Challenge for the three middle powers lies in combine their “strength and stability” to ensure “peace and tranquillity” in their respective neighbourhoods.
    • If middle powers like Brazil, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa and others can work together they may well be able to impose some discipline on the three big powers — China, Russia and the US.

    Conclusion

    At a time when big powers lurking behind in seeking to stabilise and shape the global order middle powers need to act to balance the influence exerted by the big powers.

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  • India-Germany relations

    Context

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Berlin for the sixth Indo-German Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC) is significant for its timing and substantial results.

    Strategic and economic importance of India-German ties

    • The timing of the IGC, which Germany chose not to delay, showed outreach to India and the Indo-Pacific.
    • Impact of pandemic on economy: The pandemic hit German economy and sanctions on Russia will further dent its prospects.
    • The country requires new markets for trade and investment.
    • India is an important partner in this regard due to its sustained economic growth and market size.
    • Ukraine crisis: The Ukraine crisis created an urgency to engage with India as part of Germany’s fledgling Indo-Pacific policy.

    Opportunities for India

    • As Germany does the reassessment of China’s role in world affairs it creates an opportunity for India.
    • The Bundestag will discuss the situation of Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang on May 7.
    • Any departures from China will bring business engagement to India.
    • Germany and India do not have a traditional strategic partnership.
    • It is a green partnership based on trade, investment, technology, functional collaboration, skill development, and sustainability.
    • There are several initiatives like the Indo-German energy forum, environmental forum, partnership on urban mobility, skill development and science and technology.
    • The biggest gain from the IGC has been the Joint Declaration of Intent (JDI) establishing the Green and Sustainable Development Partnership.
    • This will raise the quality and quantum of the existing partnership between the two countries.
    • Germany is reaching out with new and additional financing of €10 billion to fund green projects in India under public, private and PPP models.
    • To support this, a ministerial segment is being introduced under the IGC.
    • The IGC is the only such format that India has with any country.
    • Another significant development is the JDI on Triangular Development Cooperation for projects in third countries.
    • This will provide avenues to work together in the Indo-Pacific, Africa and beyond.
    • The Indo-German Education Partnership, which the German Bundestag passed in 2016 as a New Passage to India, has borne fruit — from about 4,000 students in 2015, there are nearly 29,000 Indian students in Germany.
    • The Indo-German Science and Technology Centre has made valuable contributions.
    • Now, under the energy partnership, the Green Hydrogen Task Force will develop a Green Hydrogen Roadmap.
    • This will attempt to take R&D to the level of commercialisation.
    • The JDI on migration and mobility is an important step taken during this IGC.

    Conclusion

    A new period is reflecting new priorities in view of crises like the pandemic, the economic downturn and now, Ukraine. The German response to India as evidenced through the IGC has been promising. Both sides may justifiably call it a defining moment in the Indo-German partnership.

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  • How a trade deal with EU could shape up?

    After signing comprehensive economic and trade agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Australia, India has stepped up efforts to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the European Union (EU).

    What is a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)?

    • A FTA is a pact between two or more nations to reduce barriers to imports and exports among them.
    • Under a free trade policy, goods and services can be bought and sold across international borders with little or no government tariffs, quotas, subsidies, or prohibitions to inhibit their exchange.
    • The concept of free trade is the opposite of trade protectionism or economic isolationism.
    • Countries often agree to FTAs if their economic structures are complementary, not competitive.

    India-EU Trade Ties

    • The EU is India’s third largest trading partner, accounting for 11.8% of India’s total trade in 2020-21, after the US (12.61%) and China (12.59%).
    • It is India’s second-largest export destination after the US.
    • India is the EU’s tenth largest trading partner, accounting for 1.8% of the EU’s total trade in goods in 2020.
    • The EU is also a major source of FDI in India. Between April 2000 and March 2021, FDI flows from the EU to India totalled $88.32 billion.

    How would the FTA help India?

    • It will help Indian exporters gain competitive advantage in the EU markets while helping domestic manufacturers get cheaper access to imports from the EU.
    • India’s major exports to the EU include mineral fuels, mechanical appliances, electrical and electronic machineries, organic chemicals, automobiles and auto components, pharmaceuticals, precious stones, and iron and steel products.
    • The untapped export potential for India in the seven major markets of the EU—Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland—is around $26.8 billion.

    Why is the FTA important for the EU?

    • After Brexit, the EU is trying to clinch trade deals to diversify supply chains and find profitable exporting destinations for European companies.
    • The EU is looking for a large market as intra-EU trade remains stagnant and trade with the UK shrinks because of new institutional trade barriers.
    • The FTA with India will also help the EU reduce trade ties with Russia.

    What are the key stumbling blocks?

    • A major point of contention has been the EU’s demand for  reduction in India’s tariff rate.
    • Earlier talks did not resolve issues involving trade in agriculture and services, digital trade, intellectual property rights, and commitments on sustainable development issues such as environmental, social, and labour rights.
    • Visa requirements and work permits for Indian workers to the EU have been a major bone of contention.
    • Restrictions on transfer of personal data from the EU to other countries is a barrier for trade in digital services.

    What is the likelihood of an agreement?

    • The two sides have set the ball rolling on the FTA.
    • The president of the European Commission recently agreed to establish a trade and technology council to deliberate on data protection regulations and strengthening digital trade between India and the EU.
    • PM Modi’s recent visit to three key EU member countries is expected to further reinvigorate the FTA talks.

    Also read

    [Burning Issue] India-EU Relations

     

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  • India-Denmark relations

    Context

    As Russia, isolated by unprecedented Western sanctions, deepens its alliance with China, Europe has begun to loom larger than ever before in India’s strategic calculus. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Berlin, Copenhagen, and Paris this week could give us a glimpse of India’s post-Russian strategic future in Europe.

    Engagement with collective Europe

    • In her visit to Delhi, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von Der Leyn, unveiled the new contours of the EU’s strategic partnership with India by launching the India-Europe Trade and Technology Council. 
    • This week, the focus is on India’s key bilateral partnerships with European majors — Germany and France — as well as a critical northern corner of Europe, the so-called Norden.
    • Having built up a significant engagement with Moscow over the decades, India and Germany are under pressure to disentangle from the Russian connection.
    • Modi and Scholz could also exchange notes on how their long-standing illusions about China came crashing down.
    • Macron’s return to power in France offers a good moment for Modi to imagine the next phase in bilateral relations.
    • For some time now it has been said that France is India’s “new Russia” — Delhi’s most important strategic partner.
    • In recent years, France has emerged as a strong defender of India’s interests in the United Nations Security Council and a regional ally in the vast Indo-Pacific theatre.
    • France has also been a major supplier of advanced arms to India.
    • But Delhi and Paris have been some distance away from demonstrating full possibilities of their defence partnership.
    • There is no doubt that Western Europe has moved from the margins to the centre of India’s foreign and security policies.
    • The crisis in Ukraine, which has shattered the regional order that emerged in 1991, intensifies the imperatives for deeper strategic cooperation between India and its European partners.

    India’s engagement with smaller European countries

    • In Copenhagen, the bilateral talks with Danish leadership are about Delhi finally finding time for the smaller European countries.
    • The Nordic summit hosted by Denmark underlines India’s discovery of the various sub-regions of Europe — from the Baltics to the Balkans and from Iberia to Mittleuropa.
    • The Nordic Five — Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden — have a population of barely 25 million but their GDP at $1.8 trillion is greater than that of Russia.
    • Two members of the Nordic five — Sweden and Finland — are now rushing to end their long-standing neutral status and join NATO.
    • The other three — Denmark, Iceland, and Norway — have been founding members of NATO, set up in 1949.
    • Listening to the Nordic leaders might help Delhi appreciate the deeply-held fears about Russia among Moscow’s smaller neighbours.
    • In Copenhagen, Modi would want to build on the unique bilateral green strategic partnership with Denmark.

    Germany and India’s engagement with Russia

    • Berlin is tied far more deeply to Russia than India.
    • Germany’s annual trade with Russia is about $60 billion while India’s is at $10 bn.
    • Germany relies heavily on Russian natural gas, while Russian arms dominate India’s weaponry.
    • Irrespective of their Russian preferences, Germany and India have no option but to live with circumstances over which they have no control.
    • Opportunity for India: Making India an attractive new destination for German capital, now under pressure to reduce its exposure to Russian and Chinese markets, should be the highest priority for PM Modi.
    • Germany is one of India’s oldest economic partners, but the full potential of the commercial relationship has never been realised.
    • If there ever was a moment to think big about the future of German trade and investment in India, it is now.

    Conclusion

    A new paradigm is beckoning India — strong commercial and security partnerships with Europe that stand on their own merit and bring the many synergies between them into active play.

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  • Making the most of the diplomatic attention

    Context

    India has witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activity during the past week with a long line of ministers, senior military officers and diplomats from a number of countries visiting Delhi and engaging with their Indian counterparts.

    Highlights of this year’s Raisina Dialogue

    • The senior-most official and inaugural speaker was Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission.
    • The European presence was prominent.
    • China and Russia were absent from among official delegates, which is a pity.
    • The European presence was prominent. China and Russia were absent from among official delegates.
    • The focus narrowed down to the Ukraine war and, more specifically, India’s posture on Russia’s increasingly brutal assault on the hapless people of Ukraine.
    • It fell to the external affairs minister to deflect the expectations of India on this score.

    What should be India’s approach toward West?

    • India will need the West more than it has in the recent past, whether in building up its deterrent capabilities or accelerating its own economic and technological transformation.
    • India’s Quad partners the US, Japan, Australia, its partners in Europe and several ASEAN countries, see India as an anchor that could help stabilise the international situation.
    • They have a stake in India emerging as an influential power and are willing to contribute to that end.
    • The temptation to indulge in criticising each other should be avoided.

    Why India should recalibrate its ties with Russia?

    • Assumptions about Russia-China ties: A key assumption in India’s Russia policy has been that as a great power, Moscow would be unlikely to accept a junior partnership with China.
    • It was also assumed that in the long run, Russian and Chinese interests would not be aligned and, therefore, India should maintain a close relationship with Moscow.
    • Even if the Ukraine war had not erupted, the February 4 Sino-Russian Joint Declaration should have led India to question the continuing validity of these assumptions.
    • There are valid legacy reasons for maintaining positive ties with Russia just as some European countries have had to do.
    • The reality is that India-Russia relations are not a continuation of the old Indo-Soviet ties.
    • That strategic partnership that helped India cope with the Cold War and the Chinese and Pakistani threats evaporated with the end of that war and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    • Moscow no longer saw Beijing as its main security challenge but for India, China became a bigger challenge.
    • Marginal economic and trade relations: India’s economic and trade relationship with Russia has become increasingly marginal.
    • Defence relationship diminishing progressively: Even the defence hardware relationship has diminished progressively as India has rightly tried to diversify its sources of supply.
    • The legacy in this respect, too, is of diminishing relevance.
    •  India may have its issues with the existing order but what is envisaged in the Joint Declaration is not the alternative which would enhance India’s interests.

    Way forward for India

    • Remain engaged with Russia and China: In a shifting geopolitical landscape, it is in India’s interest to remain engaged with Russia and China as two leading powers in the world.
    • Such engagement is important to gauge how these powers are themselves adjusting to the changing geopolitical equations across the world.
    • The US has shaken off the taint of its chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan but its domestic politics is unpredictable and this calls for caution.
    • Europe will likely emerge as a more coherent and cohesive entity, anchored in German power, and playing a role more independent of the US than hitherto.
    • Deepen partnership with Europe: All the more reason why India must deepen its all-round partnership with Europe, build a shared vision of an altered geopolitical landscape and encourage Europe to play a greater role in the Indo-Pacific.

    Conclusion

    The attention being paid to India is substantive. A rare but perishable opportunity has presented itself to significantly advance India’s long-term prospects. It must be grasped with single-minded tenacity.

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