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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • Uniting South Asian region to combat Covid

    The article analyses how South Asia is dealing with the pandemic and the need for coordinated action by the countries across the region.

    Varying response across the region

    • Governments in South Asian countries have responded in varying degrees to counter the health and economic crises.
    • India resumed its economic activities on a limited scale following a strict lockdown.
    • Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka did the same after an extended lockdown.
    • Bhutan and the Maldives have managed to largely contain community transmission and avoid prolonged lockdowns due to a higher testing rate.
    • This is consistent with the hypothesis that countries that have conducted more tests have been more successful in containing the pandemic.

    Low mortality in the region

    • Unlike other regions, South Asian countries are experiencing a lower mortality rate despite having a higher infection rate.
    • However, epidemiological studies and the World Health Organization’s reviews have been sceptical about the data reliability.

    Effectiveness of state responses

    • India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have unveiled stimulus packages.
    • The rest of the countries are yet to announce any concrete support for their low income and lower-middle income population still suffering from the economic fallout of the crisis.
    • In late March, India announced a $22.5 billion relief package to ensure food security and cash transfers to save the livelihoods of an estimated 800 million people living in poverty.
    • The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) slashed the repo and reverse repo rate to create liquidity for businesses.
    • In early April, Bangladesh announced a stimulus package worth about $8 billion in addition to an earlier $595 million incentive package for export-oriented industries.
    • Although countries like India and Bangladesh announced financial and material stimulus packages, distribution concerns remain unaddressed.

    United response by SAAR

    • The region need to look beyond narrow geopolitical rivalry and come together to work towards a well-coordinated response mechanism.
    • A SAARC COVID-19 fund was created following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call to South Asian leaders.
    • Bbut governments are yet to decide on its modus operandi.
    • The region could leverage its existing institutional framework under the umbrella of SAARC to effectively respond to the crisis.
    • For instance, SAARC Food Banks could be activated to tackle the imminent regional food crisis, and the SAARC Finance Forum can be activated to formulate a regional economic policy response.

    Conclusion

    Faced with an unprecedented crisis, this is the right time for the leaders of the region to come together and take on the challenge collectively.

  • Difficulties faced by India and Russia in following convergent policies

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-Russia relations against the background of changing global order.

    Context

    • India decided to pull out of Russia’s Kavkaz 2020 military exercises, where it was scheduled to participate alongside other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member states.

    Russia’s role in India-China dispute

    • The ongoing conflict between two prominent members, and both close partners of Russia, has given rise to concerns about its impact on India-Russia ties.
    • Moscow has been playing a quiet diplomatic role during the recent border clashes without actively taking sides.
    • Recent visits by India’s Defence Minister to Russia saw detailed discussions around furthering the India-Russia defence relationship alongside the promise to accelerate certain supplies based on New Delhi’s requirements.
    • The September visit coincided with the biannual Indo-Russian naval exercises, INDRA.

    India-Russia relations

    • India and Russia have spent the past few years strengthening their partnership, particularly since the 2018 Sochi informal summit.
    • From substantive defence engagement to regional questions in Central Asia, Afghanistan and West Asia, a conversation with Moscow remains an important element of Indian foreign policy.
    • India and Russia are pragmatic players looking at maximising their strategic manoeuvrability,
    • Both recognise the value of having a diversified portfolio of ties. .
    • India on its part has sought to include Russia in its vision of the Indo-Pacific that does not see the region as ‘a strategy or as a club of limited members’.
    • Reports indicate that a proposal for a India-Russia-Japan trilateral is being explored.

    Multilateral forums and Challenges in India-Russia relation

    • The multilateral forums are important as they foster continued India-Russia cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels.
    •  Increasingly divergent foreign policies of its members pose challenges of agenda-setting and overall scope.
    • At this moment of flux, countries such as India and Russia are keeping all their options open.
    • We live in a ‘curious world’ where one cannot view engagement with different parties as a ‘zero-sum game’.
    • Worsening India-China ties or a burgeoning China-Russia relationship does not automatically mean a breakdown of the India-Russia strategic partnership.
    •  It is the combination of a changing regional order, closer Russia-China ties and India’s alignment with the United States and other like-minded countries to manage Beijing’s rise that has the potential to create hurdles for India-Russia cooperation in the Asia.

    Consider the question “Despite difficulties in pursuing convergent policies, India-China relations retains its relevance. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Although the evolving global order makes it difficult for India and Russia to pursue fully convergent policies, it does not preclude the bilateral relationship from retaining its relevance.

  • India joins Djibouti Code of Conduct

    India has joined the Djibouti Code of Conduct/ Jeddah Amendment (DCOC/JA) as Observer, following the high-level virtual meeting.

    Try this MCQ:

    Q.The Djibouti Code of Conduct is related to:

    (a) International trade in precious stones (b) Maritime Security (c) Data sharing on Terrorism related activities (d) Data Localization

    Djibouti Code of Conduct

    • DCOC/JA is a grouping on maritime matters comprising 18 member states adjoining the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, the East coast of Africa and Island countries in the IOR.
    • The DCOC, established in January 2009, is aimed at the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean Region, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

    Provisions of the code

    • The Code provides a framework for capacity building in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean to combat the threat of piracy.
    • It is a partnership of the willing and continues to both deliver against its aims as well as attract increasing membership.
    • The Code was signed on January 29 by the representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen.
    • Since the meeting, further countries have signed bringing the total to 18 countries from the 21 eligible.

    Significance for India

    • India joins Japan, Norway, the UK and the US as Observers to the DCOC/JA.
    • As an Observer at the DCOC/JA, India looks forward to working together with DCOC/JA member states towards coordinating and contributing to enhanced maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region.
    • Delhi has been steadily increasing its strategic footprints in Western and Eastern Indian Ocean besides Eastern African coastal states.

  • India needs to change the framework of non-involvement

    Realignment of relations is taking place in the Middle East with wider implications for the future of the region. India needs to reconsider its framework based on the non-involvement.

    Recent geopolitical developments

    • India-China tensions have soared over the border issue.
    • The Afghan peace process is underway with the first direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban insurgents at Doha, in Qatar.
    • The normalisation of the relations between Israel and Arab countries began with the UAE and Bahrain normalising the relations.

    Issues with the development

    • The chances of failure in Afghanistan are real.
    • The momentum behind the normalisation of ties between Israel and the Gulf kingdoms, may not necessarily lead to broader peace in the Middle East.
    • The US initiatives in Afghanistan and Arabia are driven by President Donald Trump’s quest for diplomatic victories.

    Why it matters to India

    1) The vulnerability of the peace process

    • Because of competing interests, the peace process in Afghanistan and the Middle East remain vulnerable.
    • The unfolding dynamic will alter the geopolitical landscape in both places.
    • Whether peace breaks out in Afghanistan or not, the Taliban is here to stay.
    • As UAE and Bahrain join Egypt and Jordan in having formal relationships with Israel, the contradiction between Arabs and Israelis is no longer the dominant one in the region.

    2) India should recognise the importance of Arabia

    •  India’s strategic community tends to take too narrow a view of the Arabian salience.
    • The focus is mostly on ensuring oil supplies, promoting manpower exports, and managing the Pakistan problem.
    • We should consider that the Afghan peace talks are taking place in Qatar, a tiny Gulf Kingdom.
    • The UAE and Saudi Arabia were the only countries to recognise the Taliban government in the late 1990s.
    • This time around, they appear to have taken a backseat.
    • Delhi will need to pay more attention to the unfolding realignments between the Arabs and non-Arab states like Iran, Turkey and Israel.

    3) Paradox of American power

    • The U.S. is being seen as a declining power in the matters of the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  But the reality remains that the US is the one forcing a change in both the places.

    4) Implications of strategic vacuum created by the U.S. exit

    • As the US steps back from the region, the resulting strategic vacuum is likely to be filled by Russia and China.
    • Russia and China are quite active in both the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  China’s future role in Afghanistan, in partnership with Pakistan, could be quite significant and will be of some concern for India.
    • Regional powers have already acquired much say in the new geopolitics of the Middle East.
    • Qatar and UAE punch way above their weight, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are locked in a major contest for regional influence.

    5) Domestic politics in the country

    • Religious radicalism, sectarian and ethnic divisions, and the clamour for more representative governments are sharpening conflicts within and between countries.
    • The collapse of the oil market is undermining the region’s economic fortunes.
    • Collapsing oil market is also making it harder for political elites to address the emerging political challenges.

    Consider the question “Middle East is going through the major realignment of relations. What are its implications for India?.

    Conclusion

    As the old order begins to crumble in the greater Middle East, the question is no longer whether India should join the geopolitical jousting there; but when, how and in partnership with whom.

  • Finding alternative to non-alignment

    The article analyses role of non-alignment in India’s foreign policy and India’s struggle to find the alternative to the non-alignment.

    Background

    • Non-alignment was a policy fashioned during the Cold War, to retain the autonomy of policy between two politico-military blocs.
    • The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provided a platform for newly independent developing nations to join together to protect this autonomy.
    • NAM campaigned for de-colonisation, universal nuclear disarmament and against apartheid.
    • After the end of the Cold War, the NAM countries were able to diversify their network of relationships across the erstwhile east-west divide.

    Non-alignment and India’s foreign policy in the present context

    • For a few years now, non-alignment has not been projected by our policymakers as a tenet of India’s foreign policy.
    • India has not yet found a universally accepted alternative to the non-alignment yet.
    • “Strategic autonomy” as an alternative soon acquired a connotation similar to non-alignment, with an anti-U.S. tint.
    •  Multi-alignment has not found universal favour, since it may convey the impression of opportunism, whereas we seek strategic convergences.
    • Seeking issue-based partnerships or coalitions is a description that has not stuck.
    • “Advancing prosperity and influence” was a description External Affairs minister settled for, to describe the aspirations that our network of international partnerships seeks to further.

    Role of geography and politics

    • Two major imperatives flow from India’s geography-1) economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific space. 2) the strategic importance of the continental landmass to its north and west.
    • The Indo-Pacific has inspired the Act East policy of bilateral and multilateral engagements in Southeast Asia and East Asia and the Pacific.
    • Shared India-U.S. interests in dealing with the challenge from China in the maritime domain have been a strategic underpinning of the bilateral partnership since the early 2000s.

    Issues in India’s engagement with the U.S.

    • In the immediate-term, Indian and U.S. perspectives are less convergent in India’s continental neighbourhood.
    • Connectivity and cooperation with Afghanistan and Central Asia need engagement with Iran and Russia, as well as with the Russia-China dynamics in the region.
    • Russia extends to the Eurasian landmass bordering India’s near and extended neighbourhood.
    • A close Russia-China partnership should move India to broad-base relations with Russia.
    • A strong stake in relations with India could reinforce Russia’s reluctance to be a junior partner of China.
    • As the U.S. confronts the challenge to its dominance from China, classical balance of power considerations would dictate accommodation with Russia.
    •  U.S. should see ties with India as a joint venture not an alliance in which they could pursue shared objectives to mutual benefit and accept that differences of perspectives will have to be addressed.
    • This template could have wider applicability for bilateral relations in today’s world order, which former could be described as militarily unipolar, economically multipolar and politically confused. 
    • The U.S. could acknowledge that India’s development of trade routes through Iran which could provide it route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan and Russia, respectively.

    Consider the question “India has not been able to find an alternative to NAM which has been described as the basic tenet of India’s foreign policy. Discuss.”

    Conclusion

    India should find the alternative to the non-alignment which accommodate its interest in relations with the U.S. at the same time allow it “strategic autonomy”.

  • Chushul Valley and its Significance

    The Chushul sub-sector has come into focus in the standoff between the Indian and PLA troops.

    Tap to read more about Himalayan River System

    What is the Chushul Valley?

    • The Chushul sub-sector lies south of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh.
    • It comprises high, broken mountains and heights of Thatung, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, and Magger Hill besides passes such as Rezang La and Reqin La, the Spanggur Gap, and the Chushul valley.
    • Situated at a height of over 13,000 feet close to the LAC, the Chushul Valley has a vital airstrip that played an important role even during the 1962 War with China.

    What is its strategic importance to India?

    • Chushul is one among the five Border Personnel Meeting points between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China.
    • It enjoys tremendous strategic and tactical importance because of its location and terrain, which make it a centre for logistics deployment.
    • This sector has plains that are a couple of km wide, where mechanized forces, including tanks, can be deployed. Its airstrip and connectivity by road to Leh add to its operational advantages.
    • Indian troops have now secured the ridgeline in this sub-sector that allows them to dominate the Chushul bowl on the Indian side, and Moldo sector on the Chinese side.
    • They also have a clear sight of the almost 2-km-wide Spanggur gap, which the Chinese used in the past to launch attacks on this sector in the 1962 War.

    How is Chushul important to China?

    • Simply put, Chushul is the gateway to Leh. If China enters the Chushul, it can launch its operations for Leh.
    • After the initial attacks, including on the Galwan valley by the Chinese in October 1962, the PLA troops prepared to attack Chushul airfield and the valley to get direct access to Leh.
    • However, just before the attacks were launched, the area was reinforced by the 114 Brigade in November 1962, which also had under its command two troops of armour and some artillery.

    What are the challenges in this area?

    • An immediate challenge is of a flare-up as troops of the two countries are deployed within a distance of 800 to 1,000 metres of each other at Black Top and Reqin La.
    • Logistics also pose a major challenge. There is a need to carry water and food to the top which soldiers cannot do.
    • The harsh winter that lasts for eight months of the year poses a big challenge.
    • It is very difficult to dig in and make shelters on the ridgeline. The temperature falls to minus 30 degrees Celsius, and there are frequent snowstorms.

  • What is the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, and why is it contentious?

    After the Rajapaksas’ win in the November 2019 presidential polls and the August 2020 general election, the spotlight has fallen on two key legislations in Sri Lanka’s Constitution.

    Sri Lankan amendments in news

    • One, the 19th Amendment was passed in 2015 to curb powers of the Executive President, while strengthening Parliament and independent commissions.
    • The Rajapaksa government has already drafted and gazetted the 20th Amendment.
    • The other legislation under sharp focus is the 13th Amendment passed in 1987, which mandates a measure of power devolution to the provincial councils established to govern the island’s nine provinces.

    What is the 13th Amendment?

    • It is an outcome of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, signed by the then PM Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayawardene, in an attempt to resolve the ethnic conflict and civil war.
    • The 13th Amendment, which led to the creation of Provincial Councils, assured a power-sharing arrangement to enable all nine provinces in the country, including Sinhala majority areas, to self-govern.
    • Subjects such as education, health, agriculture, housing, land and police are devolved to the provincial administrations.
    • But because of restrictions on financial powers and overriding powers given to the President, the provincial administrations have not made much headway.
    • In particular, the provisions relating to police and land have never been implemented.

    Why is it contentious?

    • The 13th Amendment carries considerable baggage from the country’s civil war years. It was opposed vociferously by both Sinhala nationalist parties and the LTTE.
    • The opposition within Sri Lanka saw the Accord and the consequent legislation as an imprint of Indian intervention.
    • It was widely perceived as an imposition by a neighbour wielding hegemonic influence.
    • The Tamil polity, especially its dominant nationalist strain, does not find the 13th Amendment sufficient in its ambit or substance. However, some find it as an important starting point, something to build upon.

    Why is it significant?

    • Till date, the Amendment represents the only constitutional provision on the settlement of the long-pending Tamil question.
    • In addition to assuring a measure of devolution, it is considered part of the few significant gains since the 1980s, in the face of growing Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism.

    Its criticism

    • Critics argue that in a small country, the provinces could be effectively controlled by the Centre.
    • The opposition camp also includes those fundamentally opposed to sharing any political power with the Tamil minority.
    • All the same, all political camps that vehemently oppose the system have themselves contested in provincial council elections.
    • The councils have over time also helped national parties strengthen their grassroots presence and organisational structures.

  • Non-War Military Tactics used by China

    An annual report from the U.S. Department of Defense describes Chinese leaders’ use of tactics short of armed conflict to further the country’s objectives, citing border conflicts with India and Bhutan among the examples.

    Try this question:

    Q. What are Non-War Military Activities (NWMA)? Discuss how China is using NWMA as a tool for its overtly ambitious expansionist policy.

    Various non-war military tactics

    The report describes Non-War Military Activities (NWMA) as one of two kinds of military operations (the other is war) used by the PLA. NWMA can be conducted internationally or domestically and encompass activities in multiple domains.

    (1) Provoking armed conflict

    • China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • It can notably include operations in which the PLA uses coercive threats and/or violence below the level of armed conflict against states and other actors to safeguard its expansionism.
    • These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.

    (2) Neo-imperialist tools

    • China also employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests.
    • The Belt and Road Initiative is leading to a greater overseas military presence for China in the guise to protect its economic interests.

    (3) Multilateralism as a strategic messaging tool

    • The report says that China uses multilateral forums and international organisations to generate new opportunities to expand its influence, strengthen its political influence.
    • It promotes strategic messaging that portrays China as a responsible global actor, advances its development interests, and limit outside interference in and criticism of its initiatives.
    • The Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) grouping and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are among those cited as examples of this alleged phenomenon.

  • Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)

    With COVID-19 and trade tensions between China and the US threatening supply chains or actually causing bottlenecks, Japan has mooted the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) as a trilateral approach to trade, with India and Australia as the other two partners.

    Q.Discuss the efficacy of the idea of Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) initiaited by Japan.

    What is Supply Chain Resilience (SCR)?

    • In the context of international trade, SCR is an approach that helps a country to ensure that it has diversified its supply risk across a clutch of supplying nations instead of being dependent on just one or a few.
    • Unanticipated events whether natural or man-made that disrupt supplies from a particular country or even intentional halts to trade, could adversely impact economic activity in the destination country.

    What is Japan proposing?

    • The pandemic has brought into sharp focus the assembly lines which are heavily dependent on supplies from one country.
    • While Japan exported $135 billion worth of goods to China in 2019, it also imported $169 billion worth from the world’s second-largest economy, accounting for 24% of its total imports.
    • So, any halt to supplies could potentially impair economic activity in Japan.
    • In addition, the U.S.-China trade tensions have caused alarm in Japanese trade circles for a while now.
    • If the world’s two largest economies do not resolve their differences, it could threaten globalisation as a whole and have a major impact on Japan.
    • It is heavily reliant on international trade both for markets for its exports and for supplies of a range of primary goods from oil to iron ore.

    Japan eyeing India as a partner for the SCRI

    • Japan is the fourth-largest investor in India with cumulative FDIs touching $33.5 billion in the 2000-2020 periods.
    • It accounts for 7.2% of inflows in that period, according to quasi-government agency India Invest.
    • Imports from Japan into India more than doubled over 12 years to $12.8 billion in FY19. Exports from India to the world’s third-largest economy stood at $4.9 billion that year, data from the agency showed.
    • It is a clear reflection that the two countries are unlikely to allow individual cases to cloud an otherwise long-standing and deepening trade relationship.

    Where does Australia stand?

    • Australia, Japan and India are already part of another informal grouping, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, which includes the U.S.
    • Media reports indicate that China has been Australia’s largest trading partner and that it counts for 32.6% of Australia’s exports, with iron ore, coal and gas dominating the products shipped to Asia’s largest economy.
    • But relations including trade ties between the two have been deteriorating for a while now.
    • China banned beef imports from four Australian firms in May and levied import tariffs on Australian barley.

    India’s stand to gain or lose

    • Following the border tensions, partners such as Japan have sensed that India may be ready for dialogue on alternative supply chains.
    • Earlier, India would have done little to overtly antagonize China. But an internal push to suddenly cut links with China would be impractical.
    • China’s share of imports into India in 2018 stood at 14.5%. It supplies dominate segments of the Indian economy.
    • Sectors that have been impacted by supply chain issues arising out of the pandemic include pharmaceuticals, automotive parts, electronics, shipping, chemicals and textiles.
    • Over time, if India enhances self-reliance or works with exporting nations other than China, it could build resilience into the economy’s supply networks.

  • Turkey’s Maritime Disputes

    Turkish President Erdogan has asserted that his country will take whatever belongs to it in the Mediterranean, as well as Aegean and the Black Sea.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Turkey is located between

    (a) The Black Sea and Caspian Sea

    (b) The Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea

    (c) Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea

    (d) Gulf of Aqaba and the Dead Sea

    Assertion over the Mediterranean

    • Greece and Turkey have been locked in a dispute over control of eastern Mediterranean waters.
    • They are at odds over the rights to potential hydrocarbon resources, based on conflicting claims over the extent of their continental shelves.
    • The Turkish navy will hold the shooting exercises in the eastern Mediterranean off the coast of Iskenderun, northeast of Cyprus.
    • Cyprus was divided in 1974 following a Turkish invasion triggered by a Greek-inspired coup.
    • Turkey recognizes the Turkish-populated north of Cyprus as a separate state, which is not recognised by other countries.