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  • Soon, red hexagonal label to warn of high fat, sugar, salt in snacks

    Why in the News

    The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has told the Supreme Court that it proposes a red hexagonal front of pack label to warn consumers when a packaged food is high in salt, added sugar or added fat. The proposal answers the Court, which is hearing a plea by 3S and Our Health Society, a Kerala based non-profit organisation. No notification has been issued. What is contested is whether the phasing and the trigger conditions attached to the label leave most unhealthy products outside it.

    What would the proposed label carry?

    1. Shape and placement: The label is a red hexagon carried on the front of the packet, so the warning is visible before the pack is turned over.
    2. Language and size: The warning will be in English, in a font one point larger than the font used in the nutritional information table at the back of the pack.
    3. The declarations: The label will state “high fat”, “high sugar”, “high salt” or “highly sweetened beverage”, as applicable, to let consumers identify products high in the specified nutrients.
    4. The thresholds: What counts as high is set against the thresholds in the Dietary Guidelines for Indians, 2024, issued by the Indian Council of Medical Research and the National Institute of Nutrition (ICMR-NIN).

    How will the rollout be phased?

    1. The first phase: Only products high in at least two of the ingredients of concern will carry the warning label.
    2. The second phase: The warning will extend to products high in even one ingredient.
    3. The stated reason: FSSAI said the two phase plan is meant to secure consumer acceptability and to give industry adequate time for reformulation.

    Which products are exempt?

    1. Single ingredient foods: Food products with a single ingredient fall outside the labelling requirement.
    2. Foods inherently rich in the nutrients: Ghee, edible oil, salt, sugar, jaggery and honey are exempt, subject to the other requirements under the food safety and labelling regulations.

    Why do nutrition experts call the proposal ineffective?

    1. The two nutrient trigger: The Convener of Nutrition Advocacy in Public Interest (NAPi) India said many unhealthy products will not need the warning label in the first phase, since they are high in just one nutrient.
    2. No date for the second phase: FSSAI has given no timeline for the phase in which every product high in fat, sugar or salt must carry the warning.
    3. The word “added”: The warning is triggered only by added sugar or added fat, and the added quantity is difficult to estimate.
    4. Natural sugars escape the trigger: High levels of naturally occurring sugars also harm health, and the proposed trigger does not capture them.
    5. Presentation: The proposed font size is too small, and the message should also be carried in Hindi.

    Conclusion

    FSSAI has accepted warning labelling in principle, and the conditions attached to it decide how many products will actually carry a warning. The petitioner has circulated a revised draft, invited public comments on it, and will file a rejoinder once those comments are received. The next milestone is the notification itself, which will show whether the second phase carries a date.

    Back2Basics

    1. Statutory basis: FSSAI was established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
    2. Parent ministry: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    3. Mandate: It lays down science based standards for articles of food and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import.
    4. Labelling powers: Packaging and labelling requirements for packaged food, including what must be declared on the pack, are framed under regulations it issues.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] With reference to pre-packaged items in India, it is mandatory to the manufacturer to put which of the following information on the main label, as per the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011? 1. List of ingredients including additives 2. Nutrition information 3. Recommendation, if any, made by the medical profession about the possibility of any allergic reactions 4. Vegetarian/non-vegetarian Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1, 2 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 only ANSWER: (c)”

  • PM visit to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic: Why Central Asia matters for India (Explainer)

    PM visit to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic: Why Central Asia matters for India (Explainer)

    Why in the News

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting Uzbekistan from August 29 to 30 on a bilateral visit, followed by the Kyrgyz Republic for the 26th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit from August 31 to September 1. The visit continues India’s focused Central Asia engagement, which began in 2012 with the “Connect Central Asia” policy and was reinforced when Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit all five Central Asian countries in July 2015.

    What resources make Central Asia strategically valuable?

    1. Kazakhstan holds major mineral wealth: Kazakhstan has one of the world’s biggest uranium reserves along with substantial deposits of coal, lead, zinc, gold and iron ore.
    2. The Kyrgyz Republic offers gold and hydropower: The Kyrgyz Republic’s economy is built significantly around gold mining and hydropower generation potential.
    3. Turkmenistan holds vast natural gas reserves: Turkmenistan has one of the world’s largest natural gas reserves, a resource base central to regional pipeline politics.
    4. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan add hydropower, gold and uranium: Tajikistan has substantial hydropower potential, while Uzbekistan holds gold, uranium and natural gas reserves of its own.

    Why is India competing for strategic space in Central Asia?

    1. Countering China’s regional investments: China’s President Xi Jinping visited four of the five Central Asian countries in September 2022, his first overseas trip after the Covid-19 disruption, and China has made major investments in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative, which India does not want to see capture the post-Soviet space unchallenged.
    2. Security concerns following the Taliban takeover: India’s engagement is driven partly by the need for security cooperation in the wake of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, since Central Asia borders Afghanistan directly.
    3. Energy and connectivity needs: India’s interest includes Kazakhstan’s uranium reserves, Turkmenistan’s role in the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, and connectivity plans built around the International North-South Transport Corridor.
    4. A cultural outreach signal in 2022: India invited Central Asian leaders to the Republic Day celebrations in January 2022, an early diplomatic signal of the outreach it has since built on.

    What challenges constrain India’s Central Asia engagement?

    1. No overland access through Pakistan: Pakistan blocks India’s direct overland transport access to Central Asia, forcing India to route connectivity plans through the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Chabahar port in Iran instead. Eg. India’s push to integrate the Corridor with Chabahar exists specifically because the shorter, direct land route through Pakistan is closed to it. Fix. Prioritise completion of the Chabahar-linked rail and road segments of the Corridor on a fixed timeline, since it is the only viable alternative connectivity route available to India.
    2. Radicalisation risk along the Taliban-adjacent frontier: Central Asia is widely seen as the northern boundary of the Islamic world, and the Taliban’s ascent next door raises the risk of radicalism and a possible regrouping of the Islamic State within the region. Eg. Central Asian governments have flagged the security implications of Afghanistan’s instability spilling across shared borders. Fix. Expand India’s existing counter-terrorism training and intelligence-sharing arrangements with Central Asian states as a standing component of the engagement, not an occasional add-on.
    3. Russia-Ukraine spillover creating local churn: The Russia-Ukraine conflict has pushed some Russians with money and skills, but unable to move to the West, toward these Central Asian countries, which could bring inflows of talent and funds alongside social tension. Eg. Reports point to a rising Russian presence in Central Asian cities since the conflict began, altering local economic and social dynamics.

    What civilisational and trade links does India draw on?

    1. Deep historic ties with Uzbekistan: The only known Buddhist monastery in Central Asia is at Kara Tepa in Termez, Uzbekistan, an important centre during the Kushana era when Buddhist influence spread into the region, and close to 3,000 words are shared between Hindi and Uzbek.
    2. Shared cuisine as a marker of the connection: Similarities exist across Indian and Central Asian food traditions, including ghee and sariyok, samosa and samsa, naan and non, and pulao and pilaf.
    3. A meaningful trade relationship with Uzbekistan: India is among Uzbekistan’s top 10 trading partners, with bilateral trade in 2025-26 close to $1 billion.

    What is the SCO summit’s composition and agenda?

    1. A ten-member grouping with wide partner networks: The SCO comprises 10 member states, India, Belarus, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, alongside 15 Dialogue Partners including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkiye, and two Observers, Mongolia and Afghanistan.
    2. India joined the grouping in 2017: India has been a full SCO member since 2017, and this year’s summit also marks the third edition of the SCO+ format, expected to bring in additional states and bodies such as the United Nations and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

    Conclusion

    Modi’s back-to-back Uzbekistan visit and SCO summit attendance extend a Central Asia policy that dates to 2012, aimed at securing energy access, countering Chinese influence and building connectivity around Pakistan’s blockage of overland routes. The next milestone is the Bishkek summit itself, from August 31 to September 1, and whatever bilateral outcomes emerge from the Uzbekistan leg beforehand.

    Back2Basics: What is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)?

    1. A multimodal route bypassing Pakistan: The International North-South Transport Corridor is a multimodal transport link connecting India to Russia and Europe via Iran, Azerbaijan and Central Asia, designed to move goods by ship, rail and road, and it is the route India relies on to reach Central Asia given the absence of direct overland access through Pakistan.

    [2025] India is one of the founding members of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal transportation corridor, which will connect

    [A] India to Central Asia to Europe via Iran

    [B] India to Central Asia via China

    [C] India to South-East Asia through Bangladesh and Myanmar

    [D] India to Europe through Azerbaijan (2017, same Microtheme).

  • In India-China diplomacy, wariness is the only normal In India-China diplomacy, wariness is the only normal

    In India-China diplomacy, wariness is the only normal In India-China diplomacy, wariness is the only normal

    Why in the News

    National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on August 25 for the 25th round of Special Representatives (SR) talks on the India-China boundary. India and China first issued separate readouts, then released an identical eight-point joint consensus on August 26, agreeing to push for “Early and Substantial Harvest” on boundary delimitation, two new military meeting points, two new border hotlines, an Expert-Level Mechanism on trans-border rivers, facilitation of the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, resumption of border trade, and the next SR round in India in 2027.

    What does the joint statement’s careful language reveal about the relationship?

    1. A delayed but fast-negotiated text: The 24 hour gap between the separate initial statements and the identical joint text suggests consensus took time to build, but once found, the text was agreed within 18 hours, signalling political intent at the highest level ahead of a packed diplomatic fortnight.
    2. Deliberate avoidance of contentious terms: Both sides avoided the words “Tibet” or “Xizang” in the joint text, referring only to the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra and border trade through three passes, and used the dual naming, Kailash and Gang Rinpoche, Manasarovar and Mapam Yun Tso, to sidestep sovereignty-loaded terminology.
    3. New hotlines require internal clearance in Beijing: Until now, the only functional military hotline was in the Western sector, Ladakh; extending hotlines and meeting points to the Eastern sector, Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as South Tibet, would have required internal Chinese clearance, since it touches a claim China treats as sensitive.

    Why is China’s stance on the BRICS summit significant?

    1. Calibrated ambiguity on Xi Jinping’s participation: China has said it “supports India in hosting a successful BRICS summit” in Delhi on September 12 but has stayed evasive on whether President Xi Jinping will personally attend, a position the writer reads as deliberate tactical ambiguity rather than indecision.
    2. India’s leverage is constrained by external pressure: India has to accept this ambiguity given its trade-economic vulnerability and the geopolitical turbulence triggered by President Donald Trump’s tariff actions, which narrows India’s room to press Beijing on the BRICS question.

    Challenges to sustaining the India-China diplomatic thaw

    1. The boundary dispute remains structurally unresolved: “Early and Substantial Harvest” language covers delimitation, mapping where the border lies, but explicitly operates without prejudice to the final settlement under the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters, so no boundary line is actually being fixed. Eg. The Eastern sector hotline extension itself required Beijing’s internal clearance precisely because the underlying territorial claim remains contested. Fix. Use the Expert-Level Mechanism agreed in the joint statement to convert delimitation “harvest” language into a scheduled, verifiable set of mapping milestones rather than an open-ended process.
    2. Trust deficit persists beneath cooperative language: Both governments continue to issue separate domestic-facing statements before agreeing a joint text, reflecting a persistent gap between what each side is willing to say to its own public and what it is willing to commit to jointly. Eg. India’s initial embassy statement was notably more restrained than Beijing’s warmer framing of “global and strategic significance,” before both converged on the identical joint text a day later.

    Conclusion

    The writer’s central argument is that deeply embedded wariness, not a failure of diplomacy, is the operating method of India-China relations: both sides manage friction through carefully calibrated joint language, incremental confidence-building measures and studied ambiguity on sensitive questions such as Tibet and Xi Jinping’s BRICS attendance. The near-term test of this method will be the SCO summit in Bishkek from August 31 to September 1 and the BRICS summit in Delhi on September 12.

    India-China Relations

    1. A boundary dispute rooted in the 1962 war: India and China share an unresolved boundary along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the subject of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and have since built a layered set of confidence-building mechanisms rather than a settled border.
    2. The Special Representatives mechanism: Established in 2003, the SR talks are the highest-level bilateral channel for discussing a framework settlement of the boundary question, distinct from routine military and diplomatic contacts.
    3. Galwan reset the relationship’s tenor: The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, the first fatal India-China military confrontation in over four decades, froze high-level engagement for years before talks such as the current SR round resumed.
    4. Trade imbalance runs alongside the security relationship: India runs a large and persistent trade deficit with China even as both sides pursue diplomatic normalisation, a structural feature of the relationship independent of the boundary talks.

    Key Facts about India-China Relations

    1. Agreement on Political Parameters, 2005: Sets out the guiding political parameters and principles for a boundary settlement, and remains the reference framework the current “Early and Substantial Harvest” language explicitly operates without prejudice to.
    2. SCO membership since 2017: India and China are both members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the same platform hosting the Bishkek summit immediately after the current round of SR talks.

    Challenges in India-China Relations

    1. Unresolved boundary despite repeated confidence-building measures: Decades of hotlines, meeting points and expert mechanisms have reduced the risk of miscalculation without resolving the underlying territorial claims. Eg. The Eastern and Middle sector hotlines agreed in the current round only supplement, rather than replace, the unresolved 2005 political parameters framework. Fix. Anchor future confidence-building measures to specific, dated delimitation milestones rather than open-ended review mechanisms.
    2. Structural trade dependence on China: India’s electronics, pharmaceutical and solar manufacturing sectors remain dependent on Chinese intermediate goods and active pharmaceutical ingredients, a vulnerability that persists regardless of the state of boundary diplomacy. Eg. India’s trade deficit with China has stayed among its largest with any single country for over a decade. Fix. Accelerate production-linked incentive schemes targeting the specific intermediate goods categories where import dependence is highest, rather than broad-based manufacturing incentives.

    Back2Basics: What is the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?

    1. A de facto, not a demarcated, boundary: The Line of Actual Control is the notional line separating Indian-controlled and Chinese-controlled territory, distinct from an internationally recognised or mutually demarcated border, and both sides hold differing perceptions of exactly where it runs in several sectors.
  • Trump administration seeks to restrict internships for international students (CPT rules)Trump administration seeks to restrict internships for international students (CPT rules)

    Trump administration seeks to restrict internships for international students (CPT rules)Trump administration seeks to restrict internships for international students (CPT rules)

    Why in the News

    The Trump administration issued a memo, dated August 24, directing US universities to restrict Curricular Practical Training (CPT) work authorisations for international students. The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), part of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, said it had observed a rise in CPT authorisations that appear to violate the rule permitting CPT only where the training is an integral, curriculum-linked requirement. The memo warned that non-compliant institutions could lose certification to enrol foreign students, prompting the University of California, Los Angeles and the University of California, Berkeley to pause certain CPT applications.

    Why does the CPT restriction matter for Indian students?

    1. Indian students form a large share of the affected pool: Indian nationals are among the largest cohorts of international students in the United States, concentrated in graduate programmes in science, technology, engineering and business where CPT and its post-study counterpart, Optional Practical Training, are commonly used to gain early work experience.
    2. CPT often bridges study and full-time employment: Many international students use CPT internships to secure the practical experience and employer relationships that later translate into full-time job offers and sponsored work visas, so tighter CPT rules narrow that pathway at its earliest stage.
    3. Institutional caution creates immediate uncertainty: Universities such as UCLA and UC Berkeley pausing CPT applications while they review the guidance leaves currently enrolled students without a clear timeline for authorisations they may need for the coming term.

    Challenges the CPT tightening creates

    1. Ambiguity in what counts as curriculum-integral training: The memo does not precisely define the line between legitimate curriculum-linked internships and authorisations SEVP considers a violation, leaving universities to interpret the standard conservatively. Eg. UC Berkeley’s international office described the August 24 memo as “more narrow in focus” and “more restrictive in nature” than earlier guidance, without full clarity on the new threshold. Fix. SEVP could issue detailed, program-specific criteria for curriculum integration, developed in consultation with universities, rather than a general compliance warning.
    2. Institutional risk pushes universities toward blanket caution: Because non-compliance risks an institution’s certification to enrol any foreign student, universities have an incentive to pause CPT broadly rather than assess applications individually, even where most are legitimate. Eg. UCLA paused certain CPT authorisations altogether while it determines next steps, affecting students beyond those the memo specifically targets.

    What is Curricular Practical Training (CPT)?

    Work authorisation tied to the curriculum: Curricular Practical Training is a work authorisation available to international students on an F-1 visa that allows off-campus employment or internships considered an integral part of an established academic curriculum, distinct from Optional Practical Training, which applies mainly after a course of study is completed.

  • India, Kuwait hold inaugural key dialogue in Delhi to bolster defence ties

    Why in the News

    India and Kuwait held the inaugural meeting of the India-Kuwait Joint Defence Committee in New Delhi on August 28. Both sides agreed to expand bilateral defence cooperation across training, military exercises, industry, and research and development. The meeting operationalises the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Kuwait in December 2024.

    Why does an institutionalised defence dialogue with Kuwait matter for India?

    1. A first standing forum with a Gulf monarchy on defence: The Joint Defence Committee gives India and Kuwait a recurring institutional channel, rather than one-off visits, to advance training, joint exercises, defence industry links and research and development.
    2. Extends India’s Gulf defence footprint beyond energy ties: India’s engagement with the Gulf has historically centred on energy imports and the diaspora; a dedicated defence committee with Kuwait signals a broadening of the relationship into security cooperation, alongside similar frameworks India already runs with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    3. Kuwait sits at a sensitive maritime chokepoint: Kuwait’s location near the head of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz gives India a stake in the security of a route through which a large share of its crude oil imports transit.

    Challenges to the India-Kuwait defence relationship

    1. Limited defence-industrial base on the Kuwaiti side: Kuwait’s domestic defence manufacturing capacity is minimal, so cooperation is likely to stay import and training-oriented rather than co-production, unlike some of India’s other defence partnerships. Eg. India’s co-production discussions with the United States on the Javelin missile system have no current parallel in the Kuwait relationship. Fix. Use the Joint Defence Committee’s industry track to identify smaller co-development areas, such as maintenance, repair and overhaul services, where Kuwait’s capacity constraints are less binding.
    2. Competing suppliers already entrenched in the Gulf: Gulf states, including Kuwait, have longstanding defence procurement relationships with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which limits the near-term scope for India to secure large equipment sales. Eg. Kuwait’s air defence and fighter fleets are built around US and European platforms, leaving India’s defence exports pitch centred on niche systems and services rather than big-ticket sales.

    Conclusion

    The inaugural Joint Defence Committee meeting converts the 2024 MoU into a standing institutional mechanism, marking a modest but concrete step in India’s effort to deepen security ties with the Gulf beyond energy and trade. The substantive test will be whether the committee produces actual joint exercises, training exchanges or industry tie-ups before its next meeting.

    What is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)?

    1. A regional grouping, not Kuwait’s own body: The Gulf Cooperation Council is a political and economic union of six Gulf Arab states, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, formed in 1981 to coordinate economic, security and foreign policy matters among them.
    2. India engages the GCC bilaterally, not as a bloc: India does not have a defence framework with the GCC as a single entity; agreements such as the Joint Defence Committee are negotiated bilaterally with individual member states like Kuwait.
  • India seals deal to purchase Javelin anti-tank missile system from US

    India seals deal to purchase Javelin anti-tank missile system from US

    Why in the News

    India has finalised a deal to buy the Javelin anti-tank guided missile system from the United States, with the Indian Army signing a Letter of Offer and Acceptance through the US Foreign Military Sales process. The US Embassy called the signing a “milestone” that strengthens the US-India Major Defence Partnership and opens discussions on co-production, extending a series of recent India-US defence deals that followed Operation Sindoor.

    What is the Javelin system, and how was the deal concluded?

    1. A man-portable, fire-and-forget missile: The Javelin is a single, man-portable, fire-and-forget, medium-range anti-tank guided missile designed for use against armoured vehicles and fortified positions. “Fire-and-forget” means soldiers do not need to remain exposed after launch, and “man-portable” means it can be carried by soldiers, a combination that makes it particularly effective.
    2. Produced by a joint venture, used by Ukraine: The Javelin is manufactured by the Javelin Joint Venture, a partnership between RTX and Lockheed Martin, and is used by the US Army and Marine Corps as well as several international customers, including Ukraine in its war with Russia.
    3. A prior clearance preceded the final signing: In November last year, the US had approved a possible foreign military sale of 100 FGM-148 Javelin rounds, one Javelin missile and 25 Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units and related equipment, estimated at $45.7 million, ahead of Friday’s signed agreement.

    What does the deal signal for US-India defence ties?

    1. Co-production is now under discussion: US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said in May that Washington had committed to pursuing co-production of Javelin munitions with India, calling it a real, tangible step to improve the collective readiness of both forces.
    2. Part of a broader run of recent procurements: The Javelin purchase follows India’s acquisition of 216 M982A1 Excalibur tactical projectiles, a planned purchase of six additional Boeing P-8I maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, US approval of support services and equipment for Apache helicopters worth $198.2 million, a five-year, Rs 7,995 crore support agreement for the MH-60R helicopter fleet, and an October 2024 deal for 31 MQ-9B High Altitude Long Endurance drones.
    3. Built on the 2024 defence partnership framework: India and the US signed the framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership last October, a framework the current wave of procurements, including the Javelin deal, sits within.

    What is the Foreign Military Sales process?

    A government-to-government US arms transfer route: Foreign Military Sales is the US government’s mechanism for selling defence equipment and services to foreign governments, under which the US government, rather than the manufacturer directly, administers the sale.

  • A law that could criminalise compassion

    Why in the News

    A former Mumbai college principal has criticised Maharashtra’s new Freedom of Religion Act, commonly called the anti-conversion law, arguing it makes the offence non-bailable and places the burden of proving innocence on the accused, provisions the writer compares to the anti-terror Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). The piece argues the law threatens not only an individual’s freedom to choose a religion but also humanitarian activities, including education, healthcare and social services, run by religious institutions for disadvantaged communities.

    What does the new Maharashtra law provide, and why does the writer call it disproportionate?

    1. A reversed burden of proof: The law makes the offence of unlawful conversion non-bailable and places the onus on the accused to prove innocence, a standard the writer likens to the UAPA, rather than the ordinary criminal law principle that the prosecution must prove guilt.
    2. No demonstrated evidence of large-scale forced conversion: The writer states that no data has been provided anywhere in the country establishing large-scale conversions by force, fraud or inducement, the harm the law is intended to address.
    3. Existing criminal law already covers illegal conversion: The writer notes the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 can already address criminal acts of conversion carried out through illegal means, without a separate non-bailable, reverse-onus law.
    4. Third-party complaints and an undefined “inducement”: Accusations under the law can be filed by third parties or family members, and the law does not clearly define “inducement,” which the writer argues could bring ordinary educational, medical or social services within its scope.

    What activities does the writer say the law could criminalise?

    1. Education, healthcare and welfare run by religious institutions: The writer cites decades of Catholic Church-run education, certified by bodies such as the University Grants Commission (UGC), medical facilities and social services extended without religious restriction, and financial aid to students and patients regardless of faith.
    2. Inter-religious marriages: The writer notes 30 to 40 percent of marriages recorded by the Catholic Church in parts of the country are inter-religious and do not require the non-Catholic partner to convert; the new law’s requirement of a public declaration weeks before such a marriage could invite false allegations of attempted conversion.
    3. Prayer and healing practices: The writer describes prayers for healing, including the practice of laying hands on a person in need, as normal Christian worship that the new law could bring under suspicion if extended to people of other faiths who request it.

    Challenges in India’s anti-conversion legal framework

    1. Absence of a safeguard against false complaints: The law does not penalise complainants whose allegations are later found false, allowing accusers to act without consequence. Eg. The writer notes attacks by non-state actors on prayer meetings in private halls or homes, after which police have filed FIRs mainly against the persons attacked rather than the attackers. Fix. Insert a provision imposing penalties, including a jail term, on complainants whose allegations are established as false, to deter misuse of the reverse-onus provision.
    2. Reverse onus enabling prolonged pre-trial detention: Making the offence non-bailable while shifting the burden of proof to the accused risks turning the judicial process itself into the punishment. Eg. The writer draws a parallel with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), under which persons have allegedly remained in jail for years without anything being proved against them. Fix. Restore the ordinary bail standard and the prosecution’s burden of proof for conversion offences that do not involve demonstrated force or fraud.

    Conclusion

    The writer argues that Maharashtra’s anti-conversion law, by combining a non-bailable offence with a reversed burden of proof and an undefined threshold for inducement, risks criminalising ordinary humanitarian and educational work as well as inter-religious marriage, without any demonstrated evidence of the large-scale forced conversion the law claims to address.

    What is Article 25 of the Constitution?

    1. Freedom of conscience and religion: Article 25 guarantees all persons freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, health and other fundamental rights.
    2. Subject to state regulation: The Article allows the state to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice and to provide for social welfare and reform, the constitutional basis states cite when enacting anti-conversion legislation.

  • To Zohran Mamdani: The RSS chief you may not know

    Why in the News

    A senior advocate who served as one of three mediators in the Ayodhya-Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi dispute has written an open letter responding to New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s criticism of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat, recounting Bhagwat’s role in restraining celebration after the 2019 Ayodhya settlement and in the later Gyanvapi mosque controversy in Varanasi. The piece sets Bhagwat’s public restraint against a moment when the judiciary itself, rather than the RSS, departed from the settled position on the Places of Worship Act, 1991.

    What role did Bhagwat play around the Ayodhya settlement?

    1. Restraint after the 2019 verdict: Bhagwat insisted there should be no celebration or jubilation over the Ayodhya outcome, since this would be provocative to the other side, and the moment passed largely without triggering wider unrest.
    2. A stated limit on the RSS’s claims: Bhagwat said the RSS’s interest was confined to the Ram Mandir and that it was not seeking to reclaim any other place of worship, a statement the writer says helped temper the Vishva Hindu Parishad’s publicly stated list of other disputed mosques.

    What happened in the Gyanvapi case, and how did Bhagwat respond?

    1. A departure from precedent in the Gyanvapi ruling: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, then a puisne judge who had earlier delivered part of the Ayodhya judgment, remarked in the Gyanvapi case that it remained open to the court to examine whether the site was a mosque or a temple, a position the writer characterises as a departure from the Ayodhya judgment’s own reasoning on the Places of Worship Act.
    2. Bhagwat’s public intervention: Bhagwat responded the following day by saying “one cannot go looking for shivlings in every mosque,” a statement the writer frames as running counter to the direction the Court’s own remark had opened up.

    Conclusion

    The writer argues that Bhagwat’s recorded public positions, restraint after Ayodhya and the remark against searching for shivlings in every mosque, reflect a stated commitment to inter-community harmony that Mamdani’s criticism of the RSS chief does not account for, and proposes that the two meet and talk during Bhagwat’s visit to the United States.

    What is the Places of Worship Act, 1991?

    1. Statutory freeze on religious character: The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 mandates that the religious character of every place of worship, as it existed on 15 August 1947, be maintained and prohibits its conversion, with the Ayodhya dispute exempted as a case already in litigation when the law was enacted.
    2. Held to embody a Basic Structure value: In the Ayodhya judgment, the Supreme Court held that the Act embodies the constitutional values of secularism and is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

  • The SYL canal saga: Why Punjab won’t yield, and Haryana cannot let go (Northern Lights column)

    Why in the News

    Chief Justice of India Surya Kant remarked, while hearing the three-decade-old Satluj-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal case, that “once the heart opens, the door also opens,” after Attorney General R. Venkataramani told the Bench that Punjab and Haryana now “speak in a joint voice.” The conciliatory language follows a 1996 suit by Haryana seeking completion of the SYL canal and comes months before Punjab’s Assembly elections, raising the question of whether it signals a genuine shift or another turn of phrase in a dispute where both states have historically hardened their positions, including a standoff last year when Punjab refused to loan Haryana water from the Bhakra dam for thirsty villages in Hisar and Fatehabad.

    What is the SYL canal dispute?

    1. A link canal ordered under a 1981 tripartite agreement: The SYL was designed as a 214-km canal, 122 km in Punjab and 92 km in Haryana, to carry surplus Ravi-Beas waters assessed at 17.17 million acre feet (MAF) under a 1981 agreement brokered by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi between Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan.
    2. Haryana has completed its share, Punjab has not: Haryana finished its 92-km portion years ago, while construction on Punjab’s stretch has remained stalled since the 1980s.
    3. Legal basis on both sides: Haryana rests its claim on its status as a successor state of undivided Punjab, the 1981 agreement and successive Supreme Court rulings directing Punjab to complete its share. Punjab invokes the riparian principle, under which states through which a river flows hold primary rights to its waters, to challenge the 1981 allocation.

    Why has construction on the canal stalled for decades?

    1. Militancy halted work at its peak: The Shiromani Akali Dal’s Nehar Roko Morcha against the canal evolved into the Dharam Yudh Morcha after the Akalis joined radical ideologue Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. In 1990, Babbar Khalsa International militants shot dead SYL chief engineer M.L. Sikri, superintending engineer Avtar Singh Aulakh, and 32 labourers at the site.
    2. Punjab legislated itself out of the pact: In 2004, the Congress government headed by then Chief Minister Amarinder Singh passed the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, ending Punjab’s obligations under the 1981 pact; the Supreme Court struck the Act down in 2016.
    3. Land returned to original owners: In 2016, the Akali government in Punjab returned the land acquired for canal construction to its original owners, a practical and political obstacle to reviving construction on the Punjab side.

    Why does Punjab resist sharing the water?

    1. Groundwater is already overexploited: Roughly 73 to 76 percent of Punjab’s blocks are overexploited, forcing farmers to dig progressively deeper wells, while border districts in southern Punjab at the tail end of the canal network struggle to irrigate.
    2. The 1955 allocation is seen as historically unfair to Punjab: The Centre in 1955 allocated non-riparian Rajasthan 8 MAF of water, leaving undivided Punjab with 7.2 MAF of the Ravi-Beas waters, a division Punjab’s political class continues to cite as the root grievance.
    3. Water unites Punjabi public opinion: Opposition to sharing water with Haryana cuts across political lines in Punjab. Eg. Rapper Sidhu Moosewala’s song “SYL,” released after his death, sang “Paani chhado, tibka nahin dinde (forget about water, we won’t give a drop)” and drew a large public response before being taken down.

    Why does Haryana insist the canal must be completed?

    1. Its own water stress is worsening: Haryana’s southern and south-western districts face falling water tables, down to 1,700 feet in places, and Chief Minister Nayab Singh Saini has repeatedly appealed to Punjab to share water, this year earmarking Rs 100 crore for the canal.
    2. It considers the legal position settled in its favour: Haryana points to its status as successor state, the 1981 agreement and repeated Supreme Court directions to Punjab as establishing its entitlement to the share of Ravi-Beas waters the canal was meant to carry.

    What is the Eradi Tribunal assessing, and what can it not do?

    1. Re-verifying the water assumed available: The Ravi-Beas Waters Tribunal, commonly called the Eradi Tribunal after its first chairman Justice V. Balakrishna Eradi, was set up in 1986 to re-verify water claims. The present tribunal, headed by retired Supreme Court judge Justice Vineet Saran with Justices P. Naveen Rao and Suman Shyam, conducted fresh field inspections in Punjab this summer, examining river inflows, canal outflows and hydraulic structures.
    2. Punjab’s position before the tribunal: Punjab’s Chief Minister and officials told the tribunal the state faces severe groundwater depletion and an acute canal water shortage, has no surplus for Haryana or Rajasthan, and that only Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir fall within the actual Ravi-Beas basin.
    3. A tribunal finding cannot force construction: Whatever the tribunal concludes on whether the water assumed under the 1981 agreement still exists, it cannot itself build the canal or make Punjab’s people accept a settlement they consider damaging; only a negotiated political solution between the two states can do that.

    Conclusion

    The cordial language before the Supreme Court reflects political intent at the highest level, but it sits atop a dispute rooted in militancy, a legislated repudiation of the original pact and unresolved questions before the Eradi Tribunal about whether the water assumed under the 1981 agreement still exists. With Punjab’s Assembly elections approaching, whether the two states can convert this rhetorical shift into an actual settlement remains uncertain.

    What is Fiscal Federalism?

    1. About: Fiscal federalism is the division of financial powers, resources and responsibilities between the Union and the states, governing how revenue, expenditure and shared resources such as inter-state river waters are allocated and adjudicated.
    2. Rationale: It exists because states have unequal revenue capacity and unequal access to shared natural resources, requiring a constitutional and institutional mechanism to allocate resources and resolve disputes between states and the Centre.
    3. Named typology: Centre-state financial relations operate through tax devolution, grants-in-aid, and inter-state dispute mechanisms such as river water tribunals under Article 262 and the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Fiscal Federalism

    1. Article 262: Empowers Parliament to provide for the adjudication of disputes relating to the use, distribution or control of waters of inter-state rivers, and to bar the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts over such disputes if Parliament so provides.
    2. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides the statutory framework under which river water tribunals, such as the Eradi Tribunal, are constituted to adjudicate disputes between riparian states.
    3. Seventh Schedule, State List Entry 17: Places water, including water supplies and irrigation, within the states’ legislative domain, subject to the Union’s power under Entry 56 of the Union List over inter-state rivers declared expedient in the public interest.

    Challenges in Centre-State River Water Sharing

    1. Tribunal awards without enforcement teeth: River water tribunal decisions can remain unimplemented for decades without an enforcement mechanism binding the states. Eg. The SYL canal dispute has remained unresolved for over three decades despite multiple Supreme Court directions to complete construction. Fix. Empower the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act framework with a standing implementation authority with a fixed timeline, rather than leaving execution to the state governments involved in the dispute.
    2. Elections repeatedly delaying settlement: Water disputes become politically charged ahead of state elections, discouraging incumbent governments from conceding ground. Eg. The renewed conciliatory statements before the Supreme Court in the SYL case have come months ahead of the Punjab Assembly elections, raising doubts about whether they reflect a genuine shift.

  • Before SC Collegium: Can Acting CJs of HCs send names for judge appointments?

    Why in the News

    A controversy over the conduct of Rajasthan High Court’s Acting Chief Justice, Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, has revived a recurring question before the Supreme Court Collegium: whether recommendations for High Court judge appointments sent by an Acting Chief Justice should be treated on the same footing as those sent by a permanent Chief Justice. The Collegium, headed by CJI Surya Kant and comprising Justices Vikram Nath, B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh and P.S. Narasimha, must now consider at least four names recommended by Justice Sharma, who has held the acting post for almost a year. Supreme Court judge Justice Sandeep Mehta, a former Rajasthan High Court judge, has written three letters to the CJI seeking Sharma’s replacement by a chief justice from outside the state, alleging manipulation of case listings and misuse of administrative powers, allegations the CJI has said must go through institutional channels rather than the media.

    Why does an Acting Chief Justice’s recommendation raise a genuine question for the Collegium?

    1. Convention discourages it, but does not bar it: Acting Chief Justices conventionally do not make recommendations for judicial appointments because of their typically short tenures, though the Collegium has in the past accepted such recommendations in exceptional cases.
    2. One view favours considering recommendations on merit: Sources say part of the Collegium holds that names sent by an Acting Chief Justice should not be returned solely because of the official’s title, and should instead be assessed on merit.
    3. A competing view warns against normalising long acting tenures: The opposing view cautions that accepting names from Acting Chief Justices removes the pressure to appoint a permanent Chief Justice promptly, since there would be no apparent urgency.
    4. Justice Sharma’s tenure and lineage make this case unusual: Justice Sharma has been Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court for almost a year since September 2025, and Rajasthan is also his parent High Court, factors cited in support of considering his recommendations.

    What precedent exists for how the Collegium has handled Acting Chief Justice recommendations?

    1. The Bombay High Court precedent split the Collegium’s consultees: When Justice Dharmadhikari was Acting Chief Justice of Bombay High Court in 2020, he prepared a list of 22 names; two consultee judges objected in writing that no Acting Chief Justice could properly vet 22 candidates in so short a tenure, while a third consultee judge disagreed, noting Dharmadhikari’s long service on that High Court.
    2. The Collegium still forwarded most of the list: Despite the objections, the Collegium headed by then CJI S.A. Bobde sent 18 of the 22 recommended names to the Centre, relying on the third consultee’s affirmative response.
    3. A comparable case arose in Rajasthan in 2022: The Centre raised objections to at least 12 names sent by then Rajasthan High Court Chief Justice Akil Kureshi on the ground that they were made at the fag end of his tenure, and the Collegium headed by then CJI D.Y. Chandrachud ultimately cleared 8 of the 12 names after the Centre did not specify objections to particular candidates.

    What does the present Rajasthan controversy add to the recurring question?

    1. The dispute is no longer only about tenure length: Justice Mehta’s letters to the CJI allege manipulation of case listings and threats to fellow judges citing closeness to the CJI, extending the question from whether an Acting Chief Justice’s recommendations should count to whether the officeholder’s conduct in the post is itself compromised.
    2. Justice Sharma’s career path preceded his return to Rajasthan: He served as a Rajasthan High Court judge from 2016, moved to Patna High Court in 2022, was sent to Punjab and Haryana High Court after the Collegium declined his 2023 request to return to Rajasthan on health grounds, and was brought back to Rajasthan under a 2025 resolution.
    3. The Collegium has so far deferred adjudication: CJI Surya Kant responded to the allegations by stating that claims against a sitting judge cannot be adjudicated through the media and must go through institutional channels, leaving the underlying question of Justice Sharma’s four recommended names still pending.

    Conclusion

    The Supreme Court Collegium must now decide, in the specific case of Justice Sharma’s four recommendations, a question it has answered inconsistently in the past: whether an Acting Chief Justice’s nominations for High Court judgeships carry the same weight as a permanent Chief Justice’s. How it resolves this, against the backdrop of allegations against Justice Sharma’s own conduct in office, will shape whether prolonged acting tenures continue to carry recommending power in future.

    Back2Basics

    1. Supreme Court Collegium: An extra-constitutional, judicially evolved mechanism comprising the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most Supreme Court judges, which recommends appointments and transfers of judges to the higher judiciary.
    2. Acting Chief Justice: Appointed under Article 223 of the Constitution by the President when a High Court’s Chief Justice post falls vacant or the incumbent is unable to perform duties, distinct from a permanent Chief Justice appointment.
    3. Consultee judges: Sitting or former judges, typically with prior experience of the High Court concerned, whom the Collegium consults on the suitability of recommended names before finalising a list.

    (GS2-05, 2025) Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.