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GS Paper: GS2

  • In Indo-Pacific, a steady projection of power, Quad, Great Nicobar

    Why in the News

    India has agreed to build a trilateral Track 1.5 dialogue mechanism with Japan and the Philippines and continues developing the $10 billion Great Nicobar Island Development Project near the Strait of Malacca. These moves mark a shift from India’s earlier cautious, ambiguity-preserving approach to the Indo-Pacific toward more visible geostrategic positioning, raising the question of whether India is emerging as a third power in the region alongside the United States and China.

    What is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)?

    1. Quad: The Quad is a strategic dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India, first conceived in 2007 and formally revived in 2017, working toward a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific without a permanent secretariat or headquarters.

    How has India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific evolved under the current government?

    1. Summit participation: India’s Prime Minister has attended 12 ASEAN-India Summits, nine East Asia Summits, and all six Quad leader-level summits held since 2021.
    2. Bilateral visits: The Prime Minister has visited Japan eight times, Singapore five times, Indonesia four times and Australia three times over the past decade.
    3. Engagement with China: Despite bilateral differences, the Indian and Chinese leaders have crossed paths over 20 times in the last 12 years, though not all of these constituted serious engagements.

    Why did India historically avoid an assertive framing of its Indo-Pacific role?

    1. Deliberate ambiguity: While the US proposed “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the Quad’s motto, India added the word “inclusive,” leaving open the question of which countries the grouping might exclude.
    2. ASEAN Centrality: India proclaimed the concept of “ASEAN Centrality” for the Indo-Pacific at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in 2017, positioning Southeast Asian nations rather than any single power at the centre of the framework.
    3. China and Russia’s rejection: China and Russia refused to adopt the term “Indo-Pacific.” China’s foreign minister in 2018 dismissed it as an effort by Western powers to encircle and contain China.

    What signals a shift toward more assertive geostrategic positioning?

    1. Great Nicobar project: The $10 billion Great Nicobar Island Development Project sits just 40 nautical miles north of the Strait of Malacca, a route that carries around 100,000 ship crossings annually, 60% of them Chinese-flagged, positioning India’s own maritime infrastructure directly along a critical Chinese trade corridor.
    2. New trilateral mechanism: India formally agreed to build a Track 1.5 dialogue with Japan and the Philippines during the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Delhi in July, extending Indian engagement into the East and South China Seas, a traditionally tense maritime zone.
    3. Beyond trade and technology: These engagements involve defence deals and strategic maritime collaboration, not only economic cooperation.

    What does the rise in Japanese and South Korean defence spending show about the region’s security environment?

    1. Japan: Japan raised its defence budget to $58 billion last year, moving toward a 2027 target of 2% of GDP.
    2. South Korea: South Korea has increased its defence spending to almost $45 billion, with a target of 3.5% of GDP by 2035.
    3. Shared driver: Both increases reflect a regional assessment that US engagement in the Indo-Pacific is waning even as the challenge posed by China’s rise continues to grow.

    Conclusion

    India’s recent Indo-Pacific moves, from the Great Nicobar project to the new Japan-Philippines trilateral, mark a departure from its earlier gradualist posture built around ASEAN Centrality and deliberate ambiguity. Whether India can sustain this more assertive positioning while preserving its strategic autonomy remains unresolved.

    Back2Basics

    1. Quad: Formed as a concept in 2007, formally revived in 2017.
    2. Headquarters: No formal headquarters; it functions as a strategic dialogue rather than a treaty organisation.
    3. Mandate: Strategic dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India on maritime security, counter-terrorism and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific.
    4. Great Nicobar Island Development Project: A roughly $10 billion project on Great Nicobar Island approved in 2022, comprising an international container transshipment terminal, a greenfield international airport, a power plant and a township, and the subject of ongoing environmental and tribal rights concern over its impact on Nicobarese and Shompen communities and coastal biodiversity.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)’ is transforming itself into a trade bloc from a military alliance, in present times. Discuss.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the Quad’s evolving role in the Indo-Pacific strategic architecture and regional security. The article highlights India’s more assertive Indo-Pacific strategy through the Quad, new minilateral partnerships, and maritime initiatives like Great Nicobar.

  • Tariff-free Scottish salmon under UK-India CETA

    Why in the News

    The first tariff free shipment of Scottish salmon reached Bengaluru on July 31 under the UK India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), eliminating India’s earlier 33 percent import tariff on the product. A single consignment marks the transition of a trade agreement from signed text into commercial reality, with industry estimating up to £130 million in additional export opportunity for Scotland’s salmon sector over the next decade.

    What is the UK India CETA?

    1. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): CETA is the bilateral free trade agreement between the United Kingdom and India that eliminates or reduces tariffs across a wide range of goods and services traded between the two countries, recently operationalised as part of the broader India-UK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

    Why does the tariff removal matter?

    1. Immediate price effect: Removing the 33 percent import tariff makes Scottish salmon significantly cheaper for Indian importers and retailers, directly affecting shelf pricing for consumers.
    2. Early proof of implementation: A commercial shipment moving within months of the agreement taking effect signals that CETA’s tariff schedules are being implemented on the ground, not just agreed on paper.
    3. Export opportunity for Scotland: Industry estimates suggest the tariff elimination could unlock up to £130 million in additional export opportunities for Scotland’s salmon sector over the next decade.

    What are the challenges to realising CETA’s full trade potential?

    1. Cold chain and logistics: Perishable goods such as fresh salmon require reliable cold chain logistics from the United Kingdom to Indian cities, infrastructure that must scale alongside tariff-driven demand growth.
    2. Domestic industry exposure: Cheaper imported salmon could pressure India’s own aquaculture and seafood sector as volumes scale beyond this early shipment.
    3. Uneven sector by sector implementation: Tariff elimination for individual products such as salmon does not guarantee equally smooth implementation across CETA’s other covered sectors, some of which involve more complex regulatory alignment.
    4. Consumer market development: Realising the full projected export opportunity depends on Indian consumer demand for premium imported seafood growing at the pace industry estimates assume.

    Conclusion

    The Scottish salmon shipment is an early, narrow proof point for CETA’s tariff provisions rather than evidence of the agreement’s full commercial impact. Subsequent months will show whether tariff elimination translates into sustained trade volumes across the agreement’s broader list of covered goods.

  • What Chinese AI model Kimi’s success says about the next phase of US-China AI race

    Why in the News

    Moonshot AI’s Kimi K3, released in July with 2.8 trillion parameters, is being billed as the world’s largest open-weight artificial intelligence (AI) system, prompting Anthropic to accuse the Chinese company of illicitly extracting the capabilities of its Claude model. The episode echoes the shock caused by DeepSeek R1 in January 2025, and exposes a widening split between China’s open-weight AI strategy and the closed, proprietary approach favoured by leading US labs.

    What is Kimi K3?

    1. Kimi K3: Kimi K3 is an advanced AI model released by the Chinese company Moonshot AI, said to rival models from OpenAI and Anthropic, built as an “open-weight” system that can be downloaded and modified by developers.

    What is an open-weight AI model?

    1. Open-weight: An open-weight model allows developers to download its parameters, the numerical values that determine how the system responds to prompts, and run or customise it locally, unlike a closed model whose parameters remain proprietary.

    Open-Weight vs. Closed Models

    1. Open-Weight: Anyone can download the core files, study how it works, and run it offline.
    2. Closed Models: The code and numbers stay hidden on a company’s private servers, and you can only use it through a web page or an API.

    How does the Kimi K3 episode parallel the DeepSeek moment of January 2025?

    1. Prior shock: DeepSeek R1’s January 2025 release triggered global market panic after being compared favourably to leading US models, with OpenAI accusing DeepSeek of copying its technology.
    2. Repeated pattern: Kimi K3’s release in July 2026 has prompted a similar sequence, with Anthropic accusing Moonshot AI of illicitly extracting Claude’s capabilities and a US official describing it as an assault on economies that reward private capital and fair competition.
    3. Chinese countercharge: China’s Commerce Ministry responded by accusing the US of “AI hegemonism.”

    Why is China favouring an open-weight strategy over proprietary models?

    1. Chip supply constraints: Chinese developers face chip supply constraints from Western export restrictions and domestic production bottlenecks, limiting their capacity to support commercial access to a closed model.
    2. Ecosystem building: Chinese labs use open weights to reach developers faster and build an ecosystem around their models, generating demand more quickly than a closed, enterprise-only distribution model would allow.
    3. Custom licensing approach: Kimi K3 uses a hybrid model, open-weight for most users but requiring large companies to strike a commercial agreement with Moonshot, an approach described as unusual among popular open-weight releases.
    4. Diplomatic dimension: China increasingly presents open models as part of international technological cooperation, illustrated by a new Chinese government AI governance body launched this month.

    What does the US industry debate reveal about the open versus closed model split?

    1. Industry open letter: Industry figures have called for the US to shift toward open-weight models, arguing that open-source software already underlies most of the internet and systems used by the US military and federal agencies.
    2. Divergent incentives: Companies behind AI infrastructure, such as chip makers, have generally favoured open-weight models to spread adoption and demand for their hardware, while companies with proprietary models, such as Anthropic, have expressed reservations about this shift.
    3. US investigation: The US government is reportedly investigating whether Moonshot AI illegally accessed advanced chips to train its models.

    Does China’s progress prove that US export controls have failed?

    1. Not proof of failure: Kimi K3’s capability does not prove that export controls have failed. It shows that progress in AI models depends on more than access to the most advanced chips.
    2. Gap still exists: Parity between US and Chinese AI companies remains distant, given the continuing US edge in compute capacity, capital, global distribution and chip access.
    3. Wider influence: The rise of Chinese AI companies could still give other countries more choice and lower-cost options for local deployment, extending China’s influence over global technical standards even without full parity.

    Conclusion

    Kimi K3 has intensified a two-player race for global AI dominance between the US and China, driven partly by a strategic divergence between China’s open-weight approach and the closed models favoured by leading American labs. Export controls have not stopped Chinese progress, but neither have they closed the underlying gap in compute, capital and distribution that still separates the two sides.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2026] Which of the following statements with regard to Large Language Models (LLMs) used in machine learning is/are correct?

    1. LLMs assign probabilities to the next possible words and then pick the one with the highest probability.

    2. LLMs process data through mathematical optimisation to minimise prediction errors.

    3. LLMs produce unbiased outputs.

    (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3.

  • FIR over remarks on PM, how law treats obscenity and profanity

    Why in the News

    The Noida Police registered a Zero FIR against a 25 year old protester over remarks about the Prime Minister during the July youth protests, invoking sections covering insult, public mischief and defamation rather than obscenity. The case surfaces a legal distinction courts have sharpened over six decades: crude or profane language is not automatically the same offence as obscenity, and each carries its own, narrower evidentiary bar.

    How has India’s legal test for obscenity evolved?

    1. Ranjit D. Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, 1965: The Supreme Court upheld a ban on D H Lawrence’s novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover and adopted the 1868 English Hicklin test, which asked whether isolated passages of a work could corrupt the most vulnerable reader.
    2. Doordarshan v Anand Patwardhan, 2006: The Supreme Court cleared the broadcast of a documentary that had been denied airtime over its adult certificate, holding that obscenity must be judged by viewing a work as a whole, not by isolating individual scenes.
    3. Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014: The Supreme Court discarded the Hicklin test in favour of a community standards test, holding that material is obscene only if it tends to arouse sexual feelings when judged by an average person applying contemporary standards.

    What is Section 296 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita?

    1. Section 296, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS): The successor to Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, this is the default charge for loud, obscene public behaviour, punishing obscene acts or words uttered in or near a public place to the annoyance of others, with up to three months in jail.

    Why is profanity not the same as obscenity?

    1. College Romance ruling, 2024: The Supreme Court quashed an FIR against a web series over an expletive-heavy episode, holding that vulgarity and profanity are not, by themselves, the same as obscenity, since crude words in common usage reflect emotions such as anger or frustration rather than arousing sexual feelings.
    2. Sivakumar v State, April 2026: The Supreme Court acquitted a man under Section 294 for calling someone a slur during a heated argument, holding it did not meet the threshold for obscenity.
    3. Mani v State, July 2026: The Supreme Court held that swear words, profanities and vulgar expletives, however distasteful, cannot be equated with obscenity, since obscenity requires a showing that the utterance was lascivious.

    What does the Noida FIR actually need to prove?

    1. Section 352, insult: This requires proof that the accused intended, or knew it was likely, that the insult would provoke an actual breach of public peace, not merely that someone felt insulted.
    2. Section 353(1), public mischief: This section targets incitement, such as inciting mutiny, fear likely to push people toward offences against the state, or enmity between communities, a considerably higher bar than sharp criticism of a leader.
    3. Section 356(1), defamation: Defamation carries long standing exceptions for good faith comment on a public figure’s conduct in their public role.

    Conclusion

    Six decades of Supreme Court rulings have progressively narrowed what counts as obscenity while explicitly separating it from mere vulgarity or profanity. The Noida case will test whether remarks about the Prime Minister meet the considerably higher evidentiary bar the insult, public mischief and defamation provisions actually require.

    Back2Basics

    International Examples

    1. United States: Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969): Speech can be punished only if it is intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action, not merely because it is offensive.
    2. United Kingdom: Handyside v. UK (ECHR, 1976): Freedom of expression protects ideas that “offend, shock or disturb” the State or any section of society.
    3. United States: Cohen v. California (1971): The US Supreme Court held that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,” protecting the use of profanity as free speech.
    4. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR): Political speech enjoys the highest level of protection, and public officials are expected to tolerate greater criticism than private individuals.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2013] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the balance between freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). The article examines the legal limits of criminalising speech, highlighting judicial safeguards against misuse of obscenity and other speech-related offences.

  • SC upholds NCLAT order setting aside CCI’s ₹301.6-crore penalty on Grasim Industries

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court dismissed the Competition Commission of India’s appeal against an NCLAT order that set aside a Rs 301.6 crore penalty on Grasim Industries, holding that the regulator breached natural justice by not giving the company a hearing after departing from its own investigative findings. The ruling exposes the boundary between a regulator’s power to penalise dominant firms and the procedural fairness it owes them before doing so.

    What did the CCI originally rule and why was it set aside?

    1. Original penalty: The Competition Commission of India imposed the Rs 301.6 crore penalty on Grasim Industries in March 2020 for allegedly abusing its dominant position in the supply of viscose staple fibre to spinners.
    2. Departure from the Director General’s findings: The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal found that the CCI had departed from the findings of its own Director General, the regulator’s investigative arm, without giving Grasim a chance to respond to that departure.
    3. NCLAT’s order: The NCLAT set aside the CCI’s order and remanded the matter back to the Commission for a fresh hearing that accounts for this procedural gap.

    Why did the Supreme Court agree with the natural justice finding?

    1. Hearing before departure: A bench of the Supreme Court held that once the CCI decided to differ from the Director General’s conclusions, natural justice required that Grasim be given an opportunity to present its arguments against that specific departure.
    2. Procedural fairness as a substantive check: The ruling confirms that a regulator’s substantive finding of market dominance abuse can be undone purely on procedural grounds, regardless of the underlying merits of the dominance allegation.

    What are the challenges this ruling poses for competition regulation?

    1. Delay in enforcement: The case now returns to the CCI for a fresh hearing, meaning a matter that began with a 2020 penalty order will take years longer to resolve, weakening the deterrent effect of competition enforcement.
    2. Procedural burden on the regulator: The CCI will need to build an additional hearing step into its process whenever it departs from Director General findings, adding to its administrative workload in future dominance cases.
    3. Precedent for future appeals: Companies facing CCI penalties now have a clearer procedural ground to challenge orders that diverge from investigative findings without an intervening hearing.
    4. Market conduct still unresolved: Whether Grasim actually abused its dominant position in the viscose staple fibre market remains unresolved and will only be settled after the CCI re-examines the case.

    Conclusion

    The Supreme Court’s ruling turns on procedure, not on whether Grasim actually abused its market position. The Competition Commission of India must now rehear the case with Grasim given the opportunity it was earlier denied, leaving the substantive dominance question open until that fresh hearing concludes.

    Back2Basics:

    Competition Commission of India (CCI)

    1. The CCI is India’s cross-sectoral competition regulator, governed by the Competition Act, 2002, covering anti-competitive agreements, mergers and combinations, and abuse of dominance across all sectors.
    2. It is not a price control body; it intervenes only where conduct is anti-competitive, a distinction commonly tested since CCI does not regulate prices directly.
    3. The CCI acts as the first-instance adjudicator across all sectors, since there is no separate technical regulator performing a parallel function within its domain.
    4. Appeals against CCI orders lie with the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), as in the Grasim case, with further appeal lying with the Supreme Court.

    The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT):

    1. It serves as the direct appellate authority for orders, directions, and decisions passed by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). When the CCI rules on anti-competitive agreements, cartels, or abuse of dominant market positions, aggrieved parties challenge those decisions before the NCLAT

    Key Aspects of the Relationship

    1. Appellate Jurisdiction: Empowered under Section 410 of the Companies Act, 2013, NCLAT hears and disposes of all appeals arising from CCI rulings (replacing the erstwhile Competition Appellate Tribunal or COMPAT).
    2. Judicial Review: NCLAT evaluates whether CCI orders follow principles of natural justice, properly weigh market evidence, or stay within regulatory jurisdiction

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] Discuss the role of the Competition Commission of India in containing the abuse of dominant position by the Multi-National Corporations in India. Refer to the recent decisions.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the role of the CCI in preventing abuse of dominant position and promoting fair competition. The article highlights the CCI’s enforcement powers and the need to uphold natural justice while regulating dominant firms.

  • Amnesty International report: India’s arms exports to Israel

    Why in the News?

    An Amnesty International report titled “Made in India” alleged that India exported over 2,500 shipments of small arms, ammunition and components to Israel between October 2023 and November 2025, raising concerns over compliance with international humanitarian law.

    Key Findings

    • Over 2,500 shipments of arms and ammunition-related items were exported.
    • At least 788 shipments were identified as having military purposes.
    • Exports reportedly included machine gun components, artillery shells and explosive warheads.
    • The report relies on shipment-level trade data rather than aggregate trade statistics.

    Why is it Significant?

    • Raises concerns regarding India’s defence exports amid the Gaza conflict.
    • Brings attention to issues of international humanitarian law (IHL) and arms transfers.
    • Highlights the growing India-Israel defence partnership.

    Challenges

    • Balancing strategic defence cooperation with international legal obligations.
    • Ensuring transparency and oversight of defence exports.
    • Reputational risks arising from allegations of complicity in conflict-related violations.

    Amnesty International

    • Established in 1961.
    • Headquarters: London, United Kingdom.
    • Global human rights organisation that investigates and campaigns against human rights violations.
    • Publishes the annual State of the World’s Human Rights report.

    International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

    • Also known as the Law of Armed Conflict.
    • Regulates the conduct of armed conflicts.
    • Primarily based on the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols.
    • Protects civilians, prisoners of war and the wounded during armed conflict.

    India-Israel Defence Cooperation

    • Israel is among India’s major defence suppliers.
    • Cooperation includes: Missiles (Barak-8), UAVs (Heron), Radar systems, Electronic warfare equipment, and Small arms and ammunition

    Geneva Conventions (1949)

    • Four international treaties governing humanitarian protection during war.
    • India is a State Party to all four Geneva Conventions.

    United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI)

    • Independent fact-finding mechanism established by the UN Human Rights Council.
    • Investigates alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

    [2015] Amnesty International is

    (a) an agency of the United Nations to help refugees of civil wars

    (b) a global Human Rights Movement

    (c) a non-governmental voluntary organization to help very poor people

    (d) an inter-governmental agency to cater to medical emergencies in war-ravaged regions.

  • Italy suspends Schengen pact with Spain amid Ceuta migrant crisis

    Why in the News?

    Around 60,000 migrants crossed from Morocco into Spain’s Ceuta enclave within 24 hours, prompting Italy to temporarily suspend the Schengen Agreement with Spain for one month by reintroducing border checks.

    What is the Schengen Area?

    • A passport-free travel zone that abolishes internal border checks among participating European countries.
    • Members maintain common external border controls.
    • Internal border checks may be temporarily reintroduced on grounds of national security or public order.

    What Happened in Ceuta?

    • Around 60,000 migrants attempted to enter Ceuta from Morocco.
    • At least 57 migrants died during the crossing.
    • Spain deployed the armed forces and additional police to restore order.
    • Morocco used tear gas to disperse migrants near the border.

    Why is it Significant?

    • Highlights vulnerabilities at the EU’s external borders.
    • Tests the functioning of the Schengen free movement system.
    • Demonstrates that one member state can temporarily restore internal border controls during security emergencies.
    • Raises concerns over irregular migration, border management and humanitarian protection.

    Challenges

    • Rising irregular migration and human smuggling.
    • Balancing border security with humanitarian obligations.
    • Coordination among EU member states.
    • Political tensions between Spain, Morocco and other EU members.

    Ceuta

    • An autonomous Spanish city on the north coast of Africa, bordering Morocco.
    • Together with Melilla, forms the European Union’s only land border with Africa.
    • Frequently used as an entry point for migrants seeking access to Europe.

    Schengen Area

    • Established under the Schengen Agreement (1985).
    • Schengen Convention: 1990.
    • Implemented from 1995.
    • Comprises 29 countries (25 EU members and 4 non-EU countries).
    • Non-EU Schengen Members: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein

    [2019] Which of the following adopted a law on data protection and privacy for its citizens known as ‘General Data Protection Regulation’ in April 2016 and started implementation of it from 25th May, 2018?

    (a) Australia

    (b) Canada

    (c) The European Union

    (d) The United States of America.

  • Govt on UN Rapporteurs SIR concern: Due process followed

    Why in the News

    The Union government told the Rajya Sabha on 30 July that the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls was carried out by following due process of law without prejudice to any group or community. The reply came almost three months after three United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs wrote to the government raising concern over large scale deletion of electors and alleged discrimination through the exercise.

    How does the Special Intensive Revision work?

    1. Enumeration: Booth level officers distribute and collect enumeration forms from every elector in the area under revision, requiring proof of citizenship, age and ordinary residence rather than relying only on the existing electoral roll entry.
    2. Draft roll: Once forms are collected and verified, the Election Commission of India (ECI) publishes a draft electoral roll reflecting the revised list of electors.
    3. Claims and objections: Electors and political parties can file claims for inclusion or objections to entries during a specified window before the roll is finalised.
    4. Final roll: The ECI publishes the final electoral roll after disposing of claims and objections, and this roll is used for elections held after that date.

    Who are UN Special Rapporteurs?

    1. Independent experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council to examine and report on specific human rights themes or country situations.
    2. They do not represent the UN as an institution, and their communications, including the one on the SIR, carry no binding legal authority over member states.

    What did the Special Rapporteurs allege?

    1. Scale of deletion: The communication raised concern over large scale deletion of electors from the rolls during the SIR exercise.
    2. Discrimination claim: It alleged the exercise had a discriminatory effect on specific groups or communities.
    3. Delay in response: The government’s reply came nearly three months after the communication was received, and only after the matter was raised in the Rajya Sabha.

    Why is a due process claim not enough to settle the matter?

    1. No numbers offered: The government’s reply asserted due process was followed but did not place before Parliament the actual scale of deletions the Special Rapporteurs had flagged.
    2. Parallel legal challenges: The same deletions remain under separate examination in pending petitions before the Supreme Court, meaning the due process claim is being tested in a forum whose outcome is still open.
    3. International scrutiny continues: A reply to Parliament does not close the UN communication, which remains part of the Human Rights Council’s special procedures record regardless of the government’s domestic response.
    4. Verification burden: Requiring citizenship and residence documents from every elector shifts the burden of proof onto individuals, affecting poor, migrant and undocumented voters more than others, the groups the Special Rapporteurs’ discrimination claim centres on.

    What are the challenges to the Special Intensive Revision?

    1. Documentation burden: Migrant workers, the poor and the elderly are least likely to hold the specific documents demanded, raising the risk of wrongful exclusion rather than genuine deduplication.
    2. Timeline pressure: Conducting a house to house enumeration across a state within a compressed window increases the chance of errors by booth level officers working under time pressure.
    3. Appeal window adequacy: A short claims and objections period limits the time available for a wrongly excluded elector to be restored to the rolls before an election is notified.
    4. Judicial pendency: With petitions challenging the SIR still pending before the Supreme Court, the exercise continues in several states even as its legal validity remains undecided.
    5. Reputational cost: Simultaneous scrutiny from Parliament, the courts and UN human rights mechanisms complicates the government’s ability to present the exercise as procedurally settled.

    Conclusion

    The government’s due process claim does not resolve the dispute over the SIR. The scale of the deletions remains undisclosed, petitions challenging the exercise remain pending before the Supreme Court, and the UN communication remains on record with no reply addressing its specific numbers. The next milestone is the Supreme Court’s disposal of the pending petitions, which will determine whether the due process claim withstands judicial scrutiny.

    Back2Basics:

    Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

    1. An intensive, house to house revision of electoral rolls conducted by the Election Commission of India under its powers over preparation and revision of electoral rolls, distinct from the routine annual summary revision.
    2. Requires fresh verification of every elector’s citizenship, age and ordinary residence rather than a review limited to additions and deletions since the last roll.
    3. The current round began in Bihar and has since been extended to other states ahead of scheduled elections.
    4. Political parties and civil society groups have challenged aspects of the exercise before the Supreme Court, citing the risk of wrongful deletion.

    Special Summary Revision (SSR)

    1. SSR is the routine, annual exercise conducted by the ECI to update existing voter lists.
    2. How it works : Unlike SIR, it does not mandate a door-to-door check for every single person. It mostly relies on citizens voluntarily submitting online or offline applications for fresh registration, deletion, or corrections.
    3. Purpose : Accommodating newly eligible young voters (who just turned 18) and making minor changes before an ordinary election cycle.

    Continuous Revision (CR)

    1. Continuous revision runs constantly between the conclusion of a summary revision and the announcement of the next major election.
    2. How it works : The voter list remains open dynamically. Eligible citizens can use the ECI’s Voter Service Portal or Voter Helpline App to update their addresses or register at any point in the year

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “one nation-one election” principle.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines electoral reforms and measures to strengthen the integrity of the electoral process. The article analyses the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), highlighting concerns over voter roll verification, inclusion, and electoral fairness.

  • [31st July 2026] The Hindu OpED: The Bay of Bengal as India’s SHANTI anchor

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2022]     What are the maritime security challenges in India? Discuss the organisational, technical and procedural initiatives taken to improve the maritime security.
    Linkage: It examines India’s maritime security challenges and initiatives to strengthen regional maritime governance.The article analyses SHANTI as India’s new framework to enhance maritime cooperation, security, and resilience in the Bay of Bengal through BIMSTEC.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The External Affairs Minister introduced Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity (SHANTI) on 13 July while launching India’s candidature for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 2028-29 term, naming the Bay of Bengal as the region to operationalise it first. The framework arrives in a region where growing naval and infrastructure capacity has outpaced any shared set of maritime norms among its littoral states.

    What is SHANTI?

    1. Full form and origin: SHANTI stands for Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity, introduced on 13 July alongside India’s UNSC candidature announcement.
    2. Lineage: It builds on Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), articulated in 2015 around the idea of equity in development, and Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR), announced in 2025 to widen that vision to the interconnectedness of security across the Indo Pacific and the Global South.
    3. Function: SHANTI is presented as a normative framework, offering shared principles for maritime security, disaster response, the blue economy and environmental resilience, rather than a new institution or treaty.
    4. Rollout sequence: The Bay of Bengal is named as the first region where SHANTI is meant to move from principle to practice, before any wider application across the Indo Pacific.

    What is BIMSTEC?

    1. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a regional grouping of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, connecting South and Southeast Asia around the Bay of Bengal.
    2. At its National Security Advisers’ meeting in New Delhi in July 2026, BIMSTEC members adopted common principles for maritime law enforcement and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They also agreed to hold their first joint maritime security exercise in the Bay in November 2026.

    Why is the Bay of Bengal treated as SHANTI’s proving ground?

    1. Strategic centrality: The Bay links India’s Act East policy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), gives access to the Malacca Strait, and connects the eastern Indian Ocean to major global trade and energy routes.
    2. Comparative advantage: The western Indian Ocean is marked by active conflict and fragile economies. The Bay’s littoral states instead face similar, non military challenges such as cyclones, coastal erosion, fisheries management and undersea cable protection, which makes cooperation more feasible than confrontation.
    3. Institutional gap: The region is not short of institutions but suffers from fragmentation among them, and SHANTI is framed as a common framework to align existing mechanisms rather than add another one.
    4. Geopolitical pressure: China’s reliance on the Malacca Strait, often called its Malacca dilemma, has driven an expanding Chinese presence through ports and infrastructure projects in the same littoral states SHANTI seeks to anchor.

    Can SHANTI move beyond being another acronym?

    1. Fragmentation risk: The region’s stated problem is institutional fragmentation, and a new framework risks adding to that fragmentation unless it visibly aligns existing mechanisms.
    2. Stewardship versus dominance: India’s convening role depends on being accepted as a preferred security partner and first responder, a position that rests on restraint rather than the naval and economic weight India commands in the region.
    3. Early stage outputs: Concrete outcomes so far are limited to a declaration of common principles, a first joint maritime exercise scheduled for November 2026, and a white shipping information sharing agreement still under discussion, none of which are yet operational.
    4. Norms without enforcement: SHANTI rests on shared principles rather than a binding treaty, leaving compliance dependent on the willingness of littoral states rather than an enforceable obligation.

    What are the challenges to SHANTI?

    1. Overlap with existing bodies: SHANTI must coordinate with, rather than duplicate, existing mechanisms such as BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, each with its own membership and mandate.
    2. Financing gap: Disaster response, undersea cable protection and blue economy cooperation require capital that several BIMSTEC members cannot supply on their own, raising the risk that shared projects become dependent on Indian or external financing.
    3. Limited replicability: The Bay of Bengal is easier ground precisely because it lacks the active conflict of the western Indian Ocean, so success there does not guarantee the same framework will work in more contested Indo Pacific waters.
    4. Competing infrastructure presence: Continued Chinese port and infrastructure investment in the same littoral states complicates India’s claim to a natural convening role.
    5. Dependence on voluntary compliance: Because SHANTI is a set of norms rather than a binding agreement, its durability depends on continued political will among BIMSTEC members rather than any enforcement mechanism.

    Conclusion

    SHANTI’s substance will not be judged by its acronym but by whether the Bay of Bengal’s BIMSTEC linked initiatives, the first joint maritime exercise due in November 2026 and the pending white shipping information sharing agreement, convert shared principles into functioning practice. Until those steps are completed, SHANTI remains a stated framework rather than a demonstrated one.

    Back2Basics:

    BIMSTEC

    1. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation was formed in 1997 and renamed after Bhutan and Nepal joined in 2004, expanding it from its original five members to seven.
    2. Its secretariat is based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and its membership spans Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
    3. The 6th BIMSTEC Summit, held in Bangkok in April 2025, adopted the Bangkok Vision 2030 and a Maritime Transport Agreement covering national treatment for vessels, crew and cargo among member states.
    4. BIMSTEC connects South Asia and Southeast Asia and has expanded its cooperation beyond trade into security, disaster management, energy and connectivity.

  • Activists raise alarm over PM CARES denial of access to audit statements

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations (PM CARES) Fund has not published audited financial statements for the last three financial years. The government maintains that the trust is not a “public authority” under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005 and is therefore not bound by its disclosure requirements. Activists argue that the fund has all the characteristics of a public body. They point out that the Prime Minister is its Chairperson, Union Ministers serve as ex officio trustees, and government employees have contributed from their salaries. Yet, the fund remains outside the RTI Act, parliamentary scrutiny, and audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).


    What is the PM CARES Fund?

    1. Establishment: Set up in March 2020 and registered as a public charitable trust under the Registration Act, 1908, with its trust deed registered in New Delhi on 27 March 2020, to support relief during public health emergencies and other disasters.
    2. Composition: The Prime Minister serves as ex officio Chairperson, and the Union Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Finance serve as ex officio trustees.
    3. Funding: Funded entirely through voluntary contributions from individuals and organisations, with the government stating it receives no budgetary support.
    4. Tax and foreign funding benefits: Donations qualify for a 100% deduction under Section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961, count as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenditure under the Companies Act, 2013, and the fund holds an exemption under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) to receive donations from overseas.

    What financial disclosure has the fund made?

    1. Last published statement: The last publicly available audited statement, for financial year 2022 23, showed an opening balance of Rs 5,415.65 crore, voluntary contributions of Rs 909.64 crore, total receipts of Rs 6,723.07 crore, total payments of Rs 439.38 crore, and a closing balance of Rs 6,283.68 crore as of 31 March 2023.
    2. Disclosure gap: Only the audited statements for 2019 20, 2020 21, 2021 22 and 2022 23 are available on the fund’s website, leaving the last three financial years without any published audit.
    3. Primary use: The fund has primarily financed India’s COVID 19 response and emergency health infrastructure.

    Why does the government’s “not a public authority” position sit uneasily with the fund’s structure?

    1. Government’s legal position: The government maintains the trust is not a public authority under the RTI Act, and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs retrospectively amended the relevant Companies Act rules to support this position.
    2. Activists’ counter: Activists argue the fund was presented as set up by the Union government, carries the sanctity of the Prime Minister’s office as chairperson, and drew contributions from government employees’ salaries, features that make it appear to be a public authority in substance.
    3. The accountability gap: The fund remains outside the RTI Act’s disclosure obligations, outside parliamentary scrutiny, and outside audit by the CAG, the three principal mechanisms that apply to ordinary government spending.

    What are the challenges to ensuring transparency in the PM CARES Fund?

    1. A named precedent: Activists cite the electoral bonds case, where sustained anonymity in political funding enabled quid pro quo arrangements between donors and the government, before the Supreme Court struck the scheme down in February 2024 for violating the right to information.
    2. No independent constitutional audit: Without CAG audit, no independent constitutional auditor verifies how contributions, including those from government employees’ salaries, are spent.
    3. Retrospective rule change: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs’ retrospective amendment to Companies Act rules narrows the scope for legal challenge based on the fund’s original design.
    4. CSR channel scrutiny: Because CSR contributions to PM CARES count toward companies’ mandatory CSR spending obligations, opacity in fund utilisation also affects corporate accountability for those obligations.
    5. No periodic review clause: Unlike time bound government schemes, PM CARES has no periodic legislative or parliamentary review clause forcing disclosure at fixed intervals.

    Conclusion

    The PM CARES Fund’s structure gives it the outward markers of a public authority, a Prime Minister led chairpersonship, ministerial trustees and salary contributions from government employees, while its legal classification as a private trust keeps it outside the RTI Act, parliamentary scrutiny and CAG audit. Three consecutive years without a published audited statement leave activists’ comparison to the electoral bonds case as the operative risk to track. Whether the fund publishes its pending audits or its RTI exempt status changes remains the open question.

    Back2Basics:

    Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India

    1. Constitutional basis: The CAG is a constitutional authority under Articles 148 to 151 of the Constitution, appointed by the President.
    2. Governing law: Its powers and duties are laid out in the Comptroller and Auditor General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971.
    3. Mandate: Audits all receipts and expenditure of the Union and state governments, including bodies substantially financed by government grants, and reports findings for placement before the legislature.
    4. Tenure and independence: Holds office for six years or until age 65, whichever is earlier, and can be removed only through a process similar to a Supreme Court judge’s removal.
    5. Relevance here: PM CARES Fund’s exclusion from CAG audit means its accounts face no scrutiny from this constitutional auditor, unlike most bodies with government backed establishment.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] “Recent amendments to the Right to Information Act will have profound impact on the autonomy and independence of the Information Commission”. Discuss.

    Linkage: This PYQ tests the role of the RTI Act in promoting transparency and accountability in public institutions.The article examines the PM CARES Fund’s exemption from the RTI Act and the resulting concerns over public accountability.