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GS Paper: GS2

  • Balancing right to be forgotten with fair criticism and accountability

    The article discusses the interplay between right to be forgotten and the right of the public to access courts of record, concepts of fair criticism and accountability.

    Context

    The Delhi High Court recently ordered the removal of one of its own judgments from easy access. The High Court recognised that the petitioner may have a right to be forgotten, which must be balanced with the right of the public to access courts of record.

    Right to be forgotten

    • In 2017, the Supreme Court recognised the right to be forgotten as being under the ambit of the right to privacy (specifically, informational privacy) under the Constitution.
    • The Supreme Court observed that a lot of personal information may serve no “legitimate interest”, was “incorrect”, or was not “necessary” or “relevant”.
    • For now, individuals may request data hosts to take down some content, and it may be taken down based on the policies of the respective hosts.
    • There is a general consensus that people should be allowed to modify or delete information uploaded by themselves.
    • However, whether this extends to information uploaded by third parties is uncertain.
    • The right to be forgotten is, generally, the right to have information about a person removed from public access.

    Balancing between right of the public

    • The Delhi High Court recognised that the petitioner may have a right to be forgotten, which must be balanced with the right of the public to access courts of record.
    • Judgments are published for good reasons.
    • Trials held under public scrutiny act as a check against judicial caprices and help in enhancing the confidence of the public in the fairness and objectivity of the administration of justice.
    • The Supreme Court has made is clear that the right to be forgotten was subject to reasonable restrictions based on countervailing rights such as free speech.

    Consider the question “What is right to be forgotten and how it is related to the right to privacy? Examine the issues related to the implementation of the right to be forgotten.”

    Way forward

    • The High Court could have ordered that the name and personal details of the petitioner be redacted while maintaining public access to the judgment itself.

    Conclusion

    The right to be forgotten needs to be studied along with the concepts of fair criticism and accountability.

  • Annual Review of State Laws Report, 2020

    The COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent lockdown had a huge impact on the working of the state legislatures in India.  The PRS Legislative Research’s “Annual review of state laws 2020” shows that the productivity and efficacy of State legislatures are poor.

    Annual Review of State Laws

    • This report focuses on the legislative work performed by states in the calendar year 2020.
    • It is based on data compiled from state legislature websites and state gazettes.
    • It covers 19 state legislatures, including the union territory of Delhi, which together accounts for 90% of the population of the country.

    Highlights of the report

    (1) Sittings of states

    • Compared with its average number of sitting days of 32 from 2016 to 2019, the Karnataka legislature, which is bicameral, met on 31 days last year, the highest for any State in 2020.
    • The southern State was followed by Rajasthan (29 days) and Himachal Pradesh (25 days). For comparison, Parliament met for 33 days last year.
    • In 2020, the average number of sitting days for the 19 States was 18, which was 11 less than the four-year (2016-19) average of 29.
    • Kerala, which had the distinction of remaining at the top in the four years with an average of 53 days, had only 20 days of sittings of the legislature last year.

    (2) Number of bills

    • As for the number of Bills passed last year, Karnataka again topped the list with 61 Bills, followed by Tamil Nadu (42) and Uttar Pradesh (37). For this purpose, Appropriation Bills were excluded.
    • Among poor performers under this category, Delhi passed only one Bill; West Bengal passed two Bills and Kerala three Bills.

    (3) Time taken for passing bills

    • On the duration of time taken to pass Bills, the previous year saw 59% of the Bills being passed by the legislature of the States on the day of introduction.
    • A further 14% was adopted within a day of being introduced.
    • Only 9% of the Bills were passed more than five days after introduction, some of which were referred to committees for further examination.

  • Electoral bonds

    The article highlights the issues with the political funding through electoral bonds.

    Changes made for the electoral bond and issues with them

    • Earlier, only profit-making domestic companies could contribute to political parties; now loss-making companies can too.
    • Earlier, foreign companies or companies where the controlling stake was held by a foreign company couldn’t contribute; now they can. 
    • India’s political parties could theoretically be fully funded by a foreign company operating in India or by a foreign entity through a shell company.
    • Only the ruling party via the State Bank of India (SBI) has a full account of all donations being made via electoral bonds, to itself and to Opposition parties.

    Issues in the Supreme Court verdict

    • In March 2021, the Supreme Court refused to stay the sale of electoral bonds before the West Bengal elections.
    • Instead, the judgment listed several documents which supposedly establish a paper trail on donations and do some ‘match the following’.
    • This is impractical and plainly incorrect.
    • The Right to Information (RTI) Act of 2005 enables easier access to information held by public authorities.
    • Suggesting a “match the following” is incorrect for three reasons.

    1) Full scale of registered entities in unknown

    • If we set aside individual donors and focus just on registered entities, we will find that the full scale of registered entities is unknown. 
    • According to back-of-the-envelope calculations, there are close to 25 lakh potential donors comprising just companies and firms.
    • This includes about 12.6 lakh active private limited companies as of January 31, 2021.
    • Firms, unlike companies, have no regulatory mandate to submit their annual reports except for filing their annual tax returns, since their functioning is regulated by Acts other than the Companies Act of 2013.

    2) No disclosure by companies about donation to political parties

    • Even if registered companies filed annual financial statements, many do not disclose political donations.
    • Conveniently, the Finance Bill of 2017 amended Section 182 of the Companies Act of 2013 to remove the requirement for declaring disaggregated donations to political parties.
    • Even if registered companies filed annual financial statements, many do not disclose political donations.

    3) Political parties do not need to disclose their donor

    • Crucially, political parties do not need to disclose their electoral bond donors either.
    • Strictly speaking, political parties are not even supposed to know their electoral bond donors.
    • The only requirement is the annual audit reports with a total of all donations received via electoral bonds.
    • These reports are submitted with great delays.
    • Even if these reports are submitted on time, there is no way to match a donation of a company to that received by a political party as only aggregate amounts are available.

    Implications

    • Electoral bonds give political power to companies, wealthy individual donors, and foreign entities, thus diluting the universal franchise of one voter-one vote.
    •  Every vote is not equally valuable if companies can influence policies through hidden donations.
    •  The winner of this arrangement is the ruling party, whether at the Centre or in a State, and the loser is the average voter.

    Way forward

    • Companies and political parties could exercise moral leadership and voluntarily disclose the identity of recipients and donors, as the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha recently did.

    Conclusion

    Opacity in political funding goes against the basic tenets of democracy. What we need is a system of political funding which is transparent and fair.

  • G7 Open Societies Pact on Universal Rights

    India has signed off on a joint statement by G-7 and guest countries on “open societies” that reaffirm and encourage the values of “freedom of expression, both online and offline, as a freedom that safeguards democracy and helps people live free from fear and oppression”.

    What is the Open Societies Pact?

    • The ‘Open Societies Statement’ was adopted at the end of an outreach session titled ‘Building Back Together—Open Societies and Economies’, where PM Modi was invited as a lead speaker.
    • The joint statement was signed by the G-7 countries, and India, South Korea, Australia and South Africa, with host British Prime Minister Boris Johnson calling them “Democracies 11”.
    • It refers to “politically motivated internet shutdowns” as one of the threats to freedom and democracy.
    • It affirms “human rights for all, both online and offline, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other HR instruments, and opposition to any form of discrimination, so that everyone can participate fully and equally in society”.

    Why needs such a pact?

    • Democracy and freedom were a part of India’s civilizational ethos”.
    • However, the common concern is that open societies are particularly vulnerable to disinformation and cyber-attacks.

    Impact of the pact

    • While the statement is directed at China and Russia, India has been under scrutiny over Internet curbs in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Moreover, the center is locked in a face-off over its new IT rules with tech giants such as Twitter, which described a police search at its offices in India last month as a “potential threat to freedom of expression”.

  • The road from Galwan, a year later

    What happened in Galwan?

    • The Indian and Chinese armies are engaged in the standoff in Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie in eastern Ladakh.
      • A sizable number of Chinese Army personnel even transgressed into the Indian side of the de-facto border in several areas including Pangong Tso.
      • The actions on the northern bank of Pangong Tso are not just for territorial gains on land, but enhanced domination of the resource-rich lake.
    • The stand-off at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley has escalated in June 2020 due to the infrastructure projects that India has undertaken in the recent years. India is building a strategic road through the Galwan Valley – close to China – connecting the region to an airstrip.
      • China is opposed to any Indian construction in the area. In 1962, a stand-off in the Galwan area was one of the biggest flashpoints of the 1962 war.
    • The border, or Line of Actual Control, is not demarcated, and China and India have differing ideas of where it should be located, leading to regular border “transgressions.” Often these don’t escalate tensions; a serious border standoff like the current one is less frequent, though this is the fourth since 2013.
      • Both countries’ troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the contested 2,200-mile border is a long-standing subject of competing claims and tensions, including a brief war in 1962.
    • Reasons: The violent clash happened when the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the LAC and attempted to unilaterally change the status quo.
      • It is part of China’s ‘nibble and negotiate policy’. Their aim is to ensure that India does not build infrastructure along the LAC. It is their way of attaining a political goal with military might, while gaining more territory in the process.

    The current situation in Ladakh

    •  With a continued deployment of 50,000-60,000 soldiers, the Indian Army has been able to hold the line to prevent any further ingress by the PLA.
    • There has been no progress in talks after the disengagement at Pangong lake and Kailash range in February.
    • Outside of Ladakh, the Indian Army remains in an alert mode all along the LAC to prevent any Chinese misadventure but the bigger change has been its reorientation of certain forces from Pakistan border towards the China border.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also exposed India’s military weakness to tackle a collusive threat from China and Pakistan.

    External balancing

    • To deal with the threat of combined China and Pakistan, the Government opened backchannel talks with Pakistan which led to the reiteration of the ceasefire on the Line of Control.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also led the Government to relook external partnerships, particularly with the United States.
    • The U.S. military officials have earlier spoken of the intelligence and logistics support provided to the Indian forces in Ladakh.
    • The military importance of the Quad remains moot, with India reportedly refusing to do joint naval patrolling with the U.S. in the South China Sea, the two treaty allies of the U.S., Japan and Australia, also refused.

    Challenges for India

    • India attempts to counter the growing Chinese influence in the neighbourhood have faltered, exacerbated by the mishandling of the second wave of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
    • With the widening power gap between New Delhi and Beijing, the challenge is as much economic as it is geopolitical.
    • Despite the border crisis and the Indian restrictions on Chinese technology companies, China displaced the U.S. to be India’s biggest trade partner in 2020-21, up to nearly 13% of India’s total trade compared to 10.4% a year ago.
    • For the past few decades, Indian planners operated on the premise that their diplomats will be able to manage the Chinese problem without it developing into a full-blown military crisis.
    • Militarily, Chinese incursions in Ladakh have shown that the idea of deterrence has failed.
    • India has learnt that it can no longer have simultaneous competition and cooperation with China.
    • A new reset in bilateral ties, àla the early 1990s, is difficult because China is now in a different league, competing with the U.S.

    Conclusion

    The events of the past one year have significantly altered India’s thinking towards China. The relationship is at the crossroads now. The choices made will have a significant impact on the future of global geopolitics.

    B2BASICS

    Line of Actual Control

    • Demarcation Line: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
    • LAC is different from the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan:
      • The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the United Nations (UN) after the Kashmir War.
      • It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement.
      • The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground.
    • Length of the LAC: India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.

  • A template for Indian engagement with the West

    The article highlights the significance of the recent G-7 summit for India.

    India’s engagement with the West

    • Two important messages emerge from India’s participation in G-7 with the members of the G-7 and three other invited guests — Australia, South Africa and South Korea.
    • First is that India is a “natural ally” of the G-7 and its partners.
    • The other is the emphasis on shared democratic values that bind India with the West.
    • The two ideas are certainly not new to India’s foreign policy, but they acquire special importance at the current juncture.
    • In the last few years, India embarked on an expansive engagement with Europe.
    • This G-7 summit can be seen as the beginning of an institutionalisation of India’s cooperation with the West.

    What makes this G-7 Summit different from the past Summits?

    • China factor: After the 2008 financial crisis, the more representative G-20, which includes China, Russia, India and many others, seemed to supersede the G-7.
    • But amidst the growing sense that China has gamed the global economic order to America’s disadvantage, there has been renewed interest in like-minded coalitions like the G-7.
    • Widening the base of G-7: There is also the recognition of the case for widening the base of institutions like the G-7 beyond the geographic West to include large democracies like India.
    • Coalition of democracies: The case for a “coalition of democracies” was certainly gaining ground over the last two decades within American academia and the political class.
    • But economic globalisation and the absence of great power rivalry meant there was no compelling policy urgency to construct an “alliance of democracies”.
    • That condition has altered radically in the last few years amidst the growing US tensions with China and Russia. 

    Dealing with the challenges presented by China

    • U.S. President Biden declared his main objective as rallying democracies to meet the great challenges of our time, especially those presented by China.
    • G-7 summit has responded to Biden’s call in the following forms:
    • 1) By offering the outline of a potential alternative to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.
    • 2)By calling for a reorientation of global supply chains away from China.
    • 3) By demanding a fresh inquiry into the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic in China.
    • 4) By reprimanding Beijing policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
    • 5) By raising concerns about the conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
    • However, there is a strong view that the door must be kept open for engagement with China on issues like climate change while calling out its unacceptable policies.

    India’s relations with China: New context for engagement with West

    • The rupture in the US engagement with China coincides with the rapid deterioration in India’s relations with China.
    • This also sets up a new context for India’s partnership with the West.
    • If the Indo-Pacific provides a regional basis for India’s engagement with the US and Europe, mitigating climate change and the management of the Covid-19 pandemic provides a global template for India’s engagement with the West.

    Way forward

    • The case for renewal and reform of democratic institutions is urgent in both the US and India.
    • So is the need for sustained consultations between India and its Western partners on a range of new challenges presented by digital technologies, including radicalisation, disinformation, electoral interference, cyber-attacks and the role of large social media companies. 
    • The statement on open societies provides a sound basis for such an engagement.

    Conclusion

    India must begin institutionalisation of its relationship with the West and increase its engagement on various common issues including the China challenge.

  • Explained: SC move to quash OBC quota in Maharashtra Local Bodies

    The Supreme Court last month quashed Maharashtra’s review petition challenging its earlier verdict that scrapped a quota for OBCs in the state’s local bodies, triggering a war of words between the ruling and opposition parties.

    What is the OBC reservation in local bodies?

    • The Maharashtra government set up a 27 percent quota in local bodies for OBCs in 1994.
    • The 27 percent reservation was applicable to all urban (Municipal Corporations, Councils and Nagar Panchayat) and rural bodies (Zilla Parishad, Panchayat Samiti and Gram Panchayat) across the state.
    • In Maharashtra, the OBCs include the Denotified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category.
    • This quota for OBCs increased their representation in rural and urban local bodies.

    What is the history of the demand for an OBC census in Maharashtra?

    • As per the Mandal Commission report, the last caste-wise census was conducted in 1931 and it was later discontinued.
    • Based on the data from the 1931 census, the Mandal commission worked out the OBC population to be 52 per cent and recommended a 27 per cent reservation for OBCs in view of the SC judgment limiting reservation up to 50 per cent.
    • There was already a 22.5 per cent reservation for SC and ST categories.
    • The Mandal Commission report recommended 27 per cent reservation in government jobs and promotions along with others.
    • The report gave momentum to OBC leaders and the community’s demand for a caste-wise census of OBC.

    Need for a caste-wise census

    • The 2011 census included data about the socio-economic caste census but has not released the data citing the errors in it.
    • In 2018, ahead of the Lok Sabha polls the following year, the Centre announced that OBC enumeration will be done in the 2021 census.
    • But this promise could not be tested with the onset of the pandemic and the indefinite delay in population enumeration.
    • OBC leaders fear the OBC enumeration may never actually happen.

    How did the matter reach the SC?

    • The quota was exceeding the 50 per cent limit which is contrary to SC 2010 judgment of K Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and Ors. vs. Union of India and others.
    • The court granted the status quo and the elections were delayed.
    • On March 4 this year, The SC read it down in stating that it may be invoked only upon complying with the triple conditions before notifying the seats reserved for OBC category in the concerned local bodies.
    • The triple conditions included setting up “a dedicated Commission to conduct a contemporaneous rigorous empirical inquiry into the nature and implications of the backwardness qua local bodies, within the State”.
    • This was to specify the proportion of reservations required to be provisioned local body-wise in light of recommendations of the commission.
    • It also stated that such reservation, in any case, shall not exceed the aggregate of 50 per cent of the total seats reserved in favour of SCs, STs and OBCs taken together.
    • The apex court observed the reservation for OBCs is only “statutory”, to be provided by the state legislations, unlike the “constitutional” reservation regarding SCs/STs which is linked to the proportion of the population.

    What do OBC leaders say now?

    • There has been a mixed response from the OBC leaders to the SC verdict, with some welcoming it while others lamenting on losing reservation.
    • Some say it will pave the way for conducting the OBC census in the state.
    • So far, there was no data about the OBC population and our demand for the OBC census for the last 30 years have fallen on deaf ears.
    • With this SC order, the state has to conduct the census now.
    • Else, there will be no OBC reservation in the local bodies polls and the ruling parties will have to pay a huge price for it.

    What lies ahead?

    • The SC judgment is applicable to the elections of all local bodies — rural and urban.
    • As per a statement from the CM’s office, the SC verdict is likely to impact around 56,000 seats in all local bodies in the state.
    • This includes polls pending due to Covid and the upcoming elections.
    • So, the state election commission will consult with the state government whenever the local bodies’ polls are held and will decide on the OBC reservation as per the SC order.

  • What is Open Market Sale Scheme (OMSS)?

    The Centre has informed the Supreme Court regarding the purchase of grains by the States and the UTs under the Open Market Sales Scheme (OMSS) in 2021-2022 while debunking apprehensions that those without ration cards may be left to die.

    Open Market Sale Scheme (OMSS)

    • OMSS refers to the selling of food grains by the government/government agencies at predetermined prices in the open market from time to time.
    • This scheme aims to enhance the supply of grains especially during the lean season and thereby to moderate the general open market prices, especially in the deficit regions.
    • The Food Corporation of India (FCI) on the instructions from the Government, sells wheat and rice in the open market from time to time.
    • This enhances the supply of wheat and rice especially during the lean season and moderates the open market prices, especially in the deficit regions.

    Components of the scheme

    The present form of OMSS comprises 3 schemes as under:

    1. Sale of wheat to bulk consumers/private traders through e-auction.
    2. Sale of wheat to bulk consumers/private traders through e-auction by dedicated movement.
    3. Sale of Raw Rice Grade ‘A’ to bulk consumers/private traders through e-auction.

    Selling through a transparent process

    • For transparency in operations, the Corporation has switched over to e-auction for sale under Open Market Sale Scheme (Domestic).
    • The FCI conducts a weekly auction to conduct this scheme in the open market using the platform of commodity exchange NCDEX (National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange Limited).
    • The State Governments/ Union Territory Administrations are also allowed to participate in the e-auction if they require wheat and rice outside TPDS & OWS.

    Answer this PYQ in the comment box:

    Q.The economic cost of food grains to the Food Corporation of India is Minimum Support Price and bonus (if any) paid to the farmers plus:

    (a) Transportation cost only

    (b) Interest cost only

    (c) Procurement incidentals and distribution cost

    (d) Procurement incidentals and charges for godowns

  • History of Tulu and the demand for Official Language Status

    Various organizations have initiated a Twitter campaign demanding official language status to Tulu in Karnataka and Kerala and received an overwhelming response.

    Answer this PYQ in the comment box:

    Q.Consider the following languages:

    1. Gujarati
    2. Kannada
    3. Telugu

    Which of the above has/have been declared as ‘Classical Language / Languages’ by the Government?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 2 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    Who all speak Tulu in India now and what is its history?

    • Tulu is a Dravidian language spoken mainly in two coastal districts Dakshina Kannada and Udupi of Karnataka and Kasaragod district of Kerala.
    • As per the 2011 Census report, there are 18,46,427 Tulu-speaking people in India. Some scholars suggest Tulu is among the earliest Dravidian languages with a history of 2000 years.
    • Robert Caldwell (1814-1891), in his book, A Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian or South-Indian Family of Languages, called Tulu “one of the most highly developed languages of the Dravidian family”.

    So what exactly is the demand by Tulu speakers?

    • The Tulu speakers, mainly in Karnataka and Kerala, have been requesting the governments to give it official language status and include it in the eighth schedule to the Constitution.
    • Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu, Bodo, Santhali, Maithili and Dogri are the 22 languages presently in the eighth schedule.

    Tulu art, culture and cinema

    • Tulu has a rich oral literature tradition with folk-song forms like paddana, and traditional folk theatre yakshagana.
    • Tulu also has an active tradition of cinema with around 5 to 7 Tulu language movies produced a year.
    • Tulu films are being screened every day in Mangaluru and Udupi in at least one theatre.

    What is the present status of Tulu?

    • According to Karnataka Tulu Sahitya Academy president Dayananda G Kathalsar,
    • People who speak Tulu are confined to the above-mentioned regions of Karnataka and Kerala, informally known as Tulu Nadu.
    • At present, Tulu is not an official language in the country.
    • Efforts are being made to include Tulu in the eighth schedule of the Constitution.
    • If included in the eighth schedule, Tulu would get recognition from the Sahitya Akademi.

    Back2Basics: Eighth Schedule to the Indian Constitution

    • The Eighth Schedule lists the official languages of the Republic of India.
    • At the time when the Constitution was enacted, inclusion in this list meant that the language was entitled to representation on the Official Languages Commission.
    • This language would be one of the bases that would be drawn upon to enrich Hindi and English, the official languages of the Union.
    • The list has since, however, acquired further significance.
    • In addition, a candidate appearing in an examination conducted for public service is entitled to use any of these languages as the medium in which he or she answers the paper.
    • As per Articles 344(1) and 351 of the Indian Constitution, the eighth schedule includes the recognition of the 22 languages.

    ‘Classical’ languages in India

    Currently, six languages enjoy the ‘Classical’ status: Tamil (declared in 2004), Sanskrit (2005), Kannada (2008), Telugu (2008), Malayalam (2013), and Odia (2014).

    How are they classified?

    According to information provided by the Ministry of Culture in the Rajya Sabha in February 2014, the guidelines for declaring a language as ‘Classical’ are:

    • High antiquity of its early texts/recorded history over a period of 1500-2000 years;
    • A body of ancient literature/texts, which is considered a valuable heritage by generations of speakers;
    • The literary tradition be original and not borrowed from another speech community;
    • The classical language and literature being distinct from modern, there may also be a discontinuity between the classical language and its later forms or its offshoots.

  • Rare Earth Metals at the heart of China-US rivalry

    Beijing’s dominance in rare earth minerals, the key to the future of manufacturing, is a cause for concern for the West.

    Answer this question from CSP 2011 in the comment box:

    Q.What is the difference between a CFL and an LED lamp? 

    1. To produce light, a CFL uses mercury vapor and phosphor while an LED lamp uses semi-conductor material.
      2. The average life span of a CFL is much longer than that of an LED lamp
      3. A CFL is less energy-efficient as compared to an LED lamp.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) Only 1

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    What are Rare Earth Metals?

    • The rare earth elements (REE) are a set of seventeen metallic elements. These include the fifteen lanthanides on the periodic table plus scandium and yttrium.
    • Rare earth elements are an essential part of many high-tech devices.
    • They have a wide range of applications, especially high-tech consumer products, such as cellular telephones, computer hard drives, electric and hybrid vehicles, and flat-screen monitors and televisions.
    • Significant defense applications include electronic displays, guidance systems, lasers, and radar and sonar systems.
    • Rare earth minerals, with names like neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, are crucial to the manufacture of magnets used in industries of the future, such as wind turbines and electric cars.

    Curbing dependence on China

    • At a time of frequent geopolitical friction among those three powers, Washington and Brussels want to avoid this scenario.
    • They are investing in the market for 17 minerals with unique properties that today are largely extracted and refined in China.
    • The expected exponential growth in demand for minerals that are linked to clean energy is putting more pressure on US and Europe to take a closer look.
    • Amid the transition to green energy, in which rare earth minerals are sure to play a role, China’s market dominance is enough to sound an alarm in western capitals.

    Why such a move?

    • In 2019, the U.S. imported 80% of its rare earth minerals from China.
    • The EU gets 98% of its supply from China.