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GS Paper: GS2

  • The challenges of walking the Indo-Pacific talk

    The article analyses the similarity, differences and limitations of the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct and delineate the challenges India as it seeks to deal with China.

    Expectations from India in countering China

    • During the mid-2000s the world expected India to be an economic powerhouse, a decade later, those expectations remain modest, at best.
    • The international community has once again decided to court New Delhi to play a decisive role in shaping the region’s strategic future.
    • The expectation this time is more strategic and military, to lead the charge against China from within the region.

    Role of India in the Quad and similarity with Indo-Pacific construct

    • Quad is a forum for strategic and military consultations among India, the U.S., Australia and Japan.
    • Quad members are also major States in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Both the Quad and the Indo-Pacific constructs are focused on China.
    • More so, they are also in some ways centred around India’s geographic location and its policies.
    • Put differently, if you take China out of the equation, they would have little rationale for existence.
    • If you take India out of the picture, their ability to sustain as geopolitical constructs would drastically diminish.

    Differences between  Indo-Pacific Construct and Quad

    • The Indo-Pacific is a politico-economic vision and the Quad is a military-strategic vision which does not form the military or strategic nucleus of the first.
    • While the Indo-Pacific provides a complex political and economic picture with a hesitant, but growing, articulation of China as a strategic challenge.
    • The Quad is inherently more anti-China in character and intent.
    • The Indo-Pacific,will find it impossible to avoid engaging China, the Quad is mostly focused on diplomatic signalling and with little common intent let alone joint action.
    • Quad’s ability to succeed would entirely depend on China — the more aggressive China gets, the more resolute the Quad countries would be in strengthening it.

    Comparing Indio-Pacific with BRI

    • The BRI is far more advanced, much more thought-out, and enjoyes the support of Chinese state.
    • Several Indo-Pacific countries are already members of the BRI.
    • On the flip side, the BRI is already under immense stress from its inherent weaknesses, such as China’s unilateral pursuit of the BRI and the associated economic burdens on the States that sign up to it.

    Challenges India face

    1) On economic front

    • There must be strong economic partnerships and linkages among its members, merely focusing on strategic talk and possible military cooperation will not work.
    • India’s recent decision not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), could potentially complicate the country’s future engagements in the region.
    • Also worryinng is the already huge gap between India and China on trade with almost every Indo-Pacific country.
    • This growing trade gap will be a major determining factor in shaping the region’s strategic realities.
    • Institutional engagement: India does not have FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., Bangladesh and the Maldives. It has FTAs with South Korea, the Association of South East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, Japan and Sri Lanka.
    • In the case of China, it has FTAs with all these countries barring the U.S.

    2) On strategic and military front

    • India strategic and military engagements in the region also fall short.
    • Beijing is a major defence supplier to several of the region’s States including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
    • This dwarfs India’s minimal sales, defence dialogues and occasional joint military exercises in the region.

    Way forward

    • India’s role in the Indo-Pacific will remain limited if it does not prove to be a major economic partner to these States.
    • But given the economic slowdown in India today in the wake of COVID-19 and the lack of political consensus about RCEP, India’s ability to economically engage with the region remains limited.
    • On the military-strategic side too, India’s performance in the region is less than desirable.
    • The only choice, it appears then, is for some sort of a loosely structured regional strategic alliance with the U.S. and its allies in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

    Consider the question ” What are the similarities and differences in the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct? What are the challenges India faces as it increases its engagement in the both.” 

    Conclusion

    India remains caught between a deeply constrained, but unavoidable, need to rethink its strategic posture, and the recognition of its material inability to do so, at least for now.

  • Excessive optimism over a pact with election-bound US is premature

    The growing pace of India-US bilateral engagement has raised hopes in several quarters. However, there are several issues that must be considered and need to avoid excessive optimism. 

    Timing of 2+2 dialogue

    • The India-US 2+2 third meeting was held in Delhi only a week before the US presidential elections.
    • The government felt that it was important to seal the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) without delay.
    • Other reason could be government’s assessment that there is bipartisan support in the US for higher and positive bilateral ties.

    Need for caution in India’s approach

    • In India-US ties, the leading outside consideration is China.
    • A Biden presidency, should that be the choice of the American people, would seek to ensure that China’s rise is not at the cost of the US’s global pre-eminence.
    • However, the strategy and methods it employs would be different from that of its predecessor.
    • Further, even a Trump 2 administration, with the election done, may change course in its China approach.
    • Hence, caution and prudence are good diplomatic watchwords.
    • It is good that the agreements for a full defence engagement with the US are in place.
    • But it is one matter to have them done and an entirely different one insofar as the nature and intensity of cooperation.
    • So, India’s tradition of relying on its own strengths in matters of national security should not be eroded in the hope that an outside power would provide useful inputs.

    Alliance Vs. Partnership

    • India-US ties are in the framework of a partnership, not an alliance.
    • The partnership may not be based on opposition to an outside element, the alliance almost always is.
    • Alliances also demand a much higher price than partnerships, through loss of autonomy if the ally is a bigger power.

    Excessive enthusiasm on Quad may be premature

    • The 2+2 joint statement does not name China but its thrust is clear.
    • The Quad is based on a commonality of concerns on account of China’s actions.
    • India’s decision to go along with a more purposive group, including through its maritime exercises, is in keeping with its interests.
    • The real direction that the Quad will take has to await the US’s overall China strategy over the next few years.
    • Excessive enthusiasm on the Quad front may, therefore, be premature.

    Way forward

    • India has to change the nature of its economic and commercial ties with China.
    • Thus, the joint statement’s reference on the need to “enhance supply chain resilience and to seek alternatives to the current paradigm” was timely, though here, again, the future US approach is not entirely certain.
    • The areas where the bilateral partnership has the potential of evolving most positively for India relate to health, education and science and technology.
    • There should not be any reluctance in developing ties in defence industries, too, but it cannot be forgotten that no country will part with any of its critical technologies.
    • But there cannot be a substitute for developing indigenous capacity for India’s needs for weapon systems.

    Conclusion

    India-US ties will move positively forward but there will be imponderables ahead, principally arising out of US strategies towards China. But, a close embrace of another country is always problematic.

  • Annual State of Education Report (ASER) Wave 1, 2020

    The ASER Wave 1 Survey was recently released since the COVID-19 crisis interrupted this years’ trajectory.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.Discuss the efficacy of the One-Nation- One-Board System and its limitations.

    About ASER Survey

    • This is an annual survey (published by education non-profit Pratham ) that aims to provide reliable estimates of children’s enrolment and basic learning levels for each district and state in India.
    • ASER has been conducted every year since 2005 in all rural districts of India. It is the largest citizen-led survey in India.
    • It is also the only annual source of information on children’s learning outcomes available in India.

    How is the survey conducted?

    • ASER tools and procedures are designed by ASER Centre, the research and assessment arm of Pratham.
    • The survey itself is coordinated by ASER Centre and facilitated by the Pratham network. It is conducted by close to 30,000 volunteers from partner organisations in each district.
    • All kinds of institutions partner with ASER: colleges, universities, NGOs, youth groups, women’s organisations, self-help groups and others.
    • The ASER model has been adapted for use in several countries around the world: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Pakistan, Mali and Senegal.

    Assessment parameters

    • Unlike most other large-scale learning assessments, ASER is a household-based rather than school-based survey.
    • This design enables all children to be included – those who have never been to school or have dropped out, as well as those who are in government schools, private schools, religious schools or anywhere else.
    • In each rural district, 30 villages are sampled. In each village, 20 randomly selected households are surveyed.
    • Information on schooling status is collected for all children living in sampled households who are in the age group 3-16.
    • Children in the age group 5-16 are tested in basic reading and basic arithmetic. The same test is administered to all children.
    • The highest level of reading tested corresponds to what is expected in Std 2; in 2012 this test was administered in 16 regional languages.
    • In recent years, this has included household size, parental education, and some information on household assets.

    Key Findings

    1.Enrollments:

    • 5.5% of rural children are not currently enrolled for the 2020school year, up from 4% in 2018.
    • This difference is the sharpest among the youngest children (6 to 10) where 5.3% of rural children had not yet enrolled in school in 2020, in comparison to just 1.8% in 2018.
    • Due to the disruptions caused by the pandemic, families are waiting for the physical opening of schools to enrol their youngest children, with about 10% of six-year-olds not in school.
    • Among 15-16 year-olds, however, enrollment levels are slightly higher than in 2018.
    • The proportion of boys enrolled in government schools has risen from 62.8% in 2018 to 66.4% in 2020, while for girls, that number has gone up from 70% to 73% in the corresponding period.
    • Patterns show a slight shift toward government schools, with private schools seeing a drop in enrolment in all age groups.
    • The Centre has now permitted States to start reopening schools if they can follow Covid-19 safety protocols but the majority of the country’s 25 crore students are still at home.

    2.Availability of Smartphones:

    • Among enrolled children, 61.8% live in families that own at least one smartphone which was merely 36.5% in 2018.
    • About 11% of families bought a new phone after the lockdown, of which 80% were smartphones.
    • WhatsApp is by far the most popular mode of transmitting learning materialsto students, with 75% of students receiving input via this app.

    3.Availability of Learning Material:

    • Overall more than 80% of children said they had textbooks for their current grade.
    • This proportion was higher among students enrolled in government schools (84.1%) than in private ones (72.2%).
    • In Bihar, less than 8% got such materials from their schools, along with 20% in West Bengal, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
    • More than 80% of rural children in Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Kerala and Gujarat received such input.

    4.Learning Activities:

    • Most children (70.2%) did some form of a learning activity through material shared by tutors or family members themselves, with or without regular input.
    • 11% had access to live online classes, and 21% had videos or recorded classes, with much higher levels in private schools.
    • About 60% studied from their textbooks and 20% watched classes broadcast on TV.

    Suggestions

    • Fluid Situation: When schools reopen, it will be important to continue to monitor who goes back to school as well as to understand whether there is learning lossas compared to previous years.
    • Building on and Strengthening Family Support: Parents’ increasing levels of education can be integrated into planning for learning improvement, as advocated by National Education Policy, 2020. Reaching parents at the right level is essential to understand how they can help their children and older siblings also play an important role.
    • Hybrid Learning: As children do a variety of different activities at home, effective ways of hybrid learning need to be developed which combine traditional teaching-learning with newer ways of “reaching-learning”.
    • Assessment of Digital Modes and Content: In order to improve digital content and delivery for the future, an in-depth assessment of what works, how well it works, who it reaches, and who it excludes is needed.
    • Mediating the Digital Divide: Children from families who had low education and also did not have resources like smartphones had less access to learning opportunities. However, even among such households, there is evidence of effort with family members trying to help and schools trying to reach them. These children will need even more help than others when schools reopen.

    Way Forward

    • Covid-19 has left the nation with deep economic distress and uncertainty over school-reopenings and thrown open new challenges in every sector.
    • The nationally representative sample highlighted the role played by the families where everyone in the family supported children regardless of their education levels.
    • This strength needs to be leveraged by reaching out to more students and reducing the distance between schools and homes.

  •  Explained: Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) VS COMCASA VS LEMOA

    India and the United States have signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which, along with the two agreements signed earlier — the LEMOA and the COMCASA.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q. What is the troika of “foundational pacts” of India with the US? Discuss each of them. (150W)

    Completing the troika

    • The two agreements signed earlier are— the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA).
    • This completes a troika of “foundational pacts” for deep military cooperation between the two countries.

    What is BECA?

    • BECA will help India get real-time access to American geospatial intelligence that will enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed drones.
    • Through the sharing of information on maps and satellite images, it will help India access topographical and aeronautical data, and advanced products that will aid in navigation and targeting.

    Benefits of BECA

    • This could be a key to Air Force-to-Air Force cooperation between India and the US.
    • BECA will provide Indian military systems with a high-quality GPS to navigate missiles with real-time intelligence to precisely target the adversary.
    • Besides the sailing of ships, flying off aircraft, fighting of wars, and location of targets, geospatial intelligence is also critical to the response to natural disasters.

    What was the LEMOA about?

    • LEMOA was the first of the three pacts to be signed in August 2016.
    • LEMOA allows the militaries of the US and India to replenish from each other’s bases, and access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed.
    • LEMOA is extremely useful for India-US Navy-to-Navy cooperation since the two countries are cooperating closely in the Indo-Pacific.

    Concretizing the mutual trust

    • The critical element that underpins LEMOA is mutual trust.
    • Without trust, no country will be willing to expose its military and strategic assets such as warships to the facilities of another country.
    • The signing of LEMOA was in itself an affirmation of the mutual trust between the two militaries, and its application will enhance the trust.
    • It took almost a decade to negotiate LEMOA, and the exercise in a sense bridged the trust deficit between India and the US and paved the way for the other two foundational pacts.

    What about the COMCASA?

    • COMCASA was signed in September 2018, after the first 2+2 dialogue during Mrs. Swarajs’ term as EAM.
    • The pact allows the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US military commanders, and the aircraft and ships of the two countries, can communicate through secure networks during times of both peace and war.
    • The signing of COMCASA paved the way for the transfer of communication security equipment from the US to India to facilitate “interoperability” between their forces.

    Specific context and practical benefit for India

    • The strengthening of the mechanisms of cooperation between the two militaries must be seen in the context of an increasingly aggressive China.
    • Amid the ongoing standoff on the LAC in Ladakh — the longest and most serious in three decades — India and the US intensified under-the-radar intelligence and military cooperation at an unprecedented level.
    • These conversations facilitated information-sharing between the two countries, including the sharing of high-end satellite images, telephone intercepts, and data on Chinese troops and weapons deployment along the LAC.

    Conclusion

    • Such agreements mark the enhancement of mutual trust and a commitment to the long-term strategic relationship.
    • The US wants India to move away from Russian equipment and platforms, as it feels this may expose its technology and information to Moscow.
    • So far, India is going ahead with the purchase of the S-400 air defence missile system from Russia, and this has been a sticking point for American interlocutors.
    • For its part, India is wary of Pakistan’s deep-rooted ties with the Pentagon, and Washington’s dependence on Rawalpindi for access to Afghanistan as well as its exit strategy.
    • But, because of the clear and present danger from China, New Delhi’s strategic embrace of Washington is the obvious outcome.

  • India-Myanmar relations

    The Foreign Secretary and Chief of the Army Staff have recently visited Myanmar reflected India’s multidimensional interests in the country.

    Try this question:

    Q.Myanmar is the key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach. Analyse.

    India-Myanmar relations

    • There are two lines of thinking that drive India’s Myanmar policy: engagement with key political actors and balancing neighbours.
    • For Myanmar, the visit would be viewed as India’s support for its efforts in strengthening democratization amidst criticisms by rights groups over the credibility of its upcoming election.

    Non-interference in internal politics

    • The political logic that has shaped India’s Myanmar policy since the 1990s has been to support democratization driven from within the country.
    • This has allowed Delhi to engage with the military that played a key role in Myanmar’s political transition and is still an important political actor.
    • A key factor behind the military regime’s decision to open the country when it initiated reforms was, in part, to reduce dependence on China.

    India as an alternative

    • By engaging Myanmar, Delhi provides alternative options to Naypyidaw.
    • This driver in India’s Myanmar policy has perhaps gained greater salience in the rapidly changing regional geopolitics.

    Recent initiatives

    • Like in other neighbouring countries, India suffers from an image of being unable to get its act together in making its presence felt on the ground.
    • The inauguration of the liaison office of the Embassy of India in Naypyidaw (the capital) may seem a routine diplomatic activity.
    • However, establishing a permanent presence in the capital where only a few countries have set up such offices does matter.
    • Interestingly, China was the first country to establish a liaison office in Naypyidaw in 2017.
    • India has also proposed to build a petroleum refinery in Myanmar that would involve an investment of $6 billion.

    Strategic calculus

    • This is an indication of Myanmar’s growing significance in India’s strategic calculus.
    • It also shows India’s evolving competitive dynamic with China in the sector at a time when tensions between the two have intensified.
    • Another area of cooperation that has expanded involves the border areas.
    • Furthermore, the recent announcement that India was transferring a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar demonstrates the depth of their cooperation in the maritime domain.

    The balancing act

    • For Delhi, the balancing act between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains one of the keys to its overall approach to the Rohingya issue.
    • Delhi has reiterated its support for “ensuring the safe, sustainable and speedy return of displaced persons” to Myanmar.
    • By positioning as playing an active role in facilitating the return of Rohingya refugees, India has made it clear that it supports Myanmar’s efforts and also understands Bangladesh’s burden.
    • For Delhi, engaging rather than criticizing is the most practical approach to finding a solution.

    Conclusion

    • For India, Myanmar is key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach.
    • Delhi’s political engagement and diplomatic balancing seem to have worked so far in its ties with Myanmar.
    • Whether it has leveraged these advantages on the ground to the full is open to debate.
    • The aforementioned initiatives could be the beginning of change on the ground by establishing India’s presence in sectors where it ought to be more pronounced.

  • Outsiders can now buy land in Jammu and Kashmir

    People, as well as investors outside Jammu and Kashmir, can now purchase land in the Union Territory (UT) as the Centre has notified new land laws for the region.

    What is the new criterion?

    • Under the newly introduced J&K Development Act, the term “permanent resident of the State” as a criterion has been “omitted”, paving the way for investors outside J&K to invest in the UT.
    • Under the ‘transfer of land for the purpose of promotion of healthcare or education’, the government may now allow the transfer of land.
    • According to amendments made to “The Jammu & Kashmir Land Revenue Act, Samvat, 1996”, only agriculturists of J&K can purchase agricultural land.
    • No sale, gift, exchange, or mortgage of the land shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist.
    • No land used for agriculture purposes shall be used for any non-agricultural purposes except with the permission of the district collector.
    • Under a new provision, an Army officer not below the rank of Corps Commander can declare an area as “Strategic Area” within a local area, only for direct operational and training requirements.

    Note: These laws do not apply to the UT of Ladakh. The Centre is likely to notify separate land laws for the UT of Ladakh soon.

    Criticisms of the move

    • Political parties have opposed the move citing the sale of the state.
    • With these new laws in place, tokenism of the domicile certificate has been done away with, as purchasing non-agricultural land has been made easier.

  • New dimension to the bilateral engegement

    The article draws parallels in the past in India and China’s engagement with West Asia and contrasts it with the present approach adopted by China in dealing with the region.

    Strategic autonomy

    • According to a former Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, the ideation of ‘strategic autonomy’ is much different from the Nehruvian era thinking of ‘non-alignment’.
    • Speaking in January 2019, Mr. Gokhale said: “The alignment is issue based, and not ideological.”

    India’s engagement with West Asia

    • Pre-dating 2020, India’s outreach to West Asia sharpened since 2014.
    •  Oil-rich Gulf states looked at India as investment alternative away from the West to deepen their own strategic depth.
    • India also doubled down on its relations with the likes of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, giving open economic and political preference to the larger Gulf region.
    • While engagements with Israel moved steadily forward, Iran lagged behind, constrained by U.S. sanctions, which in turn significantly slowed the pace of India-Iran engagements.

    China’s engagement with West Asia

    • China’s overtures have been steadily more adventurous as it realises two major shifts that have taken place in West Asia.
    • First, the thinking in the Gulf that the American security safety net is not absolute.
    • Second, the Gulf economies such as Saudi Arabia, even though trying to shift away from petro dollar, will still need growing markets to sell oil to in the coming decade as they reform their economic systems.
    • The obvious two markets here are China and India.

    Similarity in India and China’s approach to West Asia

    • Both India and China employed similar versions of ‘non-alignment’ thinking is in West Asia based on equitable engagement with the three poles of power in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.
    • Both countries did it without getting involved into the region’s multi-layered conflicts and political fissures.
    • However, deteriorating U.S.-China ties, the COVID-19 pandemic that started in China, followed by the Ladakh crisis, is forcing a drastic change in the geopolitical playbooks of the two Asian giants, and, by association, global security architectures as well.

    Changing approach of China

    •  A report in September shone a light on a $400 billion, 25-year understanding between Iran and China, with Beijing taking advantage of abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal.
    • China is no longer happy with a passive role in West Asia, and through concepts such as “negative peace” and “peace through development”.
    • In concert with tools such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is now ready to offer an alternative model for “investment and influence”.
    •  It remains to be seen, however, how China balances itself between the poles of power while backing one so aggressively.

    Stability of the region and opportunity for India

    • From India’s perspective, the overt outreach to the Gulf and the ensuing announcements of multi-billion-dollar investments on Indian shores by entities from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is only New Delhi recognising the economic realities of the region. 
    • Despite entanglements in the Yemen war and general tensions between the Gulf states and Iran, the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on have maintained relatively strong and stable economic progression.
    • Israel’s recent peace accords with the UAE and Bahrain add much further weight towards a more stable Gulf region — the caveats withstanding that the operationalisation of the accords is smooth and long-lasting.

    Consider the question “Despite turbulence in the region, India’s engagement with West Asia has always been characterised by non-alignment and ethos of equitable engagement. In light of this, elaborate on India’s approach to the region and region’s importance for India.”

    Conclusion

    While in the recent past, the Indo-Pacific, with the development of the Quad, has taken centre stage, other geographies such as West Asia have also started to showcase bolder examples of New Delhi and Beijing’s metamorphosing approaches towards the international arena.

  • Incentives for furthering the India-US partnership are stronger than ever

    Changing geopolitical factors have accelerated further the deepening of India-US ties. The article analyses the current circumstances and evolution of the bilateral relations.

    Background against which 2+2 dialogue taking place

    • The 2+2 dialogue between India and the United States in Delhi this week marks an important moment in bilateral relations.
    • The 2+2 dialogue comes just three weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad — or the Quadrilateral Security Framework — met in Tokyo.
    • It also takes place amidst a profound structural shift in great power politics as well as turbulence in the international economic order intensified by the coronavirus pandemic.
    • The dialogue follows India’s first-ever participation in a meeting of the exclusive Five Eyes grouping that facilitates intelligence-sharing among the US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand.
    • A few days ago, Delhi announced the much-awaited expansion of the annual Malabar exercises to include Australia.

    Background of the past engagements

    • Signing the historic civil nuclear initiative ended India’s prolonged atomic isolation in the world laid the outline of a broader framework for security cooperation.
    • Due to the deep divisions within the national security establishment, the leadership and some political constraints faced by the government, the coalition broke up.
    •  The focus was on keeping visible distance from the US in the name of non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and the quest for a multipolar world.
    • The relationship survived those years, thanks to the US’s perseverance.

    3 Factors responsible for rapid progress in the US-India ties

    1) Chines aggression on northern border

    • The huge military crisis on the northern borders with China that is well into the sixth month is the first factor.
    • In the past, India avoided closer security ties with the US in deference to Beijing’s sensitivities.
    • In contrast, the government now has refused to pay heed to Chinese sensitivities over its policy on security cooperation with the US.

    2) Disruption caused by the corona pandemic

    • The coronavirus has sharpened the US debate on the dangers of excessive economic interdependence on China.
    • Meanwhile, India has begun to reduce its commercial ties to Beijing in response to the PLA’s Ladakh aggression.
    • This has created the conditions for a new conversation between India and the US on rearranging global supply chains away from China.
    • So, the Quad Plus conversations have drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam with a view to rearrange the global supply chain.

    3) Focus on critical technologies

    • Third factor is critical technologies like artificial intelligence that promise to transform most aspects of modern life — including security, political economy and social order.
    • Delhi and Washington are now focused on finding ways to collaborate on the critical technologies of the 21st century and work with their partners in setting new global rules for managing them.

    Conclusion

    As the regional and global order faces multiple transitions, the incentives for Delhi and Washington to sustain and advance India-US partnership are stronger than ever before and will continue into the next administration.

  • Live-streaming of Courts

    Attorney General of India has pushed for live-streaming court proceedings to make hearings accessible to all. But CJI sounded a cautionary note, saying it was susceptible to “abuses.”

    Why such demands?

    • In a first in India, the Gujarat High Court has begun live streaming of Court Proceedings on YouTube.
    • The issue of live-streaming came up as a Special Bench led by the CJI was taking stock of the virtual court system initiated soon after the pandemic lockdown.

    Live-streaming of Court

    • Justice Chandrachud was one of the three judges on the Bench that gave the verdict on live-streaming in September 2018.
    • In fact, he had noted in his separate opinion that live-streaming of proceedings would be the true realization of the “open court system.”
    • His suggestions were later adopted as guidelines in the September 2018 judgment.

    Why there should be live-streaming?

    • Improved accountability: Live-streaming of court proceedings would serve as an instrument for greater accountability and formed part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    • Living up the expectation of Constitution: Live Streaming of Court proceedings is manifested in public interest. Public interest has always been preserved through the Constitution article 19 and 21
    • Empowering the masses: It will enable the legal system to deliver on its promise of empowering the masses.
    • More transparency: It will encourage the principle of open court and reduce dependence on second-hand views. It will effectuate the public’s right to know. 
    • This would inspire confidence in the functioning of the judiciary as an institution and help maintain the respect that it deserved as a co-equal organ of the state.
    • Academic help: Live streaming may also be a help for academic purposes.

    Issues with live-courts

    The Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) of the Department of Personnel, Public Grievances and Law and Justice have tabled its report on the functioning of Virtual Courts and Digitization of Justice Delivery in Parliament.

    Following are the four key considerations and recommendations of the committee as far as mainstreaming of virtual courts is concerned:

    (1) The question of access:

    • A large number of litigants and advocates lack internet connectivity and requisite infrastructure and means to participate in virtual hearings and the process. This has serious implications.
    • The obvious one being that a large chunk of our citizenry is vulnerable to being excluded from the process of justice delivery owing to factors beyond their control.
    • The committee also opined that the judiciary considers solutions such as mobile video conferencing facilities to allow for meaningful participation from those living in remote geographies.

    (2) The degree of comfort:

    • A highly underrated but equally consequential factor is whether everyone, even if access to reliable internet connectivity is universal, is comfortable and well versed with the new tools and mediums of justice delivery.
    • Big, well-to-do law firms and advocates in urban areas would face no issues as compared to those participants in rural areas given the digital divide.

    (3) The idea of open courts itself:

    • Virtual courts allegedly threaten the constitutionality of Court proceedings and undermine the importance of Rule of law which forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
    • Expressing concern over the opaqueness of such hearings, critics state that virtual courts are antithetical to the open court system given the limited access that they allow for.

    (4) The question of Privacy and Data Security:

    • This is where the report makes some interesting and innovative suggestions vital to the performance of any digital justice delivery mechanism.
    • It also took note of the fact that most virtual court proceedings in India currently take place using third-party software or platforms and a few of them have already been rejected earlier on grounds of being unsafe to use.
    • The committee noted how courts across the world have had instances of intrusion and data privacy or security concerns while adapting to an entirely virtual mode of conducting hearings.

    Still, digital records are necessary

    • Litigants depend on the information provided by lawyers about what has transpired during the course of hearings.
    • When the description of cases is accurate and comprehensive; it serves the course of open justice.
    • Again, if a report on a judicial hearing is inaccurate, it impedes the public’s right to know.

    Best examples

    • Internationally, constitutional court proceedings are recorded in some form or the other.
    • In Australia, proceedings are recorded and posted on the high court’s website.
    • Proceedings of the Supreme Courts of Brazil, Canada, England and Germany are broadcast live.
    • The Supreme Court of the US does not permit video recording, but oral arguments are recorded, transcribed, and available publicly.
    • And democracies aside, in China, court proceedings are live-streamed from trial courts up to the Supreme People’s Court of China.

    Significance of open-courts

    • India stands alone amongst leading constitutional democracies in not maintaining audio or video recordings or even a transcript of court proceedings.
    • Court hearings can be turning points in the life of a nation: ADM Jabalpur comes readily to mind. More recently, there is any number of cases where the Supreme Court’s judgments have changed citizens’ lives.
    • Ayodhya, Aadhaar, Section 377, Sabarimala, NRC and the triple talaq judgments are among them.

    Various moves for accessibility

    • Over the last few years, the Supreme Court has taken steps to make justice more accessible. The Court started providing vernacular translations of its judgments.
    • Non-accredited journalists were permitted to live-tweet court proceedings. During the lockdown, journalists have been permitted to view virtual court proceedings in real-time.

    Way forward

    • There should be live-streaming cases of constitutional and national importance as a pilot project, including Constitution Bench cases.
    • Matrimonial cases and those involving national security could be excluded.
    • There must be a reasonable time-delay (say 10 minutes) between the live court proceedings and the broadcast to ensure any information which ought not to be shown, as directed by the court, can be edited from being broadcast.
    • The judiciary must also employ a press officer to liaise with the media, and issue simultaneously one or two page summaries of its judgments to facilitate greater public understanding.
    • There has to be a greater reliance on written briefs and the significance accorded to them, time limits for oral arguments, and a greater emphasis on preparation in advance.

  • Why India should consider the next US administration’s approach to China

    Though it is the election held in the US for the election of the US President, it is closely followed throughout the world given the dominant position of that country in the world and impact of the US Presidents decision on the world. This article analyses the implications for India in both the scenarios re-election of Trump or Joe Biden winning the election.

    Implications for India

    • Broader foreign policy decisions will have significant implications for India.
    • Particularly consequential will be how a second Trump administration or a Biden administration perceive and approach China and, relatedly, the question of America’s role in the world.
    • The outcome will depend on the choices that the next American president makes on key personnel and policies.

    Analysing Trump administration’s approach to China from India’s perspective

    • The Trump administration’s more hawkish view of China broadly converges with Indian concerns about a rising China’s actions and intentions.
    • And it has facilitated the Trump administration to assign India an important role in its strategic framework, including through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept.
    • This has laid the basis for defence and security cooperation, helped to manage differences with Delhi on trade, Russia, Iran, and human rights, and vocal American support for India in the ongoing crisis with China.
    • Unlike India’s subtler approach to highlighting Beijing’s malign behaviour, the administration’s more explicit one has put a global spotlight on Chinese assertiveness.
    • However, there are aspects of President Trump’s China approach that have caused concerns in Delhi.
    • There has been concern about Trump striking a deal with Chinese leader Xi Jinping since summit in April 2017.
    • The administration subsequently pivoted to competition with China that summer.
    • Concerns have also been raised due to neglect in the Trump administration of developments related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Huawei/ZTE.
    • The other aspects of Trump’s China approach that have given Delhi pause are its ideological dimensions, as well as responses like tariffs that have hurt India too.
    • On the similar lines American withdrawal from international institutions and agreements that has served to benefit Beijing.
    • The China prism has had its limits — it has not, for instance, resulted in concessions to India on trade and immigration.

    What would be Joe Biden’s to approach towards China and implications for India

    • And there is recognition among most Democrats that the US-China relationship today is different from what it was in 2009, 2012 or 2016.
    • An Obama administration China hand noted that opinion in the US on approach to China has “moved from balancing co-operation and competition, to competition and confrontation”.
    • But what a Biden administration sees as the terms of strategic competition with China and how it might choose to blend in cooperation will have implications for India.
    • Its outcome will depend in part on the president’s views, who holds key foreign and economic policy positions, as well as Beijing’s approach.
    • India will closely watch how Biden might respond to any overtures from Beijing.
    • It will particularly worry about any signs that Washington would be willing to limit competition or criticism in return for Chinese cooperation on certain administration priorities.
    • More broadly, it will look at whether Biden administration’s Asia policy derives from its China policy or vice versa.
    • Other aspects of Biden’s preferred approach might suit India, for instance:
    • 1) acting collectively with allies and partners rather than unilaterally,
    • 2) Not imposing tariffs that hit allies and partners along with China,
    • 3) Recommitting to international organisations in ways that could blunt Chinese influence.
    • India might also broadly approve of — and could benefit from — the 3Ds of a Biden foreign policy: Domestic (renewal), deterrence, and democracy.
    •  If a Biden administration sees engagement with China on climate change, global health security and non-proliferation as a priority that will complicate the Indian government’s options and require adjustments.
    • Moreover, with either Trump or Biden, foreign economic policy choices and budgetary ones for example, spending at home versus abroad will have crucial implications for India.

    Conclusion

    India will need to consider what America’s choice on November 3 will mean for American power and purpose — because assessments of that could determine how Beijing decides to act in the region and globally.