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  • Punjab’s drug scourge needs policy, not slogans

    Why in the News

    The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has flagged off the first of four “Nasha Mukt Punjab” yatras, a campaign that will cover nearly 4,000 km before culminating at Jalandhar on 30 September. The party has said it will contest all 117 seats in Punjab on its own, and the Union Home Minister is expected to address the closing rally. The campaign follows the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government’s “Yudh Nasheyan Viruddh” drive, launched in March 2025. That drive has produced arrests and seizure figures in abundance. It has not produced any visible slowdown in the flow of contraband. The tension is that a problem which has outlived a dozen crackdowns and three governments is being contested as an electoral idiom rather than a policy question, so the state keeps publishing enforcement output while the money, the supply routes and the treatment capacity behind the trade stay untouched.

    Why has the drug question returned to the centre of Punjab’s politics?

    1. A recurring electoral peg: The drug question returns to the centre of the state’s politics before successive elections, and it has returned again as the next Assembly election approaches.
    2. The BJP’s framing: The yatras run under the slogan “Bhajpa Da Naara, Nasha Mukauna Saara”, which states the objective of ending drug use without naming a measure that would deliver it.
    3. The Congress response: The party’s Punjab in charge led a protest at Chandigarh over the death of a labourer who had publicly questioned the state Finance Minister about the availability of drugs.
    4. The Akali Dal position: Leaders of the Akali Dal (Waris Punjab De) made drugs the centrepiece of their campaign at the Rakhar Puniya rally and promised a white paper on the scourge.
    5. The common shape of all three: Each response is a yatra, a protest or a promised document, and none of them carries a stated measure on financing, supply routes or treatment capacity.

    Why has the border explanation stopped explaining the trade?

    1. Position on the supply route: Punjab sits at the edge of the Golden Crescent and shares a border of roughly 550 km with Pakistan, which is the reason most often cited for the scale of the problem.
    2. Drone delivery: Drones now ferry consignments across the line, which removes the physical crossing that a fenced and patrolled border is designed to intercept.
    3. Relay points in other States: Other States have become relay points in the chain, so a consignment no longer has to reach Punjab directly from the border at all.
    4. Diverted pharmaceutical drugs: Pharmaceutical drugs are cheaper, more accessible and harder to trace, and they have become an important part of the trade.
    5. The consequence for strategy: A trade that has outgrown the border cannot be contained by a response built around the border.

    Why have arrests and seizures not slowed supply?

    1. Output without outcome: The campaign launched in March 2025 has generated arrests and seizure figures in abundance with no corresponding fall in the contraband reaching users.
    2. Enforcement reaches the wrong end of the chain: Arrests fall on carriers and users at the retail end, while those who finance and supply the trade are not prosecuted.
    3. The money trail is unexamined: A serious response has to trace the money moving through the trade, and no campaign so far has produced that examination.
    4. Institutional failures are unnamed: The trade survives because of institutional failures that allow it to operate, and no crackdown has identified or acted on them.
    5. The cost the seizure count does not record: Families are destroyed and many young Punjabis leave the state in search of a future abroad, which is the outcome no enforcement statistic captures.

    What must a policy response do that a campaign cannot?

    1. Dismantle the networks: The state has to dismantle the networks controlling the trade rather than only intercept the consignments those networks move.
    2. Prosecute financiers and suppliers: Prosecution has to reach those who finance and supply the trade, because that is where the incentive to continue actually sits.
    3. Build treatment capacity: Accessible treatment and sustained rehabilitation are required for those caught in addiction, and both are capacity questions rather than campaign questions.
    4. Provide an alternative occupation: Young people need opportunities to rebuild their lives, since recovery without an occupation returns a person to the same market.
    5. The family cannot substitute for the state: Families matter in prevention and recovery, and that role does not allow the state to abdicate its own responsibility.

    Challenges to Punjab’s anti drug policy

    1. Prosecution stops at the carrier: Enforcement records the quantity seized rather than the ownership of the consignment, so the chain above the carrier survives every recovery. Eg. The Special Task Force report on Punjab’s drug trade, submitted to the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a sealed cover in 2018, was never made public.
      The Fix: Require every commercial quantity case to carry a financial investigation report naming the funder before the chargesheet is filed.
    2. Diverted pharmaceutical supply is a licensing failure: Prescription opioids leave the legal chain at the chemist and the manufacturer, which is a regulatory lapse that no border deployment can reach. Eg. Tramadol was brought under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 by notification in 2018 after it displaced heroin in parts of the state.
      The Fix: Link every Schedule H1 opioid sale to a prescription number in a State drug database and audit the outlier chemists monthly.
    3. Treatment is counted in registrations, not in completions: Outpatient opioid assisted treatment centres report enrolment while relapse after discontinuation goes untracked, so the system cannot say what treatment achieved. Eg. Punjab runs Outpatient Opioid Assisted Treatment centres across its districts alongside government de addiction centres.
      The Fix: Publish a retention at six months figure for each centre, so capacity is measured by completed treatment rather than by registrations.
    4. Interdiction lags the delivery method: A small drone crosses in minutes and its payload is recovered only after it has landed, so the seizure confirms the delivery rather than preventing it. Eg. The Border Security Force has recovered drones and dropped consignments along the Punjab frontier in rising numbers each year since 2020.
      The Fix: Fund a counter drone detection grid along the Punjab frontier and tie each recovery to the ground receiver traced from it.

    Conclusion

    Punjab has heard the promise of a drug free state from three governments and is hearing it again from four parties. The state does not lack a diagnosis of the trade; it lacks a policy that outlasts the campaign that announced it. What remains unresolved is that enforcement produces a number a government can publish within weeks, while financial investigation, prosecution of financiers and treatment capacity produce results only across a full term. The 2027 Assembly election is where that record gets tested, and the test is for Punjab’s political class as a whole rather than for one party in office.

    Back2Basics: Golden Crescent

    1. What it is: The Golden Crescent is the illicit opium producing region of South West Asia, covering Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
    2. Why it reaches India: Afghanistan has historically been the largest single source of the region’s opium, and the output moves outward through Pakistani and Iranian routes.
    3. The other producing region: The Golden Triangle, covering Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, is the second major illicit opium region and feeds India’s eastern land routes.
    4. India’s position between them: India lies between the two regions, which is the basis for its classification as a transit country as well as a consuming one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “India’s proximity to two of the world’s biggest illicit opium-growing states has enhanced her internal security concerns. Explain the linkages between drug trafficking and other illicit activities such as gunrunning, money laundering and human trafficking. What counter-measures should be taken to prevent the same?”

  • Forces comb Pir Panjal to stop terrorist movement between Jammu, Kashmir

    Why in the News

    Security forces have adopted a sustained deployment across the Pir Panjal range, operating from Temporary Operational Bases (TOBs) instead of withdrawing after each operation. The change was visible in an operation in which a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist was killed at Ashdar Gali in the upper reaches, after a four month joint effort by the Army, its para forces, the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces. Terrorists had for four years used the high altitude transit routes through the dense forests to move between the Kashmir Valley and the Jammu region. Pressure applied on one side of the range simply moved them to the other. The tension is that a terrain which gave observation and concealment to small armed groups is now being answered by keeping troops inside it through the season, at a cost in exposure and logistics that a raid never carried.

    What is a Temporary Operational Base?

    1. What it is: A Temporary Operational Base is a forward position from which a joint team stays deployed in the mountains for an extended period, rather than returning to a garrison once an operation ends.
    2. Duration: Deployments run from more than ten days to several months, decided by the security situation and intelligence inputs.
    3. Shelter: Where a natural shelter exists, such as a Gujjar dhok, a herder’s seasonal shack, or a cave, it is used as the base. Otherwise the team operates in the dense forest without shelter.
    4. Siting: The bases are scattered across the range on intelligence inputs and ground situation analysis, and the one above the Doodhpathri meadow at Ashdar Gali has been held for several months.

    Why is the Pir Panjal strategically decisive?

    1. What the range divides: The Pir Panjal separates the Jammu region from the Kashmir Valley.
    2. Southern approaches: To its south lie the Poonch and Rajouri districts, which run up to the Line of Control (LoC).
    3. The two corridors: The range connects Kashmir to Poonch and Rajouri on one side, and to the Chenab Valley districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban on the other.
    4. The northern stretch: Inside Kashmir the range extends to Gulmarg and Baramulla, connecting the Valley back to the Line of Control.
    5. Why that matters operationally: A single mountain system linking the infiltration frontier to both halves of the Union Territory makes the range a transit corridor rather than a destination.

    How is the deployment organised across the range?

    1. Three zones: The mountains are divided into the upper reaches, the middle range and the lower reaches.
    2. Upper reaches: The Army’s paratroopers hold the highest ground, trained and equipped for high altitude warfare, and are stationed at mountain tops from where drones monitor large stretches of terrain.
    3. Middle range: The middle range is manned either by the Rashtriya Rifles, the Army’s counter insurgency force, or by joint teams of the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces, depending on the requirement.
    4. Lower reaches: The lower ranges are usually held by the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces.
    5. Closing the weapons gap: Militants at height held stationary positions from which they could watch soldiers, and carried weapons such as the American M4 carbine, efficient in close combat. Special troops now carry comparable weapons and night vision devices for patrolling after dark.

    What new units has the Jammu and Kashmir Police raised?

    1. The trigger: The Pahalgam attack on tourists in April last year killed twenty five tourists and one local.
    2. A new elite tier: The Jammu and Kashmir Police raised a new elite unit within its Special Operations Group (SOG) to strengthen operations in challenging terrain.
    3. Snow Leopards: The Snow Leopards unit is trained for high altitude warfare in rough terrain during the winter.
    4. Markhor: The Markhor unit is trained for gunfights in dense forest.

    What does the earlier record in Poonch and Rajouri show?

    1. A former hotbed: The Poonch and Rajouri axis carried a large number of militants, mostly foreigners, moving openly through the forests.
    2. Operation Sarp Vinash: The Indian Army launched Operation Sarp Vinash in 2003, with the help of local residents, to flush militants out of the area.
    3. The clearance held for a decade: The region was declared militant free in 2012.
    4. The return: The forested mountains have become a major challenge again over the last few years, with a series of setbacks recorded in the last three.

    Challenges to the Pir Panjal deployment model

    1. Support networks reconstitute faster than they are mapped: Overground worker networks change composition and new hideouts appear, so intelligence on a valley goes stale between operations. Eg. Officials record newer terrorist hideouts in the same forest belts that earlier operations had cleared.
      The Fix: Tie the base siting cycle to a rolling review of the support network in each valley, rather than to the location of the last contact.
    2. Winter attrition falls on the force: Holding high ground through a Himalayan winter produces cold injury and altitude illness that no contact with an adversary causes. Eg. Non battle casualties have historically exceeded combat casualties on India’s high altitude deployments.
      The Fix: Rotate upper reach detachments on a fixed acclimatisation cycle and pre position winter stores before the passes close.
    3. The herding population uses the same routes: A standing armed presence in grazing areas cuts across the seasonal movement of the Gujjar and Bakarwal communities. Eg. The dhoks used as temporary bases are the herders’ own seasonal shelters.
      The Fix: Compensate the use of private dhoks and issue transit passes to registered herders, so ordinary seasonal movement is not read as suspicious.
    4. Infiltration sits upstream of the model: Sustained presence inside the range does not change the supply of armed entrants crossing into it. Eg. Foreign militants moving through these forests enter from launch pads across the Line of Control.
      The Fix: Pair the deployment with counter infiltration grid upgrades on the Line of Control, so the corridor is contested at entry and not only in transit.
    5. Aerial observation fails where it is most needed: Drone surveillance from mountain tops loses effect under forest canopy and in cloud, which is when movement is attempted. Eg. Dense deodar and pine cover in the Poonch forests blocks overhead observation for most of the day.
      The Fix: Combine aerial observation with ground sensors and human sources in the canopy belts, rather than relying on the aerial picture alone.

    Conclusion

    The range’s value to an armed group was never its height. It was the ability to leave one side the moment pressure arrived on the other, and a standing presence is what removes that option. The deployment answers movement. It does not answer entry, and the supply of armed entrants is decided at the frontier rather than in the forest. What to watch is whether the bases are held through the coming winter, since a presence that thins with the snow restores the very transit option it was raised to deny.

    Back2Basics: Overground Worker (OGW)

    1. What the term means: An overground worker is a person who supports an armed group without taking part in armed action.
    2. What the support covers: Shelter, food, movement of weapons and money, and reconnaissance of security force movement.
    3. Why the category matters: An infiltrated group cannot sustain itself between operations without a local support layer, so dismantling the network is treated as equivalent to an operational success.
    4. How it is handled: Police in Jammu and Kashmir maintain lists of suspected overground workers and periodically detain and prosecute them under criminal and preventive detention law.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Winning of ‘Hearts and Minds’ in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • Six high-tech Army labs to weed out foreign bugs from drones, cameras

    Why in the News

    The Indian Army will operate six AASHVAST laboratories, at which all its drones will undergo mandatory inspection for firmware level vulnerabilities before use. One laboratory is already running in Delhi, with at least five more planned in the coming months. Drones procured by the Army until now were never checked at the firmware level, and their origin was established from the purchase invoice alone. The tension is that an invoice records where a component was bought, not what is embedded inside the silicon. A component sourced from China can be presented as made in India with no test contradicting the claim.

    What is AASHVAST?

    1. The name: AASHVAST stands for Assessment and Analysis of Electronic Systems Hardware for Vulnerabilities and Security Threats.
    2. What it is: It is a firmware analysis and validation suite, built by a private developer for the Directorate General of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (DG EME).
    3. What it inspects: It examines the software that operates an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), rather than physically inspecting the airframe alone.
    4. Procurement route: The Army issued a Request for Proposal in April 2026 for customised licensed software to validate firmware and embedded systems in electronic components, including UAV components.

    What vulnerabilities can the laboratories detect?

    1. Scale of the screen: About fourteen types of vulnerability can be detected by the suite.
    2. Geospatial faults: A malfunction triggered when the aircraft flies over a particular location, or a fault that stops it reaching a preset destination.
    3. Hidden and unused code: Code left in the firmware that can make a drone terminate its flight before reaching its target.
    4. Time and location bugs: Instructions that let a drone operate normally except at specific times or in specific places.
    5. Access and identity artefacts: Hidden passwords, embedded keys, remote access tools and location based security controls.
    6. Foreign origin components: Chinese or other foreign origin active components sitting inside the airframe’s electronics.
    7. How a vulnerability enters: It can be introduced during the manufacturing stage of a component or during a later upgrade process.

    Why does the invoice not establish origin?

    1. What the invoice shows: A purchase invoice records the point at which a component was bought, not the origin of what is inside it.
    2. No test at the silicon level: No mechanism in the procurement chain determines what is embedded within the silicon itself.
    3. The misrepresentation risk: Active components sourced from China can be presented as made in India or in a third country on the strength of that invoice.
    4. The existing prohibition: Domestic military drone manufacturers have already been barred from using parts made in China.
    5. The framework in progress: The Army Design Bureau submitted a detailed framework to the Ministry of Defence in 2025 aimed at eliminating Chinese origin components from UAVs.

    Why does the screen matter now?

    1. Procurement volume: The Army is acquiring drones at scale through the emergency procurement route, which compresses the time available for technical scrutiny.
    2. Where the drones fly: Many of these drones are used in operations along the eastern borders, where the supplier concern and the adversary are the same state.
    3. The gap being closed: Firmware level checks were absent from Army drone procurement until now, so the suite covers a stage that no other test reached.
    4. Operational purpose: The stated aim is to neutralise enemy interference that would stop a drone performing its designated task in a contested area.
    5. Cameras next: CCTV cameras procured by the Army in future will also be inspected, for Chinese proprietary protocols or their equivalent.
    6. The declared frame: The Army has placed the facility under the Atmanirbhar Bharat vision, presenting it as raising cyber resilience and growing the domestic defence electronics ecosystem.

    Challenges to firmware screening of military drones

    1. Screening capacity against procurement volume: Six laboratories testing every drone and later every camera create a throughput bottleneck at the point of induction. Eg. Emergency procurement contracts run on delivery timelines measured in months rather than years.
      The Fix: Set a risk tier so that only new firmware builds and new component sources take full analysis, with repeat builds cleared on a cryptographic hash comparison.
    2. Firmware changes after clearance: A drone cleared at induction can be altered through a later update pushed by the supplier. Eg. Commercial drone platforms routinely push updates that change flight envelope and geofencing behaviour.
      The Fix: Require signed firmware with a key held by the Army, and revalidate any build before it is loaded onto a fielded aircraft.
    3. Hardware implants escape a software test: A malicious function fabricated into the chip itself is not visible to firmware analysis. Eg. Counterfeit and re-marked integrated circuits are a recurring finding in defence supply chain audits worldwide.
      The Fix: Pair the firmware suite with hardware level testing, such as X ray and die level inspection, on a sampled share of every batch.
    4. Supply chain depth beyond the first tier: A vendor can certify an Indian assembly while its own sub suppliers buy from the restricted origin. Eg. Restrictions on direct imports have historically shifted sourcing to intermediaries in third countries rather than changing the component.
      The Fix: Require a component level bill of materials with origin declarations down to the sub tier, verified against the laboratory’s own findings.
    5. Substitutes must exist before a ban works: Removing a restricted component only helps where a qualified domestic or allied alternative exists at the same performance and price. Eg. Motors, flight controllers and imaging sensors for small drones are concentrated in a few overseas suppliers.
      The Fix: Fund qualification of domestic alternatives for the specific component classes the laboratories flag most often, rather than relying on a blanket origin ban.

    Conclusion

    Procurement has until now verified where a component was bought. The laboratories move verification to what the component actually does, which is the only level at which a concealed function can be found. The gap that remains sits between a one time clearance at induction and a fleet that keeps receiving software through its service life. The marker to watch is whether the screen is applied to the drone and camera stock already in service, or only to what is bought next.

    Back2Basics: Directorate General of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (DG EME)

    1. What it heads: DG EME heads the Corps of Electronics and Mechanical Engineers, the Indian Army’s technical corps, from Army Headquarters.
    2. Mandate: The Corps maintains, repairs and upgrades the Army’s equipment, covering vehicles, weapon systems, electronics and instrumentation.
    3. Origin: The Corps was raised in 1943 and took its present form after Independence.
    4. Indigenisation role: DG EME sponsors development and validation projects with Indian industry for equipment support, testing and life extension.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Keeping in view India’s internal security, analyse the impact of cross-border cyber attacks. Also, discuss defensive measures against these sophisticated attacks.”

  • How agentic AI could transform the way we make digital payments

    Why in the News

    The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), the umbrella body that operates India’s retail payment systems, has unveiled MyUPI, an artificial intelligence (AI) powered revamp of the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) capable of delegating pre authorised payments and filing payment disputes automatically. It has also launched a back end tool described as the connective tissue for AI interaction across the financial ecosystem, called Agentic Orchestration and Messaging (AtOM). Both were shown at the Global Fintech Fest in Mumbai, where several of the country’s largest payment companies demonstrated AI integration in their products. Conventional AI already sits inside the payments stack, reducing friction and screening fraudulent transactions from the back end. The shift now proposed is different in kind: an agent that carries the consumer’s entire payment journey rather than one that checks it, which moves the question from how safe a payment is to who is accountable for a payment the consumer did not personally execute.

    What is agentic commerce?

    1. Definition: Agentic commerce is a digital trade model in which AI agents discover, negotiate and execute a purchase on behalf of the customer.
    2. Authorisation is not bypassed: The model does not remove the requirement of authorisation. It compresses the number of steps in the buying journey, including the payments stage.
    3. Agentic AI, defined: An agentic AI model executes tasks for a user without constant prompts, operating inside limits the user has set in advance.
    4. Consumer oversight survives: The consumer retains oversight through the process and can change any component of the transaction before it completes.

    What has NPCI actually launched?

    1. MyUPI: The revamp delegates pre authorised payments to an agent and files payment disputes automatically and without a separate consumer initiated complaint.
    2. AtOM: The back end tool standardises how AI systems across the financial ecosystem talk to each other, which is what allows an agent on one platform to act against rails operated by another.
    3. Placement on public rails: Putting the capability inside UPI rather than leaving it to individual wallets extends an interoperable public system into agentic commerce.

    How does agentic AI differ from the AI already used in payments?

    1. Conventional AI is a back end function: It reduces friction in the payments process, makes back end processes more reliable and screens consumers from fraudulent transactions.
    2. Agentic AI is a front end actor: It performs the consumer’s task rather than validating it, which makes the agent a participant in the transaction rather than a control over it.
    3. Adoption is early: Agentic AI adoption in payments remains at a nascent stage, and agentic commerce is currently its largest use case.

    What are private wallets already doing?

    1. Amazon Pay’s Smart Wallet: The wallet combines smart recommendations, biometric authentication and a tap and pay feature, with an agent handling each step of the journey.
    2. Auto execution within a threshold: The wallet executes small ticket regular purchases automatically inside a set limit. A customer with a monthly grocery limit of Rs 10,000 authenticates only once that threshold is crossed.
    3. Single authentication in place of repeated prompts: An agent that selects the payment instrument replaces multiple one time passwords and authorisation requests with a single authentication event.
    4. Industry wide adoption: Samsung Pay, Google Pay and PhonePe already offer pin less small ticket purchases, and MyUPI carries a comparable feature.

    Challenges to agentic payments

    1. Liability on a delegated transaction is unallocated: No settled rule assigns the loss where an agent transacts inside a pre authorised limit and the consumer later disputes the outcome. Eg. The RBI’s limited liability framework for unauthorised electronic banking transactions is written around a customer who did not authorise the payment at all.
      The Fix: Extend that limited liability framework to agent initiated payments, with the reporting window running from the transaction alert rather than from discovery.
    2. Authentication thins as steps are removed: Collapsing several authorisation checkpoints into one removes the repeated confirmations that currently interrupt a compromised session. Eg. Delegated payments under the UPI Circle facility already run on the primary user’s single authentication for a secondary user’s spending.
      The Fix: Require a step up authentication whenever the agent changes the merchant, the instrument or the amount from the pattern it was authorised on.
    3. Ranking can be tuned to the platform: An agent that selects products and payment instruments can be configured to serve the platform’s commercial interest rather than the buyer’s. Eg. The Competition Commission of India has investigated preferential treatment of selected sellers by large online marketplaces.
      The Fix: Mandate disclosure of the ranking and payment instrument selection criteria an agent applies, on the same principle as the Central Consumer Protection Authority’s dark patterns guidelines.
    4. Grievance redress assumes a human decision: The ombudsman route is built around an identifiable act by a named regulated entity, not an autonomous action taken by a model. Eg. The Reserve Bank Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021 requires a complaint to be made against a specified regulated entity.
      The Fix: Register agentic payment providers so that every agent action maps to an accountable regulated entity before the service reaches scale.

    Conclusion

    Agentic payments are at the demonstration stage, with the public rails and the large private wallets converging on the same design within a single week of announcements. The unresolved question is accountability: a system built to compress authorisation steps is being layered onto a consumer protection framework that assumes the customer authorised each step personally. What to watch is whether the RBI issues a liability and authentication standard for agent initiated payments before MyUPI moves from demonstration into general availability.

    Back2Basics: National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI)

    1. What it is: NPCI is the umbrella organisation for retail payments and settlement systems in India.
    2. How it was set up: It was incorporated in December 2008 at the initiative of the RBI and the Indian Banks’ Association, as a not for profit company under the companies law.
    3. Legal basis: It operates under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, which gives the RBI authority over payment systems.
    4. What it runs: UPI, the Immediate Payment Service, RuPay, the National Automated Clearing House, FASTag and the Bharat Bill Payment System.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Which one of the following statements about Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Central Bank Digital Currency (Digital Rupee) is NOT correct? (a) UPI is a real-time payment system but Digital Rupee is akin to sovereign paper currency (b) In case of UPI, settlement for end users happens instantly; in case of Digital Rupee, wallet balance gets transferred to another wallet (no traditional settlement) (c) UPI transactions are recorded by banks and reflected in bank statements; in case of Digital Rupee, no data is captured in bank statements (d) In both the cases (UPI and Digital Rupee), the liability lies with the users and their respective banks”

  • A homegrown innovation ecosystem is taking root

    A homegrown innovation ecosystem is taking root

    Why in the News

    Three institutional foundations of an innovation economy are advancing together in India for the first time: public research, corporate research and development (R&D), and deep technology entrepreneurship. Technologies that once arrived through imports are increasingly being invented at home, in research institutions, in industry and in startups. Gallium Nitride (GaN) semiconductor technology, critical for advanced radar, space systems and next generation communications, is now being developed domestically in a tightly export controlled field. Affordable immunotherapies developed in India are expanding access to advanced cancer care at the same time. The tension is between volume and value. Patent filings are rising sharply, while the number of patents actually in force, the rate of commercialisation and national R&D spending remain far below those of the economies India is measured against.

    What are the three major institutional pillars shaping India’s emerging innovation ecosystem?

    1. Public Research Institutions: Government-supported institutions conduct foundational and long-gestation research. Eg: DRDO developed indigenous Gallium Nitride (GaN) technology.
    2. Corporate R&D: Private-sector industries increasingly invest in research and development. Eg:Jio Platforms has made significant patent filings in 5G and 6G technologies.
    3. Deep-Tech Entrepreneurship: Startups convert advanced research into commercial applications. Eg:AGNIT Semiconductors is commercialising indigenous GaN technology developed through IISc’s research ecosystem.

    What do the patent and R&D numbers actually show?

    1. Filing growth: Patent filings rose from just over 1,10,000 in 2024-25 to more than 1,43,000 in 2025-26, an increase of 30.2%.
    2. Domestic ownership of filings: Domestic applicants now account for almost seven in ten filings, so the growth is not driven by foreign applicants seeking protection in the Indian market.
    3. Patents in force, which is the real test: Patents in force in India stood at just over 2,40,000 in 2025, against 5.7 million in China, 3.5 million in the United States and 2.1 million in Japan on 2024 data. Patents in force counts rights that were granted and are still being maintained, so a wide gap against filings points to low grant rates, high abandonment, or both.
    4. The spending floor beneath all of it: India spends just under 1% of GDP on research and development, against about 2.4% in China and 3.5% in the United States.

    What is gallium nitride (GaN) and why is it strategic?

    1. What it is: Gallium Nitride is a semiconductor material that handles higher voltage, higher frequency and higher temperature than silicon, which is why it is used where power density and signal strength matter more than cost.
    2. Where it is used: It underpins monolithic microwave integrated circuits (MMICs), the single chip radio frequency circuits inside advanced radar, satellite links and next generation wireless equipment, and it is subject to export control for that reason.

    What does the GaN breakthrough show about the public research pillar?

    1. The breakthrough and where it happened: Scientists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at the Solid State Physics Laboratory (SSPL) in Delhi and the Gallium Arsenide Enabling Technology Centre (GAETEC) in Hyderabad announced a breakthrough in making GaN MMICs in March 2023.
    2. Why it had to be built at home: The technical know how for these circuits was, by widely reported accounts, refused to India under the offset provisions of the Rafale fighter jet purchase from France.
    3. The club it joined: India is now one of seven countries to have mastered this technology, alongside China, France, Germany, Russia, South Korea and the United States.
    4. Transfer out of defence: DRDO is actively transferring GaN High Electron Mobility Transistor (HEMT) based MMIC technology, a transistor design that carries current through a very thin high mobility layer, for use in 5G and 6G wireless infrastructure, electric vehicle on board chargers and renewable energy inverter systems.
    5. The commercial end of the pipeline: AGNIT Semiconductors, a spin off from the Centre for Nano Science and Engineering (CeNSE) at the Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru, is translating homegrown GaN technology into commercial applications.

    Is India moving from standard implementer to standard setter?

    1. The alliance and its target: The Bharat 6G Alliance (B6GA) has stated an aim of contributing 10% of global 6G patents by 2030.
    2. The filing base so far: Alliance members have made more than 7,700 patent filings across 5G and 6G technologies, including over 4,400 foreign filings.
    3. The caveat on those numbers: These are applications, not grants, and not declared standard essential patents, which are the patents a technical standard cannot be implemented without and which earn licensing revenue from every implementer.
    4. Participation in the standards body: Indian contributors made almost 3,000 technical contributions to the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the body that writes mobile communication standards, in the last year, a 15 fold increase over 2020.
    5. International filing rank: The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 2025 Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) rankings, which track a single international application route that reserves rights across member countries, placed Jio Platforms Limited 19th overall among international filers, a rise of more than 300 places and its first entry into the top 20.

    What has changed in the startup ecosystem?

    1. The capital commitment behind it: Members of the India Deep Tech Alliance (IDTA) have made deep technology commitments of more than $2.5 billion, alongside the central government’s Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) financing.
    2. Earth observation: Pixxel Space, founded by two alumni of the Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, has six satellites in orbit in hyperspectral imaging, which captures hundreds of narrow wavelength bands so materials can be identified rather than merely seen, with a full constellation of 18 to 24 planned.
    3. Launch vehicles: Skyroot Aerospace flew the Vikram-1 low earth orbit launch, and the Indian Institute of Technology Madras nurtured Agnikul Cosmos is working toward fully reusable launch vehicles.
    4. Affordable advanced medicine: ImmunoACT, incubated at the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay with the Tata Memorial Centre, developed NexCAR19, India’s first indigenous CAR-T cell therapy, in which a patient’s own immune cells are re engineered to attack cancer cells, delivered at a tenth of typical treatment costs.
    5. Preventable blindness: Bengaluru based Remidio Innovative Solutions, supported at early stage by the Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council (BIRAC), screens for diabetic retinopathy and glaucoma through smartphone enabled retinal imaging with artificial intelligence.

    Challenges to India’s homegrown innovation ecosystem

    1. Patent examination capacity: A grant depends on examiner throughput, so filings rising faster than examiner strength lengthen the wait rather than produce enforceable rights. Eg. The Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks administers patents, designs, trade marks and geographical indications through a single office.
      The Fix: Ring fence recruitment of technically qualified examiners to the patent stream and publish disposal data by technology field.
    2. The cost of keeping a patent in force: A granted patent lapses unless a renewal fee is paid every year, so a holder with no paying customer lets it go. Eg. The Patents Act, 1970 requires renewal fees annually from the third year across the twenty year term.
      The Fix: Defer renewal fees for publicly funded institutions and recognised startups until the patent earns its first revenue.
    3. Non standard transfer terms for publicly funded intellectual property: Each laboratory negotiates its own royalty and exclusivity terms, so a licensee faces a fresh negotiation at every institution. Eg. The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008, drafted to settle exactly those terms, was never enacted.
      The Fix: Issue one standard licensing template with published royalty bands for every publicly funded laboratory.
    4. No public first customer for unproven technology: Procurement rules reward the lowest price and a record of prior supply, which a first time deep technology supplier cannot show. Eg. The Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017 sets local content thresholds but creates no route for a technology with no supply history.
      The Fix: Reserve a share of ministry procurement for first of a kind indigenous technology with a relaxed prior experience condition.

    Conclusion

    India’s innovation constraint has moved. The question is no longer whether homegrown technology can be created, since a full pipeline from government laboratory to academic institution to commercial venture now exists in at least one strategic field. The open question is whether a right on paper can be turned into a product with a buyer, which is where filings, grants and revenue currently part company. The marker to watch is the share of filings that survive to become patents in force, because that one ratio tests grant capacity, commercial intent and maintenance funding at the same time.

    Government Initiatives for India’s research and innovation ecosystem

    1. Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF): Established under the Anusandhan National Research Foundation Act, 2023 to seed and grow research in universities, colleges and research laboratories, with the larger share of its funding intended to come from non government sources.
    2. Startup India: Launched in 2016 under the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, it gives recognised startups tax exemptions, self certification under labour and environment laws, and fast tracked patent examination with fee rebates.
    3. Fund of Funds for Startups: Operated by the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), it invests in Alternative Investment Funds rather than in startups directly, so capital reaches ventures through professional fund managers.
    4. Atal Innovation Mission: Runs Atal Tinkering Labs in schools and Atal Incubation Centres in host institutions, working on the supply of innovators rather than on the funding of firms.
    5. Technology Development Board: Set up under the Technology Development Board Act, 1995 to provide loans and equity to companies commercialising indigenous technology.

    Back2Basics: Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Scheme

    1. What it is: A central financing window for private sector led research in sunrise and strategic sectors, aimed at the stage private capital avoids.
    2. Size: A corpus of Rs 1 lakh crore was approved for it by the Union Cabinet in 2025.
    3. How the money moves: Funds flow through a special purpose fund to second level fund managers, who extend long tenure low or nil interest loans or take equity, rather than paying out direct grants.
    4. Who steers it: It is guided by the Governing Board of the Anusandhan National Research Foundation, so research financing and research promotion sit under one apex structure.

    [2026, GS3, 15] How are startups in India promoting entrepreneurship, innovation and employment? Discuss the global and domestic challenges in their working and suggest suitable measures to overcome these challenges.”

  • Creative Economy: India’s Next Growth Frontier

    Creative Economy: India’s Next Growth Frontier

    Why in the News?

    The creative economy is emerging as a major source of employment, entrepreneurship and innovation in India. The AVGC sector is expected to require nearly 2 million skilled professionals by 2030, creating new opportunities for India’s youth.

    Key Highlights

    • Creative economy is driven by: Ideas and imagination, Culture, Innovation, Intellectual Property (IP)
    • Major sectors include: Film, Music, Gaming, Animation, Design, Publishing, Advertising, and Digital content

    Economic Significance

    • Creative economy contributes 3.1% of global GDP.
    • Accounts for 6.2% of global employment.
    • Around 57 million Indians are already working in cultural and creative occupations.
    • India’s media and entertainment economy: ₹2.5 trillion.

    AVGC Sector

    AVGC = Animation, Visual Effects, Gaming and Comics

    • Expected skilled-professional requirement by 2030: nearly 2 million.
    • Creates opportunities in: Animation, Gaming, Visual effects, Digital content, and Creative technology

    Government Initiatives

    • Indian Institute of Creative Technologies: The government is supporting the Indian Institute of Creative Technologies to build specialised capabilities and future-ready skills in the creative sector.

    AVGC Creator Labs

    • Planned in 15,000 schools
    • Planned in 500 colleges
    • Aim to equip young people with skills relevant to the emerging creative economy.

    Policy and Regulatory Issues

    • Growth of the creative economy requires appropriate frameworks relating to:
      • Copyright protection
      • Fair compensation for creators
      • Intellectual Property Rights
      • Responsible use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

    Prelims Quick Revision

    • Creative economy is based on creativity, culture, innovation and intellectual property.
    • Global contribution: 3.1% of GDP.
    • Global employment share: 6.2%.
    • Around 57 million Indians work in cultural and creative occupations.
    • Indian media and entertainment economy: ₹2.5 trillion.
    • AVGC skilled workforce requirement by 2030: nearly 2 million.
    • AVGC Creator Labs: 15,000 schools + 500 colleges.
  • HAL Hands Over Tejas Trainers, HTT-40 and Dhruv NG

    HAL Hands Over Tejas Trainers, HTT-40 and Dhruv NG

    Why in the News?

    Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) handed over 2 LCA Tejas FOC Twin Seater Trainers and 3 HTT-40 Basic Trainers to the Indian Air Force (IAF), along with 4 Dhruv Next Generation (NG) helicopters to Pawan Hans Limited (PHL) on 18 September 2026 in Bengaluru. The event highlights India’s growing indigenous defence and civil aerospace capabilities.

    Key Highlights

    LCA Tejas FOC Twin Seater Trainer

    • 2 aircraft handed over to IAF.
    • These are the final two aircraft under the FOC contract.
    • Designed to support pilot training before frontline fighter operations.
    • Retains the core systems and combat capability of the frontline Tejas platform.
    • Provides an indigenous training continuum for fighter pilots.
    • FOC: Final Operational Clearance

    HTT-40 Basic Trainer

    • 3 aircraft handed over to IAF.
    • HTT-40: Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40.
    • Indigenously designed and developed basic trainer aircraft.
    • Intended for primary training of Defence Forces pilots.
    • Uses a turboprop engine.
    • Features modern cockpit and avionics.

    Training Roles

    • HTT-40 can undertake: Aerobatics, General handling, Instrument flying, Navigation, Night flying, and Close formation flying

    Dhruv NG

    • 4 helicopters handed over to Pawan Hans Limited (PHL).
    • Represents HAL’s entry into the civil and commercial rotary-wing segment.
    • Features:
      • Enhanced systems
      • Modern avionics
      • More powerful engine
    • Intended applications:
      • Passenger transport
      • Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
      • Offshore logistics support

    Strategic Significance

    • The initiative demonstrates the development of an integrated Indian aerospace ecosystem covering:
    • Aircraft design, Avionics, Propulsion, Composite materials, Flight-control systems, Manufacturing, Certification, and Maintenance and lifecycle support
    • The government also emphasised greater public-private synergy and indigenous development of emerging technologies such as:
      • Artificial Intelligence (AI)
      • Autonomous systems
      • Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
      • Electronic warfare
      • Cyber technologies
      • Next-generation propulsion

    Defence and Civil Aerospace Linkage

    • An important aspect of the event is the convergence of military and civil aerospace capabilities.
      • Tejas FOC Trainer: indigenous military aerospace capability.
      • HTT-40: indigenous basic military trainer.
      • Dhruv NG: indigenous civil/commercial helicopter capability.
    • This illustrates how common capabilities such as avionics, propulsion, materials, manufacturing and certification can support both civil and defence aerospace sectors.
  • Deep-sea discovery, environmental responsibility

    Deep-sea discovery, environmental responsibility

    Why in the News

    India holds three International Seabed Authority (ISA) exploration contracts covering approximately 95,000 square kilometres across the Central Indian Ocean Basin, the Central Indian Ridge and the Carlsberg Ridge in the international seabed area. Its exploration has identified an estimated 366 million tonnes of polymetallic nodules containing nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese. Under the Deep Ocean Mission, deep sea mining technology, underwater robotics and the MATSYA 6000 human submersible are being developed. The case now put is that this capability raises a prior question rather than settling one: whether everything that can be technologically exploited should necessarily be exploited. The counter position is that these minerals carry legitimate strategic importance for India’s renewable energy, electric mobility and advanced manufacturing ambitions. The tension is between a demonstrated technical capability and an ecosystem whose functioning is not understood well enough to predict what large scale disturbance would do to it.

    What is deep sea mining of polymetallic nodules?

    1. Polymetallic nodules: Mineral concretions the size of a potato that lie loose on the abyssal seabed at depths of roughly 4,000 to 6,000 metres, formed over millions of years as metals precipitate around a nucleus.
    2. Why they are wanted: They carry nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese, the metals used in battery cathodes and in alloys, which ties the deposits to the energy transition.
    3. How collection works: A seabed crawler lifts the nodules off the sediment surface. The nodules are then raised through a riser pipe to a surface vessel, and the sediment and water drawn up with them are discharged back into the water column.
    4. Where the activity is regulated: Mineral activity on the seabed beyond national jurisdiction is administered by the International Seabed Authority, which issues exploration contracts and has not yet finalised the rules for commercial exploitation.

    What does India’s deep ocean research actually show?

    1. Biodiversity surveys: Surveys across 19 seamounts have studied around 1,300 deep sea organisms.
    2. Species new to science: Nearly 23 of those organisms have been reported as new to science.
    3. Mining technology tested: The National Institute of Ocean Technology has tested a mining machine at a depth of about 5,270 metres.
    4. Environmental baselines built alongside: The exploration work has been accompanied by extensive environmental and biodiversity studies rather than resource assessment alone.
    5. The standing gap: The research continues to reveal previously unknown organisms, so the consequences of large scale seabed disturbance cannot be confidently predicted while the inventory remains incomplete.

    Why does strategic importance not settle the question of extraction?

    1. Capability is not permission: Technological progress creates the assumption that what can be exploited should be exploited, and the deep ocean is the case where that assumption does not hold.
    2. The necessity test: Before extraction is considered, the questions are whether the minerals are genuinely necessary at the proposed scale, whether alternatives exist, and whether demand can be reduced.
    3. The demand side routes: Recycling, efficiency, substitution and a circular economy each reduce the quantity of primary metal required, so the case for extraction has to be made against them rather than in their absence.
    4. Where the burden sits: Necessity must be demonstrated rather than presumed, which places the onus on the party proposing extraction rather than on the party opposing it.
    5. Exploration is separable from exploitation: Investment in deep ocean science advances knowledge, biodiversity assessment, environmental baselines and technology without committing the country to commercial mining.

    Why can adaptive management not substitute for the decision itself?

    1. The nature of the disturbance: Mining physically disturbs the seabed, so the damage follows from the activity itself rather than from how carefully it is run.
    2. Limits of adaptive management: Adjusting practice in response to observed harm requires a baseline against which harm can be detected, and the baseline for these ecosystems is incomplete.
    3. Irreversibility: Nodules form over geological time, so the hard substrate they provide is not recreated within any management horizon a contract could set.
    4. The question restated: The operative question is not how to mine with minimum damage but whether there is a need to mine at all.
    5. Why the timing matters: India’s ISA activities remain at the exploration stage, so a high ecological threshold can be fixed before any commercial decision rather than negotiated after one.

    What would leadership on deep sea ecological governance involve?

    1. Recognising ecological value: Treating the deep ocean as a precious ecological asset whose value may exceed that of its mineral wealth, rather than as a mineral reserve alone.
    2. Using the Mission’s own findings: The knowledge generated under the Deep Ocean Mission can support a conclusion that some poorly understood and potentially irreversible ecosystems are better left undisturbed.
    3. Mission LiFE as the domestic anchor: Lower demand, resource efficiency, recycling, substitution and circular consumption already sit in Mission LiFE, so the position has a stated domestic policy basis.
    4. Alignment with existing frameworks: Nature based Solutions, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the circular economy share the principle that nature is the capital on which development depends.
    5. The role of science: Science establishes not only how far a country can go but also where it must stop, so identifying the frontiers best left untouched is part of its function.

    Challenges to deep sea mining governance

    1. The exploitation rules are unfinished: The International Seabed Authority has not adopted the regulations for commercial recovery, so there is no agreed standard for environmental thresholds, monitoring or liability. Eg. The two year rule triggered by Nauru in 2021 forced the Authority to face applications even without a completed code.
      The Fix: Hold commercial applications until the exploitation regulations and a liability regime are adopted, and argue that position at the Authority’s Council.
    2. The sponsoring State carries the liability: A contractor operates under the sponsorship of a State, which bears responsibility for ensuring compliance, so a private failure becomes a sovereign exposure. Eg. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea advisory opinion of 2011 set out the due diligence obligations of States sponsoring activity in the Area.
      The Fix: Require every sponsored contractor to post an environmental bond and accept independent monitoring before a sponsorship certificate issues.
    3. Sediment plumes travel beyond the mine site: Collection stirs fine sediment that drifts across the seabed, and the discharge from the surface vessel spreads through the water column, so effects extend past the licensed block. Eg. Tracks left by an experimental seabed disturbance in the Peru Basin in 1989 were still visible decades later with little faunal recovery.
      The Fix: Mandate plume modelling and independent monitoring across an agreed buffer around every test and production site.
    4. Recovery time exceeds any contract term: Nodule fields and the organisms attached to them re form over millions of years, so a disturbed area is lost for the purposes of any human management cycle. Eg. Sponges, corals and other attached species in the Clarion Clipperton Zone depend on the hard nodule surface as their only available substrate.
      The Fix: Designate no mining reference zones of ecological significance inside each contract area before exploitation is licensed, not after.
    5. India has no domestic law for activity in the Area: The Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002 governs India’s own offshore areas, while activity in the international seabed area is covered only by contract conditions. Eg. India’s exploration contracts sit beyond national jurisdiction, where domestic environmental clearance procedures do not apply at all.
      The Fix: Enact a domestic statute fixing environmental assessment, monitoring and liability standards for Indian entities operating in the Area.
    6. Demand forecasts may not survive a change in battery chemistry: The commercial case for nodules rests on nickel and cobalt demand, which falls as cell chemistries shift away from those metals. Eg. Lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cells use neither nickel nor cobalt and have taken a growing share of electric vehicle batteries.
      The Fix: Tie any extraction decision to a periodically revised national critical mineral demand assessment that accounts for substitution and recycling.

    Conclusion

    India’s position on the seabed is unusual in that it holds the contracts and the technology to use them, and has not yet taken a decision to exploit. That interval is where an ecological threshold can be written in as a condition rather than conceded later as a compromise. The two commitments pull against each other, since the same mineral demand the energy transition generates is what makes the seabed attractive, and reducing that demand is what would make the seabed unnecessary. The point to watch is what India argues when the rules for commercial recovery come to a decision at the Authority, because that is where a principle has to become a stated national position.

    Government Initiatives for deep ocean science and the blue economy

    1. Deep Ocean Mission: Launched in 2021 under the Ministry of Earth Sciences with an outlay of about Rs 4,077 crore, it runs on six pillars covering deep sea mining technology and a manned submersible, ocean climate change advisory services, technologies for deep sea biodiversity, ocean survey and exploration, energy and freshwater from the ocean, and an advanced marine station for ocean biology.
    2. Samudrayaan: The manned ocean mission under the Deep Ocean Mission, designed to take a crew to a depth of 6,000 metres in the MATSYA 6000 submersible.
    3. O SMART: The Ocean Services, Modelling, Application, Resources and Technology scheme, which funds ocean observation, forecasting and marine resource services.
    4. National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research: Headquartered in Goa, it runs India’s polar and Southern Ocean research programmes and supports ocean science campaigns.
    5. Deccan High Level Principles on Blue Economy: Adopted at Chennai under India’s G20 Presidency in 2023, they set out an agreed framework for sustainable ocean management.

    Back2Basics: International Seabed Authority (ISA)

    1. What it is: An autonomous international organisation established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 and its 1994 Implementation Agreement.
    2. Mandate: It organises and controls all mineral related activity in the Area, meaning the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, which UNCLOS designates the common heritage of mankind.
    3. Membership and seat: It is headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, and its membership comprises every State party to UNCLOS, India included.
    4. What it issues: It grants exploration contracts to State sponsored contractors and is still drafting the exploitation regulations, known as the Mining Code, that would govern commercial recovery.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following statements with regard to India’s Deep Ocean Mission is/are correct?

    1. It was launched by the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India.

    2. Matsya-6000 has been designed to carry 3 people for deep sea exploration.

    3. Samudrayaan is a project under this mission.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: B”

  • To curb farm fires, Govt readies stiff ‘red entry’ rules in revenue records

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change has published a draft of the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas (Imposition, Collection and Utilization of Environmental Compensation for Stubble Burning) Rules, 2026. It specifies for the first time how long a red entry against a farmer’s land in the revenue record stays valid. The entry runs for 15 months from the date of the incident, and extends by a further 15 months where burning recurs or where the environmental compensation imposed is not paid. The parent Rules were notified in 2023 and carried the red entry provision without fixing its duration. A red entry makes it difficult for a farmer to raise a loan or mortgage the land, so the penalty operates through access to credit rather than through a fine alone. Farm unions have opposed the system since it was introduced, and the parliamentary standing committee on subordinate legislation has recommended a route out of it for farmers who change practice.

    What is a red entry in revenue records?

    1. The instrument: A red entry is an adverse remark recorded against a specific land parcel in the State’s revenue record, the register that establishes ownership and cultivation rights over that parcel.
    2. How it penalises: Lenders and registering authorities read the revenue record before sanctioning a loan or accepting land as security, so an adverse remark restricts credit and mortgage without any separate order being passed.
    3. What triggers it: It is made against land on which a stubble burning incident is detected, alongside the environmental compensation imposed on the basis of the size of the holding.
    4. Who maintains it: State revenue officials make and remove the entry, so a central air quality rule is enforced through a State land administration record.

    What has the draft changed?

    1. Validity fixed: The red entry is valid for 15 months from the date of the incident, which the 2023 Rules did not state.
    2. Expiry conditions: It expires where no subsequent stubble burning incident is found on that land. It also expires where the environmental compensation imposed has been deposited.
    3. Extension conditions: Where there is a subsequent incident on that land, or where the compensation imposed is not paid, the validity extends for a further 15 months.
    4. Compensation amounts untouched: The draft does not alter the compensation itself, which continues to be set by the size of the land holding.
    5. Use of the money: Compensation collected is to be spent on crop diversification programmes, biomass utilisation, research and development in crop residue management, and subsidies for residue management technology.
    6. The process ahead: The draft was published on 16 September with a two month window for objections and suggestions, so the change will not operate before the coming paddy harvest ends.

    Why does stubble burning persist in the sowing window?

    1. The cropping calendar: Farmers in Punjab, Haryana, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh sow wheat between mid September and early December, and burning clears the paddy residue in the short gap between the two crops.
    2. The pollution share: Crop residue burning contributes up to 35 percent of the pollutants in Delhi and the National Capital Region on some days.
    3. Cost of the alternative: The Bharatiya Kisan Union (Dakaunda) has asked for financial assistance for paddy stubble management in place of penalties, on the position that the machinery and its running cost fall on the farmer.
    4. Reach of the penalty: The union’s stated position is that the pollution problem cannot be settled by force, and it records that red entries made earlier were removed after protest and petitioning.

    How has the red entry worked across the States?

    1. Punjab: Farm unions there have raised grievances about loans, subsidies and the mortgaging of land arising from red entries.
    2. Haryana: In districts such as Kurukshetra, authorities have said the red entry will be made on the Meri Fasal Mera Byora portal, the State’s crop and farmer registration platform.
    3. The portal ban: A farmer marked on that portal is barred from it for two years, which removes access to the benefits of all agricultural schemes routed through it.
    4. The committee’s recommendation: In a February 2025 report, the parliamentary standing committee on subordinate legislation recommended an incentive based removal system, allowing early removal for farmers who take up sustainable farming practices or government supported stubble management programmes.

    Challenges to the red entry system

    1. Detection rests on satellite fire counts: Burning is identified from remote sensing passes that cross at fixed times of day, so a fire lit outside the pass window is not recorded and the penalty falls unevenly across farmers doing the same thing. Eg. Daily fire counts for Punjab and Haryana are compiled from the afternoon overpasses of polar orbiting satellites carrying moderate resolution imaging sensors.
      The Fix: Pair satellite detection with geotagged field verification by revenue staff before an entry is recorded against a parcel.
    2. The penalty attaches to the land, not the burner: The remark sits on the parcel, so a tenant’s act marks the owner’s title and the owner has no simple route to contest it. Eg. A large share of paddy land in Punjab is cultivated under informal tenancy that never enters the revenue register.
      The Fix: Record the cultivator’s identity alongside the entry and provide a time bound appeal to the district collector.
    3. Residue machinery reaches the larger holding first: Equipment such as the Happy Seeder and the Super Straw Management System is priced beyond a small holding, and the custom hiring centres that rent it out are unevenly spread. Eg. The Crop Residue Management scheme routes subsidised machinery through cooperative societies and custom hiring centres whose village level coverage varies widely.
      The Fix: Guarantee machinery availability by village for the two week window between harvest and sowing, with the hiring charge met from the compensation fund.
    4. Paddy straw has no standing buyer: High silica content and low fodder value mean paddy straw, unlike wheat straw, has no ready market, so burning remains the cheapest disposal route. Eg. Biomass power plants and compressed biogas units in Punjab absorb only a fraction of the paddy straw generated each season.
      The Fix: Fix an assured offtake price for straw delivered to biomass and compressed biogas plants, funded from the environmental compensation already collected.
    5. The enforcing government is not the government that gains: State revenue staff record the entry and face the same farming community on land, water and procurement, while the air quality benefit accrues to Delhi. Eg. Punjab and Haryana supply the bulk of the fire counts on which the Commission acts, and neither State is the one whose air the measure is designed to clean.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated central verification and enforcement cadre for the sowing window, reporting its detections publicly rather than through the State revenue chain.

    Conclusion

    The draft settles how long the penalty lasts without settling what the penalty is for. A remark that blocks borrowing punishes the farmer as a debtor, while the machinery, the offtake and the alternative crop that would actually end the burning all require the farmer to be able to borrow. The comment window closes after the coming paddy harvest, so this season will run under the existing position. The point to watch is whether the final Rules carry a route out of the entry for a farmer who changes practice, since that is the one proposal on the table that ties removal to behaviour rather than to the passage of time.

    Back2Basics: Commission for Air Quality Management in NCR and Adjoining Areas

    1. What it is: A statutory body for better coordination, research, identification and resolution of problems relating to air quality in the National Capital Region and adjoining areas.
    2. Legal basis: It was constituted under the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021, and it replaced the Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority.
    3. Jurisdiction: It covers Delhi and the areas of Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh falling in the National Capital Region and adjoining areas, and its directions prevail over those of the State pollution control boards on air quality.
    4. Powers: It issues binding directions, imposes environmental compensation and operates measures such as the Graded Response Action Plan, and appeals against its orders lie to the National Green Tribunal.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 10] Describe the key points of the revised Global Air Quality Guidelines (AQGs) recently released by the World Health Organisation (WHO). How are these different from its last update in 2005? What changes in India’s National Clean Air Programme are required to achieve these revised standards?”

  • INS Kolkata was on routine patrol, Pak vessel conduct wrong: MEA

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of External Affairs has identified INS Kolkata as the Indian Navy warship involved in a collision with a Pakistani naval vessel in the North Arabian Sea, and has said that PNS Hunain conducted itself in an unacceptable and unprofessional manner at sea. India’s stated position is that the Pakistani ship’s overtaking manoeuvre grossly violated Article 10 of the Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troops Movements, 1991. That article bars naval units of the two countries from closing to less than three nautical miles of each other in international waters. Pakistan rejects the account, says its Navy was conducting its biennial exercise SEASPARK-26, and places the incident inside its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The tension is over where the collision happened and which rule governed it.

    What does the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice require?

    1. What the agreement covers: It obliges each country to give the other advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements above specified levels, so routine activity is not read as preparation for attack.
    2. The naval separation rule: Article 10 states that naval ships and submarines of the two countries are not to close to less than three nautical miles of each other while operating in international waters, in order to avoid an accident.
    3. When it was concluded: The agreement was signed in April 1991, as part of the set of confidence building measures built between the two countries after the military standoffs of the 1980s.
    4. What it is not: It is a risk reduction instrument rather than a dispute settlement one, and it carries no verification machinery and no penalty for breach.

    What happened at sea on 15 September?

    1. India’s account of the deployment: INS Kolkata was on a routine deployment in the western Arabian Sea when the collision occurred.
    2. The manoeuvre: The Pakistani vessel closed in on the Indian warship at high speed and attempted an overtaking manoeuvre, which resulted in contact between the two ships.
    3. Where it happened: The incident took place about 120 nautical miles from the Gulf of Oman.
    4. The ships involved: INS Kolkata is a frontline guided missile destroyer of the Indian Navy. PNS Hunain is an offshore patrol vessel, often listed as a Yarmook class corvette because of its combat suite.
    5. The damage: No major damage was caused to INS Kolkata and the ship remains at sea.

    What are the two sides’ competing claims?

    1. India’s legal case: India places the incident in international waters and cites a breach of Article 10 of the 1991 agreement and of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs).
    2. Pakistan’s account: Pakistan says its Navy was undertaking the biennial exercise SEASPARK-26, and that the Indian vessel carried out aggressive manoeuvres in dangerously close proximity to a Pakistani naval ship.
    3. Pakistan’s jurisdictional claim: Islamabad describes the incident as a highly provocative and unacceptable action by an Indian Navy vessel inside Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone.
    4. India’s response to that claim: India has rejected the allegations and insinuations in the Pakistani statement, and describes the response as prevarication.

    Does an Exclusive Economic Zone claim change the legal position?

    1. What an EEZ is: Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, a coastal State’s Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from its baselines.
    2. What rights it confers: The rights in an EEZ are over resources, meaning fisheries, seabed minerals and energy, together with jurisdiction over artificial islands and marine scientific research.
    3. What it does not confer: An EEZ is not territorial sea and carries no sovereignty over the water column for navigation, so warships of other States retain freedom of navigation there.
    4. Why the location argument still matters politically: Placing the collision inside its own EEZ lets Pakistan frame an Indian deployment as an intrusion, even where the navigation itself is lawful.
    5. The rule that applies either way: COLREGs bind all vessels on the high seas and connected waters regardless of zone, and they place the duty to keep clear on the overtaking vessel.

    How did the two governments escalate this diplomatically?

    1. India’s protest: India summoned Pakistan’s Charge d’Affaires and lodged a strong protest over the incident.
    2. Pakistan’s counter protest: Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Charge d’Affaires of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad and lodged its own protest.
    3. India’s advisory: Pakistan has been advised of the need for all military units to observe due care and to respect the provisions of the relevant agreements, so that such incidents are not repeated.
    4. What the exchange settled: Neither side accepted the other’s account, so the episode closes with two contradictory official records and no joint inquiry.

    Challenges to India and Pakistan maritime risk management

    1. No incidents at sea agreement exists: The two countries have no bilateral instrument setting out communication procedures and manoeuvring rules for close naval encounters. Eg. The United States and the then Soviet Union concluded an Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972 covering exactly these situations.
      The Fix: Negotiate a dedicated incidents at sea agreement with mandatory radio contact procedures and a joint fact finding mechanism for collisions.
    2. The 1991 agreement has no verification arm: Article 10 states a separation distance with no means of establishing after the event where two ships actually were. Eg. Each side in this incident places the collision in a different legal zone, and neither account can be tested.
      The Fix: Agree to exchange navigation track and automatic identification system data for any reported incident within a fixed period.
    3. Naval communication runs only through diplomatic channels: An encounter at sea reaches the two foreign ministries before it reaches the two navies, so escalation precedes de escalation. Eg. The standing hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations covers the land border rather than naval units at sea.
      The Fix: Establish a direct maritime operations hotline between the two navies’ operational headquarters with a standing duty officer.
    4. Notification obligations do not cover sea areas: Advance notice focuses on land based exercises and troop movements, so a naval exercise can run without a notified area other vessels are expected to keep clear of. Eg. The Pakistani exercise was under way in the same waters where the collision occurred.
      The Fix: Extend the advance notice regime to naval exercise areas and dates, with a notified exclusion zone for the duration of the exercise.
    5. The North Arabian Sea is a crowded operating area: Warships of many navies operate alongside heavy commercial traffic on the approaches to the Gulf, so the margin for a manoeuvring error is small. Eg. Indian Navy destroyers and frigates have been deployed on sustained missions in these waters for several months.
      The Fix: Coordinate published deconfliction lanes for warship transits in the northern Arabian Sea through the existing multinational maritime coordination arrangements.

    Conclusion

    Two navies operating in the same waters now hold two irreconcilable accounts of one collision, and have no mechanism to reconcile them. The instrument each side reaches for was written for a different problem, since a notification agreement cannot establish what happened once contact has already occurred. Both protests have been lodged and both rejected, and the Indian warship has returned to its deployment. The step that would change the pattern is a navy to navy communication and fact finding arrangement, because the next encounter will otherwise be handled exactly as this one was.

    Back2Basics: International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)

    1. What they are: COLREGs are the international rules of the road at sea, adopted through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1972 and in force since 1977.
    2. What they govern: They set the steering and sailing rules, including which vessel gives way in crossing, overtaking and head on situations, along with lights, shapes and sound signals.
    3. Who they bind: They apply to all vessels on the high seas and in connected waters navigable by seagoing vessels, warships included.
    4. The overtaking rule: A vessel overtaking another must keep out of its way, and that duty stays with the overtaking vessel until it is finally past and clear.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15] Why is maritime security vital to protect India’s sea trade? Discuss maritime and coastal security challenges and the way forward.”