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GS Paper: GS3

  • Govt: No bank charge on UPI payment up to Rs 2,000

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Finance has notified that no bank or system provider may impose any charge, directly or indirectly, on a payment made through RuPay debit cards or through the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), the National Payments Corporation of India’s real time system for transferring money between bank accounts using a virtual address, up to Rs 2,000. The notification does not specify any charge for transactions above that amount, which opens the way for a fee on higher value person to merchant payments. It follows the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, passed by Parliament last month, which removed the statutory bar on charging for these payment modes. The contested point is that a threshold covering 96 per cent of person to merchant transactions by number leaves roughly two thirds of their value open to a charge.

    What is the Merchant Discount Rate?

    1. What it is: The Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) is the fee a bank that processes a card or digital payment levies on the merchant receiving it.
    2. What it pays for: It covers transaction processing, settlement and payment infrastructure costs across the chain of banks and providers that carry the payment.
    3. The usual range: An MDR normally runs between 1 and 3 per cent of transaction value on debit and credit card payments.
    4. The exemption since 2020: No MDR has been levied on RuPay debit cards and UPI transactions since January 2020, a decision taken to promote adoption of digital payments.

    What has the notification done, and who decides a fee above the threshold?

    1. The prohibition: The notification bars any charge, direct or indirect, on RuPay debit card payments and on UPI transactions of up to Rs 2,000, whether imposed on the person making or the person receiving the payment.
    2. The silence above the threshold: The ministry did not specify charges for transactions above Rs 2,000, which is what creates the opening for an MDR on higher value person to merchant payments.
    3. The deciding body: Whether an MDR is imposed above the threshold will be decided by the UPI and Services Steering Committee, headed by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), with 22 members including banks, third party application providers such as PhonePe and Google Pay, the Payments Council of India and the Indian Banks’ Association.
    4. The rate under discussion: Payments industry officials have suggested an MDR of around 0.4 to 0.5 per cent for UPI payments to large merchants, which would help meet the industry’s annual cost of about Rs 20,700 crore.

    What legal change made this possible?

    1. The provision amended: The Bill amended Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, which had barred any bank or system provider from imposing a charge on payments made through the electronic modes prescribed under Section 269SU.
    2. The modes covered: Those prescribed modes were RuPay debit cards, BHIM UPI and the UPI QR code.
    3. Who the underlying obligation binds: Section 269SU of the Income Tax Act, 1961 applies to businesses with a turnover of over Rs 50 crore, requiring them to offer the prescribed electronic payment modes.
    4. What the amendment enables: Removing the exemption paves the way for an MDR on UPI and RuPay debit card payments to large merchants such as e commerce platforms.
    5. The stated rationale: The amendment is presented as an enabling provision for UPI’s long term sustainability, technological advancement and resilience against emerging risks.

    Why does the Rs 2,000 threshold matter for UPI’s economics?

    1. Small share by number: Only 4 per cent of person to merchant UPI payments in 2025 to 26 were for more than Rs 2,000.
    2. Large share by value: Those same transactions accounted for about two thirds of total person to merchant UPI payment value.
    3. The base: More than 24,000 crore UPI transactions worth Rs 314 lakh crore were made during the year.
    4. What the design achieves: The threshold protects the small ticket everyday payment from any charge while leaving the value where a percentage fee actually earns revenue open to one.

    How has the state paid for zero MDR so far?

    1. The incentive scheme: The government subsidises payments of up to Rs 2,000 made to small merchants through its incentive scheme for promotion of RuPay debit cards and low value BHIM UPI person to merchant transactions.
    2. The cap and the exclusion: The incentive is capped at 0.15 per cent of transaction value, and large merchants are not covered by the scheme at all.
    3. What it costs: The Budget for 2026 to 27 estimated the payout at Rs 2,000 crore. Rs 2,196.21 crore was paid in 2025 to 26, up from Rs 1,922.77 crore in 2024 to 25.
    4. The sustainability finding: A March report of the Standing Committee on Finance recorded that the absence of MDR makes the UPI ecosystem financially unsustainable.

    Challenges to reintroducing a Merchant Discount Rate on UPI

    1. Merchant pass through to the customer: A merchant charged a percentage fee recovers it by quoting a higher price or by preferring cash for large tickets. Eg. Many small retailers added a surcharge on card payments before the Reserve Bank of India barred the practice on debit cards.
      The Fix: Bar surcharging by contract with the acquiring bank and make the ban a condition of merchant onboarding.
    2. Threshold gaming by splitting payments: A fixed value threshold invites a single large payment being broken into several below the cut off. Eg. A Rs 5,000 purchase settled as three separate UPI transfers falls entirely inside the exempt band.
      The Fix: Apply the threshold to the aggregate value settled to one merchant from one payer in a day rather than to a single transaction.
    3. Definition risk on the large merchant: The charge is designed to fall on large merchants, and the line between a large and a small merchant sits on self declared turnover. Eg. Section 269SU already uses a Rs 50 crore turnover test that a merchant can restructure across entities.
      The Fix: Anchor the classification to verified Goods and Services Tax turnover rather than to a declaration made at onboarding.
    4. Fiscal and commercial funding running in parallel: An incentive subsidy and an MDR answer the same infrastructure cost, and running both leaves the split unstated. Eg. The subsidy payout has risen each year while the industry’s stated annual cost has stayed far above it.
      The Fix: Publish a stated glide path withdrawing the incentive as MDR revenue begins, so the two do not fund the same cost twice.

    Conclusion

    The zero fee regime on UPI was paid for by the exchequer, and the bill grew every year while the payments industry’s own cost stayed several times larger. The notification shifts the funding of the large value end of the system from the Budget to the merchant, and leaves the small everyday payment where it was. What to watch is whether the UPI and Services Steering Committee sets a rate above the threshold at all, and whether merchants at that end of the market stay on UPI once it does.

    Back2Basics: National Payments Corporation of India

    1. What it is: NPCI is the umbrella organisation for retail payments and settlement systems in India.
    2. How it was set up: It was incorporated in 2008 as a not for profit company, promoted jointly by the Reserve Bank of India and the Indian Banks’ Association.
    3. Its statutory anchor: It operates under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, which is the law governing payment systems in India.
    4. What it runs: Its systems include UPI, RuPay, the Immediate Payment Service, the National Automated Clearing House and FASTag.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] What is the status of digitalization in the Indian economy? Examine the problems faced in this regard and suggest improvements.”

  • Key inflation numbers rise in August, all eyes on RBI’s interest rate decision next month

    Why in the News

    Retail inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose to 4.82 per cent in August from 4.45 per cent in July, the highest reading in at least eight months. This is the third month in a row that headline retail inflation has stayed above the 4 per cent target the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is legally mandated to hold it at. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), the six member body that sets the policy repo rate, left that rate unchanged at 5.25 per cent last month and has not raised it since February 2023. The contested point is whether a price rise now visible across food, fuel and manufactured goods obliges the MPC to begin tightening even as output is growing faster than expected.

    What is India’s inflation targeting framework?

    1. The statutory target: The RBI is legally mandated to keep CPI inflation at 4 per cent, within a tolerance band of 2 to 6 per cent.
    2. The instrument: The MPC sets the policy repo rate, the rate at which the RBI lends overnight to commercial banks against government securities, and changes in it are expected to pass through to deposit and lending rates.
    3. Why the band matters: Inflation inside the band does not by itself require action. A reading persistently above the central target, rather than a breach of the 6 per cent ceiling, is what builds the case for a rate increase.

    What do the August retail price numbers actually show?

    1. Food inflation: Food inflation measured by the CPI rose from 5.52 per cent in July to 5.95 per cent in August.
    2. Sugar: The CPI for sugar surged 19 per cent over July and 24 per cent over August 2025, on lower than expected production and inventory falling to multi year lows.
    3. Policy response on sugar: The government last month allowed duty free imports of up to 10 lakh tonnes of raw sugar until October 31, with sugar a key input through the festival season.
    4. Onion: Onion prices were up 22 per cent in August over July, with late rains delaying planting.

    Why is the price rise being read as broad based rather than a food shock?

    1. Breadth of the increase: 314 of the 358 items in the CPI recorded higher prices in August than in July. The figure was 310 in July and 236 in February, before the war in West Asia began.
    2. Items above target: The number of items with inflation above the target rate rose from 101 in July to 110 in August.
    3. Spillover risk: Price pressure spreading from food and fuel into other categories is what distinguishes a broad based rise from a seasonal vegetable spike, and it is the pattern the data now shows.

    What do the wholesale and producer numbers add?

    1. Wholesale Price Index: Wholesale inflation rose to 9.92 per cent in August from 9.78 per cent in July, driven by food and fuel.
    2. Wholesale food: Wholesale food inflation hit a 20 month high of 7.05 per cent in August, which ICRA attributes largely to higher prices of fruits, vegetables, milk, spices and sugar.
    3. Producer prices: Inflation based on the output Producer Price Index (PPI) edged up to 9.81 per cent from 9.57 per cent in July.
    4. Structural signal in manufacturing: India Ratings and Research reads the rise as becoming structural, since seven manufacturing sub categories, tobacco products, textile products, chemical products, rubber and plastic products, base metals, electrical equipment and other manufacturing, all carry wholesale inflation above 10 per cent. Those seven make up more than a quarter of the manufacturing group, which is itself almost two thirds of the entire Wholesale Price Index.

    Where does this leave the Monetary Policy Committee?

    1. Direction from the last meeting: Minutes of last month’s meeting showed the RBI Governor and a Deputy Governor both hinting towards an increase in interest rates.
    2. The RBI’s own projections: The central bank expects CPI inflation to average 4.7 per cent in July to September, 5.9 per cent in October to December, 5.5 per cent in January to March 2027 and 5.3 per cent in April to June 2027.
    3. Growth is not a constraint: GDP growth was 7.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2026 to 27, which removes the usual argument against tightening.
    4. The meeting date: The MPC meets on October 5 to 7, three weeks after this price data, and could deliver the first interest rate increase in three and a half years.

    What is the external monetary backdrop?

    1. US Federal Reserve: The Fed announces its own interest rate decision this week, with markets expecting a 25 basis point increase in the federal funds rate target range to 3.75 to 4 per cent.
    2. The US price trigger: American consumer prices rose 0.4 per cent month on month in August against a 0.1 per cent increase in July, with the year on year headline rate steady at 3.4 per cent.
    3. The tightening cycle: ANZ economists expect a compressed 75 basis point tightening cycle, with the increase this week followed by further increases in October and December to take the key rate to 4.25 to 4.50 per cent.
    4. Why it matters for India: Major central banks have already begun raising rates, which narrows the room for the MPC to hold while inflation runs above target.

    Challenges to inflation targeting in India

    1. Food weight in the index: Food carries a large share of the CPI basket, so a supply shock in one commodity moves the headline number that policy is judged against. Eg. A sugar output shortfall and delayed onion planting moved the August print on their own.
      The Fix: Publish the policy response against core inflation alongside the headline, so a supply driven spike is not read as a demand signal.
    2. Interest rates do not reach a supply shock: The repo rate works on credit demand and cannot add a tonne of sugar or an onion crop to the market. Eg. The government answered the sugar price surge with an import window rather than with monetary policy.
      The Fix: Pair the rate decision with a stated buffer stock and import calendar for the commodities driving the print.
    3. Transmission lag to borrowers: A change in the repo rate reaches lending and deposit rates only over several quarters, so a decision taken after inflation is established arrives late. Eg. The policy rate has been unchanged for four consecutive meetings while the headline number has risen for three months.
      The Fix: Widen the share of loans benchmarked to an external rate, so a policy change reaches borrowers in the same quarter.
    4. Imported price pressure: A large share of fuel and edible oil demand is met by imports, so the exchange rate and global prices set domestic costs irrespective of the domestic rate stance. Eg. Landed prices of imported crude palm, soyabean and sunflower oil in Mumbai are all above their September 2025 levels.
      The Fix: Use a calibrated import duty schedule on edible oils that moves against global prices rather than staying fixed through a cycle.

    Conclusion

    Inflation has moved from a food story to a broader one, and the numbers that usually lag the headline, wholesale and producer prices, are now leading it. The central bank holds a rate that has not changed in three and a half years against a growth rate that gives it no reason to wait. The thing to watch is the next Monetary Policy Committee decision and whether it treats the current run as a supply spike that will pass or as the start of a demand driven episode requiring a rate increase.

    Back2Basics: Producer Price Index

    1. What it measures: The Producer Price Index tracks the average change in prices received by domestic producers for their output, measured from the seller’s side of a transaction.
    2. How it differs from the Wholesale Price Index: The Wholesale Price Index measures the price a buyer pays at the wholesale stage, so it includes trade margins and indirect taxes. The PPI strips those out and measures the producer’s own realisation.
    3. Why it is tracked: It signals cost pressure building upstream before that pressure reaches retail prices, so it works as a leading indicator for consumer inflation.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 10 marks] What are the causes of persistent high food inflation in India? Comment on the effectiveness of the monetary policy of the RBI to control this type of inflation.”

  • From Bengal to Boston, politicians love a ‘revdi’

    Why in the News

    The US President has promised a dividend of $5,000 to every adult citizen of the United States if the Republican Party retains control of Congress at the November midterm elections, describing it as a return on the country’s economic strength. The promise imports into a rich economy an instrument Indian parties have used for two decades. In India, Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT), the routing of welfare money straight into a beneficiary’s bank account, were built on the Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile (JAM) trinity under the second United Progressive Alliance government, and every party now carries cash handouts in its manifesto. The Prime Minister warned against a “revdi culture” in July 2022, and his own party’s state units went on to make cash transfers central to their poll strategy. The contested point is whether an instrument with this universal electoral pull is welfare policy or a substitute for a state that has not delivered health, education and skilling.

    What is a Direct Benefit Transfer based cash transfer?

    1. Direct Benefit Transfer: Welfare money is credited directly to an identified beneficiary’s bank account instead of reaching them as a subsidised good or a service.
    2. The JAM rails: A Jan Dhan bank account, an Aadhaar number for identification and a mobile number for authentication together make the credit instantaneous and traceable.
    3. Unconditional transfer: The recipient has to satisfy an eligibility filter such as being an adult woman, and nothing more. No school attendance, health check or work requirement attaches to the payment.

    Why does a cash dividend appeal to voters in the world’s richest economy?

    1. Per capita income gap: US annual per capita income is $94,430, almost 34 times India’s $2,813, so a flat payment reads very differently at each end of that range.
    2. Bottom quintile: Mean household income of the poorest 20 per cent of Americans is $17,132 a year, per the 2024 American Community Survey of the US Census Bureau. A $5,000 payment is more than 100 days of that household’s annual income.
    3. Second quintile: The next 20 per cent has a household income of $48,852 a year, so the same payment is a little over a month’s income.
    4. Concentration at the top: Annual household income of the top 5 per cent is $5,25,113, more than 30 times the mean of the bottom 20 per cent. A flat transfer is therefore a large sum for the bottom of a rich country and a rounding error at its top.

    How large is the fiscal commitment behind these promises?

    1. Cost of the US dividend: About 245 million citizens are over 18, per US Census Bureau 2024 data, putting the cost of the promise at at least $1 trillion.
    2. Scale against India: That sum is close to a fourth of India’s entire GDP of $3.92 trillion in 2025 to 26.
    3. State transfers in India: The Sixteenth Finance Commission estimates large group unconditional cash transfers by states at Rs 1.96 lakh crore in 2025 to 26, roughly $20 billion, the bulk of it going to women in Maharashtra, Karnataka and West Bengal.
    4. Approval risk: The US dividend is a promise and not an appropriation. It requires the United States Congress to approve the spending.

    How did cash transfers become the common instrument of Indian electoral politics?

    1. Origin in delivery reform: DBT began as a leakage reduction measure under the second United Progressive Alliance government, built on the JAM trinity rather than on an electoral calculation.
    2. The electoral discovery: An advisor to that government framed the appeal in terms of funds reaching a voter’s account at the click of a mouse ahead of an election.
    3. Cross party adoption: Regional parties, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party all now carry cash handouts to sections of their voter base in their manifestos.
    4. Reversal of a stated position: The Prime Minister’s July 2022 warning against the practice was followed by his own party’s state units adopting it, producing a competitive escalation between state units, regional parties and the Congress.

    What does the spread of cash transfers reveal about the state?

    1. A political economy fallout: Cash transfers expanded because the state failed on health, education and skilling, leaving parties to offer money in place of services.
    2. Substitute forms of security: The same failure produces minimum income through job guarantees, cash in the hands of women and allowances for the literate but jobless, each of them a payment standing in for a missing service.
    3. Universality of the instrument: A rich economy with 34 times India’s per capita income reaches for the same device, which shows the appeal is electoral rather than developmental.

    Challenges to unconditional cash transfers

    1. Recurring outlay against capital spending: A monthly transfer becomes a permanent charge on a state budget and competes with capital spending on hospitals, schools and water supply. Eg. Maharashtra’s Ladki Bahin scheme and Karnataka’s Gruha Lakshmi are annual recurring commitments rather than one time payments.
      The Fix: Report unconditional transfer outlay as a disclosed share of a state’s own revenue receipts in every annual budget document.
    2. Absence of human capital conditionality: An unconditional payment asks nothing of the household, so it does not move school attendance or immunisation. Eg. Mexico’s Progresa linked benefits to school attendance and health check ups, and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia used conditional transfers to lift 36 million people out of poverty.
      The Fix: Attach verifiable attendance and immunisation conditions where the delivery system can already confirm them.
    3. Exclusion through the identification layer: Eligibility rests on databases, and a household with unseeded or mismatched records drops out of the list without knowing why. Eg. Aadhaar seeding failures have removed ration card holders from beneficiary lists in Jharkhand.
      The Fix: Provide an offline grievance and reinstatement route at the block level with a fixed disposal deadline.
    4. Pressure off the public provider: Cash allows a household to buy the private service the state failed to supply, which removes the political pressure to repair the public one. Eg. Out of pocket spending on private hospitals remains a leading route into household impoverishment in India.
      The Fix: Publish a service availability audit of the relevant public facilities alongside each transfer scheme.

    Conclusion

    A cash transfer buys immediate relief and buys it visibly, which is why it has crossed from a lower middle income democracy to the richest one. It does not build a health centre, staff a school or train a worker, and the states expanding it fastest are the ones whose service delivery gaps created the demand for it. The tension is unresolved: the instrument is popular precisely because the public system it compensates for has not been fixed, and every rupee committed to the transfer makes fixing that system harder to finance.

    What is Inclusive Growth?

    1. About: Inclusive growth is economic growth distributed fairly across society that creates opportunity for all, as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development (OECD).
    2. Rationale: It entered India’s stated policy goals with the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007 to 2012), titled “Rapid and More Inclusive Growth”, and continued in the Twelfth Plan as “Faster, Sustainable, and More Inclusive Growth”.
    3. The OECD typology: Three dimensions govern it. Participation, meaning all groups can contribute to growth; benefit sharing, meaning all groups gain in proportion to their contribution; and equity, meaning historical disadvantage is actively redressed.
    4. How it is measured: The National Multidimensional Poverty Index across health, education and living standards, the Gini coefficient for consumption or income inequality, the Human Development Index, and the Periodic Labour Force Survey for participation and unemployment.

    Government Initiatives for Inclusive Growth

    1. Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana: Free food grain to 81.35 crore beneficiaries, extended to 31 December 2028 at an outlay of about Rs 11.80 lakh crore.
    2. Viksit Bharat G RAM G Act, 2025: Replaces the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act with a 125 day wage guarantee plus skill and livelihood diversification components, effective 1 July 2026.
    3. Ayushman Bharat PM JAY: Health cover of Rs 5 lakh a year for 55 crore beneficiaries, now extended to all persons above 70 under Ayushman Vay Vandana.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Mudra Yojana and PM SVANidhi: Rs 27 lakh crore disbursed across 43 crore micro enterprise loans since 2015, and collateral free credit of Rs 10,000 to Rs 50,000 for street vendors.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 10 marks] Examine the pattern and trend of public expenditure on social services in the post-reforms period in India. To what extent this has been in consonance with achieving the objective of inclusive growth?”

  • Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Why in the News

    India has unveiled PRAHAAR, its first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, which sets a national framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activity and radicalisation through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches. The policy follows Operation Sindoor, the strikes of 6 and 7 May on the Pakistan based terror network launched after the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, and follows the three declarations India issued immediately after that operation. The first of those declarations ended the stated era of restraint, the second classified any future act of cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan as an “act of war”, and the third removed Pakistani nuclear blackmail as a restraining factor. The tension is that the doctrine India has hardened is built for a state sponsor with a return address, while the threat itself has fragmented into lone wolf attackers, autonomous cells and drone, cyber and artificial intelligence enabled methods that a retaliatory strike does not reach.

    What is PRAHAAR?

    1. PRAHAAR as a national policy: PRAHAAR is India’s first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, unveiled on 23 February 2026.
    2. Scope of the framework: It sets out a national counter terrorism framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activities and to radicalisation.
    3. Whole of government and whole of society approach: It works through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches, so prevention is not left to security agencies alone.

    How has the form of terrorism changed in 25 years?

    1. The organisational form has fragmented: Large terror groups run by single leaders, such as al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden or the Islamic State under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with its call for an Islamic Caliphate, have given way to smaller and more autonomous entities.
    2. The attacker is now often solitary: Lone wolf attacks are becoming the norm, which removes the network that intelligence collection is designed to detect.
    3. Drones, cyber capability and artificial intelligence: Drones, cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence are now used to perpetrate terror.
    4. Counter terrorism use of the same technologies: Those technologies are used by the nations combating terrorism as well, so capability advantage is contested rather than assured.

    What is a lone wolf attack?

    1. The definition: A lone wolf attack is an attack planned and executed by a single individual, or by a pair acting alone, who belongs to no organisation and takes no operational direction from one.
    2. How the attacker is produced: Radicalisation runs through online propaganda rather than through recruitment by a handler, so the individual adopts a group’s cause without ever joining its structure. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than around infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
    3. Why detection fails: Intelligence collection works by intercepting communication between conspirators and by penetrating networks, and an attacker who communicates with nobody generates neither signal.
    4. Why a retaliation doctrine does not reach it: A cross border response needs attribution to a sponsoring state, and an individual acting alone offers no camp, handler or command node to strike.

    Why did the early Indian response stay passive, and which attacks fell inside that period?

    1. Assassination of a former Prime Minister, 1991: The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on 21 May 1991 at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu came while cross border terror was only beginning in Kashmir.
    2. Internal detection failed repeatedly: The March 1993 Mumbai serial blasts killed over 250 people in 13 coordinated blasts, and the synchronised blasts across Coimbatore in February 1998 exposed the inadequacy of internal security mechanisms.
    3. Pakistan’s direct role was first exposed by a hijack: The hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 on 24 December 1999 forced India to release the Pakistan based terrorists Ahmed Omar Sheikh and Masood Azhar in exchange for more than 160 civilian hostages.
    4. Operation Parakram and its outcome: The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001 triggered a large scale military mobilisation under Operation Parakram, and after almost two years of standoff the disengagement took place with no direct punishment on Pakistan.
    5. Nuclear parity was the restraint: With both countries holding nuclear weapons, the threat of escalation drew the international community in to cool tempers each time.
    6. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the absence of retaliation: The 26/11 Mumbai attacks of November 2008, which brought the world’s solidarity with India’s fight against cross border terrorism, produced no military action against Pakistan.
    7. The Red Fort attack of 2000: An Army garrison within the Red Fort was targeted on 22 December 2000 by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, killing three soldiers.
    8. Delhi market blasts of 2005: Over 60 people were killed in serial blasts across Delhi markets including Sarojini Nagar and Paharganj in October 2005.
    9. Delhi commercial district blasts of 2008: Multiple blasts hit Connaught Place, Greater Kailash and Karol Bagh in September 2008, months before the Mumbai attacks.
    10. The Delhi High Court blast of 2011: A briefcase bomb outside the Delhi High Court on 7 September 2011 killed 15 people, claimed by Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HUJI), an al-Qaeda affiliated group largely based in Pakistan.
    11. Akshardham, Varanasi and Pune attacks: The 2002 Akshardham Temple attack, the 2006 Varanasi serial blasts and the 2010 German Bakery blast in Pune are part of the same record.
    12. Proof did not produce a response: In each of these cases India chose not to respond directly and decisively, even after conclusive proof of Pakistan’s support.

    What changed when the fight moved across the border?

    1. The Uri attack and the 2016 surgical strikes: The JeM attack on an Army camp at Uri in Kashmir on 18 September 2016 led to the first cross border surgical strikes on 28 and 29 September.
    2. Message conveyed by the surgical strikes: They sent a message and served as a statement of intent that terror would not go unpunished.
    3. The Balakot air strike of 2019: After the attack on a Central Reserve Police Force convoy at Pulwama on 14 February 2019, the Indian Air Force struck a JeM terror camp at Balakot, the first time it had crossed into Pakistani airspace to hit a terror target.
    4. Operation Sindoor, 2025: Operation Sindoor was launched on 6 and 7 May after the Pahalgam attack, and in 96 hours the leaders and headquarters of the LeT and JeM networks were destroyed and Pakistani military assets were hit.

    What is the four fold strategy proposed from here?

    1. Elimination of the residual network: Continue to hunt down and eliminate the remnants of the terror network inside the country, particularly in Kashmir.
    2. Pre emptive action across the Line of Control: Take pre emptive military action against any potential terror threat building across the Line of Control (LoC), including at terrorist launch pads, which years of experience and an embedded intelligence network make possible.
    3. The de radicalisation programme: Run an exhaustive de radicalisation programme that motivates young people towards the mainstream and makes joining or supporting a terror outfit unattractive and prohibitively costly.
    4. Terror financing: Take all necessary steps to cut off terror financing, in close coordination with friendly countries.

    What is India pressing for at the multilateral level?

    1. The charge of double standards: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Bishkek on 1 September the Prime Minister said, “We must send a strong message to countries that use terrorism as an instrument of policy and provide safe haven and support to terrorists that terrorism can never be a strategic asset for anyone.”
    2. A named attack entered a group declaration: The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi included an exclusive paragraph on the Pahalgam attack in the Delhi Declaration.
    3. Effect of a grievance carried in multilateral text: A specific Indian grievance is now carried in the text of a multi country declaration rather than only in national statements.

    Challenges to India’s counter terrorism strategy

    1. A retaliation doctrine has no target in a lone wolf attack: An “act of war” classification presumes an attributable state sponsor, and a self radicalised individual acting alone gives no address to strike. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
      The Fix: Pair the declaratory doctrine with a published attribution standard, so the threshold of evidence that triggers a cross border response is fixed in advance rather than argued after each attack.
    2. Police and public order are State subjects: A national policy has to be executed through State police forces that the Union does not control, which is where coordination breaks down. Eg. The delay in National Security Guard deployment during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
      The Fix: Route PRAHAAR’s obligations through a standing Centre State counter terrorism council with State specific implementation timelines, rather than through advisories.
    3. Intelligence remains fragmented across agencies: Multiple collection agencies without seamless real time sharing means a warning held by one is not actionable by another. Eg. Intelligence fusion is attempted through the Multi Agency Centre and the National Intelligence Grid, which depend on voluntary feeds from database holding agencies.
      The Fix: Give a single fusion centre statutory authority to task and receive feeds, on the model of a national counter terrorism centre, so sharing is an obligation rather than a courtesy.
    4. De radicalisation has no measurable output: A programme aimed at intent rather than at incidents cannot be judged by attack counts, and India runs no published evaluation of one. Eg. Online influence of the kind that drove youth radicalisation in Kashmir operates outside any programme’s reach.
      The Fix: Fix published indicators for the programme, such as recruitment attempts intercepted and cases of disengagement sustained over a stated period, and report them annually.
    5. Terror financing has moved to channels outside the banking system: Hawala, counterfeit currency and cryptocurrency route funds without touching a reportable transaction. Eg. Informal channel financing was traced in the ISIS linked Padgha module.
      The Fix: Bring virtual digital asset service providers fully under reporting obligations to the Financial Intelligence Unit India, so the fastest growing channel is monitored on the same terms as banks.
    6. There is no agreed international definition of terrorism: The absence of one lets states label selectively and refuse cooperation on legal grounds. Eg. Repeated holds placed on listings under the United Nations Security Council 1267 sanctions committee.
      The Fix: Press the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which India first proposed in 1996, to a vote rather than leaving it in open ended negotiation.

    Conclusion

    The doctrine India adopted after Operation Sindoor answers one form of the threat well and leaves the other untouched. A declared willingness to retaliate raises the cost of sponsoring an attack from across the border; it does nothing about an attacker who was recruited online and never crossed anything. PRAHAAR is the first instrument that addresses the second half, which is why its prevention and radicalisation components, rather than its enforcement components, are the part worth watching. The marker is whether the policy produces named nodal responsibilities and reported outcomes, or remains a framework document that the next attack is measured against.

    Terrorism in India

    1. Definition of terrorism: Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of violence, to instil fear and achieve political, ideological or religious goals.
    2. The statutory definition: Under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, a terrorist act is any act intended to threaten India’s sovereignty, security or unity, or to create terror through violence, explosives or disruption of essential services.
    3. The four recognised strands in the Indian context: Cross border terrorism driven by Pakistan based groups in Jammu and Kashmir and by Khalistani networks, North East insurgencies run by ethno nationalist groups such as NSCN and ULFA, Left Wing Extremism across the Red Corridor, and hinterland terrorism by modules operating outside traditional conflict zones.
    4. The direction of change: The terror and organised crime nexus supplies funding, arms and logistics, and technology acts as a force multiplier through drones, encrypted platforms and 3D printing. Eg. The Houthi drone attack on Saudi Aramco in 2019.

    Institutional Architecture and Initiatives Against Terrorism

    1. Multi Agency Centre and Cyber Multi Agency Centre: Fuse intelligence inputs across central and State agencies.
    2. National Intelligence Grid: Networks databases held by different departments to give agencies real time access.
    3. Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre: Acts as the nodal point against cybercrime with a citizen reporting route. Eg. The 1930 helpline.
    4. Border management systems: Smart fencing under the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System plugs infiltration gaps, backed by a layered coastal security grid.
    5. Surrender and rehabilitation policies: Pull cadres out of insurgency through reintegration rather than through prosecution alone.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] Terrorism is a global scourge. How has it manifested in India? Elaborate with contemporary examples. What are the counter measures adopted by the State? Explain.”

  • CAZRI moth bean varieties show resilience in an El Niño year [MENTION]

    Why in News

    Moth bean varieties developed by the Central Arid Zone Research Institute (CAZRI) performed with resilience during an El Niño year. El Niño is the warm phase of the Pacific ocean and atmosphere cycle that often suppresses the Indian monsoon.

    Static Context

    CAZRI is an ICAR institute at Jodhpur, Rajasthan, focused on arid zone agriculture and desertification research. Moth bean is a hardy arid legume grown in the rainfed drylands of western Rajasthan and Gujarat. It tolerates drought and poor soils, which makes it valuable for climate resilient cropping. Release specific yield figures could not be verified, as the PIB detail page did not resolve this run. The exam value here is the institute and the crop, not the unverified numbers.

    Prelims angle

    Place CAZRI at Jodhpur under ICAR. Recognise moth bean as a drought tolerant arid pulse. Recall that El Niño tends to weaken the southwest monsoon.

    Mains angle

    GS3, dryland agriculture and climate resilience. A supporting example for answers on drought resistant crops and rainfed farming.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2012] Consider the following crops of India: 1. Groundnut 2. Sesamum 3. Pearl millet Which of the above is / are predominantly rainfed crop/crops?
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (d)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309690&reg=3&lang=1

  • Dryland Congress 2026 concludes with the Delhi Declaration on Drylands

    Why in News

    The Dryland Congress 2026 concluded in New Delhi with the adoption of the Delhi Declaration on Dryland, also styled the 3D. The Congress ran from 10 to 12 September 2026 at the National Agricultural Science Complex, New Delhi.

    Core facts

    The Congress was organised by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). It gathered over 800 experts from Asia, Africa and the Americas. The event marked 50 years of the ICAR and ICRISAT partnership. It deliberated on six themes: breeding, climate resilience, nutrition and markets, farming systems, seed systems, and gender and youth inclusion. Drylands span about 45% of the world’s land surface and support over two billion people.

    Static Context

    ICRISAT is a research centre headquartered at Hyderabad, working on crops of the semi arid tropics such as sorghum, pearl millet, chickpea, pigeonpea and groundnut. ICAR is the apex body for coordinating agricultural research and education in India, under the Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare. Dryland and rainfed farming is supported through the Rainfed Area Development (RAD) programme under the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA), which promotes Integrated Farming Systems (IFS). Land degradation in drylands connects to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

    Prelims angle

    Distinguish ICAR (Indian apex research body) from ICRISAT (international centre at Hyderabad). Link RAD and IFS to the NMSA. Associate desertification with the UNCCD. Know the semi arid tropic crops.

    Mains angle

    GS3, agriculture and cropping systems. Frame dryland and rainfed agriculture as central to crop diversification, climate resilience and farmer incomes, and the value of cooperation among developing countries in seed and breeding research.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which among the following is/are the objective(s) of the Rainfed Area Development (RAD) initiative under the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA)?
    1. Encouraging monoculture in rainfed areas
    2. Increasing rice cultivation in irrigated regions
    3. Enhancing productivity and minimising climatic risks through Integrated Farming Systems (IFS)
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 1 and 2
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 only
    Answer: (d)”

    “[2021, GS3, 15 marks] What are the present challenges before crop diversification? How do emerging technologies provide an opportunity for crop diversification?”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309628&reg=3&lang=1

  • India to host the World Circular Economy Forum 2026 [MENTION]

    Why in News

    India will host the World Circular Economy Forum (WCEF) 2026 at Gandhinagar from 15 to 18 September 2026. The theme is “Circular Economy: Transition for People and Prosperity”.

    Static Context

    A circular economy keeps materials in use through reuse, repair, refurbishment and recycling, which cuts raw material inputs, waste and greenhouse gas emissions. The WCEF is convened by the Finnish Innovation Fund (Sitra) with partners. The Indian host is the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC). India’s related domestic instruments include Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) rules for plastic, electronic and battery waste, and the mission on resource efficiency. This item is a MENTION because the forum begins after this run. Its exam value is the circular economy concept and the fact that India hosts the WCEF.

    Prelims angle

    Link the circular economy to reduced raw material use, reduced waste and lower emissions. Associate EPR with waste categories. Note India as the WCEF 2026 host at Gandhinagar.

    Mains angle

    GS3, environment and resource efficiency. Frame the circular economy as a route to decoupling growth from material and emission intensity, and India’s positioning as a convening venue on sustainability.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: Circular economy reduces the emissions of greenhouse gases.
    Statement II: Circular economy reduces the use of raw materials as inputs.
    Statement III: Circular economy reduces wastage in the production process.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement II and Statement III are correct and both of them explain Statement I
    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement I explains Statement II
    (c) Only one of the Statements II and III is correct and that explains Statement I
    (d) Neither Statement II nor Statement III is correct
    Answer: (a)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309702&reg=3&lang=1

  • Incentive Scheme for Promotion of Domestic PNG Connections

    Why in News

    The Press Information Bureau (PIB) issued a PIB Backgrounder on the Incentive Scheme for Promotion of Domestic Piped Natural Gas (PNG) Connections. Piped Natural Gas (PNG) is cooking gas supplied to homes through a pipeline network rather than in cylinders.

    Core facts

    The scheme incentivises City Gas Distribution (CGD) entities to expand domestic PNG connections. City Gas Distribution (CGD) is the network that retails natural gas to households, commercial units and vehicles in a defined geographical area. The nodal ministry is the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. Release specific outlay and connection figures could not be verified, as the PIB detail page did not resolve this run.

    Static Context

    The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) authorises and regulates CGD networks. The PNGRB was set up under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006. It regulates refining, storage, transport, distribution and marketing of petroleum products and natural gas, and grants CGD authorisations through competitive bidding rounds. Domestic PNG and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) together form the priority segment for gas supply, which receives domestic gas allocation on a priority basis. The scheme sits alongside the clean cooking access agenda pursued earlier through the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), which provided Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) connections to poor households.

    Prelims angle

    The regulator to remember is the PNGRB and the range of activities it regulates. Distinguish PNG (piped, network based) from LPG (cylinder based) and CNG (vehicle fuel). Note the priority allocation of domestic natural gas to the CGD household segment.

    Mains angle

    GS3, energy and infrastructure. A question can frame domestic gas access as a clean energy transition and last mile infrastructure issue. The scheme links to energy security, import dependence on natural gas, and household air quality gains from switching away from solid fuels.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following activities:
    I. Production of crude oil
    II. Refining, storage and distribution of petroleum
    III. Marketing and sale of petroleum products
    IV. Production of natural gas
    How many of the above activities are regulated by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board in our country?
    (a) Only one
    (b) Only two
    (c) Only three
    (d) All the four
    Answer: (b)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309647&reg=3&lang=1

  • The choice is between AI applications and AI frontiers

    Why in the News

    India has no competitive frontier artificial intelligence (AI) model and no realistic prospect of producing one without significant policy shifts, at a time when United States and Chinese firms have released a parade of increasingly capable models through the year. The advice India has received from United States industry leaders and academics, supported by sections of the Indian information technology industry, is to concentrate on applications built on foundation models rather than on the frontier itself. The position advanced against that advice is that countries falling behind in frontier AI risk the fate of those that missed the Industrial Revolution, where a small business elite found a niche and prospered while ordinary people were disempowered. The binding constraint identified is not talent or algorithms but computing power, since the IndiaAI mission’s pool of 45,000 graphics processing units (GPUs) is a fraction of what a single United States frontier laboratory controls. The proposal put forward is a compute tax requiring any data centre established in India to reserve a share of its capacity for a publicly administered national pool.

    What is a frontier AI model?

    1. Frontier model: A frontier model is a foundation model at the leading edge of capability, from which industry specific applications are then built.
    2. Scaling laws: The industry has exploited “scaling laws”, which predict how a model’s performance improves with its size and with the computing power used for its training.
    3. Compute and data as the decisive input: The algorithms underlying modern AI models are widely understood, so better algorithms improve efficiency while the basic formula for producing a frontier model remains scaling compute and data.

    What are the two channels through which AI will matter?

    1. Diffusion through the economy: AI will spread by automating some routine jobs, with each industry requiring specialised applications built on foundation models.
    2. India’s application start up ecosystem: India has an active start up ecosystem devoted to building such applications, and businesses have rapidly adopted AI tools.
    3. The strategic channel is separate: AI will also have a strategic impact on research, cybersecurity and defence, which is not reached by application building.
    4. Mathematics and cybersecurity results: AI models have been used to solve some of the most important open problems in mathematics, and Anthropic’s Mythos model has formidable cybersecurity capabilities.

    Why is access to foreign frontier models not a durable substitute?

    1. Access today is real but conditional: Consumers currently have access to other frontier models, including Chinese open weight models.
    2. The most capable model is already withheld: Mythos has not been released publicly and is available only to selected organisations.
    3. Export control has already been applied: The United States temporarily imposed export restrictions on Mythos and on a version of Mythos with guardrails called Fable.
    4. The stated direction of policy: The United States is likely to restrict and regulate AI to “achieve global dominance”, so present availability cannot be expected to continue indefinitely.

    Why is compute the binding constraint for India?

    1. The national pool is small: The IndiaAI mission has a pool of 45,000 GPUs, which is only a fraction of the capacity controlled by a single United States frontier laboratory.
    2. The flagship allocation is smaller still: The mission allocated 4,096 GPUs to Sarvam AI to train India’s flagship model.
    3. The gap is an order of magnitude: That allocation is about 50 times smaller than what is used to train frontier models.
    4. Ingenuity does not close it: No amount of ingenuity can compensate for a resource gap of that size, which is why lack of computing power has bottlenecked sovereign Indian model development.

    What do the new data centres actually deliver to India?

    1. Data centre build out across States: A number of data centres with significant computing capacity are coming up in various States.
    2. Capacity reserved for multinational clients: These will primarily serve multinational corporations, and their location in India offers no tangible benefits.
    3. The investment goes into equipment: Most of the announced capital investment will be directed to electronic equipment.
    4. The employment effect is thin: The employment they create will be limited to a few construction and maintenance jobs.
    5. The environmental cost is local: Large data centres have a significant environmental impact, and in India that impact will be borne disproportionately by local communities.

    How would a compute tax work?

    1. The obligation: Any data centre established in India would be required to reserve a stated share, suggested at 25 per cent, of its computing capacity for a publicly administered national compute pool.
    2. The hardware does not move: That capacity would remain physically within the data centre.
    3. Allocation is centralised: The reserved capacity would be allocated by a central scheduler to Indian institutions.
    4. The bargaining position favours India: Multinational corporations are likely to resist, and their bargaining position is weak given the growing hostility to these installations elsewhere.
    5. Limits of the compute tax: Such a tax would not obviate the other data centre concerns, and only together with environmental safeguards and welfare measures would it open a narrow route to building a frontier model in India.

    Challenges to a compute tax on data centres

    1. Reserved capacity is not the same as usable capacity: Frontier training needs thousands of GPUs interconnected as one cluster, and a quarter of each site’s capacity scattered across many sites does not assemble into that. Eg. The flagship national allocation of 4,096 GPUs already sits far below frontier training scale despite being a single block.
      The Fix: Write the reservation as a contiguous interconnected block within each site, with a minimum cluster size, rather than as a percentage of total capacity.
    2. A capacity levy raises the cost of hosting in India: An operator prices the reserved share into its India investment case and can site the facility in a neighbouring jurisdiction instead. Eg. Data centre investment is mobile across countries in a way that manufacturing capacity is not.
      The Fix: Offset the reservation against power tariff and land concessions already given to data centres, so the obligation is priced as a condition of the incentive rather than as an additional charge.
    3. A public pool needs an allocation rule it does not yet have: Deciding which institution gets scarce compute, for how long and on what merit is a governance problem that no existing Indian body performs. Eg. The single largest allocation so far went to one start up for the flagship model.
      The Fix: Publish the scheduler’s allocation criteria and a usage register, so grants of compute are contestable in the way research grants are.
    4. Compute alone does not produce a model: Frontier training also needs large curated datasets and a small pool of researchers who have trained models at scale, both of which are internationally mobile. Eg. Indian language data is thin compared with the English language corpora frontier models are trained on.
      The Fix: Tie the compute grant to a data contribution obligation, so a recipient returns curated Indian language datasets into the national repository as a condition of access.
    5. The environmental burden stays where it was: Reserving capacity changes who uses the machines and not their power draw, water use or siting. Eg. The impact of large installations falls disproportionately on the communities around them.
      The Fix: Attach site level water and power disclosure and a local benefit sharing requirement to the same instrument that creates the reservation.

    Conclusion

    The question the argument forces is not whether India should build applications, which it already does well, but whether an applications only position is a strategy or a description of the constraint. The claim on the other side is that capability at the frontier has a strategic use in research, security and defence that no amount of downstream product building substitutes for. The compute tax is the first concrete instrument proposed to convert privately owned capacity sited in India into publicly directed capacity, and it is testable against a single question: whether the reserved share can be assembled into a cluster large enough to train anything. The marker to watch is whether any Indian allocation moves from the thousands of GPUs to the tens of thousands, since that is the threshold the gap is actually measured at.

    Artificial Intelligence in India

    1. AI as a public good: India treats AI as a public good rather than a proprietary luxury, anchored in shared compute infrastructure, open and locally relevant datasets and decentralised talent development.
    2. The scale of the ecosystem: Over 6 million people are employed in the technology and AI ecosystem, with more than 1,800 Global Capability Centres of which over 500 are AI focused.
    3. Adoption is broad: 87 per cent of enterprises are actively deploying AI solutions, led by industrial and automotive, consumer goods and retail, banking and financial services, and healthcare.
    4. The projected economic weight: AI is projected to contribute USD 500 to 600 billion to India’s Gross Domestic Product by 2030.

    Government Initiatives for Artificial Intelligence

    1. IndiaAI Mission, 2024: Implemented by IndiaAI under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology with an outlay of Rs 10,371 crore, on the stated vision of making AI in India and making AI work for India.
    2. AIKosh: The national AI dataset repository, carrying over 3,000 datasets and 243 models across 20 sectors.
    3. BharatGen: A government funded multimodal large language model initiative designed for AI powered public services and Indian use cases.
    4. Digital India Bhashini and Project Vaani: Speech and translation tools across the 22 Scheduled Languages, supported by a 150,000 hour Indian speech dataset.
    5. IndiaAI FutureSkills and YUVAi: Fellowships and AI labs concentrated in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, and an AI skills initiative for school students in Classes 8 to 12.
    6. IndiaAI Safety Institute: The national trust framework covering bias mitigation, privacy, explainability and AI governance.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 15 marks] What is agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI)? Explain its working. Describe its applications with suitable examples. Discuss the advantages, risks and challenges associated with agentic AI systems.”

  • Kottayam residents mobilise against Centre’s ESA proposal

    Why in the News

    The Centre’s seventh draft notification on Ecologically Sensitive Areas (ESAs) in the Western Ghats, issued on 27 July, has entered the closing fortnight of its 60 day objection window, with two weeks left for filing objections and suggestions. Four villages in the high ranges of Kottayam district in Kerala, Koottikkal, Melukavu, Poonjar Thekkekkara and Teekoy, all in the Poonjar Assembly constituency, are on the proposed ESA map, and the proposal is estimated to affect around 70,000 people. Opposition has already moved past petitions, with the Koottikkal local body convening special grama sabhas in all 14 wards and passing a council resolution detailing its objections. The contest is between a conservation boundary drawn at the level of the Ghats as a whole and settler households whose plantations sit inside it.

    What is an Ecologically Sensitive Area?

    1. Ecologically Sensitive Area: An Ecologically Sensitive Area is a zone notified by the Union government in which specified activities are prohibited or regulated because of the area’s ecological value.
    2. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: The notification is issued under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which lets the Centre restrict industries, operations and processes in an area on environmental grounds.
    3. What notification changes on the ground: Land inside the zone continues in private ownership, and it is the permissible use of that land that is narrowed.
    4. Why a draft matters procedurally: A draft notification opens a statutory window for objections and suggestions before the final notification is issued, and the boundary can move in that window.

    Which areas are proposed and who does the boundary affect?

    1. The four villages named: Koottikkal, Melukavu, Poonjar Thekkekkara and Teekoy have been included in the draft notification.
    2. Poonjar Assembly constituency: All four are in the Poonjar Assembly constituency in Kottayam district.
    3. The population estimate: The proposal is estimated to affect around 70,000 people, mostly settler families in the high ranges.
    4. Seventh draft notification in the series: This is the seventh draft notification on Western Ghats ESAs, so the boundary has been redrawn repeatedly without a final settlement.

    Why does the boundary matter to these villages?

    1. Agriculture is the economic base: Agriculture is the backbone of these high range villages, with rubber, cardamom, coffee, pepper, coconut and banana among the major crops.
    2. The fear is about permissible use: Residents hold that bringing their land under the ESA could impose restrictions on plantations.
    3. Development works in the villages: Residents also fear that essential development activities in the villages would be hampered.

    How has the objection been organised?

    1. The local body went beyond petitions: The Koottikkal local body convened special grama sabhas in all 14 wards and held an urgent council meeting.
    2. A formal resolution was passed: The council passed a resolution detailing its objections, and the resolution will be forwarded to the State and Union governments.
    3. The campaign is broad based: Residents, local bodies and various organisations including the Catholic church have stepped up the campaign against the move.
    4. The political channel is in use: The Government Chief Whip has stated that all possible steps would be taken to secure the exclusion of the villages, that the settlers’ concerns have been presented to the Chief Minister, and that interactions continue to mobilise observations of farmer collectives.

    Challenges to the Western Ghats Ecologically Sensitive Area notification

    1. The boundary has never been settled: Seven draft notifications over more than a decade mean no final legal position exists, so neither conservation nor land use planning can proceed on a fixed map. Eg. The present draft was issued on 27 July and is the seventh in the series.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory outer date for finalisation after the objection window closes, so a draft cannot be reissued indefinitely in place of a decision.
    2. The unit of demarcation is the village, not the forest: Drawing the zone on revenue village boundaries pulls in cultivated and settled land along with the ecologically sensitive tract. Eg. The four Kottayam villages carry rubber, cardamom and coffee plantations inside the proposed zone.
      The Fix: Demarcate on satellite verified land use at the survey plot level, so plantations and habitations are separated from natural forest before the boundary is drawn.
    3. Objections are filed individually against a technical map: A settler household is asked to contest a boundary drawn from remote sensing data without access to the underlying basis. Eg. The Koottikkal local body had to convene grama sabhas in all 14 wards to assemble its objections.
      The Fix: Publish the plot level basis for each village’s inclusion alongside the draft, so an objection can be argued on the record rather than as a general protest.
    4. Restriction is announced without a compensation route: A notification narrows permissible use of privately held land and carries no attached payment for the value foregone. Eg. Plantation crops in the high ranges are the single income source for settler households in the proposed zone.
      The Fix: Attach an ecosystem services payment schedule to the final notification, so land kept under restricted use earns a recurring transfer rather than only a prohibition.
    5. The zone is notified by the Centre and administered by the State: Enforcement, land records and local body consent all sit with the State, while the boundary is a Union decision. Eg. The Koottikkal resolution is being forwarded to both the State and the Union governments because neither alone can settle it.
      The Fix: Require a recorded State government response on each local body resolution before the final notification issues, so the objection is disposed of rather than absorbed.

    Conclusion

    The window closes in two weeks and the boundary in the draft is still the operative proposal. What the Kottayam mobilisation establishes is that the objection is now institutional rather than individual, since a local body resolution carries a claim that the Union government has to dispose of on the record. The status is that four villages remain on the map, the resolution is on its way to both governments, and the next milestone is the close of the objection window followed by the Centre’s decision on whether an eighth draft or a final notification issues.

    Back2Basics: Western Ghats

    1. Mountain chain along the western coast: A mountain chain running roughly parallel to India’s western coast, older than the Himalaya, spanning Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
    2. Biodiversity hotspot status: It is one of the world’s recognised biodiversity hotspots and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, with high levels of endemic species.
    3. Monsoon interception and peninsular rivers: It intercepts the southwest monsoon and feeds the peninsular river systems that the southern States depend on.
    4. Overlap with settlement and plantations: Large parts of the range carry dense human settlement, plantations and mining, so ecological demarcation and existing land use overlap directly.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] Which one of the following has been constituted under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 ? (a) Central Water Commission (b) Central Ground Water Board (c) Central Ground Water Authority (d) National Water Development Agency ANSWER: (c)”