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Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?

Fiscal federalism refers to the financial relations between centre and states, covering the division of taxation powers, expenditure responsibilities, and transfer mechanisms. Article 268 – 293 deal with Fiscal Federalism in India.

Evolving Pattern of Centre-State Financial Relations in Planned Development

1950-1990- Centralised Planning Era

The Planning Commission controlled transfers through discretionary plan grants.

The Finance Commission played a limited role in fiscal transfers.

The Centre shaped State priorities through proliferation of CSS.

1991-2014- Reform & Decentralisation Phase

Economic liberalisation gave States more fiscal autonomy in revenue and expenditure.

Introduction of VAT (2005) boosted State revenues through a buoyant tax base.

CSS were rationalised but tied funds still constrained State flexibility.

2015 onwards- New Federalism Phase

The 14th Finance Commission raised devolution to 42%, enhancing fiscal space for States.

NITI Aayog replaced the Planning Commission and adopted a consultative approach.

GST (2017) introduced pooled sovereignty and created a shared tax regime.

The 15th Finance Commission continued 41% devolution but increased performance-linked grants.

Impact of Recent Reforms on Fiscal Federalism

Positive Impacts

Institutionalised Cooperative Federalism – GST Council as joint decision-making forum.

Economic Efficiency – GST reduced cascading taxes, transport time cut by 33%, tax base expanded from 66 lakh (2017) to 1.5 crore+ (2024), collections near .

Strengthened Development Role – States’ developmental expenditure rose from 8.8% of GDP (2004-05) to 12.5% (2021-22).

Negative Impacts

The Centre retains major taxation powers (income tax, CGST, natural resources), while States restricted to SGST.

Cesses & surcharges grew, shrinking States’ effective share from 35% (2015-20) to ~31% (2020-24).

Delayed GST compensation, especially during COVID, undermined States’ trust.

Borrowing capped at 3% of GSDP, with enhanced limits tied to reform conditions (e.g., power sector).

The 15th FC’s 45% income distance weight penalised better-performing States (TN, Kerala, Karnataka).

Grants-in-aid declined from to , reducing States’ fiscal flexibility.

CSS burden increased as States finance a larger share but have little role in design.

Way Forward

Equity in devolution – Use HDI as a parameter in horizontal tax distribution.

Off-budget borrowings – Scrutinise and report to ensure transparency and accountability.

Horizontal imbalance – Guarantee minimum share for rich States and set a ceiling for poorer States.

Increase Devolution to 50% under 16th FC.

Include Cess/Surcharge in divisible pool

Restructure CSS – Consolidate into fewer umbrella schemes

For India’s fiscal federalism to be effective, it must rest on the principles of autonomy, adequacy, and elasticity.