[9th March 2026] The Hindu OpED: One Nation, One Election – remedy worse than disease

Mentor’s Comment

The debate on One Nation, One Election (ONOE) has intensified following the introduction of a constitutional amendment proposal based on the High-Level Committee report (2023-24) chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind. The proposal suggests synchronising the election cycles of the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies through amendments to Articles 83, 172, and a new Article 82A. The issue has become significant because it proposes a fundamental restructuring of India’s electoral calendar and constitutional functioning.

What Does the One Nation, One Election Proposal Entail?

1. Simultaneous electoral cycle: Aligns elections for Lok Sabha and State Assemblies to a single schedule.
2. Article 82A (Proposed): Enables the President to notify an “appointed date” aligning Assembly terms with the Lok Sabha cycle.
3. Truncation of legislative tenure: Requires some Assemblies to end their tenure earlier to achieve synchronisation.
4. Residual tenure rule: If a legislature dissolves early, the newly elected Assembly serves only the remaining term rather than a full five-year term.
5. Election Commission authority: Grants the Election Commission of India (ECI) power to defer State elections if simultaneous elections are impractical.

Does Comparative Constitutional Practice Support Simultaneous Elections?

1. Canada: Conducts separate federal and provincial elections, maintaining independent political cycles.
2. Australia: State legislatures have fixed four-year terms, while the House of Representatives has a maximum three-year tenure, making synchronisation structurally difficult.
3. Germany: Stability arises from the Constructive Vote of No Confidence, not from simultaneous elections.
4. South Africa and Indonesia: Use proportional representation systems, which distribute political power across parties and protect minority voices.
5. United States analogy: Fixed election cycles function because the executive is insulated from legislative confidence, unlike parliamentary systems.

How Could Simultaneous Elections Affect Parliamentary Accountability?

1. Continuous accountability mechanism: Staggered elections maintain ongoing voter oversight of governments.
2. Feedback loop: Elections across different states allow voters to periodically signal approval or disapproval.
3. Democratic responsiveness: Frequent elections maintain governments’ dependence on public sentiment, a principle highlighted by James Madison in Federalist No. 52.
4. Campaign cycles: ONOE may reduce the frequency of elections but risks weakening institutional responsiveness.

What Problems Arise From the Concept of “Unexpired Term Elections”?

1. Residual mandate: Newly elected legislatures serve only the remaining tenure rather than a full five-year term.
2. Reduced electoral legitimacy: Governments formed mid-cycle may lack a fresh democratic mandate.
3. Policy distortions: Short-term governments may prioritise populist measures rather than structural reforms.
4. Administrative constraints: The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) and truncated tenure may weaken governance capacity.

Does the Proposal Threaten India’s Federal Structure?

1. Basic structure doctrine: The Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. The Union of India affirmed that federalism forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure.
2. Independent constitutional identity of states: States possess autonomous political cycles and democratic rhythms.
3. Mandate truncation risk: Aligning electoral cycles may prematurely terminate state mandates.
4. Central discretion: Proposed Article 82A(5) enables the ECI to defer State elections without clear criteria.

Could the Proposal Enable Constitutional Misuse?

1. Presidential Rule extension risk: If a State government falls mid-term, elections could be deferred to maintain synchronisation.
2. Article 356 safeguards: Currently restrict President’s Rule to one year (extendable only during emergencies with ECI certification).
3. Governance by Governor: Deferred elections could result in prolonged governance through central authority.
4. Judicial precedent: In NJAC Case, the Court held that constitutional validity depends on institutional design, not on assumptions of benign use.

Is the Fiscal Argument Strong Enough to Justify the Reform?

1. Election expenditure scale: Combined Lok Sabha and Assembly elections cost about ₹4,500 crore (0.25% of Union Budget).
2. GDP proportion: Electoral spending accounts for roughly 0.03% of GDP.
3. Historical data: Lok Sabha election expenditure historically ranged between 0.02-0.05% of GDP (1957-2014).
4. Administrative flexibility: Elections conducted in phases allow the ECI to rotate EVMs, VVPATs, and security forces.
5. Resource burden: Simultaneous elections could require significantly greater logistical capacity.

Conclusion

The proposal for simultaneous elections attempts to streamline electoral administration but risks distorting constitutional balance. India’s parliamentary democracy is built on continuous accountability, federal autonomy, and flexible electoral cycles. A reform that truncates mandates, centralises electoral timing, and alters democratic rhythms may weaken rather than strengthen democratic governance.