‘Distorted power relations in the world make Security Council non-operational’

Why in the News

The United Nations Secretary General has stated that distorted power relations have rendered the Security Council completely non operational, and that global superpowers have not recognised that there are limits to their power. The same assessment was extended to the Bretton Woods institutions, on the ground that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not correspond to the reality of emerging economies that remain underrepresented in them. The prescription put on record is not reform but an overhaul, meaning a readjustment of the power systems and governance mechanisms of the world to the reality of today rather than that of 1945. The tension is that the officeholder making the diagnosis also holds that the organisation is not broken, since its humanitarian machinery continues to function, so the failure is located precisely in the one organ with coercive authority.

What is the Secretary General’s diagnosis of the Security Council?

1. Eighty one years without a world war: The United Nations has guaranteed that there has been no third World War in 81 years, and the absence of two superpowers fighting each other is attributed largely to its work.
2. The geopolitical divide inside the organisation: A strong geopolitical divide now runs through the organisation, and superpowers that have not accepted the limits of their power enter adventures that produce damaging results.
3. Legitimacy and effectiveness as separate failures: A Council that no longer corresponds to the world of today creates a problem of legitimacy and a separate problem of effectiveness.
4. Distorted power relations: The question is power, and power relations in the world being distorted is what makes the Council, the central entity for the preservation of peace and security, completely non operational.

Why is the prescription an overhaul rather than reform?

1. Operational reform is already under way: A significant amount of reform is being carried out in the operational aspects of the organisation, which is not what is at issue.
2. Bretton Woods representation of emerging economies: The Bretton Woods system does not correspond to the reality of the emerging economies, which remain underrepresented in the World Bank, the IMF and several other institutions.
3. Governance mechanisms still set to 1945: Power systems and governance mechanisms need to be readjusted to the reality of today’s world instead of the reality of 1945.
4. Overhaul against reform: What is being recommended is described as more than a simple reform, and as an overhaul, meaning a change to the distribution of authority rather than to procedures inside it.

What does the organisation still do?

1. Institutional survival after the funding cuts: No United Nations institution has collapsed, even with fewer resources and after the funding cuts that were made.
2. Humanitarian delivery continues: Its agencies go on working and supporting people in the most dangerous places in the world.
3. Self reform of working methods and structures: The organisation is described as able to inclusively reform its own ways of work and its own structures, which is precisely what it cannot do to the Council.

Where does the enforcement gap lie?

1. Absence of a punishment mechanism: No instrument exists in the international community to guarantee that violations of international law are effectively punished.
2. Divided major powers and state calculation: With the major powers divided, individual states calculate that they can act without consequence.
3. No power to stop the exclusion of officials: Asked what happens when a state excludes United Nations officials and tens of thousands die, including large numbers of children, the stated position is that the organisation does not have the power to stop it.
4. Israel’s exit and the persona non grata declaration: Israel has exited many United Nations institutions and declared the Secretary General persona non grata, which means no visa would be issued to him, and he did not request one.
5. Genocide as a determination for the courts: Genocide is a legal definition belonging to the courts and in principle to the International Criminal Court (ICC), so the organisation describes events in Gaza as a dramatic violation of all principles under international law without offering that legal definition itself.

What is being attempted on freedom of navigation?

1. Capture of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Houthi and other groups have captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and oil prices are expected to rise sharply as a result.
2. Freedom of navigation: Freedom of navigation is fundamental and must be respected.
3. The Black Sea Grain Initiative precedent: The organisation has proposed mechanisms under which a blockade makes exceptions at least for the transport of food and fertilizers, as was done through the Black Sea Grain Initiative in the Russia Ukraine conflict.
4. The Strait of Hormuz fertilizer offer: A similar offer has been made for the Strait of Hormuz to allow fertilizers through, and Iran has not accepted it.

Where does India figure in this assessment?

1. Ukraine and the Gulf in the India discussion: Both the war in Ukraine and the situation in the Gulf were discussed with the Indian Prime Minister, on a common perspective that peace and absolute freedom of navigation are needed.
2. The assessment of India’s mediation: India’s mediation efforts and its contacts with Moscow and Kyiv, aimed at creating conditions for trust to be re established, were described as valuable, with the position taken that no country is better placed to act as a bridge builder.
3. No mediation between India and Pakistan: The organisation is not directly involved in any mediation process between India and Pakistan, since mediation requires the agreement of both parties and that agreement does not exist.

What was said about the United Nations map controversy?

1. The disclaimer on United Nations maps: There is no such thing as a United Nations map with borders, and it is not for the organisation to define borders.
2. The “Correct the Map” resolution: The “Correct the Map” resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 3 September is not a map. It records that there are distortions in the representation of landmasses, traces those distortions to power relations of the past, and seeks to replace the Mercator projection with maps following the “equal area” principle.
3. The status of the disputed document: The map published by UN Geospatial on 1 July and later discussed at the General Assembly remains on the organisation’s website, and is described as not an official map but the contribution of a non governmental organisation, indicative rather than definitional.
4. The Line of Control and Aksai Chin depiction: That map showed the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a dotted line with an explanatory note, while depicting Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin without the Indian and Chinese claim lines that earlier maps carried, and with no note explaining the omission.
5. India’s recorded position: India voted for the resolution in support of the principle of equal area representation, has taken note of the anomaly in the map, and is taking it up with the organisation.

Challenges to reform of the United Nations Security Council

1. The permanent members hold a veto over their own dilution: Any change to the Council’s composition requires an amendment to the Charter ratified by all five permanent members, so the beneficiaries of the current structure control the exit from it. Eg. Charter amendment under Articles 108 and 109 requires ratification by all permanent members.
   The Fix: Pursue working method reform inside the existing Charter first, such as a binding commitment to withhold the veto in mass atrocity situations, since that route does not require ratification.
2. The claimants cannot agree among themselves: Aspirants for permanent seats are blocked as much by regional rivals as by the incumbents. Eg. The Uniting for Consensus group opposes new permanent seats in the same round in which the G4 countries press for them.
   The Fix: Negotiate on an intermediate model of longer term renewable seats without veto, which separates the question of representation from the question of privilege.
3. Text based negotiation has never begun: The Intergovernmental Negotiations process has run for over a decade without producing a single negotiating text to amend. Eg. The process continues to operate on convened position papers rather than on a draft resolution.
   The Fix: Fix a deadline by which the General Assembly President must table a consolidated single negotiating text, so positions are recorded against clauses rather than restated annually.
4. Regional representation gaps are structural, not incidental: Africa and Latin America have no permanent seat, which is the specific defect the 1945 composition has carried forward. Eg. The Ezulwini Consensus records Africa’s claim to two permanent seats with veto and five non permanent seats, and has been outstanding since 2005.
   The Fix: Settle the African allocation first as a distinct package, since it is the one claim with an agreed continental position behind it.
5. A reformed Council changes nothing without an enforcement instrument: Enlarging the membership does not create any means of penalising a state that ignores a Council decision. Eg. There is no instrument in the international community to guarantee that violations of international law are punished.
   The Fix: Strengthen the General Assembly’s residual authority through the Uniting for Peace route and link non compliance to automatic referral to the International Criminal Court.
6. Financial leverage sits with the states least interested in change: Assessed contributions are concentrated among a few members, so budget pressure can be applied against reform. Eg. Cuts to the organisation’s resources have already forced its agencies to operate on reduced funding.
   The Fix: Broaden the assessed contribution base and build a reserve fund from voluntary contributions by emerging economies, so operational continuity is not hostage to a single contributor.

Conclusion

The assessment on record separates two things that are usually argued together: the organisation’s capacity to deliver, which is defended, and the Council’s capacity to decide, which is written off. That separation narrows the reform question from the institution as a whole to the single organ where authority and legitimacy have come apart. An outgoing officeholder’s recommendation carries no procedural weight, and the change he describes requires the assent of the states it would constrain. The thing to watch is the selection of the next Secretary General, since the terms on which that appointment is settled will show whether the membership treats the Council’s composition as a live question or a closed one.

Back2Basics: Black Sea Grain Initiative

1. The Black Sea Grain Initiative: An arrangement permitting the export of grain and foodstuffs from Ukrainian Black Sea ports during the Russia Ukraine conflict, negotiated in July 2022.
2. United Nations and Turkey as brokers: It was agreed through the United Nations and Turkey, with Russia and Ukraine signing parallel agreements rather than a single joint text.
3. The Istanbul joint coordination centre: A joint coordination centre in Istanbul inspected vessels in both directions along an agreed maritime corridor, so cargo could move without either party treating the ships as combatants.
4. Precedent for a humanitarian exception to a blockade: It is the working precedent for carving a humanitarian exception out of a blockade, and it is the model behind the offer made for the Strait of Hormuz.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2015, GS2, 12 marks] Discuss the impediments India is facing in its pursuit of a permanent seat in UN Security Council.”