India’s bullet train project took a long detour

Why in the News

India’s first bullet train line has moved from a Japanese system bought whole, due in 2022, to a hybrid of Japanese track and civil design, European signalling and Indian built trains. Work on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail began in September 2017, and the first section is now expected by December 2027. The change followed a divergence over cost, choice and indigenisation, meaning building the parts in India.

What was agreed in 2017, and what is being built now?

1. What the project is: A dedicated high speed railway between Mumbai and Ahmedabad, built for trains far faster than any in service in India.
2. Why Japan was the partner: Japan, which runs the Shinkansen bullet train network, offered to finance the whole project on highly concessional terms, meaning unusually cheap loans.
3. What is being built: The hybrid keeps Japanese track and civil design, and the Japanese financing package.
4. The Indian train: The B28 is being developed by BEML Limited, the public sector heavy equipment maker, in Bengaluru.
5. The takeaway: A project launched as an imported system has become a mixed one, so the hard part is no longer construction but making the parts work together.

Why did the two sides diverge?

1. Japan’s expectation: Japan expected to export the entire system, track, rolling stock (the trains) and signalling, because it was financing the project.
2. India’s objective: India did not want to be tied to a single high cost imported solution, and wanted cost effectiveness, choice and indigenisation for later high speed lines.
3. A system not built for export: The Shinkansen was designed for domestic use as a comprehensive system, not for piecemeal export.
4. Announcement before planning: Timelines and costs were announced before procurement, approvals and construction schedules were settled. It was the first complex project the two attempted together.

What pushed the cost and the timeline out?

1. Land acquisition: Land and legal right of way for much of the route fell into uncertainty when the Maharashtra government changed after the 2019 election, and was settled only after the next.
2. Pandemic and Japanese politics: The Covid-19 pandemic held up work, and Japan has had four changes of administration since the project was announced.
3. The train withdrawn: Japan phased out the trainset meant for India and could not supply its E10 successor before 2034. India then decided to build its own train.
4. Cost: The cost has nearly doubled to about Rs 2 lakh crore from Rs 1.08 lakh crore, and a special budget allocation is likely to meet the surge.

What does other countries’ experience show?

1. Delays are common: Large high speed projects slip and overrun elsewhere. Eg. Japan’s Hokkaido Shinkansen and the United Kingdom’s High Speed 2.
2. Mixed systems already run: The choices on rolling stock and signalling drew on South Korea, Taiwan, China and European networks, where similar systems run with variations.

Challenges

1. Two train types, one corridor: India must prove it is safe to run two different bullet trains and their separate signalling systems on the same line.
2. The total systems approach: The Shinkansen is designed as one integrated system, so one train and its signalling may eventually have to go.
3. Certification depends on Japan: Japanese experts clear all drawings, designs, construction schemes and quality control, which ties the Indian train’s approval to them.
4. Trust for the next project: The Indian side’s detailed planning and adherence to agreed terms were found lacking, which makes the next joint venture harder to agree.

Way Forward

1. One interface specification: The Ministry of Railways should publish a single interface standard for track, signalling and rolling stock before trial runs begin.
2. An independent safety case: The Commissioner of Railway Safety should certify mixed operation of the Indian and Japanese trainsets before passenger service starts.
3. Order visibility: Indian Railways should commit rolling stock orders for later corridors, so indigenisation does not rest on one line.

Conclusion

A project begun as the import of a complete foreign system has ended as a negotiated mixture, cheaper to buy and harder to engineer. What to watch is the opening of the first section, and whether a Japanese trainset is ever added to a line built around an Indian one.

Key numbers

1. Route: 508 km between Mumbai and Ahmedabad.
2. Speeds: Shinkansen trains run at 300 kmph, the B28 at a maximum operational 250 kmph.
3. Signalling contract: Awarded to a European-Indian joint venture in June 2025.
4. Approvals: Feasibility study by Japanese consultants in December 2013, Union Cabinet approval in December 2015.

Matching Previous Year Question

“No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Thematic PYQ: [2014, GS3, 12 marks] National Urban Transport Policy emphasises on ‘moving people’ instead of ‘moving vehicles. Discuss critically the success of the various strategies of the Government in this regard.”