On theatre commands, let’s finish arguing, reach a settlement, before next crisis comes

Why in the News

India still runs 17 single-service military commands, seven years after the government directed the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to replace them with theatre commands to build jointness (the three services planning and fighting as one force). The reform has since become an inter-service quarrel over turf. A settlement is needed before the next security crisis.

What are theatre commands, and why is the status quo untenable?

1. What it is: A theatre command puts all three services’ forces in one area under a single commander with operational authority, like one coach running a team instead of three.
2. How commands work now: Each existing command answers to its own service headquarters, and its area of responsibility does not match those of the other services.
3. Why it fails in war: A conflict on the western or northern fronts, or at sea, would span several commands at once.
4. Speed gap: Coordinating across these lines takes time, and algorithmic warfare guided by artificial intelligence (AI) moves too fast to allow it.
5. The takeaway: The present patchwork would leave India slow to respond in a modern conflict, so the status quo is not an option.

Why do the services resist, and do their fears hold?

1. Service fears: Each service fears a loss:
   • the Army, of air support when it needs it;
   • the Air Force, of its scarce squadrons being divided among theatre commanders;
   • the Navy, of a continental mindset starving it of resources.
2. Air power doctrine: The Indian Air Force (IAF) follows “centralised control and decentralised execution”: aircraft are controlled centrally and tasked locally. Critics say splitting them would break this.
3. Doctrine intact: Squadrons would stay where they are; only central control shifts from an IAF commander to the theatre commander.
4. Air expertise retained: A three-star IAF Component Commander would advise each theatre commander on air power.
5. Old rivalry: Air power has divided the services since World War I. The fears are legitimate but not new.

What do other countries’ experiences show India?

1. United States, 1947: The National Security Act created an independent air force and a unified defence establishment. It left “who does what” unsettled, so open conflict followed.
2. Key West Agreement: The US Defence Secretary held the joint chiefs at Key West until they split roles: strategic bombing to the air force, carrier aviation to the navy, land combat to the army.
3. Roles by agreement: Key West set the principle that roles are allocated by mutual agreement under civilian authority. Eg. In 1966, the US Army traded its fixed-wing aircraft for combat helicopters.
4. Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986: The United States (US) achieved true integration of its services only through this law, nearly four decades and several operational disasters after Key West.
5. Changing warfare and open choices: Recent cases show how fast war is changing and how open leadership choices are:
   • Ukraine, lacking a traditional navy, crippled Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and sank its flagship, the Moskva;
   • Iran, its air force decimated, used missiles and drones against 14 US bases in West Asia;
   • Britain made a non-pilot engineer its CDS in 2025, and a Royal Marine head of its navy.

Challenges

1. Squadron shortage: The IAF operates 31 squadrons against a sanctioned 42, which sharpens its fear of dividing air assets.
2. No joint doctrine: India has no codified tri-service doctrine, and each service trains and fights by its own philosophy.
3. Acquisition timing: India is close to major weapon purchases that risk being planned service by service without a settlement.

Way Forward

1. CDS as honest broker: The CDS should broker and persuade between the services.
2. Roles under civilian authority: The government should settle service roles by negotiated agreement overseen by political leaders.
3. National security strategy: The government should anchor theatre commands in a formal national security strategy.
4. Bold service chiefs: Service chiefs should drop long-held service dogmas, not guard turf.

Conclusion

The theatre command debate is no longer about whether India needs integrated forces but about who controls scarce assets, a question only political authority can settle. Whether the government brokers an agreed division of roles before the next crisis will decide the reform’s fate.

Government Efforts towards Jointness

1. CDS and Department of Military Affairs: India appointed its first CDS in 2019 and created the Department of Military Affairs in the Ministry of Defence in 2020 to drive tri-service integration.
2. Joint Logistics Nodes (2021): Nodes in Mumbai, Guwahati and Port Blair integrate the services’ logistics.
3. Inter-Services Organisations Act, 2023: It gives commanders of tri-service formations disciplinary control over personnel from all three services.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2024] What are the duties of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as Head of the Department of Military Affairs? 1. Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee. 2. Exercise military command over the three Service Chiefs. 3. Principal Military Advisor to Defence Minister on all tri-service matters. Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1,2,3 (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1 and 3 only* ANSWER: (d)”