Pakistan’s westward turn – strategic depth or overstretch

Why in the News

Pakistan and Kuwait signed a defence cooperation agreement on 27 August 2026, the latest step in a rapidly expanding Pakistani strategic footprint in West Asia. It follows the Makkah Agreement of 7 August, under which Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan agreed that an armed attack against one member would be regarded as an attack against all. Pakistan has also acted recently as an intermediary between Iran and the United States. What is new is not Pakistani involvement in West Asia, which is decades old, but its institutionalisation into standing commitments with a secretariat behind them. The contest is over what those commitments actually buy: strategic depth against India, or an overstretch that ties Pakistan into rivalries it cannot control.

What is the Makkah Agreement?

1. Signatories and the collective defence clause: Signed on 7 August among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, it stipulates that an armed attack against one member would be regarded as an attack against all.
2. The permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia: At a meeting in Istanbul on 31 August, the three countries’ Foreign and Defence Ministers and military chiefs decided to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia.
3. The Secretary General post: A Pakistani will serve as its first Secretary General for three years.
4. Interoperability and defence industrial cooperation: The three agreed to strengthen military interoperability and to pursue defence industrial cooperation, including joint technology development and production.

What are the historical roots of Pakistan’s West Asian orientation?

1. A dual identity from the start: From its inception Pakistan attempted to combine its South Asian geopolitical identity with that of a major Muslim power.
2. The Cold War architecture: Pakistan, Iran and Türkiye were linked through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and subsequently through the Regional Cooperation for Development.
3. The 1971 defeat as the turning point: Pakistan’s defeat and dismemberment in 1971 pushed it towards the Arab world, as it sought to compensate for its diminished position in South Asia by emphasising its Islamic identity.
4. The Lahore Islamic summit of 1974: The Islamic summit held in Lahore in 1974 marked the reorientation, and Pakistan simultaneously developed extensive military relationships with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies.

What contradictions does the new arrangement already face?

1. Houthi attacks as the first test: Renewed Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia created the first serious test of the Makkah pact.
2. The Houthis have improved their position at sea: Their capture of Mocha port and Perim island has added to their capability to choke off Saudi shipping through the Bab al-Mandab.
3. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz: With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed by Iran, a frustrated Saudi Arabia may relaunch a full scale war against the Houthis.
4. The collective defence clause dilemma: Such a war would create a major dilemma for Pakistan if Riyadh decided to invoke the collective defence provision of the Makkah agreement.
5. Pakistan is holding five roles at once: It wants to be Saudi Arabia’s security partner, Türkiye’s strategic ally, Iran’s friend and interlocutor, Washington’s useful intermediary and a security provider to the Gulf monarchies, and these roles are compatible only when regional tensions are manageable.

What does the westward turn give Pakistan against India?

1. Defence in depth through a security network: A Pakistan embedded in a web of West Asian security relationships may acquire defence in depth.
2. Saudi finance, Turkish technology and Gulf access: Saudi financial resources, Turkish defence technology and Pakistan’s expanding relationships with Gulf militaries can in theory increase Islamabad’s resilience in a confrontation with India.
3. Türkiye’s position on Kashmir: Türkiye is Pakistan’s most vocal major supporter on Kashmir.
4. Pakistan’s nuclear status as currency: Pakistan’s nuclear status enhances its strategic value to Arab states concerned about an unstable regional order created by a nuclear armed Israel’s policies.

Why could the same turn weaken Pakistan against India?

1. Pakistan’s India centric security establishment: Pakistan’s security establishment has historically concentrated overwhelmingly on India.
2. The new commitments pull resources away: Diplomatic, military and intelligence resources now have to be devoted to Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Yemen and the Red Sea, leaving fewer to concentrate on India.
3. Entanglement is the price of entry: The deeper Pakistan becomes embedded in West Asian security arrangements, the harder it becomes to remain aloof from the region’s conflicts.
4. The Riyadh versus Tehran choice: If the Houthi Saudi confrontation escalates, Islamabad may have to choose between honouring the credibility of its collective defence commitments and maintaining its relationship with Tehran, the Houthis’ principal ally.

How should India read it?

1. Exposure that comes with the new role: Pakistan’s growing West Asian role should not be interpreted in purely negative terms, because the same relationships expose it to some of the world’s most combustible rivalries.
2. The Gulf states have their own stake in India: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf states hold major economic and strategic relationships with India that they are unlikely to sacrifice for Pakistan.
3. India’s response, deeper Gulf engagement: New Delhi should continue deepening those relationships as the counter to Pakistan’s expanding footprint in West Asia.

Challenges to the Makkah Agreement

1. A collective defence clause invites the very conflict it deters: A guarantee that is credible draws its guarantor into wars it did not choose, and a guarantee that is not credible is worthless. Eg. The pact’s first test arrived within weeks, through Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.
   The Fix: Define the triggering threshold in writing, naming what constitutes an armed attack and what response is owed, so the guarantee is bounded rather than open ended.
2. The three signatories do not share an adversary: Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan each face different threats, and a pact without a common opponent has no agreed contingency to plan against. Eg. Türkiye’s principal security concerns lie in the eastern Mediterranean and northern Syria, not in the Red Sea.
   The Fix: Restrict joint planning to the functional areas already agreed, meaning interoperability and defence industrial production, rather than to a shared war plan that does not exist.
3. A permanent secretariat does not create a command: Standing staff can coordinate procurement and exercises, and none of that generates a force able to act on the clause. Eg. The secretariat’s first Secretary General holds a three year term with no operational forces assigned to the arrangement.
   The Fix: Establish a standing combined planning cell with earmarked national units, so the commitment has a force attached to it rather than an office.
4. Pakistan’s fiscal position limits what it can actually provide: A security guarantor needs sustained defence spending, and Pakistan’s is constrained by repeated recourse to external financing. Eg. Pakistan has been a recurring borrower from the International Monetary Fund across successive programmes.
   The Fix: Convert the arrangement’s defence industrial pillar into Saudi and Turkish funded production inside Pakistan, so the commitment generates revenue rather than consuming it.
5. The arrangement cuts across Pakistan’s Iran relationship: A pact aimed at protecting Saudi Arabia from an Iran aligned force is difficult to reconcile with an intermediary role between Tehran and Washington. Eg. Pakistan shares a long land border with Iran, across which both states have previously conducted strikes.
   The Fix: Keep the intermediary role at the level of the Foreign Ministry and separate from the pact’s military structures, so one function does not discredit the other.

Conclusion

The institutional step taken in August converts a long standing set of bilateral military relationships into a commitment Pakistan can be called on to honour, at a moment when the region is already at war. That is a different proposition from the financial and manpower arrangements it has run with the Gulf for fifty years, because those could be scaled back quietly and a collective defence clause cannot. For India the reading should be neither alarm nor relief, since the same arrangement that adds to Pakistan’s depth also adds to the claims on its attention. The marker to watch is whether Riyadh invokes the clause against the Houthis, because that is the point at which the commitment stops being a document.

West Asia in India’s Foreign Policy

1. Evolution of India’s West Asia policy: Guided after Independence by non alignment and a pro Arab position, it moved to full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992, a Look West launch in 2005 centred on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and a Think West approach from 2014 extending to maritime security, counter terrorism and investment.
2. The energy dependence: The region supplies nearly 60% of India’s crude and about 70% of its liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas needs.
3. The economic weight: India GCC bilateral trade stood at $178 billion in FY 2024-25, making the GCC India’s largest trading partner bloc, and the region contributes about 38% of India’s global remittances.
4. The human stake: A diaspora of about 10 million people works across the region, which makes West Asian stability a domestic political question in India.

Back2Basics: Central Treaty Organization

1. CENTO’s origin as the Baghdad Pact: A Cold War defence pact, originally the Baghdad Pact of 1955, renamed CENTO after Iraq withdrew in 1959.
2. Membership: Its members were Iran, Türkiye, Pakistan and the United Kingdom, with the United States as an associate rather than a full member.
3. Purpose, containment of Soviet expansion: It was built to contain Soviet expansion along its southern periphery, linking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
4. Dissolution in 1979: It dissolved in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, and Pakistan’s withdrawal followed.

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