Warning signals for India from NATO’s Ankara Summit

Mentor’s Comment

The 32 heads of state or government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met at the Ankara Summit on July 7-8, 2026, to review progress since the 2025 Hague Summit and set out a roadmap for implementation. The summit locked in a fivefold rise in the defence-spending pledge and a commitment to build a Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), even as Europe’s existing industry struggles to meet current demand.

What four commitments came out of the Ankara Summit?

1. Collective defence reaffirmed: All 32 allies affirmed an “ironclad commitment” to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond.
2. Five per cent spending pledge: Allies unanimously endorsed “The Hague defence commitment,” under which every NATO member undertook to allocate at least five per cent of GDP to defence by 2035, up from the earlier two per cent pledge.
3. Support for Ukraine: NATO declared “unwavering support” for Ukraine’s freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. European defence industrial base: Members committed to building a high-technology, high-capacity, Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), the network of firms, factories, laboratories and skilled workers needed to build and sustain military power.
5. Focus on implementation: Discussions at Ankara centred on converting these political commitments into military capability through investment, industrial capacity and innovation.

Can Europe’s defence industry deliver on the pledge?

1. Pre-existing shortages: European defence giants MBDA and Rheinmetall had warned of ammunition production shortages even before The Hague’s five per cent pledge.
2. Evidence from the Iran campaign: Operation Epic Fury, the U.S.-Israel bombing campaign against Iran, saw the U.S. fire more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles; at the current production rate of 85 a year, replacing them would take a decade.
3. Coordination gap: Many NATO members have capable Defence Industrial Bases (DIBs) individually, but there is little coordination of alliance-wide priorities.
4. Concentrated mismatch: The resulting strategic mismatch found during the Ukraine war has clustered in air defence missiles and interceptors, precision-guided munitions, and artillery rockets.
5. Deepening dependency, not reducing it: The U.S. supplied half of Europe’s defence spending between 2022-2024, up from 28% in 2019-2021, and without a major revitalisation of Europe’s own industry, the five per cent pledge will only deepen dependence on the U.S.
6. Rising U.S. sales to Europe: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) notifications to the U.S. Congress for European customers have quadrupled since 2008, to $76 billion in 2024.

How does NATO’s spending surge affect global arms buyers like India?

1. Buyer’s market turning seller’s market: As NATO spends more, the international arms market is shifting from a buyers’ market to a sellers’ market for the world’s big arms buyers, including India.
2. First warning sign: U.S. firm General Electric Aerospace has delayed supplying F-404 fighter jet engines, critically needed for the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme.
3. Competing demand: Asian allies’ rising demand for U.S. weaponry is competing directly with ongoing European needs for the same suppliers.

What must India do in response?

1. Growing reliance on new-age technology: India’s defence increasingly depends on drones, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and resilient networks.
2. Self-reliance as the necessary response: India’s defence industry must achieve self-reliance in these technology areas rather than depend on suppliers who are themselves overstretched fighting their own battles.
3. Mitigating Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Avoid over-reliance on single-source western suppliers like General Electric who face competing allied demands. Push local aerospace and defense firms (such as HAL and private sector partners) to prioritize delayed components like fighter jet engines.
4. Giving a big push to the private sector: Funding and orders should be increased for domestic defense startups working in the fields of drones, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity.
5. Further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List’: The scope of the existing ‘Positive Indigenisation List‘ should be further expanded. There should be further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List‘. India’s Positive Indigenisation Lists (PIL) ban military imports, forcing procurement strictly from domestic makers. Managed via the Srijan Portal, key tracks include the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) lists for major platforms and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) lists for components.
   

Conclusion

NATO’s Ankara Summit converted last year’s spending pledge into a five per cent-of-GDP commitment and a mandate to build a European Defence Industrial Base (DIB), but ammunition and missile shortages already visible in the Ukraine war show capacity, not political will, is now the binding constraint. Because higher NATO spending is shifting the global arms market from a buyers’ to a sellers’ market, without a rapid European industrial build-out the pledge will deepen dependence on the U.S. rather than reduce it, and it is squeezing supply for outside buyers like India, making self-reliance in new-age defence technologies the necessary Indian response.