Subject: Economic Growth,LPG,Planning

Why in the News

Global agencies have raised their full year growth estimates for India to about 7 per cent. The upgrades follow the first quarter Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimates. Those estimates recorded stronger economic momentum than expected. The same agencies expect that momentum to fade in the second half of the fiscal year. They also project average inflation of 5.1 per cent and a higher policy rate. The growth upgrade therefore arrives with the case for tighter money attached to it.

Why have the growth forecasts been raised?

1. Asian Development Bank: The bank now pegs growth at 7 per cent for the year. Its earlier forecast was 6.6 per cent.
2. S&P Global: The agency forecasts the economy to grow at 7 per cent.
3. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): The OECD has raised its projection from 6.3 per cent to 7.1 per cent.
4. Moody’s: The agency had earlier raised its growth forecast for the year to 7 per cent, up from 6 per cent.

What is carrying growth in the first half?

1. Conflict in West Asia: Concerns persist over economic activity being affected by the conflict in West Asia. Growth has held up through those concerns.
2. Industrial production: The Index of Industrial Production (IIP), a volume measure of output in mining, manufacturing and electricity, grew at 6.3 per cent during April to July. Manufacturing grew at 7 per cent.
3. Central capital spending: Capital expenditure by the Centre has surged by almost 30 per cent during April to July this year.
4. Merchandise exports: Goods exports grew at 17.8 per cent during April to August. A weak currency aided that growth.

Why is the second half expected to be weaker?

1. Fading tax tailwinds: S&P Global expects growth to ease in the second half of the fiscal year as the tailwinds from sales tax rationalisation and income tax cuts diminish.
2. Momentum into 2027: The OECD expects momentum to weaken before a gradual recovery takes place in 2027.
3. Farm sector risk: The farm sector has emerged as a key area of risk. The Asian Development Bank states that an El Nino worse than expected could reduce agricultural output and raise food inflation across the wider region.

What do the same forecasts imply for monetary policy?

1. Price pressures: Price pressures are building up in the economy. Expectations of higher interest rates have gained traction.
2. Inflation path and the policy rate: S&P Global expects inflation to average 5.1 per cent. It expects the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to raise its policy rate by 25 basis points in the current fiscal year.
3. A temporary rise in rates: The OECD projects India to raise policy rates temporarily to offset stronger inflationary pressures.
4. The next decision point: The central bank’s monetary policy committee meets in a few weeks. The growth and inflation dynamics tilt the scales towards tighter policy.

Conclusion

Growth readings and price readings are now pointing in opposite directions. The upgrades rest on a first half that the forecasters themselves do not expect to repeat. What remains unsettled is whether output can hold its pace once borrowing costs rise and a poor farm season arrives together. The next monetary policy review is the first place that question gets tested.

Back2Basics: India’s Inflation Targeting Framework

1. The target: The government has retained a Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation target of 4 per cent for the period April 2026 to March 2031.
2. Legal basis: Section 45ZA of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 requires the target to be reset every five years.
3. Who sets the rate: A six member monetary policy committee sets the repo rate. The combined Consumer Price Index published by the National Statistical Office is the target measure.
4. Accountability: A breach of the 2 to 6 per cent tolerance band for three consecutive quarters obliges the RBI to report to the government.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2019, GS3, 10 marks] Do you agree with the view that steady GDP growth and low inflation have left the Indian economy in good shape? Give reasons in support of your arguments.”

Why in the News

India’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the last quarter is expected to print close to 8 per cent, defying fears that the West Asia conflict had dented the economy. This follows a joint fiscal, monetary and regulatory stimulus through 2025, direct tax cuts, a Goods and Services Tax (GST) rationalisation, and an effective 150 basis point policy rate cut, combined with a swift diversification of energy imports during the conflict. The pickup is largely cyclical, and the investment rate, corporate capital expenditure (capex) and structural export and employment growth remain too weak to sustain the expansion once the stimulus fades.

What explains India’s growth resilience through the West Asia conflict?

1. A joint stimulus in 2025: Direct taxes were cut in February, GST was rationalised in September, and policy rates were cut by an effective 150 basis points along with regulatory easing in the financial sector.
2. Non-oil export acceleration: Exports have picked up on the back of a near 15 per cent depreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER), the trade weighted, inflation adjusted value of the rupee against a basket of currencies, since 2025, a reduction in United States tariffs, and resilient global growth.
3. Swift energy diversification: India sourced crude from Russia and liquefied natural gas from the United States and Oman to prevent shortages, importing 17 per cent more energy than normal last quarter, while the government absorbed the bulk of the oil price shock through the fisc to insulate the private sector.

Why does India’s investment rate remain a structural concern?

1. Fixed investment stagnant: Fixed investment remains near its decadal average of 32 per cent of GDP and has not lifted despite rising public investment and real estate capex.
2. Corporate capex has not picked up: Corporate capex continues to languish around 10 to 11 per cent of GDP, and balance sheets of the top 1,000 listed companies show no discernible pickup in 2025-26.
3. Central capex is slowing: Central capex grew 30 per cent between 2020 and 2023, then slowed to 11 per cent in 2024 and just 1.6 per cent in 2025, as tax cuts absorbed fiscal space.
4. State capex under pressure: Cash transfers on demand are pushing state capex growth below nominal GDP growth.
5. Weak demand visibility: Capacity utilisation has stayed in the 75 to 76 per cent range for a decade, and rising Chinese overcapacity is discouraging corporate investment.

Why are consumption and export growth not yet structural?

1. Weaker growth than the earlier export led cycle: Post-pandemic private consumption and exports grew at about 5 per cent, against the 16 per cent export growth between 2003 and 2012 that had crowded in private capex.
2. Service export growth has halved: Service export growth in nominal dollars has fallen to 8 per cent over the last year from 16 per cent over the previous four years, and employment across major IT firms has stayed flat.
3. Employment mix is shifting toward self-employment: The Periodic Labour Force Survey shows India’s employment rate rising, but a significant share of new jobs are self-employed rather than salaried, even as the mix improved in 2025.
4. Consumption is credit fuelled: Non-Banking Financial Company lending to households is growing at 20 per cent and unsecured personal lending momentum has risen to 25 per cent, on the back of rising household leverage.

What must change for the growth cycle to become structural?

1. Labour must become more competitive against capital: India’s capital-labour ratio has risen for over two decades, and reversing this needs education, skilling and health investment, alongside rationalising labour laws that raise the cost of labour.
2. Exports need structural competitiveness: Goods exports have fallen from 17 per cent of GDP a decade ago to 11 per cent, and further gains need tariffs and non-tariff barriers rationalised and overregulation reduced.
3. Private capex is the real crowding-in mechanism: Structurally higher consumption and exports are what would draw in a sustained private capex cycle, which in turn would crowd in foreign direct investment and stabilise the balance of payments.

Conclusion

The current cyclical strength, backed by clean corporate and financial balance sheets and a sustained agricultural surplus, is a bridge over the West Asia shock, not a destination. Unless investment, exports and employment turn structural, the growth cycle will not sustain once the fiscal and monetary stimulus fades, and the piece warns there is little time left to act given global automation, trade fragmentation and a fraying international order.

Matching Previous Year Question

No direct PYQ traced in the provided files.

Why in the News

Private corporate investment in India remains considerably lower than the peak seen in the mid 2000s, even as large corporates hold substantial cash. Firms are deploying funds in financial assets rather than building physical assets such as factories, and are taking money out of the country rather than investing it here. The standard explanations offered for this are subdued domestic demand and global uncertainty. A political economy explanation is now advanced instead, locating the cause in how political power structures affect investment decisions. Centralisation of political power has been unmistakable after 2014, accompanied by fiscal centralisation and a reconfiguration of federal structures. The contested claim is that market concentration around a handful of “national champions” is not an accident of policy but is politically useful, which would make an investment revival costly to the current political settlement.

What are “national champions”?

1. Definition: A national champion is a large domestic business group that a government treats as the preferred vehicle for building strategic capacity, and that is favoured in policy design as a result.
2. How the status is conferred: Preference operates through the terms of auctions, tariffs, incentive eligibility, clearances and access to public contracts rather than through an announced designation.
3. The economic consequence: A handful of such groups now command far greater sway over the economy than before, which raises the entry barrier facing any firm attempting to compete with them.

What does the investment slowdown actually look like?

1. Cash-rich firms are not building: Large corporates hold funds but are not committing them to new capacity in India.
2. Capital is leaving: Companies are taking money out of the country rather than investing it domestically.
3. Investment is below its own peak: Private corporate investment remains considerably lower than the level reached in the mid 2000s.
4. Financial assets over physical assets: Corporate India is more keen to deploy funds in financial assets than to use them for factories and plant.
5. The standard explanations are incomplete: Subdued domestic demand and global uncertainty have been put forward, and neither accounts for why firms with the means to invest choose not to.

Why does the concentration of political and market power deter private investment?

1. Political and fiscal centralisation: Centralisation of political power after 2014 has been accompanied by greater fiscal centralisation and a reconfiguration of federal structures, including attempts to restrict the powers of states and, as a consequence, of regional parties. Eg. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026, amending the 1957 law under which the State owns the mineral and signs the lease while the Centre sets the rules and the royalty rate.
2. Market concentration has moved in step: The rise of a handful of large companies, aided by policy, has given them far greater sway over the economy than ever before.
3. One, patronage for smaller firms has dried up: The concentration of political power and the decline in the relative power of regional parties has ended the patronage and protection that were afforded to smaller and regional firms, who could rise up and become national players.
4. Two, policy uncertainty and an uneven playing field: Higher barriers to entry and terms tilted towards larger corporates make it harder for new players to emerge, and firms will not invest if they fear the rules of the game can be arbitrarily changed or that they can be caught on the wrong side of policies. Policy credibility is what is at stake.
5. Three, the fear of being muscled out: Investors fear that business success will be met by a hostile takeover by a national champion, so the question is not whether they are allowed to operate but whether they can stay in business and remain competitive over the next 10 to 20 years.

Why would dispersing economic power be politically costly?

1. Competition requires a rethink of the strategy: For the larger corporate sector to ramp up investment and for competition to emerge, the strategy of relying on a few national champions needs to be reconsidered.
2. Dispersed economic power funds political opposition: A larger number of big private players would disperse rather than concentrate economic power, which would in turn increase the funding avenues available to Opposition parties.
3. Economic competition feeds political competition: Weakening the concentration of economic power would possibly weaken the concentration of political power, so greater economic competition could lead to greater political competition.
4. The two open questions: It is unsettled whether the current political structure creates the space for new players to safely invest and emerge as competitors to the national champions, or whether market concentration is itself politically useful.

Why do the ingredients of an investment boom not produce one?

1. The macroeconomic conditions are present: An undervalued exchange rate, depressed real wages and sustained public sector investment in infrastructure are all in place, alongside the demographic dividend.
2. The same mix powered East Asia: This combination powered the rise of countries such as China and South Korea, where firms responded to it with large capacity additions.
3. India’s firms are not responding: Firms are likely to remain hesitant and unsure about investing without a change in the approach, despite those conditions.
4. Confidence, not capability, is binding: Investment decisions are taken only when investors think they have a fair chance of benefiting from them.
5. The end state if nothing changes: The consequent absence of competition raises the possibility of an uncompetitive, high-cost economy.

Challenges to the national champions strategy

1. Concentration raises consumer and input costs: Dominant firms in a sector face little pressure to hold prices down, which raises costs for every downstream user. Eg. Telecom tariffs rose sharply after the sector consolidated into three private operators. Fix. Use the deal value threshold introduced by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 to review acquisitions that current turnover tests miss.
2. Policy-created advantage is hard to withdraw: Once a group builds capacity on the strength of an incentive, removing the incentive becomes a shock the government is reluctant to deliver. Eg. Most approved incentive under the Production Linked Incentive scheme for large-scale electronics manufacturing has flowed to a small group of mobile phone assemblers. Fix. Publish sunset dates and firm-level disbursement data with each incentive scheme so withdrawal is scheduled rather than negotiated.
3. Concentrated bank exposure transmits firm risk to the system: Lending concentrated in a few large groups converts a single group’s distress into a banking problem. Eg. The corporate loan losses that produced the non-performing asset build-up of the 2010s were concentrated in a handful of infrastructure and metals groups. Fix. Enforce large exposure limits at group rather than borrower level and publish group-wise banking exposure.
4. Bidding rules can favour incumbents: Net worth, prior experience and bank guarantee conditions in auctions and tenders can exclude new entrants before price is considered. Eg. Critical mineral block auctions have repeatedly failed for want of qualified bidders. Fix. Set qualification thresholds proportionate to block or contract size and allow consortium bidding for first-time entrants.
5. Competition enforcement is slow relative to market speed: Investigations concluded years after conduct occurs cannot restore a market that has already tipped. Eg. Appeals against Competition Commission of India orders routinely run for several years before finality. Fix. Fund a dedicated appellate bench for competition matters with statutory disposal timelines.

Conclusion

The reluctance of cash-rich Indian firms to invest is being read as a political economy problem rather than a demand or global uncertainty problem. Concentrated political power, an uneven playing field and the fear of being displaced by a national champion together deny new entrants confidence in a 10 to 20 year horizon. Reversing that requires dispersing economic power, which carries political costs the current settlement has no incentive to accept. What remains unresolved is whether market concentration will be treated as a cost to growth or retained as a political asset.

Industrial Policy and Private Investment in India

1. What industrial policy does: It is the set of state interventions that shape which industries expand, through licensing, tariffs, incentives, public investment and ownership rules.
2. The arc since Independence: The Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 built a mixed economy with reserved public sector schedules, the licensing regime of the 1960s and 1970s restricted private entry, and the New Industrial Policy of 1991 abolished licensing for most sectors.
3. India’s scale: Manufacturing contributes around 17 per cent of Gross Domestic Product against a 25 per cent target, and India accounts for about 2.8 per cent of global manufacturing output against China’s roughly 29 per cent.
4. The current gap: Weak domestic private capital formation persists even as foreign investment rises, with cumulative Foreign Direct Investment crossing about $1.14 trillion between April 2000 and December 2025.

Laws Governing Industry and Competition in India

1. Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951: The parent law for central regulation of scheduled industries, and the statutory basis of the industrial licensing regime.
2. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969: Regulated large business houses through asset thresholds to prevent economic concentration, and was repealed after those thresholds were removed post-1991.
3. Competition Act, 2002: Replaced the 1969 Act, prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, and establishes the Competition Commission of India to regulate combinations.
4. Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023: Introduces a deal value threshold for merger review, a settlement and commitment framework, and shorter approval timelines.

Government Initiatives for Industry and Investment

1. Make in India (2014): Aims to raise manufacturing’s share of Gross Domestic Product towards 25 per cent, largely through ease of doing business measures.
2. Production Linked Incentive scheme (2020): Covers 14 sunrise and strategic sectors with outcome-linked financial incentives paid on incremental output.
3. National Manufacturing Mission: Announced in the 2025-26 Budget, targeting a 25 per cent Gross Domestic Product share and 143 million jobs by 2035, with a focus on solar photovoltaics, electric vehicle batteries, green hydrogen and wind.
4. National Single Window System: Consolidates central and state clearances into a single application interface for investors.
5. Invest India: The dedicated investment facilitation agency created after the Foreign Investment Promotion Board was abolished in 2017.

Challenges in Industrial Policy and Private Investment

1. Logistics and infrastructure costs: Power, transport and cluster gaps raise the operating cost of a new plant and lengthen its payback period. Eg. Logistics costs remain close to 8 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. Fix. Front-load the National Infrastructure Pipeline in states with the weakest evacuation and port connectivity.
2. Land acquisition risk: Title complexity and local resistance delay projects long enough to destroy their business case. Eg. The POSCO steel project in Odisha was shelved after prolonged land disputes. Fix. Build titled and pre-cleared land banks with plug-and-play utilities before inviting investment.
3. Tariff and trade shocks: External trade measures can remove an export market after capacity has been built for it. Eg. The 50 per cent United States tariff imposed in August 2025 hit roughly 55 per cent of India’s United States-bound exports. Fix. Diversify market access through trade agreements and deepen participation in global value chains.
4. Workforce readiness for Industry 4.0: Adopting automation and artificial intelligence systems requires reskilling at a scale current training capacity cannot deliver. Eg. Only about 4.7 per cent of India’s workforce has formal skill training, against roughly 96 per cent in South Korea. Fix. Fund employer-led reskilling through the re-skilling fund created under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.
5. Import dependence in strategic inputs: Heavy reliance on imported electronics, semiconductors and pharmaceutical inputs exposes downstream manufacturers to supply shocks. Eg. Electronics assembly in India depends on imported display and chip components. Fix. Extend performance-linked incentives to component and materials manufacture rather than final assembly alone.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2025, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the rationale of the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme. What are its achievements? In what way can the functioning and outcomes of the scheme be improved?”