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Subject: “Financial Inclusion,PSL”

  • [15th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: [Financial femocracy, the Jan Dhan transformation]

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2016]
    Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) is necessary for bringing unbanked to the institutional finance fold. Do you agree with this for financial inclusion of the poorer section of the Indian society? Give arguments to justify your option.
    Linkage: The PYQ tests whether PMJDY has translated bank-account access into substantive financial inclusion for the poor. The article extends the PYQ by examining the shift from account ownership to actual usage of savings, credit and insurance.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) completed twelve years on Independence Day 2026, having crossed 58 crore accounts with deposits of about ₹3 lakh crore. The milestone exposes the distance between owning a bank account and actually using savings, credit and insurance through it.

    What is the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY)?

    1. About: National financial inclusion mission announced from the ramparts of the Red Fort on 15 August 2014 and formally launched at Vigyan Bhawan on 28 August 2014.
    2. Core entitlement: Every household in India was to have a bank account, a RuPay debit card and insurance cover.
    3. Zero balance design: The account can be opened and held without any minimum balance requirement.
    4. Credit attachment: An overdraft facility of up to ₹10,000 is attached to the account so that it functions as more than a deposit box.
    5. Administering authority: The Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, runs the scheme through public and private sector banks.

    What is Antyodaya?

    1. Definition: The principle that the most deprived person is the most deserving claimant on the fruits of development.
    2. Origin: The concept was propounded by both Mahatma Gandhi and Deendayal Upadhyaya.

    What is the JAM trinity?

    1. Definition: The linking of Jan Dhan bank accounts, Aadhaar digital identity and Mobile connectivity into one delivery rail.
    2. Function: It allows a government payment to reach a verified individual account without passing through any intermediate handling point.

    What is Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT)?

    1. Definition: The transfer of a subsidy or entitlement directly into the beneficiary’s bank account instead of through a physical distribution chain.
    2. Purpose: It removes the intermediate custody points at which cash and commodity leakage historically occurred.

    What is Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI)?

    1. Definition: Publicly governed digital rails for identity, payments and data sharing on which both government and private services are built.
    2. The Indian stack: Aadhaar supplies identity, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) supplies payments, and Jan Dhan accounts supply the account layer.

    Why did political independence not deliver financial access to millions of Indians?

    1. A distant formal system: Decades after 1947, a bank account, formal credit, insurance and a reliable channel to receive government support could not be taken for granted.
    2. Leakage in delivery: A former Prime Minister acknowledged that when a rupee was sent from Delhi, only 15 paise reached the intended recipient.
    3. No delivery address: Without an account, a citizen had no address to which government money could be sent directly.
    4. Exclusion by balance: Minimum balance requirements made the formal banking system unusable for people whose incomes were small and irregular.
    5. Incomplete freedom: Political freedom remains incomplete where a citizen cannot save securely, receive money directly or reach the institutions through which economic opportunity flows.

    Why is access to formal finance treated as a responsibility of the state?

    1. The Chanakya formulation: The launch invoked Sukhasya moolam dharmah, Dharmasya moolam artha, Arthasya moolam rajyam, that the root of happiness is dharma, the root of dharma is artha, and the root of artha is the state.
    2. The claim it carries: Economic means are fundamental to human well being, so creating access to those means is a state obligation and not a discretionary favour.
    3. The Antyodaya test: The architecture was built on the rule that the last person in the queue should not remain outside the system.
    4. Entry point, not benefit: The account was designed as an entry point into the formal economy, not as one more transfer to be received.
    5. A second independence: Sixty seven years after 1947, financial and digital literacy was placed at the centre of the Independence Day address as unfinished national business.

    How was the Jan Dhan account designed so that the poorest could keep it?

    1. No entry cost: The zero balance account meant that having little money was no longer a reason to stay outside the banking system.
    2. A usable instrument: The RuPay debit card converted the account from a passbook into a transacting instrument.
    3. Small credit line: The overdraft facility gave the holder a formal alternative to the moneylender for a consumption shortfall.
    4. Embedded insurance: A ₹2 lakh accident insurance cover was attached to the RuPay card without a separate premium payment.
    5. Household unit: Coverage was defined at the household level, so the target was universality rather than a beneficiary list.

    What do twelve years of numbers show about the scale of the first step?

    1. Account base: The scheme had crossed 58 crore accounts by July 2026.
    2. Deposits held: Balances in these accounts run into about ₹3 lakh crore.
    3. Women’s share: More than half of all Jan Dhan accounts are held by women.
    4. Geographic spread: Roughly three fourths of the accounts are in rural and semi urban areas.
    5. Average balance: The two figures together imply an average balance of about ₹5,200 per account.

    How did a bank account become the first layer of a national digital infrastructure?

    1. First layer of JAM: Jan Dhan supplied the account layer on which Aadhaar identity and mobile connectivity were stacked.
    2. A direct channel: Once accounts were linked to identity and mobile, the government gained a direct route through which benefits could reach a named individual.
    3. Transformed transfers: This changed what Direct Benefit Transfer could actually do, from a pilot idea to the default mode of payment.
    4. Continuity with UPI: The same infrastructure carried the Unified Payments Interface into everyday retail payments.
    5. Cross border reach: A merchant accepting a UPI payment in France in 2026 and a first time account holder of 2014 sit on the same financial infrastructure.

    Does opening accounts amount to financial inclusion?

    1. The ownership side: With 58 crore accounts and near universal household coverage, the question of formal access has been settled.
    2. The usage side: Financial inclusion means participation in savings, payments, credit, insurance and economic opportunity, which an account count does not measure.
    3. What the balances say: An average balance of about ₹5,200 indicates that the account works mainly as a receiving channel rather than as a savings instrument.
    4. The credit gap: The overdraft remains the least used component of the design, so formal credit has not displaced the informal lender for most holders.
    5. Dormancy: Close to a fifth of Jan Dhan accounts have been reported inoperative, which means the rail exists but is not always carrying traffic.

    Why does a bank account function as a marker of identity?

    1. Recognition with respect: The account gave people from marginalised sections a formal record of existence that the system had rarely offered them.
    2. Visibility: It made those on the periphery visible and counted within the financial system.
    3. The scheme’s own framing: The tagline Mera khaata, bhagya vidhata, my account the destiny maker, states the claim that the account itself changes standing.
    4. Forward link: Financial inclusion is now positioned as an input into the Viksit Bharat 2047 goal.

    What are the challenges to the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana?

    1. Inoperative accounts: A large share of accounts records no customer induced transaction for long periods, e.g. the Finance Ministry ran a nationwide fresh KYC drive in 2024 covering roughly 11 crore inoperative Jan Dhan accounts.
    2. Overdraft under use: Banks sanction the overdraft to a small fraction of eligible holders because these borrowers carry no credit score, e.g. lenders treat a zero balance account with irregular inflows as an unscorable credit risk.
    3. Last mile agent viability: Business correspondents earn thin commissions on low value transactions, e.g. Bank Mitras in remote blocks handle deposits too small to cover travel and cash carrying costs.
    4. Duplicate accounts: The 2014 enrolment drive produced multiple accounts per household, e.g. families opened a second account to capture the accident cover, inflating the headline count.
    5. Unclaimed insurance: The accident cover lapses through ignorance of its conditions, e.g. holders do not know the RuPay card must have been used within a qualifying period before the accident for the claim to stand.
    6. Misuse of dormant accounts: Idle zero balance accounts are rented out as conduits for fraud proceeds, e.g. mule account networks flagged by the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre have used dormant no frills accounts.

    Conclusion

    Twelve years of Jan Dhan have settled the question of access and left the question of use open. The visible achievement is 58 crore accounts; the durable one is the rail that now carries Direct Benefit Transfer and UPI. The unfinished work is converting a receiving account into a working relationship with savings, credit and insurance.

    Back2Basics:

    What is Financial Inclusion?

    1. About: Financial inclusion is the delivery of banking, payment, credit, insurance and pension services to every section of society at an affordable cost.
    2. Rationale: Exclusion from formal finance forces households into informal credit at punitive rates and denies the state a clean channel to transfer entitlements.
    3. Access: The first dimension is the availability of a formal account and a service point within reach of the household.
    4. Usage: The second dimension is the actual frequency and depth of transactions, savings and borrowing through that account.
    5. Quality: The third dimension covers consumer protection, grievance redress and financial literacy, and it is the dimension the Reserve Bank of India Financial Inclusion Index weights lowest.

    Laws and Rules Governing Financial Inclusion in India

    1. Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934: Establishes the central bank and its power to direct banking policy, including branch authorisation and priority sector norms.
    2. Banking Regulation Act, 1949: Governs the licensing and conduct of banks, and is the basis for the Basic Savings Bank Deposit Account norms that permit zero balance accounts.
    3. Aadhaar Act, 2016: Section 7 permits the use of Aadhaar authentication as a condition for receiving a subsidy or benefit funded from the Consolidated Fund of India.
    4. Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007: Gives the Reserve Bank authority to regulate payment systems, and is the legal basis for the National Payments Corporation of India operating UPI, RuPay and the Aadhaar Enabled Payment System.
    5. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Rules: Prescribe the customer identification and record keeping obligations that govern account opening and periodic verification.

    Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana

    1. Ministry or Department: Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services.
    2. Launch year: 2014, announced on 15 August and launched on 28 August.
    3. Aims and objectives: Financial inclusion through zero balance accounts, insurance, overdraft and micro pension, forming the first leg of the JAM trinity.
    4. Targeted beneficiaries: Unbanked adults, with a household level coverage target.
    5. Key features: Basic Savings Bank Deposit accounts, an overdraft of up to ₹10,000, an accident cover of ₹2 lakh, and RuPay and Aadhaar Enabled Payment System interoperability.
    6. Record: The scheme holds a Guinness World Record for the most bank accounts opened in a single week during its 2014 rollout.

    Government Initiatives for Financial Inclusion

    1. Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana: Renewable one year life cover for account holders aged 18 to 50 at a low annual premium.
    2. Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana: Accident death and disability cover for account holders aged 18 to 70 at a nominal annual premium.
    3. Atal Pension Yojana: Guaranteed minimum pension for unorganised sector workers, delivered through the same bank accounts.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Mudra Yojana: Collateral free institutional credit to micro enterprises under the Shishu, Kishore and Tarun categories.
    5. Stand Up India: Bank loans for greenfield enterprises promoted by Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe and women entrepreneurs.
    6. PM SVANidhi: Working capital loans to street vendors, extending formal credit to a category with no collateral.

    Key Facts about Financial Inclusion in India

    1. JAM as a term: The JAM trinity entered official vocabulary through the Economic Survey that followed the launch of Jan Dhan.
    2. Financial Inclusion Index: The Reserve Bank publishes an annual composite index built on Access, Usage and Quality, with Usage carrying the largest weight.
    3. Priority Sector Lending: Scheduled commercial banks must direct 40 per cent of adjusted net bank credit to priority sectors, including weaker sections.
    4. Payments banks: A separate bank category was licensed to accept small deposits and offer payments without lending, expanding the service point network.
    5. Aadhaar Enabled Payment System: It allows cash withdrawal at a business correspondent point using fingerprint authentication alone, without a card or a branch.

    Challenges in Financial Inclusion in India

    1. Thin rural service points: Banking outlets remain concentrated in towns, e.g. aspirational districts in central India depend on a single business correspondent covering several villages.
    2. Low insurance penetration: Micro insurance uptake stays low despite nominal premiums, e.g. renewal rates for the low cost life and accident schemes fall sharply after the first auto debit year.
    3. Weak grievance redress: New account holders rarely reach an effective complaint channel, e.g. unauthorised debit complaints from rural holders often stop at the branch level and never reach the Banking Ombudsman.
    4. Connectivity failures: Authentication depends on network availability, e.g. Aadhaar Enabled Payment System withdrawals fail in hilly and forest blocks where mobile data is intermittent.
    5. Financial literacy gap: Holders do not understand interest, penalty and claim conditions, e.g. overdraft users treat the limit as a grant rather than as a loan carrying interest.
    6. Gendered control of accounts: Women hold accounts that male household members operate, e.g. transfers under women centred schemes are frequently withdrawn by another family member at the agent point.

    Way Forward

    1. Shift the metric: Measure the scheme on transaction frequency, credit uptake and insurance claims settled rather than on accounts opened.
    2. Build alternative credit scoring: Use account transaction history and Account Aggregator consented data to underwrite the overdraft for holders with no formal credit record.
    3. Fix agent economics: Revise business correspondent commissions to reflect distance and transaction cost so that remote service points remain viable.
    4. Run a dormancy clearance cycle: Institutionalise periodic verification and reactivation drives instead of one off campaigns.
    5. Embed literacy in delivery: Attach a short standardised explanation of overdraft interest and insurance claim conditions to every account and card issued.
    6. Harden the rail against misuse: Apply transaction pattern monitoring to dormant zero balance accounts to detect mule account recruitment early.

  • How India’s life insurance sector funds government expenditure

    Why in the News?

    LIC’s March 2025 regulatory filings and RBI/IRDAI data confirm that life insurers collectively hold close to a quarter of India’s outstanding central government dated securities, a share that has remained stable even as total sovereign debt expanded by around 40 per cent in three years. This scale of sovereign financing has never featured in budget speeches or parliamentary debate, even as three regulatory interventions between 2023 and 2024 compressed new insurance business and, with it, the household savings pipeline that feeds this funding base.

    Why do life insurers function as a stable, counter-cyclical source of financing for government debt?

    1. Long-duration liability match: Life insurance policies carry tenures of twenty to forty years. Government securities are the only asset class that absorbs funds of this scale at matching tenures without distorting the market.
    2. Counter-cyclical behaviour: Insurers buy and hold securities. They do not exit when oil prices rise or when a geopolitical event triggers reassessment of emerging-market exposure, unlike foreign portfolio investors (FPIs).
    3. Reduced rollover risk: A steady domestic base of long-horizon holders lowers the risk that maturing government debt cannot be refinanced on favourable terms.
    4. Lower borrowing costs: Stable demand across the maturity spectrum moderates the government’s overall cost of borrowing.
    5. Structural, not discretionary: This behaviour is not a policy choice. It is the structural consequence of insurers writing long-duration promises to millions of policyholders.

    How large and entrenched is LIC’s role as a financier of the sovereign?

    1. Sector concentration: LIC carries the dominant share of the insurance sector’s sovereign exposure, a consequence of its scale, its predominantly participating product mix, and the duration of its in-force book.
    2. Regulatory filing confirmation: LIC’s Form L-26 filing with IRDAI (March 2025) shows sovereign paper accounts for nearly 63 per cent of its non-linked policyholder corpus, well above the regulatory minimum.
    3. Absolute scale: LIC’s March 2025 IRDAI filings show ₹20.2 lakh crore held in central government securities alone, and ₹32.3 lakh crore in total government and government-guaranteed securities across all funds.
    4. Single largest holder: These figures make LIC the single largest institutional holder of Indian government debt. LIC holds approximately 19 per cent of all outstanding central government dated securities (RBI Public Debt Management Quarterly Report, FY24).
    5. Official systemic recognition: IRDAI designates LIC a Domestic Systemically Important Insurer (D-SII) every year, meaning its distress would cause significant dislocation in the financial system.
    6. Private insurers’ limited but rising role: Private insurers, with a higher share of unit-linked and shorter-tenure products, contribute a smaller fraction of sovereign holdings today. Their sovereign allocation will rise as they deepen traditional, longer-duration offerings.

    Does global practice confirm that insurers hold sovereign debt because of liability structure rather than regulatory mandate?

    1. Japan: Japanese insurers are cited among the largest holders of the government’s long-dated securities. The source gives no institution-level detail.
    2. United Kingdom: UK insurers are similarly cited as large holders of long-dated government securities. No institutional specifics are given.
    3. South Korea: South Korean insurers are cited as large holders of long-dated sovereign debt. No further detail is provided.
    4. Claimed common driver: The source attributes this pattern across all three jurisdictions to liability-profile demand rather than regulatory mandate, and states India’s insurance sector is following the same path.

    Why could recent regulatory actions on the insurance sector pose a longer-term risk to the sovereign borrowing programme?

    1. Declining penetration: India’s life insurance penetration stood at 2.7 per cent of GDP in FY25, a third consecutive annual decline from a pandemic-era peak of 3.2 per cent, and below the global life insurance average of 3.0 per cent.
    2. Three simultaneous interventions: Between 2023 and 2024, regulators restructured distribution economics, imposed taxation on certain high-value policies, and mandated product repricing.
    3. Cumulative effect exceeded individual impact: Each intervention was defensible in isolation. Their simultaneous effect compressed new business across the sector.
    4. Sector currently recovering: New business has begun recovering after this compression episode.
    5. Deferred risk to sovereign funding: Compression of new business diverts household savings away from insurance-linked government debt purchases toward shorter-duration instruments elsewhere.
    6. Lagged visibility: This effect on the sovereign borrowing programme may not be visible in the short term. It would surface over a decade.

    Why has insurance’s role as a sovereign financier remained absent from public policy discourse despite its scale?

    1. Asymmetric policy attention: Banking receives policy attention in proportion to its systemic importance. Insurance, holding close to a quarter of outstanding central government dated securities, does not receive comparable attention.
    2. Discourse framed only around households: The case for deeper insurance penetration is made almost entirely in the language of household financial protection — the uninsured family, inadequate sum assured, mis-selling, or unsettled claims.
    3. Missing fiscal-stability framing: A parallel case, framed in the language of sovereign fiscal stability, has not been fully articulated in public policy discourse.
    4. Consequence for regulatory design: Regulatory interventions aimed narrowly at consumer protection did not account for their cumulative effect on the sovereign funding base.

    Conclusion

    Life insurers, led by LIC, function as India’s most stable institutional financiers of government debt, holding close to a quarter of outstanding central government securities through structurally long-duration, counter-cyclical demand. This sovereign-financing function has never entered public policy discourse, which frames insurance regulation almost exclusively around household protection. Regulatory interventions between 2023 and 2024 that compressed new insurance business exposed this gap, since their cumulative fiscal-stability cost went unweighed at the time. Insurance regulation must begin accounting for its sovereign-funding dimension alongside consumer protection, or the effect will surface only years later as higher government borrowing costs.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2019] The public expenditure management is a challenge to the Government of India in the context of budget making during the post-liberalization period. Clarify it.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines fiscal management and financing of government expenditure. The article shows that India’s life insurance sector acts as a major domestic financier of government borrowing by channelising long-term household savings into government securities, thereby strengthening fiscal stability and reducing dependence on volatile capital flows.

  • Relief to digital fraud victims: How losses upto 50K can be recovered

    Why in the News?

    The RBI notified a revised compensation framework for victims of digital payment fraud, effective 1 January 2027. Under the scheme, victims can recover part of losses up to ₹50,000 through a state-supported fund. The move follows a sharp rise in fraud value despite fewer reported cases.

    Why did the RBI intervene now, and what does the scale of digital fraud reveal about the existing liability framework?

    1. Rising fraud value: Fraud cases fell to 10,114 in FY26, but the amount involved increased 46% to ₹48,021 crore, indicating fewer but larger frauds.
    2. Consumer liability gap: The earlier framework placed the burden of proof and recovery on customers. Banks faced limited liability unless negligence was established
    3. Electronic Banking Transactions (EBTs) as the primary vector: EBT are a digitally initiated banking transaction, including NEFT, RTGS, UPI, and card-based payments. They became the primary fraud channel, exposing a liability gap.
    4. State absorption of residual risk: The new framework makes the RBI the majority loss-bearer for unrecovered fraud amounts. This signals that the regulator treats digital fraud loss as a systemic risk requiring regulatory underwriting, not merely a bilateral consumer-bank dispute.

    What is the consumer entitlement under the new framework, and what conditions govern eligibility?

    1. Maximum compensation ceiling: A victim is eligible for compensation of up to 85% of net loss amount or ₹25,000, whichever is less. This applies to gross fraudulent EBT losses up to ₹50,000.
    2. Lifetime cap: The compensation is available once during the lifetime of the account holder. Repeat claims for subsequent fraud events are not covered under this mechanism.
    3. Complaint filing window: Victims must lodge a complaint regarding the fraud within five calendar days of the event. Claims filed beyond this window are ineligible regardless of the loss amount.
    4. Loss verification standard: The loss must be established in accordance with the internal processes set out in the victim’s bank’s policy. The framework does not prescribe a uniform evidentiary standard across banks, leaving verification to individual bank procedures.
    5. Threshold-based compensation rate: For losses below ₹29,412, the victim receives 85% of the amount lost. For losses between ₹29,412 and ₹50,000, the victim receives a flat ₹25,000 (the ceiling).

    How is the cost of compensation shared between the RBI, the victim’s bank, and the beneficiary bank?

    1. Domestic fraud (below ₹29,412): RBI bears 65% of compensation. The victim’s bank and beneficiary bank contribute 10% each.
    2. Domestic EBT fraud between ₹29,412 and ₹50,000 (₹25,000 flat compensation): The RBI contributes ₹19,118 (76.5%). The victim’s bank and the beneficiary bank each contribute ₹2,941 (approximately 12% each).
    3. Cross-border EBT fraud (elevated bank contribution): In cross-border cases, the victim’s bank’s contribution rises to 20% for frauds below ₹29,412, and to ₹5,882 for frauds in the ₹29,412-₹50,000 band.
    4. Multiple beneficiary banks (proportionate allocation): Where more than one beneficiary bank receives the fraudulent amount, each bank’s share of the compensation is proportionate to the amount credited to its accounts.
    5. Numerical illustration (official example): If fraud loss is ₹40,000 and ₹15,000 is recovered, the net compensable loss is ₹25,000. The victim receives 85% of ₹25,000 = ₹21,250. The RBI contributes ₹16,250; victim’s bank and beneficiary bank contribute ₹2,500 each. If nothing is recovered, the victim receives ₹25,000 (ceiling), distributed in the same proportion.

    What standard of bank negligence triggers full bank liability, and what are the banks’ procedural obligations?

    1. Full bank liability for own negligence: Where fraud arises from the bank’s own negligence, the bank must compensate the victim entirely. The RBI cost-sharing mechanism does not apply in such cases.
    2. Safety and security failures: Failing to ensure proper safety and security mechanisms for EBTs constitutes negligence. This includes system malfunctions and security breaches.
    3. Alert failures: Failing to send mandatory transaction alerts for EBTs above ₹500 is classified as negligence. The alert obligation is non-discretionary.
    4. Complaint handling failures: Failing to provide 24×7 channels for customer complaints and failing to act diligently on received complaints both constitute negligence. Banks cannot limit complaint access to business hours.
    5. Complaint resolution timelines: Banks must resolve fraudulent EBT complaints within 45 calendar days for domestic EBTs and within 60 calendar days for cross-border EBTs. Breach of these timelines has implications for bank liability assessment.
    6. Post-complaint containment obligation: On receipt of any fraudulent EBT complaint, a bank must take prompt steps to prevent further unauthorised EBTs in the customer’s account. This is a proactive duty, not a passive acknowledgment obligation.

    Does the framework resolve the consumer’s structural vulnerability to digital fraud, or does it shift the problem without eliminating it?

    1. Consumer protection: The framework guarantees time-bound compensation and imposes liability for proven bank negligence.
    2. Limited bank incentives: RBI bears most compensation costs. Banks usually contribute only 10-20%, reducing incentives to strengthen fraud prevention.
    3. Procedural burden: Victims must report fraud within five days and satisfy bank-specific verification standards.
    4. Source of fraud: The framework compensates losses but does not strengthen EBT security standards or regulate payment intermediaries.
    5. Residual reporting: Victims must also report fraud to the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal or Cyber Crime Helpline. This supports record-keeping, not recovery.
    6. Coverage mismatch: The compensation cap is ₹25,000, whereas average fraud value in FY26 was about ₹4.75 crore per case, limiting relevance to small-value consumer fraud.

    Conclusion

    The RBI framework introduces the first regulatory mechanism for sharing consumer losses from digital fraud. It reduces immediate customer losses but leaves banks with limited financial incentives to prevent fraud. Large-value frauds, security standards and accountability of payment intermediaries remain unresolved.

  • Is inclusive growth possible under market economy? State the significance of financial inclusion in achieving economic growth in India.

    As per OECD, inclusive growth is economic growth distributed fairly across society and creates opportunities for all. A market economy drives efficiency and innovation, but without corrective policies it can widen inequalities.

    Inclusive Growth under Market Economy

    Efficient Resource Allocation- improve productivity, reduce costs, and expand economic opportunities.

    Market economies enable entrepreneurship, MSME growth and innovation-driven jobs. Eg- Indian start-up ecosystem.

    State as an Enabler- Government gets resources to invest in public goods.

    Property rights, contract enforcement and regulatory frameworks ensure fairness.

    Technological development enabling inclusive development – Eg- DBT.

    Challenges to Inclusive Growth under a Market Economy

    Rising inequality– Eg- the top 1% control 40% of net personal wealth.

    Regional disparities due to unequal investment and infrastructure. Eg- BIMARU States

    Jobless growth – Service sector contributes 55% of GDP but employs less than 30% workforce

    Weak social protection for informal workers (over 85% of India’s workforce).

    Market failures in public goods. Eg- Digital Apartheid in Education

    Significance of Financial Inclusion in Achieving Economic Growth in India

    Enhanced credit access for MSMEs, SHGs – boosts investment and employment. Eg. PM MUDRA has sanctioned over since inception.

    Greater savings through Jan Dhan accounts (53 crore accounts) ensures financial stability

    Formalisation of the economy via UPI, GSTN, Aadhaar – wider tax base and better compliance.

    Poverty reduction through targeted DBT, eliminating leakages and improving consumption.

    Women’s economic empowerment through SHG-bank linkage, Stand-Up India, digital microcredit – raises household productivity.

    Rural economic growth through Kisan Credit Cards, PM-Kisan and digital banking in villages.

    Improved risk management via insurance (PMJJBY, PMSBY) and pensions (PM-SYM) – stabilises vulnerable households.

    Boost to digital economy with UPI handling over – strengthens service sector growth.

    Inclusive growth under a market economy is possible when markets are balanced with public investment, regulation and financial inclusion.

  • With reference to India, Consider the following

    With reference to India, Consider the following:
    1. Nationalization of Banks
    2. Formation of Regional Rural Banks
    3. Adoption of villages by Bank Branches
    Which of the above can be considered as steps taken to achieve the “financial inclusion” in India.

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    1. The Self-Help Group (SHG) Programme was originally initiated by the State Bank of India by providing microcredit to the financial deprived.
    2. In an SHG, all members of a group take responsibility for a loan that an individual member takes.
    3. The Regional Rural Banks and Scheduled Commercial Banks support SHGs.
    How many of the above statements are correct?

  • Which of the following can be said to be essentially the parts of ‘Inclusive Governance’

    Which of the following can be said to be essentially the parts of ‘Inclusive Governance’?
    1. Permitting the Non-Banking Financial Companies to do banking
    2. Establishing effective District Planning Committees in all the districts
    3. Increasing the government spending on public health
    4. Strengthening the Mid-day Meal Scheme

  • Priority Sector Lending by banks in India constitutes the lending to

    Priority Sector Lending by banks in India constitutes the lending to

  • What is/are the facility/facilities the beneficiaries can get from the services of Business Correspondent (Bank Saathi) in branchless areas

    What is/are the facility/facilities the beneficiaries can get from the services of Business Correspondent (Bank Saathi) in branchless areas?
    1. It enables the beneficiaries to draw their subsidies and social security benefits in their villages.
    2. It enables the beneficiaries in the rural areas to make deposits and withdrawals.
    Select the correct answer using the code given below: