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Subject: Fundamental Rights and Duties

  • What is the right to be forgotten? 

    Why in the News?

    The Delhi High Court, ruling on 29 May 2026 in Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India, laid down India’s first structured proportionality test for the right to be forgotten. The ruling forces a direct reckoning between an individual’s right to informational privacy and the constitutional commitment to open justice and free speech.

    How did the right to be forgotten emerge, and why did Indian courts arrive at it inconsistently?

    1. Origin in EU jurisprudence: The right originated in 2014 when Mario Costeja González complained to the European Court of Justice that Google continued to display an old notice about the auction of his repossessed house even after the debt was settled.
    2. Codification in General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): The European Court ruled in his favour. This laid the groundwork for the right to erasure, later incorporated into Article 17 of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.
    3. Constitutional anchor in India: The Supreme Court’s judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) held that privacy is a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This includes the right to informational privacy.
    4. Divergent High Court practice: High Courts adopted inconsistent approaches after Puttaswamy. Some permitted anonymisation in limited cases, such as the Delhi High Court’s masking of names in certain matrimonial and criminal matters.
    5. The unresolved gap: Other courts rejected similar requests on grounds of open justice. No coherent framework existed to balance these competing interests before the May 2026 judgment.

    What test did the Delhi High Court lay down, and what does it require?

    1. The core issue: The Delhi High Court ruled on a batch of over 30 consolidated petitions. The central question was whether informational privacy could justify de-indexing or masking judicial records in a system committed to open justice.
    2. Constitutional source of the right: The court held that the right to be forgotten flows from Article 21’s guarantee of dignity and informational privacy.
    3. The proportionality test: Any restriction must have a legitimate purpose. The harm to privacy must be balanced against the public interest.
    4. Preference for the least intrusive means: Masking names should be preferred over deleting the entire judgment.
    5. Procedural direction: The court prescribed a two-week deadline for legal databases to comply. It clarified that only the parties’ names should be redacted, not the facts of the case.

    Why does the right to be forgotten sit in tension with open justice and free speech?

    1. Not a stand-alone right: The right to be forgotten frequently conflicts with freedom of speech and press under Article 19(1)(a), the principle of open justice, and the public’s right to know.
    2. A high threshold for privacy: A right to privacy must be sacrificed when the public interest is of a high order, particularly in serious cases of crime.
    3. The limiting principle: The digital presence of a case should not destroy a person’s life long after the trial ends.
    4. Selective, not absolute, restriction: Judgments remain publicly accessible by case number or keyword search. Only name-based searches are restricted.
    5. The unresolved concern: For an acquitted person, a name-based search can still surface the original accusation, described as the “shadow of crime,” as the first result a user sees.

    Why does enforcement remain the weakest link in this framework?

    1. Search engine design defeats masking: Search results are still generated at the search-engine level. Removing a court’s own copy does not remove all traces.
    2. Persistence beyond the primary source: Mirrors, archived copies, and social media sharing keep the original content accessible even after a court orders removal.
    3. No coordination mechanism: Effective technical compliance requires coordination among multiple platforms. No such mechanism currently exists.
    4. Consequence for the right’s value: Without platform-level compliance, the right to be forgotten remains largely symbolic rather than enforceable.

    What is the statutory basis for erasure under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act), and why is it inadequate for judicial records?

    1. Limited existing statutory right: The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 offers a limited right to erasure under Section 12.
    2. Consent-based design: This statutory right is primarily based on consent. It does not explicitly address judicial records.
    3. Scope gap: The Act does not cover public archives, where the need for a right to be forgotten is most acute.
    4. Non-operational status: The Act is deficient because its rules have not been notified.
    5. Missing institution: The data protection board contemplated under the Act has not been established.

    Who should decide erasure requests, and how should that authority be structured?

    1. The efficiency-accountability trade-off: Requiring every request to be decided by a court would create significant bottlenecks. Leaving decisions entirely to technology companies raises concerns about due process and transparency.
    2. A tiered proposal: A more sensible approach would use a tiered system.
    3. First tier: platforms: Straightforward cases could be heard directly by platforms.
    4. Second tier: data protection board: Contested cases would go to the data protection board.
    5. Third tier: courts: Judicial cases, including those with constitutional questions, would be reserved for courts.

    Conclusion

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling gives the right to be forgotten its most structured judicial articulation in India, subordinating deletion to name-masking to protect dignity without eroding open justice. This framework remains judge-made and non-statutory: the DPDP Act does not cover judicial records, the data protection board does not exist, and search engines retain wide discretion over technical compliance. Until the Supreme Court settles the doctrine nationally and a statutory institution is created to adjudicate erasure requests, the right to be forgotten in India will function more as a judicial aspiration than an enforceable entitlement.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Right to privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty and is inherently protected under Article 21 of the constitution. Explain. In this reference, discuss the law relating to D.N.A. testing of a child in the womb to establish its paternity.

    Linkage: The article similarly examines the Right to be Forgotten as an aspect of informational privacy under Article 21 and its balance with freedom of speech, the public’s right to know and the principle of open justice.

  • [3rd July 2026] The Hindu OpED: The right to a fair trial at the crossroads

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2023] The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society. Illustrate with special reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty.
    Relevance: The PYQ directly covers the expansion of Article 21, including the right to speedy trial, fair procedure and personal liberty. The editorial argues that prolonged incarceration without trial violates the evolving constitutional guarantee under Article 21.

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the 2020 Delhi riots case earlier this year, though they have been in pre-trial detention for nearly six years. This has renewed the question of how long an accused can be held without trial, and exposed inconsistency in how courts weigh delay against the gravity of the offence under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. At stake is whether pre-trial incarceration under anti-terror law is becoming punishment before conviction.

    Why does prolonged pre-trial detention under the UAPA raise a constitutional question of personal liberty?

    1. Delay triggers Article 21 right: The Supreme Court’s own prior judgments hold that an extended trial delay triggers the accused’s right to personal liberty under Article 21.
    2. Statutory conditions cannot override the Constitution: The UAPA’s strict bail conditions cannot override the constitutional right to personal liberty.
    3. Gravity of offence remains an allegation: At the bail stage, the gravity of the offence is only an allegation made by the state, not a proven fact.
    4. Sliding scale of detention: Allowing gravity to override delay creates a sliding scale that keeps certain individuals in jail for years simply because they are accused of grave offences.
    5. Precedent of prolonged wrongful detention: Individuals accused under the UAPA have been held in jail for over two decades before being acquitted, losing the most productive years of their lives.

    Does weighing the gravity of the offence against delay protect due process, or does it convert the trial into the punishment itself?

    1. Judge controls the pace of trial: The judge, not the accused, controls the courtroom and decides the pace of the trial.
    2. Responsibility for delay rests with the judiciary: The judge bears the ultimate responsibility to complete a trial within a reasonable timeframe, regardless of applications filed by either side.
    3. Internal Court criticism: A separate two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court openly criticised the Delhi riots bail rejection as contrary to established precedent.
    4. Reaffirmation of the rule of law: The Bench reiterated that individuals cannot be incarcerated indefinitely without trial under a Constitution committed to the rule of law.
    5. Delay used as a proxy for guilt: Treating an unproven allegation of gravity as sufficient ground to override delay effectively punishes the accused before the trial concludes.

    Why does inconsistency across and within courts on UAPA bail undermine the rule of law?

    1. Referral to a larger Bench: In a related case, the Delhi riots Bench referred the question of how long pre-trial detention can continue to the Chief Justice, for the constitution of a larger Bench.
    2. Unresolved apex court debate: The Supreme Court is now debating whether individuals who have spent over half a decade in jail without trial should be released, and the question remains open even as detention continues to lengthen.
    3. Contrasting High Court rulings: The Delhi High Court granted bail to Kashmiri human rights activist Khurram Parvez after more than four years without trial, weighing the length of detention heavily.
    4. Same judge, opposite outcomes: The judge who granted Khurram Parvez bail had earlier denied bail in the Delhi riots case, where the accused had already spent over four years in jail.
    5. Same facts, different verdicts a year apart: In the Delhi riots case itself, the same judge delivered opposing bail judgments on the same underlying facts within a year.

    What limited international references does the article draw upon to illustrate this concern? 

    1. France, Dreyfus comparison: The article compares the over-five-year detention of the Delhi riots accused to the imprisonment of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a French political prisoner, without detailing the length or process of the Dreyfus case itself.
    2. United Kingdom and United States, dissent conflated with terrorism: The article cites recent actions in the UK and US against dissent linked to the Israel-Palestine conflict as examples of states blurring political dissent with terrorism, without naming a specific law or institutional mechanism.

    Why does the political character of laws like the UAPA make judicial consistency especially critical?

    1. Political character of anti-terror law: Laws such as the UAPA carry an undeniably political character because they criminalise activities that can also constitute legitimate dissent.
    2. Global pattern of blurring dissent and terrorism: States across the world have repeatedly interpreted anti-terror laws in ways that blur the line between political dissent and terrorism.
    3. Consequence of inconsistency: Repeated inconsistency across cases and courts on a basic issue like pre-trial incarceration damages the rule of law and the cause of fundamental rights.

    What must the judiciary ensure to prevent laws like the UAPA from being weaponised?

    1. Non-negotiable constitutional floor: The state cannot keep people behind bars for years without trial, regardless of how legal interpretation is otherwise contested.
    2. Process as punishment: Allowing incarceration without trial to continue makes a mockery of the rule of law and entrenches the pre-trial process itself as the punishment.
    3. Pending resolution: It remains unclear whether or when the Supreme Court’s larger Bench will resolve the underlying question.
    4. Continuing cost: Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam remain in custody as the last two accused student activists in the Delhi riots case, with five years in prison having turned into six.
    5. Rising stakes: The cost of continued detention falls both on the lives of the imprisoned individuals and on the credibility of the rule of law.

    Conclusion

    Judicial inconsistency in weighing delay against the gravity of offence is allowing pre-trial detention under laws like the UAPA to function as punishment before conviction. This threatens the constitutional right to personal liberty under Article 21 and creates space for anti-terror law to be used against political dissent. Until the Supreme Court’s larger Bench settles the doctrine, cases such as that of Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam will continue to test the gap between the rule of law and its practice.

  • Right of movement and residence throughout the territory of India are freely available to the Indian citizens, but these rights are not absolute. Comment

    “Liberty means freedom to do everything which injures no one else.” (French Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1789). The Right to Movement and Residence under the Indian Constitution embodies this idea of liberty.

    Constitutional Provision

    Article 19(1)(d) – Right to move freely throughout the territory of India.

    Article 19(1)(e) – Right to reside and settle in any part of India.

    However, it is not absolute as

    Reasonable Restrictions under Article 19(5) – interests of the general public or for the protection of Scheduled Tribes.

    Protection of Scheduled Tribes – Restrictions in 5th and 6th Schedules safeguard traditional culture, property rights, and protect tribes from exploitation by outsiders.

    Security of State – Eg – Restrictions under AFSPA in disturbed regions.

    Public Order – Curfews, preventive detention, or restrictions during riots.

    Judicial Endorsement – Eg – State of UP v. Kaushailiya (1964) upheld restrictions on movement of prostitutes to protect public health and morality.

    Pandemic Situations – During COVID-19 lockdowns, freedom of movement was restricted to control spread of the virus.

    Inner Line Permit (ILP) – Required in certain north-eastern states; prior approval of state government needed to protect local interests.

    Foreigners – Can be deported for violating rules, even though citizens enjoy freedom of residence.

    “Liberty is not a license, but is regulated freedom.” Ensuring individual liberty while safeguarding collective interests reflects balanced constitutionalism.

  • ”The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society”. Illustrate with special reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty.

    A Living Constitution rejects rigid textualism and evolves with time to meet the changing needs of society while upholding core constitutional values. According to Woodrow Wilson, Constitution must be Darwinian in structure and in practice.

    Dynamism of Indian Constitution

    Expanding Interpretation of Fundamental Rights. Eg- Right to internet access

    Judicial Doctrines – Eg- Basic Structure Doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973)

    Democratic and Federal Evolution through constitutional amendments (over 100 so far)

    Constitution made for Progressive Society

    Social Justice – Abolition of untouchability (Article 17), reservation policies

    Gender Equality – Guarantees of equal rights (Articles 14-16)

    Political equalityUniversal Adult Franchise

    Vision for a welfare stateArticle 39(b)(c) (equitable distribution of resources) and Article 45 (free and compulsory education).

    Secularism & Fraternity – Promotes unity in diversity, preventing majoritarian domination while protecting minority rights.

    Expanding Horizons of Right to Life and Personal Liberty (through SC judgments)

    Right to Livelihood – Recognised in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), linking livelihood to dignity of life.

    Right to EducationUnni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) paved way for RTE Act, 2009.

    Right to Clean EnvironmentSubhash Kumar v. State of Bihar (1991) connected the environment with quality of life.

    Right to Health – In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity (1996), SC held that the state must provide adequate healthcare.

    Right to PrivacyJustice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) declared privacy intrinsic to personal liberty.

    Right to Die with DignityCommon Cause v. Union of India (2018) legalised passive euthanasia.

    Right to Internet AccessAnuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) recognised internet as essential for speech, trade, and education.

    Right to Marry a Person of ChoiceShafin Jahan v. Asokan (2018) upheld liberty in matters of marriage.

    Expanding Horizons of Right to Life and Personal Liberty (Through Amendments)

    44th Amendment Act (1978) – Imposed limitations on Emergency powers by ensuring that Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended even during a National Emergency.

    86th Amendment Act (2002) – Inserted Article 21A, making Right to Education (6-14 years) a fundamental right under Article 21.

    The Indian Constitution, through its dynamism, has transformed into a progressive charter of human rights. As Granville Austin remarked, the Constitution is a “social document aiming at transforming society through law.”

  • Right to privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty and is inherently protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. Explain. In this reference discuss the law relating to D.N.A. testing of a child in the womb to establish its paternity.

    “Privacy is the constitutional core of human dignity.” – Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

    The Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) declared that Right to Privacy is intrinsic to Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21.

    Scope of Right to Privacy (post-Puttaswamy)

    Informational Privacy – Protection of personal data, Aadhaar details, medical records, online footprints.

    Decisional Autonomy – Eg- Navtej Singh Johar (2018) decriminalised same-sex relations.

    Bodily Integrity – Eg- Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) recognised reproductive choice.

    Family, Marriage & Relationships – Eg- Shafin Jahan v. Asokan (2018, Hadiya case) upheld interfaith marriage choice.

    Reproductive Rights – Eg- in X v. Principal Secretary, Health case (2022), SC allowed abortion for unmarried women under MTP Act.

    Digital Privacy – Protection against surveillance, right to internet access, and data protection in cyberspace. Eg- Aadhar Judgment

    However, Privacy is not absolute and subject to Reasonable Restrictions

    Test of Proportionality – Puttaswamy (2017) –

    Legalitysanctioned by law, with a just, fair, and reasonable procedure.

    Legitimate Aim – e.g., national security, public health.

    Proportionality – The nature, method, and extent of interference must be proportionate to the purpose sought.

    Arguments in Favour of DNA Testing

    Truth and Justice – Ensures scientific accuracy in resolving paternity disputes. Eg – Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal (1993) allowed DNA in exceptional cases.

    Child’s Right to Identity – Establishing paternity secures child’s dignity and identity under Article 21.

    Preventing Fraud – Avoids false claims in inheritance, custody, or maintenance disputes.

    Criminal Justice Support – DNA helps in rape and assault cases, strengthening convictions.

    International Standards – Aligns with UNCRC’s recognition of a child’s right to know parents.

    Arguments Against DNA Testing

    Privacy of Parents – Supreme Court in 2025 held that DNA cannot be used for “roving inquiries into paternity.”

    Right to Dignity – Privacy includes the right to be left alone; forceful DNA tests intrude into intimate decisions

    Genetic information = core privacy – DNA reveals “a person’s very essence” and is part of the fundamental right to privacy under Article 21.

    Potential Misuse – DNA demands in marital disputes may be used to harass women and allege infidelity.

    Mother’s dignity – Forced DNA tests also harm the reputation and dignity of mothers, by casting aspersions on fidelity.

    Presumption of LegitimacySection 112, Indian Evidence Act presumes legitimacy of child born in wedlock.

    Child’s dignity – Children cannot be treated as material objects in divorce battles; they have a right not to have their legitimacy frivolously questioned.

    UN Convention on Rights of the Child – Recognises privacy, autonomy and identity as core entitlements of children.

    Thus, the doctrine of ‘Eminent Need’ and ‘Last resort’ (Family courts should order DNA tests only in rare, expedient cases) is essential to balance a child’s right to identity with parents’ dignity and privacy.

  • Consider the following statements

    Consider the following statements:
    1. According to the Constitution of India, the Central Government has a duty to protect States from internal disturbances.
    2. The Constitution of India exempts the States from providing legal counsel to person being held for preventive detention
    3. According to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, confession of the accused before the police cannot be used as evidence.
    How many of the above statements are correct?