💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open

Subject: Local Self-Government

  • The rebuilding of the city must begin, after Satya Niketan

    Why in the News

    A building collapse at Satya Niketan in Delhi killed seven of the 50 Delhi University students living in a makeshift arrangement inside an unauthorised structure, with many others hospitalised in serious condition. The collapse followed monsoon water reaching the basement and foundations of a structure almost half a century old, in which alterations were being carried out at basement level at the time. Given the building’s age, its condition, its unauthorised status and its position in a dense neighbourhood, the event was not preventable at the moment it happened. The tension is that almost 60 per cent of Delhi’s population lives in structures of this kind, and the city will hold nearly 40 million people by 2030, so the response has to be a documentation and licensing regime rather than an inquiry into one building.

    What is a Lal Dora area?

    1. Lal Dora, the village habitation core: A Lal Dora area is the settled habitation core of a village that was recorded separately from its agricultural land, and which municipal planning and building regulation historically did not reach.
    2. Shadow pockets outside municipal planning: These are shadow pockets that evade municipal planning, and they exist in virtually all large Indian cities rather than in Delhi alone.
    3. High density construction in urbanised villages: Urbanised villages of this kind now carry high density four and five storey buildings put up outside the building bye laws that apply elsewhere in the city.

    Why is the city’s building stock undocumented?

    1. The scale of the unregulated stock: Almost 60 per cent of Delhi’s population lives in unauthorised structures, mostly slums, low rise makeshift tenements, or high density four and five storey buildings in urbanised villages.
    2. Existing street maps of illegal colonies: Street maps of most illegal colonies already exist, so the gap is not location but the building itself.
    3. The missing building by building record: There is no building by building documentation of the type and size of each structure, no assessment of its physical condition, and no enumeration of who lives inside it.
    4. Infra red structural imaging: Advanced infra red and other imaging techniques allow a reasonably accurate assessment of a building’s structural condition without dismantling it.

    Why does the age of the stock make documentation urgent?

    1. Buildings are no longer built to last: The lifespan of structures built in this century is barely 30 to 40 years, against the generational life expected of older construction.
    2. Non compliant buildings last less: Structures such as those at Satya Niketan follow none of the required safety codes, which shortens that span further.
    3. A finite lifespan and the inspection cycle: A building stock with a known expiry has to be checked on a cycle, and partially or wholly demolished and replaced when it fails, rather than inspected only after a collapse.

    Why does the use of a building matter as much as its construction?

    1. A structure is designed for one function: Every building is engineered for a specific use, and inappropriate use with heavy loads on floors weakens and damages the structure.
    2. Residential to commercial conversion: In unauthorised colonies, blocks of flats designed for domestic use are converted into stores and restaurants, which raises the number of occupants and alters the weight carried by the floors.
    3. Makeshift student hostels: Makeshift hostels compress living space to raise the return to the property owner, which is the arrangement the Satya Niketan students were housed under.
    4. Occupancy permit tied to a designated function: No occupancy permit should be issued unless the building authority has approved a designated function for the building and allocated a minimum floor space per person.

    What does the layout of a colony do to the water?

    1. Nobody owns the shared ground: Builders take no responsibility for the ground they share with neighbouring buildings, so no one assesses the plot as part of a layout.
    2. Permeable ground and drain capacity: Whether there is adequate natural ground around a structure to absorb rainwater, and whether there are enough wide mouth drains to move water away quickly.
    3. The mechanism of failure: Too much building in too small a ground area traps excess water, directs it into basements and foundations, and destabilises the structure from below.
    4. Climate change and drainage capacity: Climate change is altering weather patterns, producing flash floods and sudden very large volumes of rain, so drainage capacity has become a structural safety question rather than a convenience one.

    Why does enforcement fail even where rules exist?

    1. The bye laws are not the binding constraint: A battery of building bye laws carries no value if it cannot be enforced, and the enforcement machinery is the part that has not been built.
    2. Inspection is purchasable: Structural evaluation of buildings achieves nothing where inspectors and site engineers can be bribed to record a passing assessment.
    3. The Bengaluru apartment collapse: A newly completed apartment building in Bengaluru collapsed after the builder added two floors beyond the three approved, weakening the structural capacity of the columns. The collapse killed 12 people.
    4. Authority is split across agencies: Control of roads, buildings, transport and other infrastructure sits with different political parties and municipal agencies, which raises the question of whether all of it should be brought under one legal entity such as the mayor.

    Challenges to regulating unauthorised construction in Delhi

    1. Regularisation has become the expected endpoint: Repeated amnesty for unauthorised colonies teaches builders and residents that non compliance is a delay rather than a risk, so the next structure is also built outside the code. Eg. Delhi has run successive rounds of recognition and regularisation of unauthorised colonies over decades.
      The Fix: Tie any future regularisation to a passed structural assessment and a registered occupancy function, so recognition follows safety rather than substituting for it.
    2. Enforcement is fragmented across agencies with no single accountable office: Land, building approval, drainage and services sit with separate bodies, so no one authority can be held responsible for a collapse. Eg. The proposal on the table is to bring roads, buildings, transport and infrastructure under one legal entity such as the mayor.
      The Fix: Vest building safety, drainage and occupancy licensing in one municipal office with statutory liability for a structural failure in its jurisdiction.
    3. The inspector’s incentive runs against the resident’s safety: A single site engineer signs off on a structure whose owner gains directly from an extra floor, and detection is unlikely. Eg. A Bengaluru apartment approved for three storeys was completed with five and collapsed, killing 12 people.
      The Fix: Move structural certification to empanelled third party engineers who are randomly assigned to sites and carry personal liability for their certificate.
    4. A hostel or a paying guest establishment sits outside the licensing net entirely: Converting a residential flat to shared student accommodation multiplies occupancy without triggering any approval. Eg. Fifty students were living in a makeshift arrangement inside one unauthorised Satya Niketan building.
      The Fix: Require a separate occupancy licence keyed to persons per unit for any shared residential use, renewable annually against a fire and structural check.
    5. Drainage capacity is planned at city scale while the failure happens at plot scale: Storm water design covers arterial drains, and the ground condition immediately around a building is nobody’s design responsibility. Eg. Water reaching a basement and foundation is what destabilised an almost fifty year old structure.
      The Fix: Make a layout level permeable ground and drainage assessment a condition of building approval, so the plot’s water behaviour is fixed before construction rather than after flooding.
    6. Demolition is politically impossible at the scale the stock requires: Sixty per cent of the population cannot be displaced, so unsafe structures stay occupied while the enforcement file remains open. Eg. Delhi will approach 40 million people by 2030, with continued in migration from nearby towns.
      The Fix: Pair every condemnation order with an in situ rental rehousing entitlement, so removing an unsafe structure does not require removing the household from the city.

    Conclusion

    The city’s governing problem is not that its bye laws are wrong but that most of its building stock sits outside any record that a bye law could be applied to. Documentation, a licensed function with a stated occupancy, a plot level drainage assessment and a single accountable authority are four separate instruments, and none of them requires a new law before it can begin. Delhi is heading towards nearly 40 million residents and the stock it will house them in has a working life measured in decades, not generations. The thing to watch is whether any municipal agency begins building by building documentation of a single Lal Dora pocket, since every other measure depends on that record existing first.

    Urban Local Bodies in India

    1. Urban local bodies: Urban local bodies (ULBs) are the elected municipal governments of Indian cities and towns, governed by Part IX-A of the Constitution as introduced by the 74th Amendment Act, 1992.
    2. Municipal planning and service functions: They prepare master plans, regulate land use, provide basic services and guide urban growth, with reserved seats for women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes built into their composition.
    3. Own revenue and property tax collection: Own revenue of Indian ULBs is under 1 per cent of GDP, against 6 per cent to 7 per cent in Brazil and South Africa, and property tax collection efficiency stays at 35 per cent to 40 per cent.
    4. The planning deficit: About 65 per cent of Indian cities operate without an updated master plan, per NITI Aayog.

    Government Initiatives for Urban Local Bodies

    1. AMRUT 2.0: Targets 100 per cent water tap coverage in all 4,800 and more ULBs and 100 per cent sewerage coverage in 500 major cities, with mandatory rejuvenation of at least one water body in every city.
    2. Swachh Bharat Mission Urban 2.0: Works to a Garbage Free City star rating, requires material recovery facilities in cities above five lakh population, and targets remediation of all 2,400 and more legacy dumpsites by 2027.
    3. Urban Challenge Fund: Rs 1,00,000 crore of central assistance aimed at catalysing Rs 4 lakh crore of investment, with the Centre funding 25 per cent of a project only where the ULB raises 50 per cent from the market.
    4. Urban Infrastructure Development Fund: Managed by the National Housing Bank, it lends to Tier 2 and Tier 3 ULBs at low interest for water supply, sanitation and storm water drainage.
    5. City Economic Regions: A Budget 2026-27 framework linking a core city with its satellite towns and industrial hubs into one labour market, with Rs 5,000 crore per region for 14 identified regions.
    6. Smart Cities Mission legacy: The mission concluded on 31 March 2025, and its Integrated Command and Control Centres now operate in all 100 cities as traffic and emergency monitoring hubs.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS2, 10 marks] “The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.” Comment.”

  • All Ladakh districts to have autonomous hill development councils

    Why in the News

    Ladakh’s Lieutenant Governor has approved the notification creating Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDCs) for each district of the Union Territory. Elected hill councils existed only in Leh and Kargil, and the notification extends the framework to the five districts notified in April. The councils are the only elected tier of self government in Ladakh, which has had no legislature since it was constituted as a Union Territory without one. The Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) are in talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for something the notification does not provide: a legislature, and protection for land and environment under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.

    What is a Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council?

    1. It is a statutory district level body: The councils were created under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, first in 1995 and then in the 1997 Act that governs them.
    2. It is directly elected: The Act provides for 26 directly elected councillors in each council, who then elect a chief executive councillor from among themselves.
    3. Its functions are developmental and land related: Powers concerning allotment, use and occupation of land vested in the council by the government, formulation of the district’s development programmes, special measures for employment generation, public health and sanitation, and local road transport sit with it.
    4. Elections require a separate notification: Polls to the newly constituted councils will be held after a formal notification is issued under Section 8 of the 1997 Act.

    What has the notification changed?

    1. All seven districts get a council: Leh, Kargil, Sham, Nubra, Changthang, Zanskar and Drass will each have a hill council.
    2. Elected local government reaches beyond two districts: The framework was earlier confined to Leh and Kargil, the two long standing district headquarters and the most densely populated areas of the Union Territory.
    3. It completes a step begun in April: The Lieutenant Governor notified the creation of the new districts in April, and the councils follow for each of them.
    4. The stated purpose is district level planning: Seven councils are expected to decentralise governance and let local priorities enter district level planning and development directly.

    Why does the expansion not settle the Ladakh demand?

    1. The demand is constitutional, not administrative: The LAB and the KDA are seeking a legislature for Ladakh and Sixth Schedule protection for land and environment, neither of which a hill council can supply.
    2. Talks continue on a separate track: The MHA has fixed a meeting of its sub committee for 9 September, the previous meeting having been held on 22 May.
    3. One existing council is running without a mandate: The term of the Leh council ended in October 2025 and fresh elections have not been announced since, which is without precedent for that body. The Kargil council last went to the polls in October 2023.
    4. More bodies do not equal more powers: Extending a council with land allotment and development functions widens the number of devolved units, and leaves untouched the legislative and protective powers the two bodies are asking for.

    Challenges to the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils

    1. The councils hold no legislative power: They plan and execute within powers delegated by the administration, and cannot legislate on land, forest or inheritance the way an autonomous district council under the Sixth Schedule can. Eg. The Bodoland Territorial Council in Assam legislates on subjects transferred to it, which no Ladakh hill council can do.
      The Fix: Specify the subjects transferred to each council in a schedule to the Act, so its jurisdiction does not depend on an executive order.
    2. Finances flow through the Union Territory administration: A council’s plan depends on funds released by an administration it does not elect, so its priorities can be reordered upstream. Eg. Ladakh has no legislature to vote its budget, so the entire allocation is decided through the Union Territory’s administrative route.
      The Fix: Fix a formula based untied share of the Union Territory’s budget for each council, released on a published calendar.
    3. Elections can lapse without consequence: Nothing forces a poll when a council’s term ends, so an elected body can be replaced by administrative control by default. Eg. The Leh council has been without an elected body since its term ended in October 2025.
      The Fix: Make the election notification under Section 8 mandatory within a fixed period before the term expires, enforceable by the courts.
    4. The new districts are thinly populated and lightly staffed: Sham, Nubra, Changthang, Zanskar and Drass have small populations spread over long distances, so each new council needs an administrative apparatus that does not yet exist. Eg. Zanskar remains cut off by road for several months each winter, which limits both administration and service delivery.
      The Fix: Sanction a standard district cadre and a linked digital service delivery backbone for each new council before its first election.
    5. Two councils have historically pulled in different directions: Leh and Kargil have differed on statehood and on religious and political representation, and seven councils multiply the coordination problem. Eg. The LAB and the KDA came together only after 2020, having earlier taken opposing positions on the Union Territory demand.
      The Fix: Constitute a statutory Ladakh level council of chief executive councillors to settle inter district allocation and present a single position to the Centre.

    Conclusion

    Devolution has widened in Ladakh at the district level and has not deepened in the powers each district holds. The two claims now sit against each other: an administration that has multiplied elected bodies, and representative groups that are asking for a legislature and a constitutional shield that no number of councils can substitute for. The sub committee meeting on 9 September is the next point at which that gap either narrows or is confirmed. The more immediate test is whether the notification for the new councils is followed by a poll date for the one that has been without an elected body for nearly a year.

    Back2Basics: Sixth Schedule of the Constitution

    1. What it provides: The Sixth Schedule, read with Articles 244(2) and 275(1), provides for the administration of tribal areas through Autonomous District Councils and Regional Councils.
    2. Where it applies: It currently covers tribal areas in four States, namely Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Ladakh is not covered by it.
    3. What the councils can do: These councils can make laws on land, forest other than reserved forest, shifting cultivation, village administration, inheritance, marriage and social customs, subject to the Governor’s assent.
    4. What powers they hold beyond lawmaking: They may constitute village courts for disputes among Scheduled Tribes, and may levy specified taxes and collect land revenue within their areas.

    “[2022, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your opinion, has the decentralisation of power in India changed the governance landscape at the grassroots ?

  • The urban nightmare: a fire with no escape 

    Why in the News?

    Repeated urban fire tragedies, in Lucknow and Delhi, are rooted in illegal construction, weak enforcement, and fragmented urban local governance. There is a growing need of empowering local bodies as the structural fix.

    Why do fire tragedies keep recurring despite each one prompting an inquiry?

    1. Illegal construction persists: Buildings that violate fire safety norms continue to be built and occupied because enforcement action rarely follows a violation before a tragedy occurs.
    2. Fragmented authority: Fire safety clearance, building plan approval, and municipal enforcement are split across different agencies, none of which holds end to end accountability for a building’s safety compliance.
    3. Post-tragedy pattern: Each fire triggers an inquiry and short term crackdown, but enforcement lapses again once public attention moves on, indicating the response is reactive rather than preventive.
    4. Weak local body capacity: Urban local bodies, the level of government closest to individual buildings, lack the staffing and financial autonomy to conduct sustained enforcement.

    How does fragmented urban governance weaken accountability?

    1. Multiple agencies: Urban functions are divided among municipal corporations, development authorities, water boards, PWDs and transport agencies.
    2. No single authority: Responsibility is dispersed, making accountability difficult after disasters.
    3. Weak Urban Local Bodies: Municipal corporations have responsibilities but limited administrative and financial powers.
    4. State dominance: Major urban decisions remain under State governments rather than elected city governments.
    5. Governance vacuum: Citizens face one government, but responsibility is split among several agencies.

    Why is empowering Urban Local Bodies more important than launching new schemes?

    1. Constitutional basis: The 74th Constitutional Amendment, 1992 envisages democratic and empowered urban governance.
    2. Authority mismatch: Local bodies have functions but lack adequate powers and resources.
    3. Professional management: Cities require specialised urban planning and enforcement capacity.
    4. Clear accountability: One authority must be responsible for urban safety and regulation.
    5. Fearless enforcement: Building and fire safety laws must be insulated from political influence.

    Conclusion

    Illegal construction and weak enforcement are the proximate causes, but fragmented urban local governance is the structural one, since no single empowered local authority is accountable for preventing violations before they turn fatal. Empowering urban local bodies with real enforcement authority and resources is the fix the piece argues has been avoided.

    Back2Basics

    International fire safety and urban risk management rely on universally recognized frameworks and codes established by global organizations. These function as the benchmark for local building laws worldwide.

    Global Core Frameworks

    1. IFSS-CP (International Fire Safety Standards – Common Principles): Developed by a global coalition and published by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), this framework provides a benchmark for life safety. It sets 5 Universal Pillars for building design and management:
      1. Prevention: Minimizing ignition risks.
      2. Detection and Communication: Fast warning systems.
      3. Occupant Protection: Safe, unhindered evacuation routes.
      4. Containment: Sectioning buildings with fire-resistant barriers to stop spread.
      5. Extinguishment: Active suppression systems (sprinklers/suppression).
    2. ISO Fire Safety Standards: The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) sets global rules for equipment and risk management. This includes ISO 7240 (fire detection/alarm systems) and ISO 31000 (integrating systemic risk management directly into urban planning).

    Widely Adopted National/Model Codes

    Many countries explicitly adopt or adapt established model codes into their local municipal bylaws:

    1. NFPA Codes (USA): Developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), these are the most globally replicated fire codes.
      • NFPA 1 (Fire Code): Total oversight rules governing building safety, hazardous materials, and structural fire protection.
      • NFPA 101 (Life Safety Code): The absolute blueprint for building design, specifying safe egress, travel distances to exits, and minimum corridor widths based on occupancy types.
    2. International Building Code (IBC): Published by the International Code Council (ICC), the IBC integrates strict structural engineering rules with active fire protection. It mandates specific automatic sprinkler thresholds (NFPA 13 standards) depending on building height and density.
    3. British Standards (UK): BS 9999 is an international code of practice for fire safety in building design and management. It uses a flexible, risk-based approach that balances architectural design with automated safety measures.

    PYQ RELEVANCE

    [UPSC 2020] The strength and sustenance of local institutions in India has shifted from their formative phase of ‘Functions, Functionaries and Funds’ to the contemporary stage of ‘Functionality’. Highlight the critical challenges faced by local institutions in terms of their functionality in recent times.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines whether Urban Local Bodies have the functional capacity and accountability to deliver effective urban governance. The article argues that repeated urban fire disasters stem from fragmented governance, weak Urban Local Bodies, poor inter-agency coordination, and lack of accountability, showing that the real challenge is the functionality of urban institutions rather than the absence of laws.

  • West Bengal strips panchayat pradhans of registration and cheque signing powers, reopening the devolution debate

    Why in the News

    West Bengal Government has stripped elected panchayat pradhans of birth and death registration powers and cheque signing authority, transferring them to bureaucrats. The state cites the need to curb corruption after the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise, but the move raises questions about devolution of powers to elected local bodies.

    Why does shifting these powers to bureaucrats raise a devolution question?

    1. Constitutional mandate: The 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 envisages panchayats as institutions of local self-government with functional autonomy, not merely implementing agencies for state bureaucrats.
    2. Elected versus appointed authority: Registration and cheque signing powers are everyday functions through which an elected pradhan exercises visible authority over local administration, and removing them shifts real power to an appointed official.
    3. Corruption justification: The stated reason, curbing corruption, does not explain why oversight rather than outright transfer of power was not chosen as the remedy.
    4. Precedent risk: A state government’s ability to strip elected local body powers by executive order, without a corresponding law reform process, sets a precedent other states could follow.

    Conclusion

    The central idea is that a corruption justification is being used to recentralise powers that the 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 assigned to elected local government. Whether West Bengal reverses this transfer, or other states adopt the same approach, will determine if devolution in India remains a one way commitment or a reversible administrative choice.

    Back2Basics

    Devolution of powers under the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992: Functional Devolution (The 3 Fs [Functions, Funds, and Functionaries] and Eleventh Schedule)

    1. 29 Subjects: Article 243-G empowers state legislatures to devolve responsibilities to Panchayats for economic development and social justice across 29 areas listed in the Eleventh Schedule (such as agriculture, drinking water, health and sanitation, and primary education).
    2. The “3 Fs” Challenge: Real devolution relies on transferring Functions (the tasks), Funds (the money), and Functionaries (the administrative staff).
    3. State Discretion: Because local government is a state subject, actual transfer of these powers depends entirely on individual state laws rather than automatic constitutional enforcement.

    Institutional and Financial Framework

    1. Three-Tier System: Established a uniform structure of Panchayats at the village (Gram Panchayat), intermediate (Block/Taluk Panchayat), and district (Zilla Panchayat) levels.
    2. Gram Sabha: Positioned as the foundational base comprising all registered voters in a village area to ensure direct local oversight and social audit.
    3. State Finance Commission (SFC): Mandated the creation of an SFC every five years to recommend tax assignments, tolls, fees, and grants-in-aid to improve local fiscal autonomy.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] ‘The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.’ Comment.”

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the extent of functional and financial devolution to local bodies. The article highlights the rollback of Panchayat powers, reflecting weak implementation of the 73rd Amendment.

  • Assess the importance of Panchayat system in India as a part of local government. Apart from government grants, what sources the Panchayats can look out for financing developmental projects.

    73rd and 74th CAA are the embodiment of grass-root democracy and democratic decentralization in India. They are inspired by Gandhiji’s concept of “Oceanic Circles of Power” and “Swaraj”.

    Importance of PRIs

    Rajni Kothari – Described local bodies as “schools of democracy” where political awareness and participation are cultivated at the grassroots level.

    Democratic Decentralization – Eg- Kerala’s People’s Plan Campaign grants local bodies control over 40% of the state’s plan budget.

    Capacity Building– Training programs for PRI members. Eg- e-Panchayat initiative

    Efficient Local Service Delivery- Addresses local needs in sanitation, drinking water, roads, housing, and education. Eg- Hiware Bazar Model of watershed development.

    Transparency– Direct accountability to local constituents. Eg- Rajasthan’s Social Audit Mechanism

    Implementation of Schemes, ensuring that benefits reach the grassroots. Eg- MGNREGA.

    Financial Autonomy– PRIs have the power to levy taxes and mobilize resources, which helps them fund and manage local development projects.

    Conflict Resolution- Reports indicate a 30% reduction in petty disputes reaching district courts due to effective Panchayat mediation.

    Inclusivity– Reserving seats for women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes. Eg- Women’s Representation at 46.44%

    Challenges

    “PRIs exist as over-structured but underpowered organisations.” (2nd ARC)

    No decentralisation of power, rather decentralisation of corruption – Mani Shankar Iyer Committee

    Dependence on higher tiers- Around 95% of Panchayat funds come from Central/State transfers, limiting fiscal autonomy.

    Limited own-source revenue- Poor tax collection efficiency (>1% own tax).

    Barriers to Local Taxation- Freebie culture and fear of losing popularity discourage local taxation.

    Incomplete devolution- less than 20% of States have transferred all 29 subjects under 11th Schedule (MoPR, 2022). (​​overall Panchayat Devolution Index is only 43.89% (2021-22))

    Centralised Welfare via Cash Transfers – The welfare state now relies on DBT through JAM, bypassing panchayats and reducing local accountability and participatory governance

    Shortage of staff- Average 0.67 Panchayat Secretaries per Gram Panchayat, as low as 0.33 in Uttar Pradesh.

    Weak Gram Sabhas- Low participation, elite domination, and token meetings.

    Gender and social barriers leading to proxy control. (Sarpanch Pati)

    Alternate Sources of Panchayat Financing (Beyond Government Grants)

    Own Tax Revenues- Property/House tax, Profession tax, Market fees, and Entertainment tax.

    Non-Tax Revenues- Rent from panchayat buildings, water usage fees, license fees, and user charges for services.

    Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for solid waste management, renewable energy, or tourism projects. Eg- waste-to-energy projects.

    Community Contributions- Voluntary labor (Shramdaan), local donations, and community funds for infrastructure.

    Borrowings and Bonds- Soft loans from NABARD and Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF) for rural projects.

    Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)- Eg- Tata Steel CSR projects in Jharkhand villages for drinking water and sanitation.

    Using funds from MGNREGA, 15th FC grants for rural infrastructure development.

    Way Forward

    Strengthen State Finance Commissions (SFCs) with mandatory action on their recommendations.

    Manishankar Aiyar Committee recommendations – Adopt activity mapping for clear delineation of 3Fs – Funds, Functions, Functionaries.

    Flexible Funding Norms under CSS

    To realise the vision of “Gram Uday se Bharat Uday”, India needs second-generation Panchayati Raj reforms

  • “The reservation of seats for women in the institutions of local self- government has had a limited impact on the patriarchal character of the Indian Political Process.” Comment.

    73rd and 74th CAA are the embodiment of grass-root democracy and democratic decentralization in India.

    Positive Impact on Women’s Political Participation

    Increased Representation- Over 14 lakh women representatives currently serve in local bodies (MoPR, 2024).

    Leadership Development- Eg- Sulata Deo started her career as Sarpanch and became MP from Odisha

    Enhanced Service Delivery- Women-led Panchayats prioritize water, sanitation, education, and health issues. Eg- Chhavi Rajawat (Rajasthan)

    Social Change Catalysts by challenging gender stereotypes in public decision-making.

    Women leaders have strengthened Self-Help Groups (SHGs) and livelihood initiatives, promoting inclusive development. Eg- Bina Devi (“Mushroom Mahila”)

    Persistent Patriarchal Barriers in Women’s Political Participation at the Local Level

    Political Barriers

    Proxy Representation- The “Sarpanch Pati” phenomenon – husbands or male relatives exercise real power.

    Political parties rarely nominate women beyond the mandated quota, restricting vertical mobility in politics.

    Tokenism- Representation often confined to fulfilling quotas rather than genuine empowerment or participation in governance.

    Institutional Barriers

    Institutional and Bureaucratic Dominance undermine elected women’s authority, especially in resource allocation and project execution.

    Limited Decision-Making Power- exclusion from key committees or budgetary discussions.

    Economic Barriers

    Economic Dependence on male family members limits independence in political and developmental decisions.

    Social barriers

    Women representatives face verbal abuse, threats, and social ostracism, especially when asserting authority.

    Cultural and Social Norms- restrict women’s mobility and participation in public life. Eg- purdah system.

    Lack of education and political training weakens women’s administrative confidence and negotiation skills.

    Intersectional Barriers- Women from SC/ST and minority communities face additional layer of discrimination.

    Way Forward

    Mandate political parties to allot a fixed percentage of tickets to women beyond local bodies to ensure vertical mobility in politics.

    Mentorship and role model initiatives led by successful women sarpanchs to inspire grassroots participation.

    Capacity Building– Establish State Institutes of Rural Development (SIRDs) as nodal agencies for PRI training.

    Manishankar Aiyar Committee recommendations.

    Create Panchayat Ombudsman for grievance redressal.

    Adopt activity mapping for clear delineation of 3Fs – Funds, Functions, Functionaries.

    “I measure the progress of a community by the degree of progress which women have achieved.” – Ambedkar

    True empowerment lies in transforming participation into power, ensuring women are policy-shapers, not placeholders.

    Elections

  • The strength and sustenance of local institutions in India has shifted from their formative phase of ‘Functions, Functionaries and Funds’ to the contemporary stage of ‘Functionality’. Highlight the critical challenges faced by local institutions in terms of their functionality in recent times.

    73rd and 74th CAA are the embodiment of grass-root democracy and democratic decentralization in India. They are inspired by Gandhiji’s concept of “Oceanic Circles of Power” and “Swaraj”. However, they have remained Half Baked Cake (Mani Shankar Iyer Committee).

    Issues in the Formative Phase of Local Governance (3Fs)

    Functions-

    Incomplete devolution of 11th & 12th Schedule subjects

    Limited administrative authority

    Functionaries-

    Lack of training & capacity

    Bureaucratic dominance over elected reps

    Funds-

    High fiscal dependence on states/centre

    Conditional and tied grants

    Critical Challenges to Functionality of Local Institutions

    Political Challenges

    Delayed Elections- Eg- Maharashtra’s 27 Municipal Corporations functioning under administrators since 2022.

    Weak Gram Sabhas- Low participation, elite domination, and token meetings.

    With rural population falling from 75% (1990) to about 60%, national development priorities have moved toward urban governance and municipal reforms.

    Functional and Planning Challenges

    District and Metropolitan Planning Committees are largely non-functional in most states.

    Poor digital capacity- Limited use of e-Gram Swaraj and GIS-based planning.

    Administrative Challenges

    Shortage of Functionaries- Severe staff vacancies-only 0.67 secretaries per Gram Panchayat (falling to 0.33 in Uttar Pradesh).

    Parastatal Dominance reduces the role of elected bodies. Eg- Delhi Jal Board

    Accountability issues- Weak social audit mechanisms and poor grievance redressal.

    Financial Challenges

    Declining Fiscal Autonomy- Local bodies generate <1% of GDP as own-source revenue (RBI, 2022).

    Post-GST Revenue Loss- Subsumption of octroi, market, and entertainment taxes.

    Irregular constitution and poor implementation of SFC recommendations.

    Social and Governance Challenges

    Elite Capture- Local elites dominate decision-making, sidelining marginalized voices.

    Despite reservation, proxy representation (Sarpanch Pati) reduces women’s leadership effectiveness.

    Way Forward

    Empower through Performance Grants linked to service outcomes (as per 15th Finance Commission).

    Regular Capacity Building via State Institutes of Rural/Urban Development.

    Digitization of Panchayats (e-GramSwaraj) for transparency and efficiency.

    Operationalize DPCs/MPCs for integrated local planning.

    Adopting Best Practices – Eg- Kerala’s People’s Plan Campaign grants local bodies control over 40% of the state’s plan budget.

    Local bodies are the cornerstones of participatory democracy and good governance. Their functional capacity and autonomy are essential for the constitutional vision of decentralization.

  • To what extent, in your opinion, has the decentralisation of power in India changed the governance landscape at the grassroots ?

    73rd and 74th CAA are the embodiment of grass-root democracy and democratic decentralization in India. They are inspired by Gandhiji’s concept of “Oceanic Circles of Power” and “Swaraj”.

    Positive Transformations in Governance Landscape

    Rajni Kothari described local bodies as “schools of democracy” where political awareness and participation are cultivated at the grassroots level.

    Democratic Deepening with over 32 lakh elected representatives across 2.6 lakh Panchayats and 4,000+ urban bodies.

    Social Inclusion and Equity – Reservation for SCs, STs, and women enhanced representation of marginalised groups in decision-making. Eg- Women’s Representation at 46.44%

    Panchayats manage programmes like MGNREGA, PMAY-G, Jal Jeevan Mission, bringing last-mile efficiency.

    Participatory Planning – Gram Sabhas and Ward Committees have improved local accountability and need-based development. Eg- Social Audits of MGNREGA

    Strengthened Disaster Response – Eg- during COVID-19 and Kerala floods.

    Efficient Resource Management- Eg- Hiware Bazar in Maharashtra effectively managed water resources through watershed development.

    Conflict Resolution- Reports indicate a 30% reduction in petty disputes reaching district courts due to effective Panchayat mediation.

    Challenges

    “PRIs exist as over-structured but underpowered organisations.” (2nd ARC)

    No decentralisation of power, rather decentralisation of corruption – Mani Shankar Iyer Committee

    Dependence on higher tiers- Around 95% of Panchayat funds come from Central/State transfers, limiting fiscal autonomy.

    Limited own-source revenue- Poor tax collection efficiency (>1% own tax).

    Barriers to Local Taxation- Freebie culture and fear of losing popularity discourage local taxation.

    Incomplete devolution- less than 20% of States have transferred all 29 subjects under 11th Schedule (MoPR, 2022). (​​overall Panchayat Devolution Index is only 43.89% (2021-22))

    Centralised Welfare via Cash Transfers – The welfare state now relies on DBT through JAM, bypassing panchayats and reducing local accountability and participatory governance

    Shortage of staff- Average 0.67 Panchayat Secretaries per Gram Panchayat, as low as 0.33 in Uttar Pradesh.

    Weak Gram Sabhas- Low participation, elite domination, and token meetings.

    Gender and social barriers leading to proxy control. (Sarpanch Pati)

    Manishankar Aiyar Committee recommendations.

    Establish National Commission for Panchayati Raj.

    Create Panchayat Ombudsman for grievance redressal.

    Set up a separate cadre of Panchayat bureaucracy with a code of conduct.

    Adopt activity mapping for clear delineation of 3Fs – Funds, Functions, Functionaries.

    To realise the vision of “Gram Uday se Bharat Uday”, India needs second-generation Panchayati Raj reforms