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Subject: LWE

  • Dimagi Naxal frames the mind as a security question

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister’s Independence Day address named the dimagi Naxal, the intellectual Naxal, as a target of the state’s response to Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The address is defended as doing what Indian political discourse had avoided for four decades. The war against Naxalism had been measured in body counts, arms recoveries and district maps turning from red to green, and the architecture of ideas behind the insurgency was rarely confronted. The claim now advanced is that naming the ideological network forces a final battle on the deadliest terror threat to have plagued India. What that opens is a contest over whether a state can move against an ideology without moving against protected speech.

    What does the term dimagi Naxal name?

    1. The ideological support network rather than the armed cadre: The term identifies those who supply the intellectual and organisational scaffolding of the insurgency instead of carrying weapons for it.
    2. Why the coinage matters: Naming that layer shifts the counter insurgency target from territory held to ideas circulated, which no previous formulation did.
    3. Where it was used: The formulation was made from the Red Fort on Independence Day, which places it in the government’s highest profile annual statement of priorities.

    Why does the argument treat Naxalism as an ideology before a militia?

    1. The founding case: Naxalism was always an ideology before it was a militia, and the ideologue of Naxalbari theorised, organised and incited others towards armed revolution rather than acting out of personal deprivation.
    2. The social origin of the leadership: Naxal leadership across generations has been drawn from comfortable, often landed or urban intellectual backgrounds.
    3. The stated political objective: Naxals seek to overthrow the Republic of India along with its bourgeois constitution and to establish a communist state. That state is to liquidate class enemies by armed revolution.
    4. The view of the Indian state itself: Underground cadre, overground members and sympathisers hold that India is an artificial and illegitimate entity denying the right of self determination to different nationalities and working at the behest of international capital.

    What did the shift to urban expansion after 2009 change?

    1. The decision and its trigger: After Operation Green Hunt in 2009, Maoists decided to expand aggressively in urban centres and to hide in plain sight.
    2. The cover adopted: Cadre positioned themselves as human rights activists, university professors, journalists and even corporate employees.
    3. The functions assigned: The stated aims are to act as couriers, to provide safe houses for cadres of banned outfits, to stall action against terror groups, to wage an ideological war on the Indian state and to promote anarchy.
    4. The vocabulary used: Propaganda is packaged in acceptable terminology such as human rights, Dalit assertion, farmer issues and individual rights, with the ostensible aim of justice for the marginalised.
    5. What is not stated publicly: The theoretical framework behind that vocabulary associates freedom from hunger and poverty with the balkanisation of India, which makes it a messianic cult in the form of a secular ideology.

    Why did the ecosystem’s attack shift to development itself?

    1. The doctrine that worked: The government’s counter Naxal doctrine has rested on a triad of security, rehabilitation and development.
    2. The response it provoked: Because the doctrine worked on the ground, the Naxal intellectual ecosystem shifted its attack to development itself.
    3. What is now opposed: Nuclear power projects, agricultural modernisation programmes and infrastructure corridors have been opposed by a recurring cast of civil society groups.
    4. The stated basis of the objection: The objection advanced is not a specific local grievance or a flaw in the project but the writ of the Indian state in that territory.

    What does the movement’s own history suggest about resurgence?

    1. The first wave and its collapse: The first wave of Naxalism was crushed by the mid 1970s.
    2. The interval before its return: It resurfaced two decades later, which shows that suppression of the armed layer alone does not settle the question.
    3. The peak of the second wave: By the mid 2000s nearly a third of the country’s territory lay in the Red Corridor.

    How has the mode of ideological transmission changed?

    1. The old method: Ideologues had to organise physically, travel to villages, print pamphlets and hold clandestine meetings.
    2. The new method: Their successors use smartphones and build a following on Instagram, YouTube and X by monetising a persona built around resistance.
    3. What has and has not changed: The medium has changed and the incitement is more diffuse, and the function is unchanged, which is manufacturing moral cover for anti state violence and instability.
    4. Why participation has widened: Others join for the allure of resistance as a cultural posture or for the profit that anti establishment content generates, without following where the argument leads.

    Can the state contest an ideology without policing lawful dissent?

    1. The stake as the argument puts it: If the Naxals succeed there will be no freedom or liberty, no police but a party militia, no rule of law or courts but kangaroo courts, and intellectuals and professors sent to labour camps.
    2. Why bluntness is defended: People must know what the ideology stands for and the consequences that follow if it prevails.
    3. The asymmetry that closes the argument: A government can be voted out at the next election, and a state that collapses cannot be voted back.
    4. The unresolved edge: The categories the formulation names are professors, journalists and activists, so the test of the doctrine is whether it distinguishes material support for a banned organisation from lawful advocacy that the state finds inconvenient.

    Challenges to the counter Naxal doctrine

    1. A security vacuum follows the withdrawal of central forces: Handing territory back to thin State police forces creates gaps that splinter groups and criminal networks occupy. Eg. Areas cleared in earlier operations in the 1970s were reoccupied two decades later. Fix. Convert forward operating bases into permanent State police stations with local recruitment before central armed police forces are drawn down.
    2. Former cadre turn to organised crime: An insurgency deprived of ideology retains its weapons, terrain knowledge and extortion networks. Eg. Maoist financing in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh already ran on levies from contractors and transporters. Fix. Tie surrender and rehabilitation payments to verified livelihood placement over several years rather than to a one time cash grant.
    3. Absentee administration in the cleared districts: Security gains do not hold where teachers, doctors and revenue officials do not report to their posted stations. Eg. Interior blocks of Bastar have run on deputation and vacancy for years. Fix. Pay a hardship differential and fix minimum tenure norms so that posting to an interior block is a career step rather than a punishment.
    4. Rejected forest rights claims reopen the original grievance: Land alienation is the grievance the insurgency was built on, and the statutory remedy is under used. Eg. Community Forest Rights claims face high rejection rates in the same districts that were worst affected. Fix. Audit rejected claims at the district level under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and record reasons for each rejection in writing.
    5. Peace attracts the extraction that caused the conflict: A district declared safe becomes available for mining and industrial investment, which brings displacement back. Eg. Iron ore and bauxite belts overlap almost exactly with the former Red Corridor. Fix. Require Gram Sabha consent under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 and transparent use of District Mineral Foundation funds before new leases are cleared.
    6. Prosecuting the overground network is evidentially hard: Cases built on association rather than on an act collapse in court and produce long undertrial detention in the interim. Eg. Several urban prosecutions under anti terror law have run for years without trial beginning. Fix. Require sanctioning authorities to record specific evidence of material support before charges are framed, and impose statutory timelines on trial commencement.

    Conclusion

    The formulation moves counter insurgency from a territorial contest to a contest over ideas, at the point where the armed movement has been declared defeated and its support network has not. The government’s own record shows that suppression of the armed layer without settling the grievance produced a second wave two decades later, which is the case for confronting the ideology rather than only the militia. What remains unresolved is the line between the material support network the state may lawfully dismantle and the criticism a democracy is obliged to tolerate, and that line will be drawn by courts rather than by speeches.

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • After Naxalism, a development corridor

    Why in the News

    The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026, closing a security campaign that ran for decades across the forests of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and the rest of the former Red Corridor. The tension this exposes is that the military defeat of an insurgency does not by itself produce the economic activity that must occupy the space the guns have vacated.

    What is Left Wing Extremism and what was the Red Corridor?

    1. The movement: Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly called Naxalism, is an armed insurgency pursuing the capture of state power through protracted rural armed struggle, drawing on Maoist doctrine.
    2. The territory: The Red Corridor was the contiguous belt of forested and mineral-rich districts across central and eastern India where Maoist cadres exercised effective control and the state's writ was contested.
    3. What that control looked like: For decades the region was associated with ambushes, armed cadres and Maoist control rather than with routine administration.
    4. The declared end point: The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026, which is treated as a turning point rather than as the end of the task.

    What are CoBRA units?

    1. What they are: Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) is the specialised jungle warfare and guerrilla warfare force raised within the Central Reserve Police Force for anti-Naxal operations.
    2. Their role here: CoBRA units, deployed alongside state police forces, carried out the operations that dismantled strongholds which had remained difficult to penetrate for years.

    What was the strategy that dismantled the insurgency?

    1. Intelligence-led operations: Operations were driven by actionable intelligence on cadre location and movement rather than by area domination alone.
    2. Centre and state coordination: Greater coordination between central and state forces removed the seams across state borders that cadres had used to evade pursuit.
    3. Disruption of Maoist financing: Agencies targeted the financial networks that sustained the insurgency, cutting the flow that paid, armed and supplied cadres.
    4. Rehabilitation: A surrender policy sought to bring former cadres back into civilian life through financial assistance, training and support for reintegration.
    5. Sustained expansion of the security grid: The security presence was expanded continuously rather than surged and withdrawn, so that recovered territory was held.
    6. Political direction from the top: Repeated engagement by the Union Home Minister, including visits to Bastar and security review meetings on the ground, kept the Centre involved in an operational challenge requiring coordination between Delhi, state governments and personnel deployed deep inside difficult terrain.

    Which operations broke the strongholds?

    1. Black Forest: One of the named operations conducted by CoBRA units alongside state police forces.
    2. Octopus: A second named operation in the same series.
    3. Double Bull: A third named operation in the same series.
    4. Chakrabandha: A fourth named operation in the same series.
    5. The common outcome: Together these operations helped dismantle strongholds that had remained difficult to penetrate for years, which is what allowed a more permanent state presence to be established.

    What has the development push delivered since 2014?

    1. Security infrastructure: 408 new security camps and 597 fortified police stations have been established in LWE-affected areas since 2014.
    2. Road connectivity: More than 12,000 km of roads have been constructed in the affected regions.
    3. Formal finance: 1,804 bank branches and 1,321 ATMs have been added.
    4. Postal reach: 6,025 post offices have been added.
    5. Telecommunications: Mobile connectivity has expanded across most villages in the affected regions.
    6. Education and skills: Eklavya Model Residential Schools, Industrial Training Institutes and skill development centres have been established alongside the physical infrastructure.

    Why does a road, a bank branch or a tower change more than the statistic suggests?

    1. Roads change access, not distance: A road changes access to a market and to a hospital, converting a physical distance into a usable one.
    2. Bank branches change the terms of credit: A bank branch connects households to formal finance and displaces the informal lender who set the terms in its absence.
    3. Towers change the relationship to the state: A telecom tower brings a remote village closer to the rest of the country, which affects everything from grievance redress to remittances.
    4. Schools change the option set: A school or a skill centre expands the choices available to young people, which is the mechanism by which recruitment into an insurgency loses its appeal.
    5. The sequencing that made it possible: These interventions became feasible only once security forces could establish a more permanent presence in areas where the state had previously struggled to maintain one.

    Why is the end of armed conflict the easier half of the task?

    1. The achievement is a milestone, not an outcome: The guns going silent is an important milestone, and the harder task is ensuring that the space they leave behind is filled with roads, schools, businesses, livelihoods and functioning institutions.
    2. The nature of the state's presence must change: The objective now is a state presence defined by institutions and opportunity rather than by the security challenge that once dominated the landscape.
    3. Infrastructure is an input, not a result: Roads, branches and towers must begin to generate sustained economic activity, better education and greater integration with the rest of India, which is not automatic.
    4. The next phase is less visible: The coming phase will be less dramatic than the operations that made the headlines, and could be more important in determining the legacy of the campaign.
    5. Reversibility is the risk: Rehabilitation must hold, since the surrender policy's purpose is to prevent former cadres from returning to the movement and to prevent the movement from replenishing its ranks.
    6. The test stated: The former Red Corridor becomes a development corridor only when the infrastructure now reaching these regions begins to generate sustained economic activity, which is where the larger test begins.

    Conclusion

    The military campaign against Left Wing Extremism succeeded through intelligence-led operations, central and state coordination, disruption of financing, rehabilitation and a sustained security grid, and the Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026. The infrastructure that followed, 408 camps, 597 fortified police stations, over 12,000 km of roads, 1,804 bank branches, 1,321 ATMs and 6,025 post offices, has changed the physical reach of the state. What remains unresolved is whether that reach converts into sustained economic activity and institutions, since the durability of the achievement will be judged on that conversion and not on the operations.

    Left Wing Extremism in India

    1. What it is: Left Wing Extremism is an armed movement seeking to overthrow the state through protracted people's war, organised around rural base areas, guerrilla zones and armed squads.
    2. Origin: The movement takes its popular name from the 1967 peasant uprising at Naxalbari in West Bengal.
    3. Present organisation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 through the merger of the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and is proscribed as a terrorist organisation.
    4. Geographic concentration: Activity was concentrated in a forested, mineral-rich and tribal-majority belt spanning Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal.
    5. Structural drivers: The movement drew on land alienation, displacement by mining and infrastructure projects, denial of forest rights, absence of administration and the weakness of local grievance redress in Fifth Schedule areas.
    6. The doctrinal frame: The Union government's approach has been organised around the SAMADHAN doctrine, which sets out the components of the counter-insurgency response.
    7. Institutional lead: The Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates the response through the Left Wing Extremism Division, with the Central Reserve Police Force as the principal central force deployed.

    Laws Governing the Response to Left Wing Extremism

    1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: The principal central law used to proscribe the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and its front organisations and to prosecute membership and support.
    2. The 2019 amendment allows the designation of individuals, not only organisations, as terrorists.
    3. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: The instrument used to trace and attach the financial networks that sustained the insurgency.
    4. Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005: A state law empowering the declaration of organisations as unlawful and criminalising membership and assistance in the most affected state.
    5. Andhra Pradesh Public Security Act, 1992: The corresponding state instrument in the southern part of the former corridor.
    6. Arms Act, 1959 and Explosive Substances Act, 1908: Govern possession and use of weapons and explosives, which are the principal charges alongside the terrorism statutes.
    7. Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA): Extends panchayat provisions to Fifth Schedule areas and vests the Gram Sabha with powers over land, minor minerals and local plans, addressing a grievance the insurgency mobilised.
    8. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community forest rights, addressing the land and forest alienation that underpinned recruitment.
    9. Fifth Schedule to the Constitution: Governs the administration of Scheduled Areas through the Governor and the Tribes Advisory Council, and is the constitutional frame within which most affected districts sit.

    Government Initiatives for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. National Policy and Action Plan, 2015: The overarching framework combining security measures, development interventions, rights and entitlements of local communities, and public perception management.
    2. Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: Reimburses state governments for security-related expenditure including training, operational costs, ex gratia payments and the surrender and rehabilitation of former cadres.
    3. Special Central Assistance (SCA) for the most affected districts: Funds public infrastructure and services in the districts of highest concern, filling critical gaps identified by district administrations.
    4. Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS): Strengthens state police infrastructure, including special forces and fortified police stations, in affected states.
    5. Road Connectivity Project for LWE Affected Areas (RCPLWEA): Successor to the Road Requirement Plan, it constructs and upgrades roads and bridges to open isolated blocks to administration and markets.
    6. LWE Mobile Tower Project: Installs mobile towers in affected districts to extend telecommunications where commercial operators would not otherwise invest.
    7. Eklavya Model Residential Schools: Provide residential schooling for tribal children in blocks with high Scheduled Tribe population, extending secondary education in the affected belt.
    8. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets the least developed districts, a large share of which fall in the former corridor, on health, nutrition, education, agriculture, financial inclusion and infrastructure indicators.
    9. Civic Action Programme: Funds central armed police forces to conduct welfare activities that build confidence between security forces and local communities.

    Back2Basics: The SAMADHAN Doctrine

    1. What it is: SAMADHAN is the Union government's stated doctrine for countering Left Wing Extremism, articulated as an eight-point formulation.
    2. S, Smart leadership: Leadership capable of directing an operation that spans police, intelligence and administration.
    3. A, Aggressive strategy: A posture of sustained offensive operations rather than defensive holding.
    4. M, Motivation and training: Continuous training and morale management for deployed forces.
    5. A, Actionable intelligence: Intelligence specific enough to act on, which is the input the campaign was built around.
    6. D, Dashboard-based key result areas and key performance indicators: Measured performance targets for units and districts.
    7. H, Harnessing technology: Use of surveillance, communications and data tools in operations.
    8. A, Action plan for each theatre: A theatre-specific plan rather than a uniform national approach.
    9. N, No access to financing: Cutting the financial networks that sustain cadres, weapons and logistics.

    Key Facts about the Left Wing Extremism Campaign

    1. The declaration: The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026.
    2. Central Reserve Police Force: The largest central armed police force, it marked its Raising Day on 27 July and has been the principal force deployed in the campaign.
    3. CoBRA: The Commando Battalion for Resolute Action is the Central Reserve Police Force's specialised jungle and guerrilla warfare unit for anti-Naxal operations.
    4. Named operations: Black Forest, Octopus, Double Bull and Chakrabandha are the operations named as having dismantled entrenched strongholds.
    5. Bastar: The Bastar division of Chhattisgarh was the operational centre of the campaign and the site of repeated ministerial review visits.
    6. Infrastructure since 2014: 408 new security camps, 597 fortified police stations, over 12,000 km of roads, 1,804 bank branches, 1,321 ATMs and 6,025 post offices in affected areas.
    7. The origin marker: The movement is named after Naxalbari in West Bengal, the site of the 1967 uprising.

    Challenges in Consolidating the Post-Insurgency Transition

    1. Infrastructure without economic activity: Physical assets do not automatically generate livelihoods, e.g. more than 12,000 km of roads open access to markets only where there is production to move.
    2. Reversibility of surrender: Rehabilitation fails where former cadres find no economic footing, e.g. surrendered cadres receiving one-time financial assistance without sustained employment remain vulnerable to re-recruitment.
    3. Unsettled land and forest rights: The grievance that fed recruitment persists where titles remain unrecognised, e.g. pending individual and community claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 in Fifth Schedule districts.
    4. Displacement from mining and industry: Development in a mineral-rich belt can reproduce the alienation the insurgency mobilised, e.g. resettlement disputes around iron ore and coal projects in Bastar and Jharkhand.
    5. Thin administrative capacity: Newly opened blocks lack the staffing to run the institutions now built, e.g. teacher and health worker vacancies in interior blocks leave schools and health centres nominally functional.
    6. Security-first institutional habits: Areas administered through a security grid do not convert automatically to civil administration, e.g. 408 security camps and 597 fortified police stations remain the most visible state presence in many blocks.
    7. Justice system backlog: Cases registered during the campaign remain unresolved and undercut confidence, e.g. long undertrial detention of tribal accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    8. Residual and displaced cadres: Movement remnants may relocate rather than dissolve, e.g. cadre movement across inter-state boundaries has historically shifted the problem rather than ended it.
    9. Fragile fiscal continuity: Development spending contingent on the insurgency's salience declines once the emergency is declared over, e.g. schemes framed as LWE-specific lose their justification the moment the region is declared free.

    Way Forward

    1. Shift funding from security-tagged to development-tagged windows: Convert LWE-specific central assistance into sustained district development funding, so financing does not lapse with the security declaration.
    2. Complete forest rights recognition: Clear the backlog of individual and community forest rights claims in the former corridor, which addresses the grievance the movement recruited on.
    3. Staff the institutions already built: Fill teacher, health worker and revenue staff vacancies in the newly connected blocks, since a building without staff does not constitute a functioning institution.
    4. Link infrastructure to production: Tie the road, banking and connectivity network to minor forest produce value chains, agro-processing and local enterprise credit, so that access converts into income.
    5. Make rehabilitation employment-linked: Extend the surrender policy beyond financial assistance into guaranteed placement in skill centres, Industrial Training Institutes and public works, so reintegration is durable.
    6. Strengthen PESA implementation: Operationalise Gram Sabha powers over land, minor minerals and local plans under the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, so local consent governs the next phase of development.
    7. Fast-track pending cases: Establish dedicated courts to clear the backlog of insurgency-era cases, since prolonged undertrial detention undermines the legitimacy the campaign gained.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • Kondapalli in Bastar shows what state presence looks like after the Maoist withdrawal

    Why in the News

    Kondapalli, a village of 600 people in Chhattisgarh’s Bijapur district that served as the base of the most dreaded Maoist battalion, now has a road, a bus, grid electricity, a cellphone tower and a new school. The change moves the test of the insurgency’s end from the absence of armed cadre to the delivery of ordinary services, since a surrendered commander now demands from the State the borewell, pond, land rights and visiting doctor he once took up arms against it over.

    How does the forward base model work in the Red Corridor?

    1. Step one, the camp: A central armed police force announces a forward operating base inside a village previously controlled by the Maoists.
    2. Step two, clearing operations: A series of encounters follows, which pushes the armed cadre out of the area.
    3. Step three, the road: An engineering agency opens a motorable road to the camp, which ends the physical isolation the insurgency depended on.
    4. Step four, civil administration: Grid electricity, telecom towers, schools, anganwadis, ration shops, Aadhaar enrolment and bank accounts follow the road.
    5. Step five, the political process: Elections resume and elected panchayat bodies begin to function.
    6. Application in Kondapalli: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) announced its forward base in the village in November 2024, and this sequence has run there since.

    What is the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)?

    1. About: The PLGA is the armed wing of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), organised into platoons, companies and battalions.
    2. Its role here: Kondapalli served as the base of Battalion No. 1, the most dreaded unit of the PLGA.

    What was Battalion No. 1?

    1. About: Battalion No. 1 was the main armed formation of the Maoists in south Bastar, camped in the jungle outside Kondapalli.
    2. Present position: The battalion is gone from the area and security forces now camp in the same space.

    What is a Revolutionary People’s Committee?

    1. About: It is a grassroots governing body of the Maoists that ran village level administration, land distribution and dispute settlement in areas under their control.
    2. Its role here: A former commander of one such committee surrendered in Kondapalli in March 2025.

    What is the Bal Sangam?

    1. About: The Bal Sangam is the children’s wing of the Maoists, used to recruit and indoctrinate minors in areas under their control.

    What is the Chetna Natya Manch?

    1. About: The Chetna Natya Manch is the Maoists’ cultural troupe, which used song and theatre on themes such as jal, jungle and zameen to mobilise villagers.

    What was the Salwa Judum?

    1. About: The Salwa Judum was a civilian counter insurgency force set up in Chhattisgarh in 2005, which armed villagers against the Maoists.
    2. Legal status: The Supreme Court declared it illegal in 2011 and ordered the disarming of the appointed special police officers.

    What is the Red Corridor?

    1. About: The Red Corridor is the belt of forested, mineral rich and largely tribal districts across central and eastern India where Maoist influence was concentrated.
    2. Scale in Chhattisgarh: Kondapalli was one of nearly 400 villages in the State’s Red Corridor where the state had little say or presence.

    What is the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)?

    1. About: The BRO is a road construction agency under the Ministry of Defence that builds and maintains roads in border and strategically sensitive areas.
    2. Its role here: It began work on the Tarrem to Kondapalli road soon after security forces pushed the Maoists back in November 2024.

    What is a Bailey bridge?

    1. About: A Bailey bridge is a portable, prefabricated steel truss bridge assembled on site without heavy equipment, used where permanent bridges cannot be built quickly.
    2. Its use here: The BRO installed nine Bailey bridges over river streams on the stretch past Kondapalli.

    What is the Mahtari Vandan Yojana?

    1. About: It is a Chhattisgarh government scheme that transfers Rs 1,000 a month to eligible married women through direct benefit transfer.
    2. Its role here: One villager’s mother opened a bank account last year and now receives this transfer.

    How did the Maoists govern Kondapalli?

    1. Territorial claim: Kondapalli lay in the Maoists’ South Bastar division, part of what they called the Liberated Zone.
    2. Strength of the formation: The division was one of the strongest Maoist formations and among the last to fall, and could gather the support of 400 to 500 people at short notice.
    3. Economic function of the village: Kondapalli mattered to the Maoists because their supplies came from its local market.
    4. Commemorative gatherings: Hundreds of villagers were assembled every year at a 64 foot tall memorial in Komatpalli, part of the Kondapalli gram panchayat, for Martyrs’ Week.
    5. Land and housing: The Maoists redistributed land and helped villagers build their houses, which is how they gained trust.
    6. Local public works: They built small roads and a pond, and asked villagers to donate money for the treatment of anyone who fell sick.
    7. Forest rule: Cutting trees was punishable under their order.
    8. What was withheld: Residents describe the arrangement as delivering a sense of security and of being seen, with little development alongside it.

    How was that order enforced?

    1. Conscription pressure: At least one person from every village had to join, which put pressure on families to give up their sons or daughters.
    2. Recruitment through front organisations: A boy recruited as a teenager passed through the Bal Sangam and then the Chetna Natya Manch, singing about saving jal, jungle and zameen.
    3. Fear of dispossession: Recruits were told the government would steal their land and that they would eventually have to leave the village.
    4. Control of movement: Villagers leaving the Kondapalli gram panchayat were questioned on their return.
    5. Public punishment: Wrongdoers were beaten publicly under a tree.
    6. Killing of suspected informers: Those suspected of informing to the police were killed, and others left the village.
    7. Destruction of state assets: The Maoists burnt down the only school and the adjoining hostel in the 2000s to stop security forces sheltering there, and destroyed the electric poles the administration brought.
    8. Withdrawal of officials: Forest officials and the patwari, the village records keeper, stopped coming to Kondapalli.
    9. Control of communication: Phones were seized and villagers were told not to use them.
    10. Cost on the other side: Villagers were caught in the middle, and one resident’s uncle was killed by security forces on the suspicion that he was a Maoist.

    What ended the Maoist hold on Kondapalli?

    1. The forward base: The CRPF announced in November 2024 that it was establishing a forward base in Kondapalli.
    2. Encounters: A series of encounters followed, after which the Maoists were pushed into Telangana.
    3. Surrender of the formation: The cadre pushed into Telangana laid down arms in March 2026.
    4. Village level surrender: A former commander of the Revolutionary People’s Committee surrendered in March 2025 along with 12 other villagers.
    5. Rehabilitation in practice: He opened a kirana store with the money received under the State’s rehabilitation policy.
    6. Losses in the campaign: A villager’s 18 year old daughter, who left home in December 2022 to join the Maoists, was among about 30 Maoists killed in a security operation in Telangana’s Karregutta hills last year.
    7. Scale of the insurgency: The decades long insurgency claimed at least 4,741 lives in the Bastar region alone since 2000.
    8. National declaration: The Union Home Minister has declared the country Maoist free, 80 years after Independence.

    Which markers of state presence have appeared in the village?

    1. Grid electricity: Kondapalli received electricity from the grid last July, after years of solar lamps and then of darkness once those failed.
    2. Telecom: A cellphone tower was erected on the edge of the village in December last year, rising above the mud houses and small shops.
    3. School building: A new government school building came up in the summer of 2025, painted bright blue and standing by the main road.
    4. School capacity: The school runs classes 1 to 8 with 158 students and seven teaching staff, all male, and has blackboards and benches.
    5. What preceded it: After the school was burnt down children studied in a shanty in the same compound, and an asbestos shade was put up there in 2020.
    6. Anganwadi and residential school: An anganwadi and a residential school are under construction in the village.
    7. Panchayat and ration infrastructure: Panchayat bhawans have been built and the new ration shop is painted in the colours of the Tricolour.
    8. Identity and banking: Villagers were called to the police camp where they were enrolled under Aadhaar and given birth certificates and bank accounts.
    9. Cash transfer: A household bank account opened last year now receives Rs 1,000 from the State under the Mahtari Vandan Yojana for women.
    10. Return of the vote: The village voted for the first time last year, in the local body polls, having been told under the Maoists to make no demands of the government.
    11. Political visit: The Chhattisgarh Chief Minister visited Kondapalli on 2 June, a first for the village.
    12. Announced pipeline: The Bijapur District Collector stated that over the next two years the village will get a cricket ground, a health centre, a cement road and government scheme benefits.
    13. Security presence: Security forces now camp in the jungle outside the village where Battalion No. 1 used to camp.
    14. Private consumption: A villager bought a Redmi phone for Rs 10,000 after the Maoists left, and uses it to watch films, news and skill tutorials.

    How has connectivity changed?

    1. Bus service: A blue bus from Cherla in Telangana has run since March 2025 under the State’s rural bus scheme, making two trips a day.
    2. What it connects: The bus carries villagers to Bijapur, 79 km to the north, and to Cherla in Telangana, where many young men work as daily wage labourers.
    3. The road agency: The Border Roads Organisation began work on the Tarrem to Kondapalli road soon after November 2024.
    4. Engineering on the road: On the stretch running past Kondapalli into Telangana, the BRO installed nine Bailey bridges over river streams and 43 precast culverts to keep the road usable during the rains.
    5. Present condition: The road is still a work in progress, carrying the occasional motorcycle or truck with construction material.
    6. Travel before the road: A circuitous journey of 209 km taking five hours through Cherla was the only way to travel from Bijapur to Kondapalli.
    7. Travel now: A 90 minute car ride from Bijapur reaches the village without crossing into Telangana, passing the junctions of Awapalli and Basaguda and reaching Tarrem on the Sukma and Bijapur border.
    8. Map lag: For the 18 km beyond Tarrem, Google Maps still recommends the older and longer route through Telangana.
    9. What the road replaced: Villagers earlier walked two days to Telangana carrying 30 kg of rice, stayed 45 days and worked plucking chillies on farms.
    10. A generation without a bus: The bus stopped after the Maoists came from Telangana in 1985, and an entire generation grew up without ever seeing one.
    11. Border geography: Kondapalli sits on the Telangana border and is closer to Cherla at 46 km than to its own district headquarters at Bijapur, 79 km away.

    What distances still separate the village from basic services?

    1. Health care: The nearest doctor requires a journey of over 30 km to Basaguda.
    2. Schooling beyond class 8: Students travel 33 km to Basaguda or 23 km to Pamed to continue past class 8.
    3. Higher education: The village’s first graduate could finish his education only by leaving during the Salwa Judum years for a hostel in Basaguda and then a college in Dantewada.
    4. A second case of leaving to study: A CRPF recruit from the village completed school while staying in a hostel in Usoor in Bijapur.
    5. Schooling in the earlier generation: The village head travelled 27 km by bus to school in Awapalli in the 1980s.
    6. Food supply: Villagers earlier travelled to Awapalli even to buy rice, which took a full day.
    7. Maternal health: Women died in labour or on the way to hospital because there was no medical facility nearby and no road, and were carried on cots.

    Why does the arrival of the state not settle the question of legitimacy?

    1. The camp changed hands rather than disappeared: Security forces occupy the same jungle space the Maoist battalion used, so the village still lives beside an armed presence.
    2. The demands are the same goods: A surrendered commander now asks the State for a borewell for irrigation, a pond, land rights, small roads and a visiting doctor, which are the goods the Maoists claimed to supply.
    3. Memory of redistribution: Residents attribute the Maoists’ trust to land redistribution and help in building houses, which the State’s works now have to match.
    4. Memory of being caught in between: Families were punished by both sides, with suspected informers killed by the Maoists and a relative killed by security forces on suspicion.
    5. The Salwa Judum legacy: A villager still recalls her father being beaten for hours in 2006 during the Salwa Judum years, and the Supreme Court declared that force illegal in 2011.
    6. Delivery remains promised: The health centre, cement road and cricket ground sit on a two year timetable, and the anganwadi and residential school are still under construction.
    7. What residents ask for next: Villagers name a health facility, a school for higher studies and a self help group for poultry, farming and other livelihoods as the unmet needs.

    Challenges to consolidating state presence in Bastar

    1. Reversibility of security gains: Cadre pushed across a State border can regroup and return if camps thin out. e.g. the cadre pushed out of Kondapalli in November 2024 moved into Telangana and laid down arms only in March 2026.
    2. Roads reach before services do: Physical connectivity arrives years ahead of health and higher education facilities, so the mortality and dropout risks persist. e.g. Kondapalli residents still travel more than 30 km to Basaguda to see a doctor.
    3. Education discontinuity beyond the primary stage: Village schools stop at class 8, so children must migrate to hostels to continue studying. e.g. Kondapalli students travel 33 km to Basaguda or 23 km to Pamed after class 8.
    4. Unsettled forest and land rights: Slow recognition of individual and community forest rights leaves the state contested on the very issue the Maoists mobilised on. e.g. community forest rights claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 have seen high rejection rates in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar districts.
    5. Distrust from past counter insurgency: Civilian militias and killings on suspicion leave a memory that slows cooperation with the administration. e.g. the Supreme Court struck down the Salwa Judum in Nandini Sundar versus State of Chhattisgarh (2011).
    6. Livelihood dependence on distant labour markets: Without local employment, better connectivity mainly makes it easier to migrate out. e.g. young men from Kondapalli take the daily bus to Cherla in Telangana for daily wage work.
    7. Administrative vacancy in interior blocks: Staffing in remote blocks remains thin even after the security situation improves. e.g. forest officials and the patwari stopped visiting Kondapalli entirely during the Maoist years, and the new school runs with seven teachers for classes 1 to 8.
    8. Displacement risk from mining and infrastructure: Newly accessible mineral belts raise the prospect of acquisition in Scheduled Areas without full consent. e.g. protests over iron ore mining in the Bailadila range in Dantewada in 2019.

    Conclusion

    Kondapalli shows that the end of an insurgency is measured by the return of ordinary state functions, not by the absence of armed cadre. Within two years of the CRPF forward base, the village has a road with nine Bailey bridges, a daily bus, grid electricity, a tower, a school with 158 students, Aadhaar numbers and bank accounts, and it has voted for the first time. The health centre, the cement road and the school for higher studies remain on a two year promise, and the villagers’ claims on the State now decide whether the change holds.

    Left Wing Extremism in India

    1. About: Left Wing Extremism is an armed movement that seeks to capture state power through a protracted people’s war, drawing on grievances over land, forest rights, displacement and the absence of the administration in tribal districts.
    2. Origin: It began with the peasant uprising at Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967, which gave the movement its popular name.
    3. Principal organisation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 by the merger of the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and is banned as a terrorist organisation.
    4. Armed wing: The People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army is its military formation, organised into platoons, companies and battalions.
    5. Geography: Influence was concentrated in the Dandakaranya belt across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.
    6. Parallel governance: Janatana Sarkars, also called Revolutionary People’s Committees, ran village administration, land distribution and dispute settlement in areas under Maoist control.
    7. Scale of decline: The number of districts affected by Left Wing Extremism fell from 126 in 2018 to 38 in April 2024, with the worst affected districts concentrated in the Bastar division.
    8. Policy frame: The National Policy and Action Plan of 2015 combines security measures, development, entitlements for tribal groups and perception management.
    9. Constitutional position: Police and public order are State subjects, so the Centre acts through central armed police forces, funding and intelligence sharing.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Scheduled Areas and Internal Security

    1. Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule: Provide for the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, including the Governor’s power to modify the application of laws and the Tribes Advisory Council.
    2. Article 275(1): Provides grants in aid to States for tribal welfare and for raising the administration of Scheduled Areas to the level of the rest of the State.
    3. Article 338A: Establishes the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to investigate and monitor safeguards for Scheduled Tribes.
    4. Article 355: Places on the Union the duty to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.
    5. Article 356: Allows a proclamation where the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution.
    6. Entry 1 of the State List: Places public order within the legislative competence of the States.
    7. Entry 2 of the State List: Places police within the legislative competence of the States.
    8. Entry 2A of the Union List: Covers the deployment of any armed force of the Union in a State in aid of the civil power.

    Laws and Rules Governing the Response to Left Wing Extremism

    1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Provides for banning unlawful associations and terrorist organisations and for offences of membership and support.
    2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019: Allows the Centre to designate individuals, and not only organisations, as terrorists.
    3. Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005: Criminalises membership of and support to organisations declared unlawful within the State.
    4. National Investigation Agency Act, 2008: Creates a central agency to investigate scheduled offences including terrorism, with jurisdiction across States.
    5. Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996: Extends panchayat provisions to Fifth Schedule areas and vests the gram sabha with control over minor forest produce and consultation before land acquisition.
    6. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community forest rights of forest dwelling tribal groups.
    7. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Requires consent, social impact assessment and rehabilitation, with additional safeguards in Scheduled Areas.
    8. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Section 152 penalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.

    Back2Basics: Bastar Region

    1. Designation: Bastar is an administrative division of southern Chhattisgarh and the core of the Dandakaranya region.
    2. Districts: The division covers Bastar, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Dantewada, Sukma, Bijapur and Kanker.
    3. Rivers: The Indravati and the Sabari are the principal rivers of the region.
    4. Protected areas: Kanger Valley National Park and the Indravati National Park and Tiger Reserve lie in the division.
    5. Landform features: The Chitrakote falls on the Indravati are the widest waterfall in India, and the Abujhmarh hills remain largely unsurveyed.
    6. Tribal groups: The Gond, Muria, Madia, Dorla, Halba and Bhatra communities live in the region.
    7. Cultural institutions: Bastar Dussehra runs for about 75 days and is among the longest festivals in the country, and the Ghotul is the traditional youth dormitory of the Muria.
    8. Mineral base: The Bailadila range in Dantewada holds some of India’s richest iron ore deposits.

    Government Initiatives for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. SAMADHAN doctrine: The Centre’s operational framework combining smart leadership, aggressive strategy, motivation and training, actionable intelligence, dashboards, harnessing technology, action plans for each theatre and denial of financing.
    2. Security Related Expenditure Scheme: Reimburses States for the costs of security operations, training, community policing and rehabilitation of surrendered cadre.
    3. Special Infrastructure Scheme: Funds fortified police stations, secure camps and district police infrastructure in affected districts.
    4. Special Central Assistance: Provides funds for public infrastructure and services in the most affected districts.
    5. Road Connectivity Project for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas: Builds all weather roads and bridges in affected districts, alongside the earlier Road Requirement Plan.
    6. LWE Mobile Tower Project: Installs mobile towers in affected districts to close the telecom gap.
    7. Civic Action Programme: Funds central armed police forces to run health camps, sports events and welfare activity to build local trust.
    8. ROSHNI and Eklavya Model Residential Schools: Provide skill training for youth and residential schooling for tribal children in affected districts.
    9. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets health, nutrition, education and infrastructure indicators in the districts with the weakest outcomes, many of them in the Red Corridor.
    10. Niyad Nellanar scheme: A Chhattisgarh programme that saturates villages within a radius of new security camps with central and State scheme benefits.

    Key Facts about Left Wing Extremism

    1. Naxalbari: The movement takes its name from the 1967 uprising at Naxalbari in Darjeeling district of West Bengal.
    2. Formation of the CPI (Maoist): The party was formed on 21 September 2004 and is listed as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    3. Decline in affected districts: Affected districts fell from 126 in 2018 to 38 in April 2024.
    4. Salwa Judum: Formed in 2005 and declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 2011 in Nandini Sundar versus State of Chhattisgarh.
    5. Specialised forces: The Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, and the District Reserve Guard and Bastar Fighters in Chhattisgarh, are the principal anti Maoist units.
    6. Stated deadline: The Union government set a target of ending Left Wing Extremism by 31 March 2026.
    7. Bastar toll: The insurgency claimed at least 4,741 lives in the Bastar region alone since 2000.
    8. Karregutta hills: The hills on the Chhattisgarh and Telangana border were the site of a major operation against Maoist formations.

    Challenges in Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. Development deficit that created the grievance: Absence of roads, schools, health centres and electricity is the condition the movement recruited on. e.g. Kondapalli got grid electricity only last July and a cellphone tower only in December.
    2. Weak implementation of tribal rights law: PESA and the Forest Rights Act remain unevenly implemented, so consent and forest produce rights stay contested. e.g. community forest rights claims across the Bastar districts have been rejected in large numbers.
    3. Displacement from mining and infrastructure: Acquisition in mineral rich Scheduled Areas turns development projects into recruitment arguments. e.g. protests over iron ore mining at Bailadila in Dantewada in 2019.
    4. Human rights costs of the security response: Killings on suspicion and civilian militias damage the state’s legitimacy for a generation. e.g. the Supreme Court’s 2011 order disbanding the Salwa Judum and disarming special police officers.
    5. Financing of the insurgency: Extortion from contractors, tendu leaf traders and transporters sustains cadre even after territorial losses. e.g. levy collection on road contractors has repeatedly been cited in National Investigation Agency chargesheets.
    6. Coordination across State borders: Cadre exploit inter State boundaries where police jurisdiction ends. e.g. the Kondapalli cadre moved into Telangana after the November 2024 encounters.
    7. Rehabilitation follow through: Surrender packages fail where no livelihood follows the cash grant. e.g. surrendered cadre in Bijapur depend on small kirana shops set up with one time rehabilitation money.
    8. Sustaining services after the camp: Teachers, doctors and revenue officials remain reluctant to serve in interior blocks. e.g. the new Kondapalli school has seven teachers for classes 1 to 8 and no facility beyond that.

    Way Forward

    1. Saturate cleared villages with entitlements: Extend the saturation model so every village within reach of a new camp receives Aadhaar, bank accounts, ration cards, pensions and scheme benefits within a fixed timeframe.
    2. Complete the road and telecom grid: Finish the Tarrem to Kondapalli type links and the mobile tower programme so connectivity does not stop at the camp.
    3. Settle forest and land rights first: Clear pending individual and community claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 and enforce gram sabha consent under PESA before any acquisition.
    4. Extend schooling beyond class 8 locally: Upgrade village schools and expand residential schools so children are not forced to migrate 20 to 35 km to continue.
    5. Place health infrastructure with the road: Staff sub centres and mobile medical units at the same time as road completion, rather than years later.
    6. Build local livelihoods: Fund self help groups, minor forest produce processing and poultry and farming enterprises so connectivity does not only enable outmigration.
    7. Make rehabilitation a multi year programme: Follow the surrender grant with skill training, credit and market linkage, and monitor outcomes for surrendered cadre.
    8. Institutionalise inter State coordination: Sustain joint operations, shared intelligence and unified surrender policies across Chhattisgarh, Telangana, Odisha, Maharashtra and Jharkhand.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • For first time in 50 years, DGP sets foot on former Maoist bastion in Telangana

    Why in the News

    For the first time in 50 years, a Director General of Police set foot on the Telangana side of Karregutta, a hill once used to house Central Committee members of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist). The visit marks the decline of Left Wing Extremism under Operation Kagar, with around 700 surrenders in Telangana and the top leadership largely killed, arrested, or surrendered.

    What is Operation Kagar?

    1. Definition: Operation Kagar is a coordinated anti-Maoist offensive launched by security forces in pursuit of the central government’s deadline for a Naxal-free India.
    2. Scope: It combines intensified security operations with surrender-and-rehabilitation measures across the Maoist-affected belt.

    Who are the CPI (Maoist)?

    1. Definition: The Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist), is a banned Left Wing Extremist organisation that seeks to overthrow the state through armed struggle.
    2. Leadership: Its former General Secretary Muppala Lakshmana Rao, alias Ganapati, was the longest-serving general secretary of the outfit.

    What happened at Karregutta?

    1. The DGP’s visit: The Telangana Director General of Police entered the Telangana side of Karregutta accompanied by a large contingent of police and revenue personnel.
    2. The message: The delegation’s size was meant to signal that it is now safe to visit the area, where earlier only specialised forces such as Greyhounds and COBRA units operated briefly during operations.
    3. Tricolour hoisted: The contingent hoisted the national flag at the spot.
    4. Tourism plan: The DGP announced the kaccha road into the forest would be tarred and the area developed into a tourist spot.
    5. Surrender support: Surrendered Maoists are given a lump-sum grant, including the bounty announced on their heads, to start a new life.

    What is the current status of the Maoist decline?

    1. Surrenders: Around 700 Maoists surrendered in Telangana alone during the operation.
    2. Leadership losses: By March 31, several Central Committee members of the CPI (Maoist) were killed, arrested, or had surrendered.
    3. Top commander killed: Former General Secretary Nambala Keshava Rao, alias Basavaraju, was killed in a police encounter in May 2025.
    4. Factional split: After Basavaraju’s death the party split into two factions, one led by Mallojula Venugopal Rao, alias Sonu, and another by Thippiri Tirupathi, alias Devuji, who later surrendered.
    5. Few absconding: Only two to three top Maoists remain absconding, chief among them Ganapati.

    Conclusion

    A DGP entering Karregutta after five decades, followed by the hoisting of the Tricolour, signals the sharp decline of the Maoist movement in Telangana under Operation Kagar. With around 700 surrenders, the top leadership neutralised, and only a handful absconding, the insurgency’s organisational base has collapsed. The next milestone is the government’s deadline for a Naxal-free India and the rehabilitation of surrendered cadres into mainstream society.

    Back2Basics:

    Left Wing Extremism in India (Foundational Context)

    1. About: Left Wing Extremism (LWE), also called Naxalism, is an armed insurgency by Maoist groups aiming to capture state power through violence.
    2. Geography: It has historically concentrated in a forested tribal belt across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Telangana, and neighbouring States.
    3. Nodal ministry: The Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates the national response through security and development measures.

    Communist Party of India (Maoist)

    1. Formation: Formed in 2004 through the merger of the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India.
    2. Status: Designated a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    3. Objective: Seeks to overthrow the Indian state through protracted armed struggle.
    4. Armed wing: Operates the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.

    Government Initiatives against LWE

    1. SAMADHAN doctrine: An overarching strategy covering smart leadership, aggressive strategy, motivation, actionable intelligence, and technology.
    2. Security Related Expenditure Scheme: Reimburses States for security operations, training, and rehabilitation of surrendered cadres.
    3. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets development in the most backward districts, many of them LWE-affected.
    4. Road connectivity projects: The Road Requirement Plan and RCPLWE scheme build roads to open up affected areas.
    5. Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy: Provides grants, vocational training, and support to those who lay down arms.

    Key Facts about LWE

    1. Shrinking footprint: The number of LWE-affected districts has fallen sharply over the past decade.
    2. Declining violence: Incidents and casualties have dropped substantially with intensified operations.
    3. Elite forces: Greyhounds of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh and the CoBRA units of the CRPF are specialised anti-Maoist forces.

    Challenges in Countering LWE

    1. Development deficit: Persistent gaps in roads, health, and education sustain grievances in affected areas.
    2. Difficult terrain: Dense forests and hilly terrain aid guerrilla movement and hamper operations.
    3. Tribal alienation: Displacement and land alienation feed recruitment among tribal populations.
    4. Rehabilitation gaps: Surrendered cadres struggle to find a foothold in mainstream society.
    5. Cross-border and inter-State movement: Cadres exploit State boundaries to evade coordinated action.

    Way Forward

    1. Sustained development: Extend roads, connectivity, and public services into cleared areas.
    2. Robust rehabilitation: Ensure surrendered cadres receive grants, skills, and livelihoods.
    3. Protect tribal rights: Implement the Forest Rights Act and Fifth Schedule protections effectively.
    4. Consolidate security gains: Hold cleared areas and prevent the movement’s revival across State borders.

    UPSC Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend, but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the Government’s approach to tackling Left Wing Extremism. Operation Kagar demonstrates the security and surrender components of this approach. The article also highlights the need for rehabilitation and development after security gains.

  • Article 244 of Indian Constitution relates to Administration of Scheduled areas and tribal areas. Analyze the impact of non-implementation of the provisions of Fifth Schedule on the growth of Left Wing Extremism

  • The persisting drives of the government for development of large industries in backward areas have resulted in isolating the tribal population and the farmers who face multiple displacements with Malkangiri and Naxalbari foci, discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the left wing extremism (LWE) doctrine affected citizens back into the mainstream of social and economic growth.

  • Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend, but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE.

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    LWE showing downward trend

    In 2025 alone, 317 Naxals neutralised (including top leadership), 800+ arrested, and nearly 2,000 surrendered

    From 2004-14 to 2014-24

    Violent incidents declined 53%

    Security force deaths fell 73%

    Civilian deaths dropped 70%

    However, it still affects some part of country

    Red corridor in 11 districts in Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, MP and Andhra pradesh

    Urban Front Strategy – Urban Naxals aim to gain legal and logistical support from cities-referred to as the “.”

    Tactical Asymmetry and “Contactless” Warfare – Eg- use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and drones

    Dandakaranya region along Chhattisgarh-Maharashtra-Odisha remains a key guerrilla base due to its difficult terrain.

    Government of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE

    Security Measures

    Operation Black Forest – killing 27 Naxals, including the top Maoist leader Nambala Keshav Rao

    Naxal’s Financial chocking

    Security Related Expenditure and Special Infrastructure Scheme for strengthening State Special Forces and Special Intelligence Branches

    Technology Use – Use of UAVs/drones, AI-based tracking, GPS, satellite imagery, and modern communication systems to locate hideouts and camps.

    Civic Action Programme (CAP) under ‘Modernization of Police Forces’ scheme to bridge the gaps between Security Forces and local people. Eg- community policing like “Jan Maitri”

    Developmental measures

    Building Critical Infrastructure in LWE Areas – Eg- Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I) constructing 14000 km of roads

    Socio-economic development

    Financial Inclusion- over 1,00 bank branches have been opened in LWE affected districts since April 2015.

    Aspirational districts program

    ROSHNI Scheme for skill development and employment-linked training for youth

    Surrender and rehabilitation policy – attractive incentives and assured livelihood. Eg- stipend for professional training

    Panchayat Extension To Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) and Forest Rights Act 2006 for strengthening tribal self-governance

    To realise the goal of achieving a “Naxal-free Bharat” by March 2026, security measures need to go hand in hand with participatory and tribal led governance.

  • What are the determinants of left-wing extremism in Eastern part of India? What strategy should Government of India, civil administration and security forces adopt to counter the threat in the affected areas?

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    Determinants of Left-Wing Extremism in Eastern India

    Maoist ideology of armed class struggle, anti-state revolution, and redistribution of resources appeals to sections alienated by inequality and exclusion. Eg- narrative of a “people’s war.”

    Land Displacement – Eg- Mining-induced displacement in Jharkhand’s coal belt (Ramgarh, Hazaribagh).

    Poor implementation of FRA, 2006, and PESA. Eg- Nearly 15% of forest and community land claims under the FRA are pending.

    Historical Socio-Economic Deprivation– Eg- LWE districts like Malkangiri, Sukma have some of the lowest HDI indicators.

    Unemployment & Lack of Livelihood Options- Eg- Jharkhand’s rural districts have among the highest youth unemployment in Eastern India.

    Governance Deficit – Eg- Large parts of Southern Bastar lacked road connectivity until recent years.

    Favourable Terrain – Eg- Dandakaranya region offers natural hideouts and logistical advantages for guerrilla warfare.

    Porous and forested borders between Chhattisgarh-Jharkhand-Odisha-Maharashtra allow safe movement and sanctuary for cadres.

    Ineffective Policing & Security Gaps – Poor training, lack of mobility, and limited intelligence in forest interiors.

    Parallel Governance – Maoists run jan adalats, levy taxes, provide quick dispute resolution-gaining perceived legitimacy in ungoverned spaces.

    Strategy to Counter LWE in Affected Regions

    Government of India

    Implement the “National Policy and Action Plan (2015)” in timely manner

    Accelerate Development – Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I), mobile towers, banking, health centres, PDS reforms in LWE belts.

    Strengthening PESA –

    real-time digital dashboards for fund utilization to Gram Sabhas

    “Bottom-Up” planning model – from “state imposition” to “participatory development”

    Economic development

    “Forest-to-Market” Value Chain development through Van Dhan Vikas Kendras (VDVKs)

    Promotion of Tribal-Start-up Ecosystem in food processing – Eg- export of products like Mahua and wild honey

    Civil Administration strategy

    “The only way to end insurgency is to win the hearts and minds of people through inclusive governance.” – Rajnath Singh

    Transparent and Participatory Mining & Resource Management- Eg- share of mineral royalties to local communities through the DMF Funds

    Technology for Governance – Use GIS mapping, drones, and e-governance platforms for service delivery and monitoring.

    Build Trust with Communities – Dialogue-based approach through “administration-public interface programmes”. Eg- Janta Darbars for grievance redressal

    Security Forces Strategy

    Strengthen Intelligence & Tech-Enabled Policing – Use of drones, satellite mapping, GPS-based tracking, communication intercept tools.

    Capacity building – Eg- fortified police stations, all-terrain vehicles for deep forest movement.

    Inter-State Coordination – Coordination between Chhattisgarh-Odisha-Jharkhand-Maharashtra in tri-junction zones.

    Community Policing – Initiatives like Jan Maitri, sports outreach, and anti-propaganda programmes.

    Progress anchored in justice and inclusion is the best antidote to extremism.

  • Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    Naxalism issue

    Social Issues Driving Naxalism

    Jal, Jungle, Jameen – Forced labour, expropriation of resources by outsiders, evasion of land ceiling laws, denial of land claims

    Maoist ideology of armed class struggle, anti-state revolution, and redistribution of resources appeals to sections alienated by inequality and exclusion. Eg- narrative of a “people’s war.”

    Land Displacement – Eg- Mining-induced displacement in Jharkhand’s coal belt (Ramgarh, Hazaribagh).

    Historical Socio-Economic Deprivation– Eg- LWE districts like Malkangiri, Sukma have some of the lowest HDI indicators.

    Economic Issues Driving Naxalism

    Unemployment & Lack of Livelihood Options- Eg- Jharkhand’s rural districts have among the highest youth unemployment in Eastern India.

    Resource Extraction without benefit sharing- Mining projects with low local hiring.

    Absence of Market Linkages – Eg- Bamboo and lac sold at low prices.

    Developmental Issues Driving Naxalism

    Governance Vacuum – poor service delivery and law enforcement.

    Poor Infrastructure – Lack of roads, telecom, electricity, and markets leaves communities isolated.

    Low Human Development Indicators – High malnutrition, low literacy, and inadequate health facilities.

    Poor implementation of welfare schemes – Leakages, corruption, and absence of monitoring. Eg- Nearly 15% of forest and community land claims under the FRA are pending.

    Emerging issues

    Urban Front Strategy – Urban Naxals aim to gain legal and logistical support from cities-referred to as the “.”

    Tactical Asymmetry and “Contactless” Warfare – Eg- use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and drones

    Dandakaranya region along Chhattisgarh-Maharashtra-Odisha remains a key guerrilla base due to its difficult terrain.

    Recruitment of Minors and Vulnerable Youth – Eg- Reports of child soldiers in southern Bastar.

    Inter-State Coordination Challenges in intelligence sharing and joint operations.

    Over 78,000 hectares of forest land was approved for diversion across India for non-forest usage in the last four years.

    Multilayered strategy

    Policy level

    Implement the “National Policy and Action Plan (2015)” in timely manner

    Accelerate Development – Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I), mobile towers, banking, health centres, PDS reforms in LWE belts.

    Strengthening PESA –

    real-time digital dashboards for fund utilization to Gram Sabhas

    “Bottom-Up” planning model – from “state imposition” to “participatory development”

    Economic development

    “Forest-to-Market” Value Chain development through Van Dhan Vikas Kendras (VDVKs)

    Promotion of Tribal-Start-up Ecosystem in food processing – Eg- export of products like Mahua and wild honey

    Governance level

    “The only way to end insurgency is to win the hearts and minds of people through inclusive governance.” – Rajnath Singh

    Transparent and Participatory Mining & Resource Management- Eg- share of mineral royalties to local communities through the DMF Funds

    Technology for Governance – Use GIS mapping, drones, and e-governance platforms for service delivery and monitoring.

    Transparency and accountability in project implementation to address Politician-bureaucrat-corporate nexus (vohra committee)

    Security level

    Strengthen Intelligence & Tech-Enabled Policing – Use of drones, satellite mapping, GPS-based tracking, communication intercept tools.

    Capacity building – Eg- fortified police stations, all-terrain vehicles for deep forest movement.

    Inter-State Coordination – Coordination between Chhattisgarh-Odisha-Jharkhand-Maharashtra in tri-junction zones.

    Community Policing – Initiatives like Jan Maitri, sports outreach, and anti-propaganda programmes.

    Progress anchored in justice and inclusion is the best antidote to extremism.

  • The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    Determinants of Left-Wing Extremism in Eastern India

    Maoist ideology of armed class struggle

    Land Displacement due to Mining

    Poor implementation of FRA, 2006, and PESA.

    Historical Socio-Economic Deprivation

    Unemployment & Lack of Livelihood Options

    Governance Deficit

    Geographical challenges

    Impact on people

    Over 14,000 lives were lost to Naxal violence in the last 20 years

    Infrastructure Destruction– targeting road networks, railways, and telecom towers in the “Red Corridor”.

    Extortion and “Levy”

    Human Rights Violations – Eg- abduction and killing of local leaders

    Low-growth trap increases inequality and poverty. Eg- The HDI for Malkangiri district (Odisha) – a LWE stronghold – is only 0.37, compared to the state’s average of 0.579.

    Socio-economic impact – Eg- As per MHA report, 70% population of naxal affected areas lives under BPL.

    Recruitment of Minors and Vulnerable Youth – Eg- Reports of child soldiers in southern Bastar.

    Measures taken by government

    Security Measures

    Specialised Forces- Eg- Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh and the Bastariya Battalion in Chhattisgarh

    Naxal’s Financial chocking

    Security Related Expenditure and Special Infrastructure Scheme for strengthening State Special Forces and Special Intelligence Branches

    Developmental measures

    Building Critical Infrastructure in LWE Areas – Eg- Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I) constructing 14000 km of roads

    Socio-economic development

    Financial Inclusion- over 1,00 bank branches have been opened in LWE affected districts since April 2015.

    Aspirational districts program

    ROSHNI Scheme for skill development and employment-linked training for youth

    Surrender and rehabilitation policy – attractive incentives and assured livelihood. Eg- stipend for professional training

    Panchayat Extension To Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) and Forest Rights Act 2006 for strengthening tribal self-governance

    Progress anchored in justice and inclusion is the best antidote to extremism.