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Subject: Organized Crime and Terrorism

  • Forces comb Pir Panjal to stop terrorist movement between Jammu, Kashmir

    Why in the News

    Security forces have adopted a sustained deployment across the Pir Panjal range, operating from Temporary Operational Bases (TOBs) instead of withdrawing after each operation. The change was visible in an operation in which a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist was killed at Ashdar Gali in the upper reaches, after a four month joint effort by the Army, its para forces, the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces. Terrorists had for four years used the high altitude transit routes through the dense forests to move between the Kashmir Valley and the Jammu region. Pressure applied on one side of the range simply moved them to the other. The tension is that a terrain which gave observation and concealment to small armed groups is now being answered by keeping troops inside it through the season, at a cost in exposure and logistics that a raid never carried.

    What is a Temporary Operational Base?

    1. What it is: A Temporary Operational Base is a forward position from which a joint team stays deployed in the mountains for an extended period, rather than returning to a garrison once an operation ends.
    2. Duration: Deployments run from more than ten days to several months, decided by the security situation and intelligence inputs.
    3. Shelter: Where a natural shelter exists, such as a Gujjar dhok, a herder’s seasonal shack, or a cave, it is used as the base. Otherwise the team operates in the dense forest without shelter.
    4. Siting: The bases are scattered across the range on intelligence inputs and ground situation analysis, and the one above the Doodhpathri meadow at Ashdar Gali has been held for several months.

    Why is the Pir Panjal strategically decisive?

    1. What the range divides: The Pir Panjal separates the Jammu region from the Kashmir Valley.
    2. Southern approaches: To its south lie the Poonch and Rajouri districts, which run up to the Line of Control (LoC).
    3. The two corridors: The range connects Kashmir to Poonch and Rajouri on one side, and to the Chenab Valley districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban on the other.
    4. The northern stretch: Inside Kashmir the range extends to Gulmarg and Baramulla, connecting the Valley back to the Line of Control.
    5. Why that matters operationally: A single mountain system linking the infiltration frontier to both halves of the Union Territory makes the range a transit corridor rather than a destination.

    How is the deployment organised across the range?

    1. Three zones: The mountains are divided into the upper reaches, the middle range and the lower reaches.
    2. Upper reaches: The Army’s paratroopers hold the highest ground, trained and equipped for high altitude warfare, and are stationed at mountain tops from where drones monitor large stretches of terrain.
    3. Middle range: The middle range is manned either by the Rashtriya Rifles, the Army’s counter insurgency force, or by joint teams of the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces, depending on the requirement.
    4. Lower reaches: The lower ranges are usually held by the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces.
    5. Closing the weapons gap: Militants at height held stationary positions from which they could watch soldiers, and carried weapons such as the American M4 carbine, efficient in close combat. Special troops now carry comparable weapons and night vision devices for patrolling after dark.

    What new units has the Jammu and Kashmir Police raised?

    1. The trigger: The Pahalgam attack on tourists in April last year killed twenty five tourists and one local.
    2. A new elite tier: The Jammu and Kashmir Police raised a new elite unit within its Special Operations Group (SOG) to strengthen operations in challenging terrain.
    3. Snow Leopards: The Snow Leopards unit is trained for high altitude warfare in rough terrain during the winter.
    4. Markhor: The Markhor unit is trained for gunfights in dense forest.

    What does the earlier record in Poonch and Rajouri show?

    1. A former hotbed: The Poonch and Rajouri axis carried a large number of militants, mostly foreigners, moving openly through the forests.
    2. Operation Sarp Vinash: The Indian Army launched Operation Sarp Vinash in 2003, with the help of local residents, to flush militants out of the area.
    3. The clearance held for a decade: The region was declared militant free in 2012.
    4. The return: The forested mountains have become a major challenge again over the last few years, with a series of setbacks recorded in the last three.

    Challenges to the Pir Panjal deployment model

    1. Support networks reconstitute faster than they are mapped: Overground worker networks change composition and new hideouts appear, so intelligence on a valley goes stale between operations. Eg. Officials record newer terrorist hideouts in the same forest belts that earlier operations had cleared.
      The Fix: Tie the base siting cycle to a rolling review of the support network in each valley, rather than to the location of the last contact.
    2. Winter attrition falls on the force: Holding high ground through a Himalayan winter produces cold injury and altitude illness that no contact with an adversary causes. Eg. Non battle casualties have historically exceeded combat casualties on India’s high altitude deployments.
      The Fix: Rotate upper reach detachments on a fixed acclimatisation cycle and pre position winter stores before the passes close.
    3. The herding population uses the same routes: A standing armed presence in grazing areas cuts across the seasonal movement of the Gujjar and Bakarwal communities. Eg. The dhoks used as temporary bases are the herders’ own seasonal shelters.
      The Fix: Compensate the use of private dhoks and issue transit passes to registered herders, so ordinary seasonal movement is not read as suspicious.
    4. Infiltration sits upstream of the model: Sustained presence inside the range does not change the supply of armed entrants crossing into it. Eg. Foreign militants moving through these forests enter from launch pads across the Line of Control.
      The Fix: Pair the deployment with counter infiltration grid upgrades on the Line of Control, so the corridor is contested at entry and not only in transit.
    5. Aerial observation fails where it is most needed: Drone surveillance from mountain tops loses effect under forest canopy and in cloud, which is when movement is attempted. Eg. Dense deodar and pine cover in the Poonch forests blocks overhead observation for most of the day.
      The Fix: Combine aerial observation with ground sensors and human sources in the canopy belts, rather than relying on the aerial picture alone.

    Conclusion

    The range’s value to an armed group was never its height. It was the ability to leave one side the moment pressure arrived on the other, and a standing presence is what removes that option. The deployment answers movement. It does not answer entry, and the supply of armed entrants is decided at the frontier rather than in the forest. What to watch is whether the bases are held through the coming winter, since a presence that thins with the snow restores the very transit option it was raised to deny.

    Back2Basics: Overground Worker (OGW)

    1. What the term means: An overground worker is a person who supports an armed group without taking part in armed action.
    2. What the support covers: Shelter, food, movement of weapons and money, and reconnaissance of security force movement.
    3. Why the category matters: An infiltrated group cannot sustain itself between operations without a local support layer, so dismantling the network is treated as equivalent to an operational success.
    4. How it is handled: Police in Jammu and Kashmir maintain lists of suspected overground workers and periodically detain and prosecute them under criminal and preventive detention law.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Winning of ‘Hearts and Minds’ in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • Centre bans Pak-based Shahzad Bhatti terror network under UAPA

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Home Affairs has declared the Pakistan-based Shahzad Bhatti Network (SBN) a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. A gazette notification invoked Section 35 of the Act to add the network to the First Schedule, which lists banned terrorist organisations. The notification records that the network draws gullible youth and local criminals into smuggling arms, explosives and narcotics from across the border, and that it uses digital communication platforms to circulate provocative messages. The designation follows a nationwide crackdown on an alleged SBN linked network last month, in which security agencies detained 253 people across 14 States. The question it raises is what a domestic ban adds against a syndicate whose leadership, funding and handlers all sit outside Indian jurisdiction.

    How does a Section 35 designation under the UAPA work?

    1. The power: Section 35 empowers the Central Government to add an organisation to the First Schedule by notification in the Official Gazette, where it believes the organisation is involved in terrorism. The listing is what makes the organisation a terrorist organisation in law.
    2. The threshold: An organisation is treated as involved in terrorism where it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for them, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in it. The present notification records that the network has participated in various acts of terrorism in India.
    3. The consequences: Membership, support, fundraising and arranging meetings for a listed organisation become distinct punishable offences under the Act. The listing therefore reaches the domestic support structure rather than the organisation’s leadership abroad.
    4. The remedy: A listed organisation may apply to the Central Government for removal from the Schedule, and a refusal goes to a Review Committee headed by a sitting or retired High Court judge. That committee is the only statutory check on the designation.

    What is the network accused of doing?

    1. Cross border smuggling: The network is accused of moving arms, explosives and narcotics across the border using local conduits. The notification treats the smuggling as the resource base for the terrorist activity rather than as a separate crime.
    2. Recruitment of petty criminals: The stated method is to offer allurements to gullible youth and local criminals, motivate them for anti-national activity and mobilise resources through them. Recruitment runs through the criminal economy rather than through an ideological cadre.
    3. Online radicalisation and propaganda: The network published hateful digital content and used communication platforms to circulate provocative messages. The stated targets are India’s democratic structure and communal harmony.
    4. Espionage and reconnaissance: The network is suspected of paying local conduits to conduct reconnaissance and install CCTV cameras for surveillance of police, defence and religious sites. It is also linked to grenade, improvised explosive device and petrol bomb attacks and to targeted killings.
    5. Attribution to a named handler: Shahzad Bhatti is accused of using social media to recruit young people, and is suspected of a link to the grenade attack at the residence of a YouTuber in Jalandhar in March last year.
    6. State backing: The network is described as a Pakistan-based syndicate backed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s military intelligence agency. That characterisation is what moves it from an organised crime case to a national security one.

    What did the crackdown recover?

    1. Scale of the operation: Security agencies detained 253 people across 14 States days before Independence Day. The geographic spread indicates a recruitment base well beyond the border States.
    2. Ordnance recovered: Recoveries included improvised explosive devices, grenades bearing Pakistan Ordnance Factory markings, pistols and live cartridges. State factory markings on recovered grenades are the material link between the network and an official supply chain.
    3. Surveillance equipment: CCTV cameras allegedly installed for espionage were among the recoveries. The presence of surveillance hardware alongside weapons indicates a network doing target development, not only delivery.

    Why does the crime and terror linkage change the security problem?

    1. Self financing structure: Narcotics trafficking funds weapons movement, so the network does not depend on transfers through the formal financial system. Financial intelligence tools built for tracing bank flows have little purchase on a cash and contraband economy.
    2. Deniable local execution: Using petty criminals rather than trained cadre gives the handlers distance from the act and makes attribution harder after an arrest. The person caught rarely knows the chain above him.
    3. Shared border infrastructure: The same tunnels, drone routes and courier networks serve both narcotics and weapons consignments. Eg. Drone borne consignments recovered along the Punjab border have carried both heroin and small arms in the same drop.
    4. Broader footprint than a conventional outfit: A syndicate built on crime scales through existing criminal markets in the interior rather than through ideological recruitment. That explains a detention footprint across 14 States for a single network.

    Challenges to the UAPA designation route

    1. No reach over handlers abroad: A domestic listing criminalises support inside India and does nothing to a leadership operating under state protection across the border. Eg. Individuals designated globally under the United Nations Security Council’s 1267 sanctions regime have continued to operate from Pakistan for years.
      The Fix: Pair every domestic listing with a dossier submitted for designation under the 1267 Committee and under partner countries’ national sanctions lists.
    2. Designation is not conviction: Proscription restricts an organisation and still requires the ordinary burden of proof in each prosecution that follows. Eg. Cases registered under the Act routinely run for years before trial concludes, and conviction rates recorded in them are low.
      The Fix: Resource the National Investigation Agency’s prosecution capacity and set internal timelines for filing charge sheets, so a listing converts into completed trials.
    3. Renaming and reconstitution: A proscribed network can resume operations under a fresh name, which requires a fresh notification each time. Eg. Front organisations of banned outfits have repeatedly reappeared under new banners after a ban.
      The Fix: Notify successor and front entities in the same instrument that lists the parent organisation, so a name change does not restart the process.
    4. Civil liberties objections to the statute: Section 43D(5) bars bail where the accusation is prima facie true, so pre-trial custody can extend for years. Eg. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) the Supreme Court held that prolonged incarceration with no prospect of an early trial permits bail despite that bar.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory outer limit for filing the charge sheet in listed organisation cases, after which the bail bar lapses.
    5. Weak seizure of assets: A ban restricts an organisation’s property in law, and the proceeds of narcotics trafficking sit in cash and in benami holdings that are hard to attach. Eg. Terror funding investigations frequently record hawala transfers with no identifiable account holder at either end.
      The Fix: Route listed organisation cases through the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 machinery in parallel, so attachment proceedings run alongside the terror prosecution.

    Conclusion

    The Shahzad Bhatti Network now sits in the First Schedule, and the immediate effect is to make support for it inside India a separate offence. The designation lands on the domestic layer of the network, which is the layer the August detentions had already reached. Whether the ban changes anything depends on what follows it: charge sheets against those detained, attachment of the assets the smuggling generated, and a listing request carried into international forums. The point to watch is the first prosecution filed against a person charged as a member, since that is where the notification is tested rather than announced.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Indian government has recently strengthened the anti-terrorism laws by amending the unlawful activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967 and the NIA Act. Analyze the changes in the context of prevailing security environment while discussing the scope and reasons for opposing the UAPA by human rights organizations.”

  • Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Why in the News

    India has unveiled PRAHAAR, its first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, which sets a national framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activity and radicalisation through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches. The policy follows Operation Sindoor, the strikes of 6 and 7 May on the Pakistan based terror network launched after the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, and follows the three declarations India issued immediately after that operation. The first of those declarations ended the stated era of restraint, the second classified any future act of cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan as an “act of war”, and the third removed Pakistani nuclear blackmail as a restraining factor. The tension is that the doctrine India has hardened is built for a state sponsor with a return address, while the threat itself has fragmented into lone wolf attackers, autonomous cells and drone, cyber and artificial intelligence enabled methods that a retaliatory strike does not reach.

    What is PRAHAAR?

    1. PRAHAAR as a national policy: PRAHAAR is India’s first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, unveiled on 23 February 2026.
    2. Scope of the framework: It sets out a national counter terrorism framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activities and to radicalisation.
    3. Whole of government and whole of society approach: It works through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches, so prevention is not left to security agencies alone.

    How has the form of terrorism changed in 25 years?

    1. The organisational form has fragmented: Large terror groups run by single leaders, such as al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden or the Islamic State under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with its call for an Islamic Caliphate, have given way to smaller and more autonomous entities.
    2. The attacker is now often solitary: Lone wolf attacks are becoming the norm, which removes the network that intelligence collection is designed to detect.
    3. Drones, cyber capability and artificial intelligence: Drones, cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence are now used to perpetrate terror.
    4. Counter terrorism use of the same technologies: Those technologies are used by the nations combating terrorism as well, so capability advantage is contested rather than assured.

    What is a lone wolf attack?

    1. The definition: A lone wolf attack is an attack planned and executed by a single individual, or by a pair acting alone, who belongs to no organisation and takes no operational direction from one.
    2. How the attacker is produced: Radicalisation runs through online propaganda rather than through recruitment by a handler, so the individual adopts a group’s cause without ever joining its structure. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than around infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
    3. Why detection fails: Intelligence collection works by intercepting communication between conspirators and by penetrating networks, and an attacker who communicates with nobody generates neither signal.
    4. Why a retaliation doctrine does not reach it: A cross border response needs attribution to a sponsoring state, and an individual acting alone offers no camp, handler or command node to strike.

    Why did the early Indian response stay passive, and which attacks fell inside that period?

    1. Assassination of a former Prime Minister, 1991: The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on 21 May 1991 at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu came while cross border terror was only beginning in Kashmir.
    2. Internal detection failed repeatedly: The March 1993 Mumbai serial blasts killed over 250 people in 13 coordinated blasts, and the synchronised blasts across Coimbatore in February 1998 exposed the inadequacy of internal security mechanisms.
    3. Pakistan’s direct role was first exposed by a hijack: The hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 on 24 December 1999 forced India to release the Pakistan based terrorists Ahmed Omar Sheikh and Masood Azhar in exchange for more than 160 civilian hostages.
    4. Operation Parakram and its outcome: The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001 triggered a large scale military mobilisation under Operation Parakram, and after almost two years of standoff the disengagement took place with no direct punishment on Pakistan.
    5. Nuclear parity was the restraint: With both countries holding nuclear weapons, the threat of escalation drew the international community in to cool tempers each time.
    6. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the absence of retaliation: The 26/11 Mumbai attacks of November 2008, which brought the world’s solidarity with India’s fight against cross border terrorism, produced no military action against Pakistan.
    7. The Red Fort attack of 2000: An Army garrison within the Red Fort was targeted on 22 December 2000 by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, killing three soldiers.
    8. Delhi market blasts of 2005: Over 60 people were killed in serial blasts across Delhi markets including Sarojini Nagar and Paharganj in October 2005.
    9. Delhi commercial district blasts of 2008: Multiple blasts hit Connaught Place, Greater Kailash and Karol Bagh in September 2008, months before the Mumbai attacks.
    10. The Delhi High Court blast of 2011: A briefcase bomb outside the Delhi High Court on 7 September 2011 killed 15 people, claimed by Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HUJI), an al-Qaeda affiliated group largely based in Pakistan.
    11. Akshardham, Varanasi and Pune attacks: The 2002 Akshardham Temple attack, the 2006 Varanasi serial blasts and the 2010 German Bakery blast in Pune are part of the same record.
    12. Proof did not produce a response: In each of these cases India chose not to respond directly and decisively, even after conclusive proof of Pakistan’s support.

    What changed when the fight moved across the border?

    1. The Uri attack and the 2016 surgical strikes: The JeM attack on an Army camp at Uri in Kashmir on 18 September 2016 led to the first cross border surgical strikes on 28 and 29 September.
    2. Message conveyed by the surgical strikes: They sent a message and served as a statement of intent that terror would not go unpunished.
    3. The Balakot air strike of 2019: After the attack on a Central Reserve Police Force convoy at Pulwama on 14 February 2019, the Indian Air Force struck a JeM terror camp at Balakot, the first time it had crossed into Pakistani airspace to hit a terror target.
    4. Operation Sindoor, 2025: Operation Sindoor was launched on 6 and 7 May after the Pahalgam attack, and in 96 hours the leaders and headquarters of the LeT and JeM networks were destroyed and Pakistani military assets were hit.

    What is the four fold strategy proposed from here?

    1. Elimination of the residual network: Continue to hunt down and eliminate the remnants of the terror network inside the country, particularly in Kashmir.
    2. Pre emptive action across the Line of Control: Take pre emptive military action against any potential terror threat building across the Line of Control (LoC), including at terrorist launch pads, which years of experience and an embedded intelligence network make possible.
    3. The de radicalisation programme: Run an exhaustive de radicalisation programme that motivates young people towards the mainstream and makes joining or supporting a terror outfit unattractive and prohibitively costly.
    4. Terror financing: Take all necessary steps to cut off terror financing, in close coordination with friendly countries.

    What is India pressing for at the multilateral level?

    1. The charge of double standards: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Bishkek on 1 September the Prime Minister said, “We must send a strong message to countries that use terrorism as an instrument of policy and provide safe haven and support to terrorists that terrorism can never be a strategic asset for anyone.”
    2. A named attack entered a group declaration: The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi included an exclusive paragraph on the Pahalgam attack in the Delhi Declaration.
    3. Effect of a grievance carried in multilateral text: A specific Indian grievance is now carried in the text of a multi country declaration rather than only in national statements.

    Challenges to India’s counter terrorism strategy

    1. A retaliation doctrine has no target in a lone wolf attack: An “act of war” classification presumes an attributable state sponsor, and a self radicalised individual acting alone gives no address to strike. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
      The Fix: Pair the declaratory doctrine with a published attribution standard, so the threshold of evidence that triggers a cross border response is fixed in advance rather than argued after each attack.
    2. Police and public order are State subjects: A national policy has to be executed through State police forces that the Union does not control, which is where coordination breaks down. Eg. The delay in National Security Guard deployment during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
      The Fix: Route PRAHAAR’s obligations through a standing Centre State counter terrorism council with State specific implementation timelines, rather than through advisories.
    3. Intelligence remains fragmented across agencies: Multiple collection agencies without seamless real time sharing means a warning held by one is not actionable by another. Eg. Intelligence fusion is attempted through the Multi Agency Centre and the National Intelligence Grid, which depend on voluntary feeds from database holding agencies.
      The Fix: Give a single fusion centre statutory authority to task and receive feeds, on the model of a national counter terrorism centre, so sharing is an obligation rather than a courtesy.
    4. De radicalisation has no measurable output: A programme aimed at intent rather than at incidents cannot be judged by attack counts, and India runs no published evaluation of one. Eg. Online influence of the kind that drove youth radicalisation in Kashmir operates outside any programme’s reach.
      The Fix: Fix published indicators for the programme, such as recruitment attempts intercepted and cases of disengagement sustained over a stated period, and report them annually.
    5. Terror financing has moved to channels outside the banking system: Hawala, counterfeit currency and cryptocurrency route funds without touching a reportable transaction. Eg. Informal channel financing was traced in the ISIS linked Padgha module.
      The Fix: Bring virtual digital asset service providers fully under reporting obligations to the Financial Intelligence Unit India, so the fastest growing channel is monitored on the same terms as banks.
    6. There is no agreed international definition of terrorism: The absence of one lets states label selectively and refuse cooperation on legal grounds. Eg. Repeated holds placed on listings under the United Nations Security Council 1267 sanctions committee.
      The Fix: Press the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which India first proposed in 1996, to a vote rather than leaving it in open ended negotiation.

    Conclusion

    The doctrine India adopted after Operation Sindoor answers one form of the threat well and leaves the other untouched. A declared willingness to retaliate raises the cost of sponsoring an attack from across the border; it does nothing about an attacker who was recruited online and never crossed anything. PRAHAAR is the first instrument that addresses the second half, which is why its prevention and radicalisation components, rather than its enforcement components, are the part worth watching. The marker is whether the policy produces named nodal responsibilities and reported outcomes, or remains a framework document that the next attack is measured against.

    Terrorism in India

    1. Definition of terrorism: Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of violence, to instil fear and achieve political, ideological or religious goals.
    2. The statutory definition: Under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, a terrorist act is any act intended to threaten India’s sovereignty, security or unity, or to create terror through violence, explosives or disruption of essential services.
    3. The four recognised strands in the Indian context: Cross border terrorism driven by Pakistan based groups in Jammu and Kashmir and by Khalistani networks, North East insurgencies run by ethno nationalist groups such as NSCN and ULFA, Left Wing Extremism across the Red Corridor, and hinterland terrorism by modules operating outside traditional conflict zones.
    4. The direction of change: The terror and organised crime nexus supplies funding, arms and logistics, and technology acts as a force multiplier through drones, encrypted platforms and 3D printing. Eg. The Houthi drone attack on Saudi Aramco in 2019.

    Institutional Architecture and Initiatives Against Terrorism

    1. Multi Agency Centre and Cyber Multi Agency Centre: Fuse intelligence inputs across central and State agencies.
    2. National Intelligence Grid: Networks databases held by different departments to give agencies real time access.
    3. Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre: Acts as the nodal point against cybercrime with a citizen reporting route. Eg. The 1930 helpline.
    4. Border management systems: Smart fencing under the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System plugs infiltration gaps, backed by a layered coastal security grid.
    5. Surrender and rehabilitation policies: Pull cadres out of insurgency through reintegration rather than through prosecution alone.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] Terrorism is a global scourge. How has it manifested in India? Elaborate with contemporary examples. What are the counter measures adopted by the State? Explain.”

  • In J&K, a facade of normalcy cannot substitute for peace

    Why in the News

    An administrative order circulating in Anantnag directed government employees to take part in a Tiranga Rally, making attendance at a State sponsored event an official obligation. The order brings out the central tension in the governance of Jammu and Kashmir since August 2019, between an official account of restored normalcy and a security regime of raids, dismissals, detentions and attachments that continues without pause. Whether participation of this kind reflects public enthusiasm or administrative compulsion is the question the order leaves unanswered.

    What is Article 370 of the Constitution?

    1. What it provided: A temporary provision under Part XXI that limited Parliament’s legislative power over Jammu and Kashmir to defence, foreign affairs and communications, with other laws requiring the State government’s concurrence.
    2. The linked provision: Article 35A, added by a 1954 Presidential Order, allowed the State to define permanent residents and reserve rights in employment and property for them.
    3. What changed in 2019: Presidential Orders of August 2019 applied the whole Constitution to the State and rendered Article 370 inoperative, and Article 35A ceased to apply.
    4. The statutory change: The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two Union Territories, Jammu and Kashmir with a legislature, and Ladakh without one.
    5. The judicial outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the 2019 measures in In re Article 370 of the Constitution (2023) and directed that statehood be restored and elections held.
    6. The contested question: The argument advanced in this piece treats the 2019 change as an abrogation imposed without consent, and reads subsequent governance as its continuation.

    Who is an overground worker?

    1. The term: A person alleged to provide logistical support to militants, such as shelter, transport, money or information, without taking part in armed action.
    2. Why the term matters: It is not defined in statute, so the label carries no fixed evidentiary threshold and can be applied to large numbers after a single incident.

    What is preventive detention?

    1. What it is: Detention ordered by the executive to prevent an anticipated act, without any charge, trial or conviction.
    2. Its basis: Article 22(3) to 22(7) carve preventive detention out of the ordinary protections against arrest, and permit detention up to three months before an Advisory Board must review it.

    What is the United Liberation Council?

    1. What it is: The name attached to a purported threat letter reported on 12 August, described by authorities and sections of the media as an affiliate of Lashkar e Taiba.
    2. What the letter did: It reportedly named several Kashmiri Pandit government employees and carried their telephone numbers.

    Why is the Tiranga Rally order treated as symptomatic rather than isolated?

    1. The object is not the issue: The objection is not to the national flag but to the coercive form of the instruction.
    2. Obligation replaces participation: When attendance at a government event becomes an administrative duty, the resulting turnout cannot be read as evidence of public sentiment.
    3. A pattern of governance: The order fits a style of administration that has defined the region since the Union government took direct control in August 2019.
    4. Display as policy output: A visible ceremony is treated as the deliverable, so the appearance of normalcy substitutes for the conditions that would produce it.
    5. Self defeating measurement: A government that compels attendance loses the only instrument that could have told it whether sentiment had actually changed.

    What measures define administration in the Valley since 2019?

    1. Raids and investigations: Searches and investigations by multiple central and State agencies have become a recurring feature of life in the Valley.
    2. Dismissals from service: Government employees have been dismissed over alleged links with militancy or with militant sympathisers, without the ordinary departmental process.
    3. Mass detention: Thousands have been detained after militant incidents, at times under broad allegations of being overground workers.
    4. Institutional closure: Educational and charitable institutions have faced closure or restriction over alleged links with banned organisations.
    5. Property attachment: Properties worth hundreds of crores of rupees have been attached under various laws.
    6. House demolition: Homes have been demolished where a member of the family stands accused of militancy.
    7. Post incident crackdowns: Thousands were reportedly detained after the killing of a police constable in south Kashmir, and the cycle of raids, detentions and suspicion followed the killing of migrant workers.

    What does the record on the Kashmiri Pandit community show?

    1. The threat letter: Reports on 12 August described a purported threat letter naming several Kashmiri Pandit government employees along with their telephone numbers.
    2. The attributed source: The letter was attributed to the United Liberation Council, described as an affiliate of Lashkar e Taiba.
    3. The casualty count: 25 members of the community have been targeted and killed since 2019.
    4. The named victims: They include Ajay Pandita Bharti, Rakesh Pandita, Makhan Lal Bindroo, Rahul Bhat, Rajni Bala, Puran Krishan Bhat and Sanjay Sharma.
    5. Why the memory matters: For a community displaced in the 1990s, each such threat revives the circumstances of that displacement rather than reading as an isolated crime.
    6. The return condition: Return has to rest on an environment in which the community feels safe, not on participation in official ceremonies designed to demonstrate that everything is normal.

    Why do the claim of normalcy and the continuing security regime contradict each other?

    1. The official account: The government tells the rest of India that Kashmir has entered a new era of peace and normalcy.
    2. The parallel reality: Extraordinary security measures, raids, detentions, dismissals and restrictions continue to shape the everyday lives of ordinary people.
    3. Both cannot be operative: A settled peace does not require a standing apparatus of preventive detention and property attachment to maintain it.
    4. The tourist test fails: Busy markets, full hotels and traffic on the roads are what a visitor sees in a few days. They measure commerce, not security of person.
    5. What each side gains: The government gains a demonstrable output in the display. The population gains nothing it can rely on when the display ends.
    6. The unresolved reminder: The threat letter of 12 August is the demonstration that the underlying problem has not closed, whatever the ceremonies record.

    How should normalcy actually be measured?

    1. Freedom to speak: Whether ordinary people feel secure enough to speak freely without anticipating consequences.
    2. Law as protection: Whether families believe the law will protect them rather than intimidate them.
    3. A visible future: Whether young people see a future for themselves in the region.
    4. Safe return: Whether communities that have suffered displacement and violence feel safe enough to return and rebuild their lives.

    What does the security regime do to a generation born after the conflict?

    1. Who they are: Those in their teens and twenties in Kashmir were born decades after the worst years of the conflict and bear no responsibility for the violence of the 1990s.
    2. What they observe: Many grow up watching fathers, brothers, relatives and neighbours being summoned, detained or questioned.
    3. Collective punishment: Large scale detentions and punitive measures after militant attacks deepen the perception that a whole community is being punished for the acts of individuals.
    4. The asymmetry they learn: One section of society is repeatedly assured that everything is normal while another is continually asked to prove that it is not a threat.
    5. The outcome: This produces bruised memory rather than reconciliation, and bruised memory does not disappear because officials are instructed to display flags.
    6. The time horizon: Brute force can silence a street for a period. It cannot silence a generation’s memory.

    What distinctions must the state draw?

    1. Militant and citizen: The State must distinguish between a militant and an ordinary citizen, which mass categorisation after an incident destroys.
    2. Accused and convicted: It must distinguish between an accused person and a convicted person, which dismissal, attachment and demolition before trial collapse.
    3. Family member and accused: It must distinguish between a family member and the person accused of committing a crime, which punitive action against a household erases.

    Challenges to restoring political normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Punitive measures before adjudication: Attachment and demolition operate before a court has decided guilt, so the penalty precedes the finding. e.g. property attachments running to hundreds of crores of rupees under various laws since 2019.
    2. Undefined categories in enforcement: Terms such as overground worker carry no statutory definition, so detention scales with suspicion rather than evidence. e.g. thousands reportedly detained after the killing of a police constable in south Kashmir.
    3. Employment as a security instrument: Dismissal without departmental inquiry converts government service into a lever of security policy. e.g. dismissals of employees over alleged links with militancy since 2019.
    4. Targeted killings of minorities: The safety of returning and resident minority employees remains unsecured. e.g. 25 members of the Kashmiri Pandit community killed since 2019 and a threat letter naming employees on 12 August 2026.
    5. Statehood still pending: Restoration of full statehood remains incomplete, leaving an elected government without control over police and public order. e.g. the Supreme Court’s 2023 direction to restore statehood at the earliest.
    6. Space for civil society: Closure of educational and charitable institutions removes the mediating layer between the State and the population. e.g. restrictions on institutions over alleged links with banned organisations.
    7. Cross border sponsorship: Infiltration and external support keep the security justification alive irrespective of local political settlement. e.g. attacks on migrant workers in the Valley followed by area wide crackdowns.
    8. Economic dependence on tourism: A single security incident removes the region’s main visible income source. e.g. the collapse of bookings in the Valley after major attacks on visitors.

    Conclusion

    The administrative order in Anantnag is a small instrument, and its significance lies in what it substitutes for. Kashmir needs healing built on dignity, justice, security and dialogue, and healing cannot be produced by an order requiring attendance. A facade of normalcy may impress visitors, and it cannot substitute for real peace. The measure of whether the situation has changed is whether the State begins to distinguish the militant from the citizen and the accused from the convict, not whether the flag is displayed on schedule.

    Jammu and Kashmir after 2019

    1. Constitutional status: The former State was reorganised on 31 October 2019 into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, with a legislature, and the Union Territory of Ladakh, without one.
    2. Political timeline: Assembly elections were held in 2024, the first since 2014, restoring an elected government to the Union Territory.
    3. Statehood question: Full statehood has not been restored. Public order and police remain with the Union government under the Reorganisation Act.
    4. Security geography: The region has a Line of Control of about 740 km with Pakistan and a Line of Actual Control segment with China in Ladakh.
    5. Displacement history: Large scale displacement of the Kashmiri Pandit community occurred from 1990, and return and rehabilitation remains an unfinished policy objective.
    6. Economy: Horticulture, handicrafts and tourism dominate the economy, all of which are directly sensitive to security incidents.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Jammu and Kashmir and Security Measures

    1. Article 1: Declares India a Union of States and makes the territories in the First Schedule part of that Union.
    2. Article 3: Empowers Parliament to form new States and Union Territories and to alter boundaries, the provision used for the 2019 reorganisation.
    3. Article 370: The temporary provision governing the State’s relationship with the Union, rendered inoperative by the Presidential Orders of August 2019.
    4. Article 14: Requires equality before the law, which limits arbitrary classification of persons or communities in security administration.
    5. Article 19: Guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, association and movement, subject to reasonable restrictions on the specified grounds.
    6. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, and requires that any deprivation follow a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable.
    7. Article 22: Provides protections on arrest, and separately permits preventive detention with an Advisory Board review after three months.
    8. Article 239A read with the Reorganisation Act: Provides the framework for a legislature in a Union Territory, with police and public order reserved to the Union in the case of Jammu and Kashmir.
    9. Article 355: Places a duty on the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.

    Laws and Rules Governing Security Administration in Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019: Created the two Union Territories and set out the distribution of legislative and executive power between them and the Union.
    2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: The principal anti terrorism statute, providing for banning organisations, designating individuals and attaching proceeds of terrorism.
    3. Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978: Permits preventive detention for up to two years on grounds of security of the State or maintenance of public order.
    4. Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990: Confers search, arrest and use of force powers on the armed forces in areas declared disturbed, with prior sanction required for prosecution.
    5. National Investigation Agency Act, 2008: Establishes the central counter terrorism investigation agency and defines the scheduled offences it can take over.
    6. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: Provides for provisional attachment of property representing proceeds of crime, used in terror financing investigations.
    7. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Replaces the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and carries the powers to issue prohibitory orders and regulate assemblies.

    Back2Basics: In re Article 370 of the Constitution (2023)

    1. What it was: A Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court on the validity of the Presidential Orders of August 2019 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
    2. Holding on sovereignty: The Court held that Jammu and Kashmir retained no element of internal sovereignty after its accession and the adoption of the Constitution.
    3. Holding on Article 370: Article 370 was held to be a temporary provision, and the President’s power to declare it inoperative was held to survive the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State.
    4. Holding on Article 35A: The Court held that the removal of Article 35A did not violate the fundamental rights framework.
    5. Direction on statehood: The Court directed that the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir be restored at the earliest, while upholding the carving out of Ladakh.
    6. Direction on elections: The Election Commission was directed to hold Assembly elections by 30 September 2024.
    7. Additional direction: The Court recommended a truth and reconciliation commission to examine human rights violations in the region since the 1980s.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Prime Minister’s Development Package, 2015: An outlay of about Rs 80,068 crore covering road, power, health, tourism and rehabilitation projects in the region.
    2. Prime Minister’s Package for Kashmiri Migrants: Provides government jobs and transit accommodation to support the return of displaced Kashmiri Pandit families to the Valley.
    3. Udaan and Himayat: Skill development and placement schemes for youth of the region, run through the National Skill Development Corporation and the rural livelihoods mission.
    4. Prime Minister’s Special Scholarship Scheme: Funds higher education outside the region for students from Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
    5. Security Related Expenditure scheme: Reimburses the Union Territory for expenditure on security, relief and rehabilitation of surrendered militants and civilian victims.
    6. Operation Sadbhavana and the Civic Action Programme: Army and central armed police force programmes that fund schools, medical camps and community infrastructure in border and affected areas.
    7. New Central Sector Scheme for Industrial Development, 2021: An outlay of about Rs 28,400 crore of capital and interest incentives to attract manufacturing investment to the Union Territory.

    Key Facts about Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Reorganisation date: The two Union Territories came into existence on 31 October 2019, observed as National Unity Day.
    2. Representation: The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir returns five members to the Lok Sabha and Ladakh returns one.
    3. Delimitation: The 2022 delimitation raised Assembly seats to 90, with 43 in the Jammu division and 47 in the Kashmir division, besides seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the first time.
    4. Reservation extension: Central laws on reservation, including for Scheduled Tribes such as the Gujjar, Bakarwal, Gaddi and Sippi communities, now apply to the Union Territory.
    5. Boundaries: The region borders Pakistan along the Line of Control and China along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.
    6. Geography: The Pir Panjal range separates the Jammu division from the Kashmir Valley, and the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus are the principal rivers.
    7. Treaty link: The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 governs the use of the western rivers that flow through the region, and India placed it in abeyance in 2025.

    Challenges in Internal Security Management

    1. Balancing force and consent: Security operations that succeed tactically can widen alienation and cost the political objective. e.g. area wide cordon and search operations following a single militant incident.
    2. Preventive detention without adjudication: Detention laws allow long custody without trial, which produces grievance even where the intelligence is sound. e.g. detention up to two years permitted under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978.
    3. Radicalisation through digital channels: Recruitment and propaganda have moved online, beyond the reach of physical area domination. e.g. encrypted messaging used for handler communication in recent militancy cases.
    4. Terror financing: Funding routes through hawala, cryptocurrency and front organisations are hard to interdict. e.g. investigations into non governmental organisations and trusts by central agencies since 2017.
    5. Rehabilitation of surrendered cadre: Without livelihood and social acceptance, surrendered militants relapse. e.g. surrender and rehabilitation policies across the Northeast and Left Wing Extremism affected districts.
    6. Centre and State coordination: Multiple agencies operating in the same theatre create gaps in intelligence handover. e.g. the multi agency centre framework created after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
    7. Human rights accountability: Sanction requirements delay prosecution in cases of alleged excess, which erodes trust in the process. e.g. the prior sanction requirement for prosecuting armed forces personnel.
    8. Border management technology: Infiltration continues where terrain defeats physical fencing. e.g. tunnels detected along the international boundary in the Jammu sector.

    Way Forward

    1. Restore statehood on a stated timeline: Give the elected government responsibility for public order so accountability for security decisions is politically located.
    2. Individualise security action: Confine dismissal, attachment and demolition to persons against whom a case is established, with reasons recorded and an appeal available.
    3. Institutionalise dialogue: Create a standing channel with elected representatives, civil society and displaced communities rather than event driven engagement.
    4. Secure minority employees: Provide verified protection and posting choices to Kashmiri Pandit employees rather than requiring presence at ceremonial events.
    5. Time bound trials: Expand special court capacity so that persons in preventive detention are either charged and tried or released.
    6. Youth employment at scale: Convert skill schemes into placement linked outcomes so that the young have a visible economic route.
    7. Independent grievance mechanism: Set up an accessible body to examine complaints of excess, following the reconciliation mechanism the Supreme Court recommended in 2023.

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] Winning of ‘Hearts and Minds’ in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • “Terrorism is emerging as a competitive industry over the last few decades.” Analyze the above statement.

  • The terms ‘Hot Pursuit’ and ‘Surgical Strikes’ are often used in connection with armed action against terrorist attacks. Discuss the strategic impact of such actions.

  • The scourge of terrorism is a grave challenge to national security. What solutions do you suggest to curb this growing menace? What are the major sources of terrorist funding?

  • The banning of ‘Jamaat-e – islaami’ in Jammu and Kashmir brought into focus the role of over-ground workers (OGWs) in assisting terrorist organizations. Examine the role played by OGWs in assisting terrorist organizations in insurgency affected areas. Discuss measures to neutralize the influence of OGWs.

    Recently, MHA has declared ‘Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu Kashmir (JeI)’ as an ‘Unlawful Association’ under Section 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

    Role played by OGWs

    Intelligence Gathering – provide real-time information on troop movement, patrol timings and security vulnerabilities.

    Logistical Support – arrange shelter, vehicles, food, medical aid and safe houses for militants to evade detection.

    Radicalisation and Recruitment through religious networks, student groups and social media.

    Terror Financing – raise funds locally, manage extortion, run front organisations and facilitate hawala transfers.

    Facilitating Arms Movement – OGWs act as couriers, store arms, and help smuggle weapons across borders or LoC. Eg- collecting drone-dropped arms.

    Information Warfare – They generate pro-terror content, circulate videos and organise protests to delegitimise the state.

    Maintaining Militant-Local Community Linkages- create public sympathy for militants, and organise funerals or protests to build support. Eg- funeral of Burhan Wani

    Measures to Neutralise the Influence of OGWs

    Intelligence and Policing Measures

    Integrated Intelligence Grid (IIG) – Real-time coordination between police, IB, NIA and security forces to identify OGW networks.

    Use of Technology for Profiling – AI-based monitoring of suspicious financial transactions, travel patterns and digital communication.

    Strengthening Local Police and Community Intelligence – Eg- Village Defence Groups in Rajouri-Poonch.

    Tightening Border Surveillance – Use of drones, sensors, and night-vision to check infiltration and OGW courier routes.

    Legal and Institutional Measures

    Action through UAPA & NIA Act – Freezing bank accounts and shutting down front organisations.

    Regulating NGOs, Religious Networks – Eg- FCRA audits of charity organisations

    Community and Preventive Measures

    De-radicalisation and Counselling of youth

    Heart and mind strategy – Eg- Operation Sadbhavana (Goodwill) of Indian Army

    Employment and Skill Development to mainstream youth. Eg- Udaan Scheme

    OGWs are the backbone of insurgency. A multi-layered approach is needed to break the support ecosystem of terrorism.

  • Analyse the complexity and intensity of terrorism, its causes, linkages and obnoxious nexus. Also, suggest measures required to be taken to eradicate the menace of terrorism

    As per Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”

    Complexity of Terrorism

    Absence of a universally accepted definition makes global consensus and coordination difficult.

    Multi-actor nature – Involves state-sponsored, non-state, proxy and lone-wolf actors

    Decentralised structure limits traceability. Eg- lone wolf attacks

    Transnational character – Funding, training, ideology and operations span across borders.

    Technological sophistication increases operational complexity. Eg- Use of encrypted communication, drones and digital finance.

    Intensity of Terrorism (Global Terrorism Index 2025)

    Over 8,000 terrorism-related deaths globally (2024)

    Islamic State (IS) expanded its operations to 22 countries

    Terrorist attacks jumped by 63% in the West

    India witnessed Pahalgam terrorist attack in 2025

    High psychological impact

    Causes of Terrorism

    Political Causes

    Political instability – Weak or exclusionary governance fuels extremism. Eg- in Syria

    Ideological radicalisation through identity and grievance politics. Eg- ISIS

    State repression – Eg- Militant recruitment in Kashmir exploiting allegations of rights abuses.

    Socio-Economic Causes

    Poverty and unemployment Create fertile ground for recruitment. Eg- in Palestine (Hamas)

    Inequality – Disparity between haves and have-nots fuels resentment.

    Regional underdevelopment and ‘Governance vaccum’- Eg- Insurgency in India’s Northeast

    Geopolitical Causes

    Proxy warfare and state sponsorship – Eg- Pakistan’s policy of bleeding India by thousand cuts

    Regional conflicts – Eg- Iran’s support “Axis of Resistance” including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis.

    Technological and Global Factors

    Online radicalisation – Eg- Use of Telegram and encrypted platforms by terror outfits.

    Ease of connectivity and funding – Eg- Hawala networks financing terror modules in India

    Linkages and Obnoxious Nexus

    Terrorism-Organised Crime Nexus – Eg- role of D-Company in 1993 Bombay blast

    Terrorism-Narco Nexus – Drug trade finances terror operations and insurgency.

    Terrorism-Religious Extremism Nexus for recruitment and legitimacy.

    Terrorism-Cyber Nexus – Use of social media and encrypted platforms for propaganda

    Terrorism-State and Non-State Actor Nexus. Eg- Pakistan’s support to LeT and JeM

    The zero tolerance against terrorism strategy needs 6-fold approach

    Robust counter-terror legal framework – Swift investigation, prosecution and conviction.

    Strengthening HUMINT (Human Intelligence) and TECHINT (Technological Intelligence).

    SMART Borders (Madhukar Gupta Committee)

    Raising cost of terrorism for Pakistan. Eg- Operation Sindoor

    Human-centric Counterinsurgency

    International Cooperation – Intelligence sharing, financial sanctions and diplomatic pressure on sponsors of terrorism. Eg- FATF Grey Listing

    Thus a holistic strategy is needed for ‘Terror free world’.

    Role of External State and Non-state Actors

  • Discuss the types of organised crimes. Describe the linkages between terrorists and organised crime that exist at the national and transnational levels.

    As per UNODC, organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand.

    Types of Organised Crime

    Drug Trafficking (Narco-Trade)- Eg- Recent high-volume seizures of “Meth” in the Arabian Sea via the Makran Coast route.

    Illicit Arms Smuggling- Eg- The use of “Payload Drones” in Punjab to transport pistols and grenades from across the border.

    Human Trafficking- Forced labor and sexual exploitation. Eg- syndicates trafficking Indians to Southeast Asian “Cyber-Slavery” hubs.

    Money Laundering- The process of “cleansing” criminal proceeds. Eg- Use of Layering techniques via Shell companies and Virtual Digital Assets (Crypto).

    Cybercrime (Crime-as-a-Service)- Eg- The 2024 surge in “Digital Arrest” scams operated by transnational gangs.

    FICN (Counterfeiting)- Smuggling Fake Indian Currency Notes to trigger monetary instability.

    Contract Killings & Extortion- Use of violence to “tax” businesses. Eg- Bishnoi gang

    Environmental Crime- Eg- Illegal Red Sandalwood trade in the Seshachalam forests.

    National Level Linkages (Operational & Tactical)

    Infrastructure Sharing- Terrorists use established criminal “rat-lines” for the clandestine movement of personnel. Eg- use of drug networks for terrorist infiltration in J&K

    Logistics support – Eg- D-Company’s role in 1993 Bombay Blasts

    Resource Appropriation- Terror groups adopt criminal tactics like “Tiger Kidnapping” (kidnapping for ransom) to create immediate liquidity.

    Corruption of Local Governance- Both groups collaborate to “buy” local administrative silence, creating pockets of lawlessness.

    Transnational Level Linkages (Strategic & Financial)

    Narco-Terrorism- Terrorist groups taxing or controlling drug trade routes to finance global jihad. Eg- The Taliban using opium revenue from Afghanistan to fund operations.

    Global Hawala Networks- Terror funding is moved across borders using the same illegal financial networks established by crime syndicates.

    The “Black Hole” Effect- In “gray zones,” criminal and terror groups merge into a single entity. Eg- ISIS-K using illegal mining of talc to fund global operations.

    Specialized Alliances- Terrorists outsource technical needs to professional transnational syndicates. Eg- use Dark Net markets by LeT to receive “anonymous” donations.

    Transnational crime acts as a tool of “Grey Zone Warfare” by hostile neighbors to destabilize the economy via drug-pushing.

    Diversion of humanitarian aid in conflict zones (Sahel, Middle East) into the hands of organized terror groups via criminal intermediaries. (FATF report)

    The Crime-Terror nexus creates Black Hole of instability. Addressing this requires Whole-of-Government approach.

    Cyber Security