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Subject: Polity

  • The judiciary’s role in complete justice

    Why in the News?

    The debate around Article 142 has gained attention after the Supreme Court recognised safe travel on National Highways as part of Article 21 (Right to Life) in In Re: Phalodi Accident vs NHAI (2025). Acting suo motu, the Court flagged a serious concern, over 30% of road deaths occur on National Highways, despite their limited share in total road length. The judgment signals a stronger judicial role where existing laws fail to ensure justice.

    What is Article 142 of the Constitution of India?

    1. It states that the Supreme Court may pass any decree or order necessary for doing complete justice.
    2. Article 142 is extraordinary, not unlimited. The Court has repeatedly said it cannot violate substantive law or the Constitution and must respect separation of powers.
    3. Examples of Use:
      1. Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1991): SC used Article 142 for settlement-related directions.
      2. Ayodhya Verdict (2019): Court used Article 142 to allot alternative land for mosque construction.
      3. Divorce Cases: SC has dissolved marriages irretrievably even when statutory conditions were not fully met.
      4. Phalodi Accident Case (2025): Used to strengthen road safety and recognise safe highways under Article 21.

    Why has Article 142 become central to the idea of “complete justice”?

    1. Constitutional Empowerment: Article 142 authorises the Supreme Court to pass orders necessary for ensuring complete justice where statutory mechanisms are inadequate.
    2. Residual Jurisdiction: Functions as a constitutional reserve power in situations where ordinary legal procedures fail to address exceptional injustice.
    3. Justice Beyond Technicalities: Enables equitable relief even where procedural or technical legal barriers exist.
    4. Constitutional Safety Valve: Fills institutional gaps when existing laws are silent, rigid, or incapable of immediate grievance redressal.
    5. Expansion of Rights-Based Jurisprudence: Strengthens substantive justice under Article 21, including newer dimensions such as road safety and dignified living.
    6. Illustration: Highway Safety Judgment (2025): In In Re: Phalodi Accident vs NHAI (2025), the Court recognised safe and motorable roads as part of Right to Life, while responding to alarming road fatalities.

    How did the Supreme Court justify judicial intervention in the highway safety case?

    1. Suo Motu Cognisance: The Court initiated proceedings after two road accidents in November 2025 led to 34 deaths.
    2. Right to Life Expansion: Interpreted Article 21 to include safe travel and well-maintained highways.
    3. Governance Failure: Judicial intervention emerged against the backdrop of persistent road safety failures.
    4. Striking Data: National Highways accounted for over 30% of road fatalities in India, despite comprising a limited share of total roads.
    5. Policy Context: Government targets 50% reduction in road accident fatalities by 2030 through the 4E Strategy:
      1. Engineering: Improves road infrastructure and black-spot correction.
      2. Education: Strengthens road safety awareness.
      3. Enforcement: Ensures traffic regulation compliance.
      4. Emergency Medical Services: Supports rapid trauma response.
    6. Mixed Outcomes: Despite a reported 11% decline in fatalities in 2024, accident deaths remain substantially high.

    What is the constitutional meaning of “complete justice”?

    1. Substantive Justice: Ensures outcomes aligned with fairness rather than rigid procedural compliance.
    2. Natural Justice: Requires adherence to principles of fair hearing, reasonableness, and equity.
    3. Constitutional Morality: Enables courts to protect constitutional values in emerging socio-legal contexts.
    4. Dynamic Interpretation: Adapts legal remedies to changing social realities where statutes lag behind societal needs.
    5. Institutional Trust: Strengthens public confidence by preventing denial of justice due to legal loopholes.
    6. Constitutional Intent: Reflects the framers’ objective of preserving justice even in legally exceptional situations.

    Can High Courts also exercise powers similar to Article 142?

    1. Constitutional Difference: High Courts do not possess powers identical to Article 142.
    2. Judicial Clarification: In Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, the Supreme Court held that Article 226 powers of High Courts are not co-extensive with Article 142 powers.
    3. Broader Writ Jurisdiction: High Courts may still deliver equitable relief under Article 226 for enforcement of fundamental and legal rights.
    4. Institutional Limitation: High Courts remain constrained by statutory frameworks to a greater extent than the Supreme Court.
    5. Functional Similarity: Both institutions pursue justice, but the Supreme Court possesses wider constitutional discretion.

    What judicial principles regulate the exercise of Article 142?

    1. Extraordinary Nature: Article 142 operates as an exceptional power and not an ordinary judicial mechanism.
    2. Judicial Restraint: Courts exercise caution to avoid institutional excess.
    3. Faith and Trust Principle: Judicial legitimacy depends upon restrained and principled use of extraordinary authority.
    4. Natural Justice Requirement: Fairness remains indispensable in all judicial interventions.
    5. Judicial Precedent: In Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, the Court recognised Article 142 as distinct from ordinary law.
    6. Limited Exercise Principle: In Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, the Court emphasised cautious application of extraordinary jurisdiction.

    Does Article 142 strengthen justice or undermine separation of powers?

    1. Judicial Activism: Supports proactive constitutional interpretation where governance gaps persist.
    2. Institutional Corrective: Responds to administrative inaction or legislative silence.
    3. Separation of Powers Concern: Critics argue frequent reliance on Article 142 risks judicial encroachment into executive and legislative domains.
    4. Procedural Bypass Criticism: Courts may bypass established statutory frameworks while granting remedies.
    5. Counterargument: Judicial intervention becomes necessary where evolving social issues outpace legislation.
    6. Illustration: Social Change: Courts have intervened in matters involving rights, dignity, and emerging social realities where existing laws proved inadequate.

    How has judicial precedent shaped the doctrine of complete justice?

    1. Equitable Justice Principle: In Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, the Court held that the Constitution seeks substantive justice beyond procedural rigidity.
    2. Legal Gap Filling: Article 142 addresses situations where legal systems fail to provide direct remedies.
    3. Precedent-Based Expansion: Judicial decisions have progressively broadened the operational meaning of “complete justice”.
    4. Balance with Constitutionalism: Courts continue to emphasise limits to avoid institutional imbalance.
    CaseContribution
    Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat (1991)Recognised independent scope of Article 142
    Canara Bank v. Debasis Das (2003)Reinforced substantive justice and natural justice
    Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009)Clarified High Courts cannot exercise Article 142 powers
    Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (2011)Emphasised restraint in Article 142 use
    In Re: Phalodi Accident v. NHAI (2025)Linked safe highways with Article 21

    What are the criticisms of Article 142?

    1. Judicial Overreach: Expands the Court’s role beyond interpretation into policy-making, raising concerns of institutional overreach.
    2. Weakens Separation of Powers: Allows the judiciary to enter domains traditionally reserved for the Legislature or Executive.
    3. Bypassing Statutory Framework: Enables relief beyond existing laws, sometimes diluting Parliament-made procedures.
    4. Ambiguous Scope: The term “complete justice” lacks clear constitutional limits, creating scope for subjective interpretation.
    5. Democratic Accountability Concerns: Unelected judges making wide-ranging decisions may raise questions of democratic legitimacy.

    Conclusion

    Article 142 reflects the Constitution’s commitment to ensuring justice where statutory remedies prove inadequate. However, constitutional legitimacy requires a careful balance between judicial innovation and institutional restraint. The enduring challenge lies in preserving the Supreme Court’s role as the guardian of justice without unsettling the constitutional equilibrium among organs of the State.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] Judicial legislation is antithetical to the doctrine of separation of powers as envisaged in the Indian Constitution. In this context justify the filing of large number of public interest petitions praying for issuing guidelines to executive authorities

    Linkage: The PYQ directly tests the tension between judicial activism, judicial overreach, and separation of powers, the core debate surrounding Article 142. Article 142 embodies the same dilemma: Should courts intervene to ensure complete justice when governance fails, or does it amount to judicial legislation?

  • [26th May 2026] The Hindu OpED: Finance Commission transfers and equity issue 

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2021] How have the recommendations of the 14th Finance Commission of India enabled the States to improve their fiscal position?Linkage: It directly examines the role of the Finance Commission in Centre-State fiscal relations and State finances. The present article extends this debate by questioning whether Finance Commission transfers under the 15th and emerging 16th FC framework are ensuring equity or disproportionately benefiting certain States while penalising economically stronger ones.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Consultations for the 16th Finance Commission have revived the debate on the fairness of tax devolution, with several States demanding changes in transfer criteria and a higher share in central taxes. The issue has gained urgency as large disparities in health and education spending persist despite decades of fiscal transfers. At the same time, the southern and economically stronger States argue that current formulas disproportionately favour poorer States.

    Why has the Finance Commission become central to the debate on fiscal federalism?

    The Finance Commission (FC) is central to the fiscal federalism debate because it acts as the primary constitutional arbitrator balancing the financial powers of the Centre with the development responsibilities of the States .

    1. Correction of Structural Imbalances: Under Article 280, the FC resolves the vertical imbalance (Centre vs. States) and horizontal imbalance (richer vs. poorer States) to ensure uniform national development.
    2. Tension over Resource Sharing through Vertical Devolution: While the 15th FC maintained a 41% vertical devolution to States, the actual money transferred has shrunk due to the Centre’s increasing reliance on cesses and surcharges, which are not shared with States.
    3. The Equity vs. Efficiency Dilemma: Horizontal distribution criteria like “income distance” favor less-developed States. This leads to growing protests from highly performing southern States that feel penalized for their demographic and economic successes.
    4. Compounded Fiscal Stress: The aftermath of the GST transition, volatile public debt levels, and rigid fiscal deficit targets have left States highly dependent on FC recommendations for survival.
    5. Erosion of Autonomy: The proliferation of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) forces States to spend their own matching funds on federal priorities, severely limiting their local budgeting freedom.

    Why are States dissatisfied with the present structure of fiscal transfers?

    1. Cesses and Surcharges: Exceeded 15% of gross tax revenues and remain outside the divisible pool, reducing States’ effective share to around 8-10% lower than expected transfers.
    2. Non-Tax Revenues: Centre retains significant revenues from natural resource extraction, asset monetisation, and RBI surplus transfers, limiting fiscal decentralisation.
    3. GST Constraints: Structural changes after GST reduced States’ tax flexibility and independent fiscal capacity.
    4. Borrowing Restrictions: States face tighter fiscal discipline norms despite increasing expenditure obligations.
    5. CSS Burden: Restructuring of schemes such as MGNREGA requires States to bear 40% programme costs, increasing expenditure pressure.
    6. Demand for Higher Share: Several States demanded 50% vertical devolution, citing shrinking fiscal space.

    How have Finance Commission criteria altered interstate equity outcomes?

    1. Changing Criteria: Successive Finance Commissions frequently changed weights assigned to devolution criteria, creating uncertainty for States.
    2. Reduced Role of Income Distance: States argued for lower weightage or purchasing-power adjustments due to cost-of-living variations.
    3. Shift in State Shares: Combined share of four major beneficiary States, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, increased from 42.5% under the 15th FC period to 51% under the 16th FC calculations.
    4. Southern States’ Decline: Share of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu fell from 24.8% to 15.8%, widening perceived inequities.
    5. Fiscal Incentive Concern: Heavy reliance on unconditional equalisation transfers may weaken incentives for revenue mobilisation and fiscal discipline.

    Why have fiscal transfers failed to ensure convergence in public service delivery?

    Evidence: Bihar spent ₹937 per capita on health (2022-23) compared to Arunachal Pradesh’s ₹10,148, despite transfer mechanisms. Bihar’s per-student elementary education expenditure stood at ₹20,282, compared to Sikkim’s ₹1,30,498 (2023-24).

    1. The Absorptive Capacity Deficit: Fiscally weaker states often lack the administrative machinery, technical staff, and institutional systems required to efficiently deploy and spend massive inflows of capital.
    2. Input-Centric Transfer Architecture: Financial allocations are traditionally tied to rigid, historical spending inputs rather than measurable quality-of-service metrics or regional development outcomes.
    3. Conditional Funding Rigidities: Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) enforce strict, uniform guidelines across the country, preventing states from adapting funds to meet unique regional needs.
    4. Distorted Capital-to-Revenue Mix: A massive portion of devolved funds is consumed by fixed revenue expenditures, such as state salaries and pensions, leaving minimal capital for public infrastructure.
    5. Varying Cost of Delivery: Geographical terrain, population density, and existing infrastructure deficits mean the actual cost of delivering identical healthcare or education units varies drastically between states.
    6. Limited Outcome Orientation: Existing transfer systems prioritise redistribution rather than measurable governance outcomes.

    What major changes did the 15th Finance Commission introduce and why are they contested?

    1. Retention of State Share: Maintained 41% vertical devolution.
    2. Removal of Revenue Deficit Grants: Abolished revenue-deficit grants, sector-specific grants, and State-specific grants.
    3. Fiscal Discipline Measures: Recommended States discontinue off-budget borrowings, integrate liabilities into budgets, and maintain fiscal deficit below 3% of GSDP.
    4. Criteria Weightage: Assigned:
      1. Income Distance: 42.5%
      2. Population: 17.5%
      3. Area: 10%
      4. Forest Cover: 10%
      5. Demographic Performance: 10%
      6. Contribution to National GDP: 10%
    5. Square Root GSDP Formula: Used square-root transformation of GSDP shares rather than actual GDP shares, reducing the advantage of economically stronger States.
    6. Major Reduction in Shares:
      1. Maharashtra: From 14.23% to 8.31%
      2. Tamil Nadu: From 9.09% to 6.67%
      3. Karnataka: From 8.95% to 6.59%
    7. Marginal Gains: Smaller States witnessed increased allocations.

    Would alternative devolution criteria produce fairer outcomes?

    1. Higher GDP Weightage Scenario: A 25% weight to square-root GDP contribution with reduced income-distance weight could increase:
      1. Karnataka: 6.441% – 7.131%
      2. Maharashtra: 4.928% – 7.218%
      3. Tamil Nadu: 4.097% – 4.867%
    2. Equal Weight Formula: Could increase shares further:
      1. Karnataka: 5.544%
      2. Maharashtra: 7.845%
      3. Tamil Nadu: 5.246%
    3. Actual GSDP Share Formula: Even 10% weight using actual GSDP shares would increase:
      1. Maharashtra: 8.698%
      2. Karnataka: 5.517%
      3. Tamil Nadu: 5.478%
    4. Financial Implications: Under estimated transfers of ₹104 lakh crore, changes could yield annual gains:
      1. Maharashtra: ~₹49,744 crore
      2. Karnataka: ~₹37,565 crore
      3. Tamil Nadu: ~₹32,365 crore

    How does the Finance Commission reflect the broader tension between equity and efficiency?

    1. Equity Principle: Supports fiscally weaker States through redistributive transfers to reduce regional inequality.
    2. Efficiency Principle: Rewards States demonstrating higher tax effort, demographic control, fiscal prudence, and stronger economic output.
    3. Political Economy Concern: States with greater parliamentary representation often receive higher transfers despite weaker fiscal performance.
    4. Delimitation Anxiety: Southern States fear demographic success may reduce political representation while redistribution continues to favour higher-population States.
    5. Future Challenge: Balancing need-based redistribution with performance-based incentives.

    Conclusion

    Finance Commission transfers remain central to India’s cooperative federal architecture. The debate increasingly reflects a deeper conflict between redistributive justice and fiscal efficiency. While poorer States require sustained support to ensure minimum public service standards, economically stronger States seek recognition for fiscal prudence and demographic performance. Future Finance Commissions may need to adopt outcome-based indicators, fiscal capacity measures, and balanced weighting frameworks to preserve both equity and federal trust.

  • Supreme Court Revives Limited Use of Sedition Law (Section 124A)

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court of India clarified that accused persons who voluntarily consent can continue to face proceedings under Section 124A (sedition), even though the constitutional validity of the law remains under challenge.

    Background

    Section 124A (Sedition)

    • Part of the: Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860
    • Introduced during: British colonial rule in 1898
    • Punishes: Acts or speech considered to incite disaffection against the government

    Earlier Supreme Court Position (2022)

    In May 2022, the Supreme Court:

    • Suspended fresh sedition cases and ongoing proceedings.
    • Observed that Section 124A:
      • Reflected colonial mindset
      • Had chilling effect on free speech
      • Was widely misused

    The Court noted the Union government’s statement that outdated colonial laws should be reconsidered.

    Recent Clarification (May 21, 2026)

    • Kamran vs State of Madhya Pradesh.
    • The Court clarified: If accused persons voluntarily agree, courts may proceed with sedition trials on merits.

    Purpose

    • To protect:
      • Right to speedy trial
      • Timely closure of pending cases

    Constitutional Challenge Still Pending

    • The constitutional validity of Section 124A remains under challenge in S.G. Vombatkere vs Union of India

    Main Grounds of Challenge

    Petitioners argue Section 124A violates:

    • Freedom of speech and expression
    • Personal liberty
    • Equality before law
    • under Article 19, Article 21, and Article 14 of the Constitution.

    Concerns Raised

    Legal and Practical Issues

    • Lower courts may decide guilt while constitutionality remains unresolved.
    • Clarification did not address situations where:
      • One accused consents
      • Co-accused refuse

    Historical Context

    • Colonial Origins: Sedition law was used by British authorities against:
      • Bal Gangadhar Tilak
      • Mahatma Gandhi

    [2025] “Sedition has become my religion” was the famous statement given by Gandhiji at the time of:

    (a) The Champaran Satyagraha

    (b) publicly violating Salt Law at Dandi

    (c) attending the Second Round Table Conference in London

    (d) the launch of the Quit India Movement

  • [22nd May 2026] The Hindu OpED: Ladakh seeks belonging through representation

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2024] What changes has the Union Government recently introduced in the domain of Centre-State relations? Suggest measures to be adopted to build the trust between the Centre and the States and for strengthening federalism.Linkage: This PYQ is highly relevant as the Ladakh debate concerns federal balance, democratic representation, and Centre-region relations in a Union Territory framework. The article directly examines tensions between administrative centralisation and political autonomy, making it useful for answers on cooperative and asymmetrical federalism.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Ladakh’s demand for constitutional representation has intensified after the Union Ministry of Home Affairs reportedly argued that additional districts and administrative decentralisation may be more suitable for Ladakh than a legislature or Sixth Schedule protections. The issue is significant because Ladakh occupies a strategically sensitive frontier bordering China and Pakistan. At the same time, it remains without legislative representation after the abrogation of Article 370 and reorganisation of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019. 

    Why Is Ladakh’s Demand for Representation a Major Constitutional Question?

    1. Post-2019 Governance Shift: Ladakh became a Union Territory without a legislative assembly after the reorganisation of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019, creating a governance vacuum in political representation.
    2. Constitutional Demand: Local groups have demanded Sixth Schedule protections, statehood, or legislative mechanisms to safeguard land, employment, culture, and local autonomy.
    3. Democratic Deficit: Governance remains concentrated in bureaucratic institutions despite growing aspirations for elected representation.
    4. Strategic Significance: Ladakh shares sensitive borders with China and Pakistan, making political legitimacy and local trust crucial for national security.
    5. Sharp Institutional Contrast: While the Centre advocates administrative decentralisation through districts, local stakeholders seek constitutional and political decentralisation.

    Can Administrative Decentralisation Substitute Democratic Representation?

    1. Administrative Accessibility: Creation of five new districts, Nubra, Changthang, Sham, Zanskar and Drass, improves access to local administration in geographically difficult terrain.
    2. Harsh Terrain Constraints: Ladakh spans nearly 59,000 sq km, with mountain barriers, harsh winters, and sparsely distributed settlements requiring local accessibility.
    3. Functional Limitation of Districts: District administrations implement policies but cannot legislate on land rights, employment priorities, education, renewable energy governance, or cultural protection.
    4. Political Accountability Gap: A district magistrate remains accountable upward to administrative superiors, whereas legislatures ensure accountability downward to citizens.
    5. Democratic Agency: Administrative convenience cannot replace political voice in a representative democracy.

    Why Is the “Population and Viability” Argument Against Representation in Ladakh Being Questioned?

    The debate centres on whether low population, financial dependence, and difficult geography should limit Ladakh’s political representation. A key argument against a legislature is that Ladakh’s sparse population and dependence on the Centre make elected governance impractical. However, this view is contested because India has historically prioritised political inclusion and strategic integration over population size or economic viability, especially in sensitive border regions where representation strengthens trust and stability.

    1. Democratic Equality Principle: India has not historically linked representation exclusively to population size or economic profitability. Several small or fiscally dependent regions have received legislative institutions to strengthen democratic participation.
    2. Northeast Precedent: Nagaland (1963), Mizoram (1987), and Arunachal Pradesh (1987) received statehood despite sparse populations, difficult terrain, and heavy dependence on central transfers, reinforcing political integration in strategic frontier regions.
    3. Strategic Imperative: Frontier populations contribute to national security through territorial presence, local intelligence, and social resilience. Political inclusion strengthens trust in border areas adjoining adversarial neighbours.
    4. Fiscal Federalism Logic: Redistributive federalism under institutions such as the Finance Commission exists precisely because regions possess unequal economic capacities. Fiscal dependence has not been a constitutional ground for limiting political representation.
    5. Governance versus Representation Distinction: Administrative decentralisation through districts may improve service delivery, but districts cannot legislate on land rights, employment safeguards, resource governance, or cultural protections, which require representative institutions.
    6. Normative Constitutional Concern: The larger question is whether strategically vital citizens who bear frontier hardships should remain politically underrepresented despite their central role in safeguarding territorial integrity.

    How Does the Northeast Challenge Arguments Against Ladakh’s Representation?

    1. Arunachal Pradesh Example: Despite sparse population and strategic sensitivity near China, Arunachal Pradesh received statehood in 1987, reinforcing political integration.
    2. Mizoram Example: Mizoram became a state in 1987 despite a relatively small population, demonstrating that representation was prioritised over demographic size.
    3. Nagaland Example: Nagaland received statehood in 1963, despite limited population and fiscal dependence.
    4. Security Through Inclusion: India historically integrated border regions through political accommodation rather than purely military or bureaucratic administration.
    5. Belonging-Based Integration: Political participation strengthened trust and national integration in sensitive frontier regions.

    Is Fiscal Dependence a Valid Reason to Deny Political Representation?

    1. Redistributive Federalism: India’s fiscal system operates through redistribution via the Finance Commission, recognising unequal developmental capacities.
      1. Example: Northeastern and Himalayan states receive higher per capita transfers due to difficult terrain and limited revenue bases.
    2. Intergovernmental Transfers: Several states depend heavily on central transfers for governance and welfare expenditure.
    3. Regional Disparity Reality: Mountainous terrain, sparse population, and strategic limitations naturally constrain revenue generation in border regions.
    4. Developmental Equity: Fiscal dependence has never been an accepted constitutional basis for limiting democratic rights.
      1. Example: Mizoram and Nagaland received statehood despite limited economic self-sufficiency.
    5. Comparative Illustration: Even large states receive significant fiscal devolution despite differing revenue capacities.
      1. Example: States such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar receive large transfers due to population and developmental criteria, though for different reasons.

    Why Is Land Governance Emerging as the Core of Ladakh’s Anxiety?

    1. Large-Scale Renewable Projects: Proposed renewable energy expansion in the Pang region of Changthang reportedly seeks access to nearly 13 GW of solar and renewable capacity.
    2. Land Transformation Concerns: Approximately 50,000 hectares of land may be impacted, raising questions over ecological sustainability and local consent.
    3. Economic Stakes: Investments nearing ₹50,000 crore and potential annual income of approximately ₹7,000 crore make land governance politically significant.
    4. Livelihood Concerns: Questions arise regarding Changpa pastoralist grazing rights, ecological safeguards, and benefit-sharing.
    5. Representation Deficit: The article argues that decisions on land, royalties, sustainability, and livelihoods require locally accountable institutions.

    How Is Ladakh’s Demand About Belonging Rather Than Separatism?

    1. Constitutional Inclusion: The article frames Ladakh’s demand as a desire to belong more fully within India’s constitutional framework.
    2. Political Trust: Greater representation strengthens legitimacy in border areas where citizens bear high strategic burdens.
    3. Frontier Citizenship: Border communities often experience developmental and climatic hardships while contributing significantly to territorial security.
    4. Democratic Principle: India’s strength lies in deepening participation rather than expanding administrative centralisation.

    Conclusion

    Ladakh’s demand highlights the broader challenge of balancing strategic administration with democratic representation in frontier regions. Administrative decentralisation may improve governance access, but it cannot substitute political voice, accountability, and local participation in decisions concerning land, resources, and identity. India’s experience in border regions suggests that durable integration is strengthened not merely through security and administration, but through constitutional inclusion and representative institutions.

  • Oral remarks and institutional limits 

    Why in the News?

    Recent oral remarks by the Chief Justice of India during a court hearing, and the clarification that followed, have revived debate on the limits of judicial remarks from the bench. The issue is important because oral observations now spread quickly through media and social platforms, often influencing public opinion before a final court judgment is delivered.

    Why Does the Distinction Between Oral Remarks and Judicial Orders Matter?

    Oral remarks are observations, questions, or comments made by judges during court hearings to test arguments and clarify issues. Judicial orders/judgments are formal, reasoned, and legally binding decisions issued by the court after due consideration.

    1. Institutional Discipline: Ensures judicial legitimacy rests on reasoned orders rather than spontaneous courtroom observations.
    2. Due Process: Prevents prejudicial comments from influencing ongoing proceedings before facts are fully adjudicated.
    3. Judicial Neutrality: Protects courts from appearing partisan, emotional, or personally opinionated.
    4. Public Trust: Prevents informal comments from shaping public perception in ways inconsistent with final judicial reasoning.
    5. Digital Amplification: Makes oral remarks consequential because media circulation often precedes written judgments.

    What Constitutional and Ethical Standards Govern Judicial Speech from the Bench?

    Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997)

    1. Institutional Restraint: The Full Court adopted the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life on 7 May 1997, directing judges not to enter public debate or express views on matters likely to arise for judicial determination.
    2. Judicial Discipline: Item 8 restrains judges from public commentary on political or controversial issues affecting impartiality.

    Benjamin Cardozo’s Judicial Standard

    1. Reasoned Adjudication: Judges must derive inspiration from “consecrated principles,” not personal emotions or impulsive sentiment.
    2. Institutional Method: Judicial discretion must remain disciplined by legal tradition, analogy, and constitutional order.
    3. Core Principle: Bench remarks must test legal positions rather than become vehicles for personal commentary.

    Constitutional Standards: The Oath of Office (Third Schedule)

    1. Before a judge takes their seat, they swear an oath under the Third Schedule of the Indian Constitution. They vow to perform their duties “without fear or favor, affection or ill-will.”

    Article 211 & Article 121 (Mutual Immunity): The Constitution sets up a strict separation of powers through a “speech immunity” pact between the Judiciary and Parliament:

    1. Article 121 bars Parliament from discussing the conduct of any Supreme Court or High Court judge (except during removal proceedings).
    2. Article 211 applies the same restriction to State Legislatures.

    Global Standards Adopted by India

    The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002): Formulated by global chief justices (and heavily endorsed by the Supreme Court of India), this is the international gold standard for judicial behavior. It highlights six core values, three of which directly govern speech from the bench:

    ValueThe Judicial Speech Rule
    ImpartialityA judge must ensure that their speech, both in the courtroom and in judgments, does not manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group.
    ProprietyA judge must accept personal restrictions that might seem burdensome to ordinary citizens. Their language must remain courteous, patient, and dignified at all times.
    EqualityA judge must not, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds like race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.

    How Did the Supreme Court Clarify the Status of Oral Remarks in the Vijaya Bhaskar Case?

    Background of the Case

    1. COVID-19 Context: In April 2021, the Madras High Court, while hearing a petition concerning COVID protocol violations during election rallies, criticised the Election Commission.
    2. Sharp Oral Observation: The Bench remarked that the Election Commission was “singularly responsible” for the situation and “should probably be booked for murder charges.”

    Supreme Court Intervention

    1. Media Reporting Challenge: The Election Commission challenged media reporting of these oral observations.
    2. Case: Chief Election Commissioner v. M.R. Vijayabhaskar (2021).

    Key Judicial Standard Established

    1. Bench Questions: Courts may ask difficult or provocative questions to test legal arguments.
    2. Language Restriction: Judicial freedom does not extend to “scathing language” directed against institutions or individuals crossing recognised judicial standards.
    3. Institutional Distinction: Courts clarified that formal opinions emerge through written judgments, not oral observations during hearings.
    4. Judicial Creativity: The Court accepted spontaneity during hearings but emphasised constitutional restraint.

    Important Principle

    1. Dual Test: The standard governing both bench questions and judicial language derives from judicial discipline and restraint.

    When Do Judicial Oral Remarks Raise Questions of Institutional Restraint?

    Justice Antonin Scalia (2003, University of Texas Admissions Hearing)

    1. Controversial Comment: Suggested some African-American students may perform better at less competitive institutions.
    2. Institutional Criticism: The remark attracted widespread criticism for prejudicial implications.
    3. No Retraction: Justice Scalia later reiterated the position.

    Justice S.A. Bobde (2021 Rape Bail Hearing)

    1. Insensitive Observation: During a rape-related bail hearing in Maharashtra, Justice Bobde reportedly asked whether the accused would marry the victim.
    2. Public Backlash: The remark drew criticism for trivialising sexual violence.
    3. Subsequent Clarification: Court clarified the statement had been misunderstood.

    Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (2016 US Presidential Election)

    1. Political Comment: Called Donald Trump a “faker.”
    2. Retraction: Later expressed regret, recognising judges must avoid entering political debates.

    Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (Marriage Equality Case, 2023)

    1. Oral Observation: Suggested absolute notions of “man” and “woman” were socially constructed.
    2. Final Judgment Contrast: Six months later, the written judgment reflected a different legal position, showing oral remarks need not indicate final judicial reasoning.

    Chief Justice Surya Kant Controversy (2025)

    1. Current Trigger: Remarks concerning senior advocate designation reignited debate over judicial language and institutional limits.

    How Has Technology Changed the Consequences of Judicial Oral Remarks?

    1. Instant Dissemination: Oral observations now circulate immediately through television, digital media, and social media platforms.
    2. Narrative Formation: Public opinion often forms before courts deliver reasoned judgments.
    3. Reputational Impact: Institutions and individuals may face reputational injury from informal remarks.
    4. Judicial Pressure: Courts increasingly face pressure to clarify statements made during hearings.
    5. Institutional Risk: Blurs distinction between courtroom exchange and authoritative judicial pronouncement.

    Can Judicial Spontaneity Coexist with Institutional Restraint?

    1. Argument Testing: Courts require freedom to ask uncomfortable questions and challenge arguments.
    2. Temperate Language: Judicial speech must avoid ridicule, humiliation, or prejudicial framing.
    3. Clarification Mechanism: Later clarifications may reduce controversy but cannot fully erase public impact.
    4. Institutional Balance: Judges must preserve spontaneity without compromising constitutional dignity.
    5. Core Challenge: Maintaining the distinction between testing legal positions and institutional commentary.

    Conclusion

    Judicial institutions derive legitimacy not only from constitutional authority but also from restraint in speech and conduct. While oral remarks help courts test arguments, maintaining a clear distinction between bench observations and written judgments remains essential to preserve judicial neutrality, public trust, and institutional credibility in the digital age.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] Constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence is a prerequisite of democracy.” Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests understanding of judicial independence, institutional credibility, and constitutional restraint in democratic governance. The article examines how judicial conduct and oral remarks can affect institutional neutrality and public trust, both essential for judicial independence.

  • Why India needs to empower local bodies

    Why in the News?

    India’s rapid urbanisation has renewed focus on the weak condition of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). Despite constitutional status under the 74th Constitutional Amendment, 1992, municipalities remain heavily dependent on states for funds, staff and decision-making. This exposes a major gap in India’s federal structure.

    What is the Constitutional position of Urban Local Bodies?

    India constitutionally recognised urban local governance through the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, which came into force in 1993 to institutionalise democratic decentralisation in urban areas.

    Key Constitutional Dimensions 

    1. Part IX-A (Articles 243P-243ZG): Establishes the constitutional framework for municipalities and urban governance.
    2. Three-Tier Urban Structure: Provides for Municipal Corporations (large urban areas), Municipal Councils (smaller urban areas), and Nagar Panchayats (transitional urban areas).
    3. Twelfth Schedule: Assigns 18 functional responsibilities, including urban planning, roads, sanitation, slum improvement, public health, water supply, and land-use regulation.
    4. State Finance Commission (SFC): Ensures periodic recommendations for fiscal devolution to local bodies.
    5. State Election Commission (SEC): Ensures regular local elections and democratic continuity.
    6. Constitutional Objective: Seeks to establish democratic decentralisation through devolution of Funds, Functions and Functionaries (3Fs).
    Three Fs of Democratic
    DecentralisationFunds: Ensures fiscal autonomy through own-source revenues and predictable transfers.
    Functions: Ensures effective transfer of constitutionally mandated responsibilities.
    Functionaries: Ensures administrative autonomy through independent personnel control.

    Why has the 74th Amendment failed to empower ULBs?

    Constitutional recognition has not translated into real empowerment, leaving local bodies dependent rather than autonomous.

    1. Functional Incompleteness: Lack of Devolved Powers
      1. Incomplete Devolution: Restricts effective transfer of Funds, Functions and Functionaries (3Fs) despite constitutional backing under Part IX-A.
      2. Minimal Functional Transfer: States have only devolved an average of 9 out of the 18 functions, with crucial services like water supply, urban planning, and slum improvement often withheld. A 2022 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report covering 18 states revealed that in many areas, ULBs have full control over only 4 functions, a limited role in 7 functions, and almost no role in others.
      3. Proliferation of Parastatals: State governments frequently empower special-purpose agencies (parastatals) rather than elected municipalities. Authorities like water boards, development authorities, and housing boards manage critical urban services, marginalizing the elected city council.
      4. The Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) Problem: Modern urban missions (e.g., Smart Cities Mission) often use SPVs controlled by bureaucrats rather than elected representatives, bypassing elected municipal councils.
    2. Fiscal Dependency: Lack of Financial Autonomy
      1. Weak Own-Source Revenue (OSR): Municipalities generate only a small portion of their income. A 2022-23 RBI report indicated that local bodies are overly dependent on grants, with very low generation of tax revenue. 
      2. Failure of State Finance Commissions (SFCs): The 74th Amendment mandates setting up SFCs to recommend financial devolution. However, states often delay forming SFCs, and when formed, their recommendations are frequently ignored.
    3. Administrative Control: Lack of Control Over Staff
      1. Dependence on State Cadre: Most municipal staff are deputed from the state government, meaning they are accountable to state bureaucracy rather than elected municipal officials.
      2. Lack of Own Personnel: Local bodies do not have their own specialized cadre of staff, affecting their capacity to plan and implement projects effectively.
      3. Political Centralisation: Allows states to retain substantial control over urban administration, weakening democratic decentralisation.
    4. Weakened Accountability and Political Structure
      1. Lack of Empowered Mayors: In many states, the Mayor’s position is not directly elected or lacks executive power, rendering the office a tokenistic figurehead.
      2. Neglect of Ward Committees: While the 74th Amendment mandates ward committees to encourage public participation, they exist only in a few states, weakening local democracy.
      3. Frequent Supersession: State governments often dissolve or supersede elected municipal councils prematurely, bypassing the 74th amendment’s intention of 5-year fixed terms.
    5. Constitutional-Practical Gap: Creates a disconnect between constitutional intent and actual governance outcomes.

    Why does political centralization persist within the urban governance architecture?

    1. The Low-Equilibrium Trap: It allows state political leaders to withhold administrative powers from local bodies under the pretext of limited local capacity. This creates a cycle that justifies keeping control centralized.
    2. Sidelined Mayoral Positions: Limits the role of the Mayor to a largely ceremonial figure with short tenures and little executive authority. This is unlike the powerful mayoral models seen in global metropolises.
    3. Suppressed Local Leadership: Discourages the emergence of strong local leadership, as state governments view empowered municipal leaders as potential political competitors.
    4. Examples of Weak Executive Terms: Restricts political continuity across major urban areas, as seen in cities like Mumbai or Bengaluru. Here the mayoral term is often limited to a single year or lacks direct executive power over the municipal budget.

    How does India compare globally in empowering local governments?

    1. Public Workforce Concentration: The Capacity Deficit
      1. India: Local government employment accounts for slightly above 10% of India’s total public workforce.
      2. Global Contrast: In sharp contrast, nearly two-thirds (60-65%) of all government employees in China and the United States function at the local level.
    2. Service Delivery Deficit: Restricts local governance capacity in urban planning, public utilities and municipal administration.
      1. The Indian Reality: Functions like urban planning, public utilities (water, sanitation), and municipal administration are fragmented. 
      2. The Global Contrast: Global cities operate as autonomous service powerhouses. For example, the Mayor of London or the New York City government directly controls public transit, public housing, policing, and zoning laws.
    3. Economic Governance Gap: Weakens India’s ability to develop city-led growth ecosystems compared to China.
      1. The Indian Reality: Indian cities are treated as centers of consumption rather than engines of production. Municipalities have virtually no power to independently attract foreign direct investment (FDI), offer localized tax incentives, or create bespoke economic zones. They rely heavily on top-down state and central government schemes.
      2. The Global Contrast: China’s economic miracle was largely built on city-led growth ecosystems. Chinese municipal leaders are given vast economic autonomy to negotiate directly with global corporations, build infrastructure, and compete aggressively with neighboring cities for investments.
    4. Fiscal Decentralisation: The Funding Disparity
      1. The Indian Reality: Local government revenue in India accounts for less than 1% of the national GDP.
      2. The Global Contrast: Local government revenues routinely exceed 6% to 10% of GDP in many developed and emerging economies

    Why are Urban Local Bodies fiscally weak in India?

    1. Stagnant Own Revenues: Limits ULB tax generation to only 0.3% of GDP, remaining largely stagnant over decades.
      1. Lack of Buoyant Taxes: The abolition of Octroi (a local entry tax) and the subsequent rollout of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) subsumed several local taxes. This stripped ULBs of their most dynamic, inflation-linked local revenue sources.
      2. Outdated Valuation and Leakages: Municipalities rely on outdated property assessment systems, suffer from low collection efficiencies, and lack comprehensive digital property registries (GIS mapping), causing massive revenue leakages.
    2. Asymmetric Fiscal Growth: Allows Centre and States to significantly increase independent revenues while municipal finances remain weak.
    3. High Fiscal Dependence: Forces ULBs to depend on grants and transfers for basic operations.
    4. Low Spending Capacity: Restricts third-tier spending to less than 1% of GDP, whereas Centre and States spend nearly 15-20 times more.
    5. Conditional Funding: Ties urban reform initiatives to centrally sponsored schemes rather than stable municipal revenues.
    6. Example: Schemes such as Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and AMRUT linked funding to reforms but did not fundamentally resolve fiscal dependence.

    Why did India fail to monetise urban land unlike China?

    1. The Missed Opportunity of Land Value Capture: Urbanization naturally causes land and property values to skyrocket relative to GDP. China successfully harnessed this trend, while India could not effectively capture rising urban land values during rapid urbanisation.
      1. The Chinese Miracle: China used rapid economic growth to fiscalise rising land values. Instead of selling land off, it systematically leased land. This scaled its revenue from land taxes and sales from less than 1% of GDP to over 10% of GDP during peak years.
    The Rise: China’s revenue from land taxes and sales hovered near 1-2% of GDP in the early 2000s, began climbing rapidly after 2009, and spiked sharply throughout the 2010s.
    The Peak: It reached its absolute highest point, exceeding 10% of GDP, in the year 2020, right before starting a downward trajectory in 2021.
    1. The Indian Stagnation: In contrast, India’s revenues from land taxes remained roughly stagnant at about 1% of GDP over the same 1999 to 2021, completely failing to benefit from the real estate boom.
    1. Restrictive Legal Frameworks and Ideological Baggage: The inability to fiscalise land owes much to “socialist-era idealist ideology intersecting with vested interests.”
      1. The ULCRA Bottleneck: The Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA) of 1976 fragmented urban land markets. Designed to prevent land hoarding, it backfired by trapping massive amounts of land in legal disputes.
      2. Artifical Scarcity: It splintered urban land into small parcels with ill-defined titles. This created an artificial scarcity of land, skyrocketing prices for citizens, and yielded a trivial amount of revenue for the state.
    2. Underutilised Public Land and State Monopoly: The Indian state sits on vast wealth that it refuses to or cannot mobilize.
      1. The Monopoly Contrast: Unlike India, China maintained a complete monopoly on land, allowing it to act as the city’s primary bank.
      2. Frozen State Assets: In India, massive public sector entities, such as public enterprises, ports, the defence department, state-managed temples, and railways, hold vast amounts of vacant or encroached-upon land. These valuable urban parcels have never been monetised to fund municipal infrastructure.
    3. Weak Property Tax Systems: Restricts municipal revenue mobilisation through poor valuation and collection mechanisms.
    4. Real Estate Distortions: Encourages informality and contributes to the growth of black money in real estate markets.
    5. Striking Data: Chinese local land revenue per urban resident was nearly 15 times higher than India in 1999, rising to almost 225 times higher by 2020.

    How has excessive state control weakened urban democracy?

    1. Appointment Control: Allows state governments to appoint municipal commissioners and senior administrators.
    2. Personnel Dependence: Keeps municipal staff accountable primarily to states rather than elected city governments.
    3. Weak Democratic Accountability: Reduces responsiveness to local citizen concerns.
    4. Administrative Over-Centralisation: Limits municipal flexibility in planning and public service delivery.
    5. Reduced Local Innovation: Prevents cities from designing context-specific development models.

    What is the ‘low-equilibrium political trap’ affecting Indian cities?

    “Low-equilibrium political trap” is a self-reinforcing vicious cycle where the upper tiers of government deliberately keep Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) weak, and then use that weakness as a justification to deny them autonomy. Instead of evolving into self-governing institutions, Indian cities are structurally pinned down into a state of permanent underdevelopment.

    1. Deliberate Under-Empowerment: Keeps local governments weak in taxation, staffing and administration.
    2. Dependency Cycle: Uses weak performance as justification for withholding further powers.
    3. Political Incentive Problem: Discourages municipalities from levying realistic property taxes and user charges.
    4. Institutional Stagnation: Produces a self-reinforcing cycle of weak finances and poor governance.
    5. Outcome: Cities remain administratively dependent instead of functioning as autonomous governance institutions.

    Can empowered cities strengthen India’s economic growth and federalism?

    1. Competitive Sub-Federalism: Encourages cities to compete for investment, talent and industrial growth.
    2. Urban Growth Engines: Positions cities as centres of innovation, employment and productivity.
    3. Rise of Tier-II Cities: Highlights potential in Bhubaneswar, Coimbatore, Indore, Kochi, Mohali and Surat as emerging economic hubs.
    4. Urbanisation Pressures: Makes city governance increasingly important amid congestion and pollution in megacities like Delhi and Bengaluru.
    5. Demographic Shift: Increases political importance of urban voters, especially with future delimitation.

    Way Forward: How Can India Strengthen Urban Local Governance?

    1. Genuine Devolution of 3Fs: Ensure effective transfer of Funds, Functions and Functionaries to Urban Local Bodies in line with the spirit of the 74th Constitutional Amendment.
    2. Strengthening Municipal Finances: Expand property tax reforms, user charges and land value capture mechanisms to reduce dependence on state grants.
    3. Administrative Autonomy: Grant municipalities greater control over appointments, staffing and personnel management to improve accountability.
    4. Land Monetisation Reforms: Unlock underutilised public land and adopt scientific urban land valuation to generate sustainable municipal revenues.
    5. Competitive Sub-Federalism: Empower Tier-II and Tier-III cities to emerge as growth centres through decentralised planning and investment.

    Conclusion

    India’s federalism cannot remain confined to Centre–State relations when cities are becoming the primary drivers of economic growth. Constitutional recognition without real devolution has left Urban Local Bodies dependent and weak. Strengthening municipal autonomy, finances and administrative capacity is essential for building liveable cities and making democratic decentralisation meaningful.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] “The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.” Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ directly tests issues of devolution, municipal autonomy and fiscal decentralisation, which form the article’s core theme. The article explains this reluctance through weak fiscal autonomy, state control over staff, incomplete transfer of functions and poor municipal revenues despite the 74th Amendment.

  • Delhi Police Seek Review of UAPA Bail Principles

    Why in the News?

    The Delhi Police urged the Supreme Court of India to refer the issue of bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) to a larger Bench, citing “conflicting” judgments on prolonged incarceration and bail.

    Key Issue Before the Court

    • The question is whether: Long incarceration and delay in trial can override strict bail restrictions under UAPA.

    Delhi Police’s Argument

    Additional Solicitor General S. V. Raju argued:

    • Under Section 43D(5) of UAPA, the presumption of innocence takes a “backseat”.
    • If accusations appear “prima facie true”, bail restrictions become mandatory.
    • Conflicting Supreme Court judgments require consideration by a larger Bench.

    Background of the Case

    • The hearing concerned bail pleas of:
      • Abdul Khalid Saifi
      • Tasleem Ahmad
    • Accused in the 2020 Delhi riots conspiracy case.

    Reference to Recent Supreme Court Judgment

    • A Bench led by: B. V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan recently observed:
    • “Bail is the rule and jail is the exception” even under UAPA.
    • Prolonged incarceration violates:
      • Right to life
      • Personal liberty
      • Speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India

    K.A. Najeeb Judgment

    • The Court referred to the Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb case, which held: Constitutional courts can grant bail despite UAPA restrictions when trials are excessively delayed.

    Section 43D(5) of UAPA

    • Restricts bail if accusations appear prima facie true.
    • Considered one of the strictest bail provisions in Indian law.

    Related Development

    A Delhi court dismissed interim bail plea of Umar Khalid for attending bereavement rituals and caring for his ailing mother.

    UPSC Prelims Pointers

    • UAPA is India’s anti-terror law.
    • Section 43D(5) imposes strict bail conditions.
    • Article 21 guarantees life and personal liberty.
    • K.A. Najeeb judgment recognised prolonged incarceration as ground for bail.
    [2020] Consider the following statements: 
    1. The Constitution of India defines its ‘basic structure’ in terms of federalism, secularism, fundamental rights and democracy. 
    2. The Constitution of India provides for ‘judicial review’ to safeguard the citizens’ liberties and to preserve the ideals on which the Constitution is based. 
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? 
    a) 1 only
    b) 2 only
    c) Both 1 and 2
    d) Neither 1 nor 2
  • In federalism challenges, consensus is the solution

    Why in the News?

    India’s federalism debate has regained urgency because the post-2026 delimitation exercise could significantly reshape parliamentary representation due to changing demographic patterns. The discussion has gained further traction through a book, A Sixth of Humanity, which identifies a growing democratic deficit in representation, rising fiscal resentments, and weakening democratic sensitivity as emerging fault lines in Indian federalism.

    How Is India Witnessing a Rising Democratic Deficit in Representation?

    1. Equal Citizenship: Democracy requires that citizens possess broadly equal political weight, making periodic adjustment of parliamentary representation inevitable.
    2. Constitutional Freeze: Constitutional amendments in 1976 and 2002 froze delimitation until the first Census after 2026 to avoid penalising states that achieved population control.
    3. Demographic Divergence: Southern states and West Bengal have reached or fallen below replacement fertility levels, while parts of the Hindi heartland continue to record relatively higher population growth.
    4. Population Redistribution: Population share has increasingly shifted toward northern states, raising pressure for seat redistribution in Parliament.
    5. Striking Data: Based on recent population estimates:
      1. Southern States: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, may collectively lose approximately 23 Lok Sabha seats.
      2. Northern States: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, may collectively gain around 31 seats.
    6. Governance Disincentive: States that successfully implemented family planning increasingly perceive delimitation as penalising demographic success.
    7. Democratic Deficit: Federal tensions are no longer restricted to administrative authority; they increasingly concern the distribution of political voice itself.

    How Are Rising Fiscal Transfers Intensifying Federal Strains?

    1. Rising Fiscal Transfers: Finance Commission transfers have increased significantly over time. Redistribution has become a major federal issue.
    2. Widening Fiscal Gap: The gap between contributing and beneficiary states has widened sharply, especially after the 1990s.
      1. Hindi Heartland Gains: By 2023, Hindi heartland states received nearly 90% more transfers relative to economic contribution.
      2. Southern States’ Loss: Southern states received nearly 44% less relative to contribution, despite stronger economic and demographic performance.
      3. Western States’ Loss: Western states received around 58% less relative to contribution, increasing perceptions of fiscal imbalance.
    3. Beyond North-South Divide: The divide is not purely regional.
      1. Major contributors: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Haryana, besides southern states.
      2. Major beneficiaries: Odisha and West Bengal, alongside Hindi belt states.
    4. Redistributive Tension: Better-performing states increasingly view transfers as penalising economic and demographic success.
    5. Federal Concern: Redistribution is necessary for national cohesion. However, prolonged asymmetry risks creating regional resentment and combative federal politics.

    Why Is Cooperative Federalism Gradually Turning Combative?

    Cooperative Federalism ensures consultation, negotiation, and consensus-building between the Centre and States in policymaking. States function as partners rather than subordinates.

    Combative Federalism reflects increasing political confrontation, distrust, and unilateral decision-making, where Centre-State relations become adversarial.

    1. Consultative Deficit: Several major policy decisions are increasingly perceived to involve limited state consultation, weakening institutional trust.
    2. Policy Examples:
      1. Demonetisation (2016): Implemented with minimal prior state consultation.
      2. CAA, 2019: Triggered opposition from several states.
      3. Farm Laws: Generated strong resistance, especially from Punjab and other agrarian states.
      4. Criminal Law Reforms: Replacement of IPC, CrPC, and Evidence Act raised concerns over inadequate deliberation.
      5. Electoral Changes: Perceived centralisation in electoral processes created federal sensitivities.
      6. Women’s Reservation Act: Linking implementation to future delimitation revived regional anxieties.
    3. Power Asymmetry: India’s federal system gives the Union greater institutional power, increasing the need for restraint and accommodation.
    4. Changing Federal Culture: Earlier federal bargaining and compromise are increasingly perceived as giving way to majoritarian policymaking.
    5. Visible Consequence: Federal dissatisfaction has surfaced in Kashmir, Ladakh, Manipur, southern states, and among religious minorities, reflecting declining political trust.
    6. Resultant Shift: Weak consultation risks transforming cooperative federalism into combative federalism, where negotiation is replaced by confrontation.
    7. Visible Grievances: Federal dissatisfaction has surfaced in Kashmir, Ladakh, Manipur, southern states, and among religious minorities, reflecting weakening trust in institutions.

    What are the Deeper Causes Behind Federal Strains?

    Divergent Economic and Demographic Performance

    1. Economic Divergence: Since the 1980s, southern and western states, along with Haryana and West Bengal, have recorded faster growth in per capita GDP.
    2. Developmental Gap: Better-performing states increasingly generate greater economic output while simultaneously experiencing slower population growth.
    3. Migration Dynamics: Faster-growing regions attract labour migration, increasing demands on infrastructure and public expenditure
    4. Federal Contradiction: States generating greater economic value increasingly demand greater fiscal retention and political influence, whereas poorer states remain dependent on redistribution.
    5. High-Stakes Politics: Federal debates now concern both power and resources simultaneously, making compromise more difficult.

    Erosion of Democratic Sensitivity 

    1. Democratic Sensitivity: Federal systems require consultation, accommodation, compromise, and respect for dissent, especially within diverse societies.
    2. Historical Practice: Earlier federalism functioned through negotiation and bargaining, even amid political disagreements.
    3. GST Council Example (2018): The then Union Finance Minister reportedly avoided pushing through a vote on gambling taxation due to lack of consensus, preserving cooperative legitimacy.
    4. Current Challenge: Increasing unilateralism weakens the trust that sustains federal systems beyond constitutional text.
    5. Political Risk: Weakening democratic sensitivity may convert manageable disagreements into structural federal crises.

    What is Consensus-based federalism?

    Consensus-Based Federalism refers to a model of federalism where the Centre and States resolve disputes through consultation, negotiation, compromise, and mutual accommodation rather than unilateral decision-making. It prioritises trust-building and shared decision-making in managing political, fiscal, and administrative differences.

    Examples of Consensus-Based Federalism

    1. GST Council: Ensures Centre-State bargaining through consensus-based tax decisions. In 2018, the Union government reportedly avoided forcing a vote on gambling taxation due to lack of consensus.
    2. Linguistic Reorganisation (1956): Prevented regional alienation through negotiated accommodation of linguistic identities instead of coercive centralisation.
    3. 14th Finance Commission: Increased states’ share in the divisible tax pool from 32% to 42%, strengthening fiscal autonomy and cooperative federalism.
    4. COVID-19 Coordination: Facilitated Centre-State cooperation on vaccination, containment measures, and disaster response despite political differences.
    5. Creation of Telangana (2014): Reflected constitutional accommodation of regional aspirations through democratic negotiation.
    6. Inter-State Water Sharing Arrangements: Agreements on Krishna and Ravi-Beas rivers demonstrate negotiated, though contested, federal settlements.
    7. Key Outcome: Consensus-based federalism reduces regional alienation, strengthens legitimacy, and prevents cooperative federalism from turning combative.

    Can Consensus-Based Federalism Provide a Sustainable Solution?

    1. Institutional Consultation: Strengthens cooperative mechanisms such as the Inter-State Council (Article 263) and structured Centre-State dialogue.
    2. Delimitation Safeguards: Balances demographic justice with protection against penalising population-control success.
    3. Fiscal Reform: Ensures transparent and legitimate redistribution through balanced Finance Commission criteria.
    4. Consensus-based Policymaking: Reduces adversarial politics by prioritising negotiation over unilateral assertion.
    5. Democratic Self-restraint: Requires stronger constitutional actors to exercise restraint for preserving federal legitimacy.

    Conclusion

    India’s federal challenge today is not solely about constitutional distribution of powers but about preserving trust between unequals. Demographic shifts, fiscal redistribution disputes, and political centralisation have exposed tensions within the federal compact. Sustainable solutions require consultation, accommodation, compromise, and democratic self-restraint, ensuring that federalism remains an instrument of national integration rather than regional alienation.

    Value Addition

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Federalism

    1. Article 1: India as a “Union of States”.
    2. Seventh Schedule: Union, State and Concurrent Lists.
    3. Article 246: Legislative competence.
    4. Article 263: Inter-State Council.
    5. Article 280: Finance Commission.
    6. Article 275: Grants-in-aid.
    7. Article 356: President’s Rule.
    8. 73rd & 74th Amendments: Decentralisation.

    Key Commissions/Reports

    1. Sarkaria Commission (1983): Recommended cooperative rather than coercive federalism.
    2. Punchhi Commission (2007): Recommended greater consultation and state autonomy.
    3. 15th Finance Commission: Added demographic performance as a criterion.

    Key Supreme Court Judgments

    1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India: Strengthened federalism and limited misuse of Article 356.

    Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India: Reinforced cooperative federalism and constitutional morality.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What changes has the Union Government recently introduced in the domain of Centre-State relations? Suggest measures to be adopted to build the trust between the Centre and the States and for strengthening federalism.Linkage: This PYQ is directly aligned with the article’s core argument on eroding cooperative federalism, consultation deficit, and trust deficit between Centre and States.The article provides contemporary examples to enrich answers on strengthening federalism.

  • Supreme Court on Bail and UAPA

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court of India expressed “serious reservations” about aspects of its earlier judgment denying bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots conspiracy case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA).

    Key Observations by the Court

    • The Court reaffirmed that:
      • “Bail is the rule, jail is the exception.”
    • Justice Ujjal Bhuyan stated that prolonged incarceration without timely trial violates:
      • Right to life
      • Personal liberty
      • Speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India

    Section 43-D(5) of UAPA

    • Restricts grant of bail if accusations appear “prima facie true”.
    • Creates a very low threshold for the prosecution to oppose bail.

    Court’s Observation

    • Courts cannot keep an accused indefinitely jailed merely because charges appear prima facie true.
    • Delayed trials can convert pre-trial detention into punishment itself.

    Reference to K.A. Najeeb Judgment

    • The Court referred to the K.A. Najeeb Judgment, which held that constitutional courts can grant bail despite UAPA restrictions when incarceration becomes excessively prolonged.

    Constitutional Principle

    • Presumption of innocence remains a cornerstone of criminal justice.
    • Section 43-D(5) remains subordinate to Article 21.

    Background of the Case

    • Delhi Police booked Umar Khalid and others under UAPA in connection with the 2020 Delhi riots conspiracy case linked to protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).
    • Umar Khalid had spent over five years in prison as an undertrial.
    [2020] Consider the following statements: 
    1. The Constitution of India defines its ‘basic structure’ in terms of federalism, secularism, fundamental rights and democracy. 
    2. The Constitution of India provides for ‘judicial review’ to safeguard the citizens’ liberties and to preserve the ideals on which the Constitution is based. 
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? 
    a) 1 only b) 2 only c) Both 1 and 2 d) Neither 1 nor 2
  • Ordinance Increases Supreme Court Judges to 37

    Why in the News?

    President Droupadi Murmu promulgated an ordinance increasing the number of judges in the Supreme Court of India to 37, excluding the Chief Justice of India.

    Key Highlights

    • The ordinance was issued under Article 123 of the Constitution of India.
    • Total sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court will rise:
      • From 34 to 38 judges
      • Including the Chief Justice of India

    Purpose of the Move

    • Aims to address rising pendency of cases.
    • Current backlog exceeds: 93,000 cases
    • Backlog is increasing rapidly ahead of the court’s summer recess.

    Amendment Made

    • The ordinance amended Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956.
    • Replaced “33” with “37” judges excluding the CJI.

    Article 124 of the Constitution of India

    • Originally provided for:
      • Chief Justice of India
      • Not more than seven judges
    • Parliament can increase the number by law.

    Evolution of Supreme Court Strength

    • 1950: 7 judges
    • 1956: 10
    • 1960: 13
    • 1977: 17
    • 1986: 25
    • 2009: 30
    • 2019: 33
    • 2026: 37

    Present Vacancy Situation

    Current vacancies include:

    • Seat of former CJI B. R. Gavai
    • Vacancy after retirement of Rajesh Bindal

    More retirements due in 2026:

    • Justice J.K. Maheshwari
    • Justice Pankaj Mithal
    • Justice Sanjay Karol

    Ordinance Rules

    • Ordinance must be approved by Parliament after reassembly.
    • It ceases to operate after six weeks if not approved by both Houses.
    [2025] With Reference to the Indian polity, consider the following statements: 
    I. An Ordinance can amend any central Act. 
    II. An Ordinance can abridge a Fundamental Right. 
    III. An Ordinance can come into effect from a back date. 
    Which of the statements given above are correct? 
    [A] I and II only [B] II and III only [C] I and III only [D] I, II and III