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Subject: Polity

  • Oral remarks and institutional limits 

    Why in the News?

    Recent oral remarks by the Chief Justice of India during a court hearing, and the clarification that followed, have revived debate on the limits of judicial remarks from the bench. The issue is important because oral observations now spread quickly through media and social platforms, often influencing public opinion before a final court judgment is delivered.

    Why Does the Distinction Between Oral Remarks and Judicial Orders Matter?

    Oral remarks are observations, questions, or comments made by judges during court hearings to test arguments and clarify issues. Judicial orders/judgments are formal, reasoned, and legally binding decisions issued by the court after due consideration.

    1. Institutional Discipline: Ensures judicial legitimacy rests on reasoned orders rather than spontaneous courtroom observations.
    2. Due Process: Prevents prejudicial comments from influencing ongoing proceedings before facts are fully adjudicated.
    3. Judicial Neutrality: Protects courts from appearing partisan, emotional, or personally opinionated.
    4. Public Trust: Prevents informal comments from shaping public perception in ways inconsistent with final judicial reasoning.
    5. Digital Amplification: Makes oral remarks consequential because media circulation often precedes written judgments.

    What Constitutional and Ethical Standards Govern Judicial Speech from the Bench?

    Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997)

    1. Institutional Restraint: The Full Court adopted the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life on 7 May 1997, directing judges not to enter public debate or express views on matters likely to arise for judicial determination.
    2. Judicial Discipline: Item 8 restrains judges from public commentary on political or controversial issues affecting impartiality.

    Benjamin Cardozo’s Judicial Standard

    1. Reasoned Adjudication: Judges must derive inspiration from “consecrated principles,” not personal emotions or impulsive sentiment.
    2. Institutional Method: Judicial discretion must remain disciplined by legal tradition, analogy, and constitutional order.
    3. Core Principle: Bench remarks must test legal positions rather than become vehicles for personal commentary.

    Constitutional Standards: The Oath of Office (Third Schedule)

    1. Before a judge takes their seat, they swear an oath under the Third Schedule of the Indian Constitution. They vow to perform their duties “without fear or favor, affection or ill-will.”

    Article 211 & Article 121 (Mutual Immunity): The Constitution sets up a strict separation of powers through a “speech immunity” pact between the Judiciary and Parliament:

    1. Article 121 bars Parliament from discussing the conduct of any Supreme Court or High Court judge (except during removal proceedings).
    2. Article 211 applies the same restriction to State Legislatures.

    Global Standards Adopted by India

    The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002): Formulated by global chief justices (and heavily endorsed by the Supreme Court of India), this is the international gold standard for judicial behavior. It highlights six core values, three of which directly govern speech from the bench:

    ValueThe Judicial Speech Rule
    ImpartialityA judge must ensure that their speech, both in the courtroom and in judgments, does not manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group.
    ProprietyA judge must accept personal restrictions that might seem burdensome to ordinary citizens. Their language must remain courteous, patient, and dignified at all times.
    EqualityA judge must not, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds like race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.

    How Did the Supreme Court Clarify the Status of Oral Remarks in the Vijaya Bhaskar Case?

    Background of the Case

    1. COVID-19 Context: In April 2021, the Madras High Court, while hearing a petition concerning COVID protocol violations during election rallies, criticised the Election Commission.
    2. Sharp Oral Observation: The Bench remarked that the Election Commission was “singularly responsible” for the situation and “should probably be booked for murder charges.”

    Supreme Court Intervention

    1. Media Reporting Challenge: The Election Commission challenged media reporting of these oral observations.
    2. Case: Chief Election Commissioner v. M.R. Vijayabhaskar (2021).

    Key Judicial Standard Established

    1. Bench Questions: Courts may ask difficult or provocative questions to test legal arguments.
    2. Language Restriction: Judicial freedom does not extend to “scathing language” directed against institutions or individuals crossing recognised judicial standards.
    3. Institutional Distinction: Courts clarified that formal opinions emerge through written judgments, not oral observations during hearings.
    4. Judicial Creativity: The Court accepted spontaneity during hearings but emphasised constitutional restraint.

    Important Principle

    1. Dual Test: The standard governing both bench questions and judicial language derives from judicial discipline and restraint.

    When Do Judicial Oral Remarks Raise Questions of Institutional Restraint?

    Justice Antonin Scalia (2003, University of Texas Admissions Hearing)

    1. Controversial Comment: Suggested some African-American students may perform better at less competitive institutions.
    2. Institutional Criticism: The remark attracted widespread criticism for prejudicial implications.
    3. No Retraction: Justice Scalia later reiterated the position.

    Justice S.A. Bobde (2021 Rape Bail Hearing)

    1. Insensitive Observation: During a rape-related bail hearing in Maharashtra, Justice Bobde reportedly asked whether the accused would marry the victim.
    2. Public Backlash: The remark drew criticism for trivialising sexual violence.
    3. Subsequent Clarification: Court clarified the statement had been misunderstood.

    Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (2016 US Presidential Election)

    1. Political Comment: Called Donald Trump a “faker.”
    2. Retraction: Later expressed regret, recognising judges must avoid entering political debates.

    Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (Marriage Equality Case, 2023)

    1. Oral Observation: Suggested absolute notions of “man” and “woman” were socially constructed.
    2. Final Judgment Contrast: Six months later, the written judgment reflected a different legal position, showing oral remarks need not indicate final judicial reasoning.

    Chief Justice Surya Kant Controversy (2025)

    1. Current Trigger: Remarks concerning senior advocate designation reignited debate over judicial language and institutional limits.

    How Has Technology Changed the Consequences of Judicial Oral Remarks?

    1. Instant Dissemination: Oral observations now circulate immediately through television, digital media, and social media platforms.
    2. Narrative Formation: Public opinion often forms before courts deliver reasoned judgments.
    3. Reputational Impact: Institutions and individuals may face reputational injury from informal remarks.
    4. Judicial Pressure: Courts increasingly face pressure to clarify statements made during hearings.
    5. Institutional Risk: Blurs distinction between courtroom exchange and authoritative judicial pronouncement.

    Can Judicial Spontaneity Coexist with Institutional Restraint?

    1. Argument Testing: Courts require freedom to ask uncomfortable questions and challenge arguments.
    2. Temperate Language: Judicial speech must avoid ridicule, humiliation, or prejudicial framing.
    3. Clarification Mechanism: Later clarifications may reduce controversy but cannot fully erase public impact.
    4. Institutional Balance: Judges must preserve spontaneity without compromising constitutional dignity.
    5. Core Challenge: Maintaining the distinction between testing legal positions and institutional commentary.

    Conclusion

    Judicial institutions derive legitimacy not only from constitutional authority but also from restraint in speech and conduct. While oral remarks help courts test arguments, maintaining a clear distinction between bench observations and written judgments remains essential to preserve judicial neutrality, public trust, and institutional credibility in the digital age.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] Constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence is a prerequisite of democracy.” Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests understanding of judicial independence, institutional credibility, and constitutional restraint in democratic governance. The article examines how judicial conduct and oral remarks can affect institutional neutrality and public trust, both essential for judicial independence.

  • Why India needs to empower local bodies

    Why in the News?

    India’s rapid urbanisation has renewed focus on the weak condition of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). Despite constitutional status under the 74th Constitutional Amendment, 1992, municipalities remain heavily dependent on states for funds, staff and decision-making. This exposes a major gap in India’s federal structure.

    What is the Constitutional position of Urban Local Bodies?

    India constitutionally recognised urban local governance through the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, which came into force in 1993 to institutionalise democratic decentralisation in urban areas.

    Key Constitutional Dimensions 

    1. Part IX-A (Articles 243P-243ZG): Establishes the constitutional framework for municipalities and urban governance.
    2. Three-Tier Urban Structure: Provides for Municipal Corporations (large urban areas), Municipal Councils (smaller urban areas), and Nagar Panchayats (transitional urban areas).
    3. Twelfth Schedule: Assigns 18 functional responsibilities, including urban planning, roads, sanitation, slum improvement, public health, water supply, and land-use regulation.
    4. State Finance Commission (SFC): Ensures periodic recommendations for fiscal devolution to local bodies.
    5. State Election Commission (SEC): Ensures regular local elections and democratic continuity.
    6. Constitutional Objective: Seeks to establish democratic decentralisation through devolution of Funds, Functions and Functionaries (3Fs).
    Three Fs of Democratic
    DecentralisationFunds: Ensures fiscal autonomy through own-source revenues and predictable transfers.
    Functions: Ensures effective transfer of constitutionally mandated responsibilities.
    Functionaries: Ensures administrative autonomy through independent personnel control.

    Why has the 74th Amendment failed to empower ULBs?

    Constitutional recognition has not translated into real empowerment, leaving local bodies dependent rather than autonomous.

    1. Functional Incompleteness: Lack of Devolved Powers
      1. Incomplete Devolution: Restricts effective transfer of Funds, Functions and Functionaries (3Fs) despite constitutional backing under Part IX-A.
      2. Minimal Functional Transfer: States have only devolved an average of 9 out of the 18 functions, with crucial services like water supply, urban planning, and slum improvement often withheld. A 2022 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report covering 18 states revealed that in many areas, ULBs have full control over only 4 functions, a limited role in 7 functions, and almost no role in others.
      3. Proliferation of Parastatals: State governments frequently empower special-purpose agencies (parastatals) rather than elected municipalities. Authorities like water boards, development authorities, and housing boards manage critical urban services, marginalizing the elected city council.
      4. The Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) Problem: Modern urban missions (e.g., Smart Cities Mission) often use SPVs controlled by bureaucrats rather than elected representatives, bypassing elected municipal councils.
    2. Fiscal Dependency: Lack of Financial Autonomy
      1. Weak Own-Source Revenue (OSR): Municipalities generate only a small portion of their income. A 2022-23 RBI report indicated that local bodies are overly dependent on grants, with very low generation of tax revenue. 
      2. Failure of State Finance Commissions (SFCs): The 74th Amendment mandates setting up SFCs to recommend financial devolution. However, states often delay forming SFCs, and when formed, their recommendations are frequently ignored.
    3. Administrative Control: Lack of Control Over Staff
      1. Dependence on State Cadre: Most municipal staff are deputed from the state government, meaning they are accountable to state bureaucracy rather than elected municipal officials.
      2. Lack of Own Personnel: Local bodies do not have their own specialized cadre of staff, affecting their capacity to plan and implement projects effectively.
      3. Political Centralisation: Allows states to retain substantial control over urban administration, weakening democratic decentralisation.
    4. Weakened Accountability and Political Structure
      1. Lack of Empowered Mayors: In many states, the Mayor’s position is not directly elected or lacks executive power, rendering the office a tokenistic figurehead.
      2. Neglect of Ward Committees: While the 74th Amendment mandates ward committees to encourage public participation, they exist only in a few states, weakening local democracy.
      3. Frequent Supersession: State governments often dissolve or supersede elected municipal councils prematurely, bypassing the 74th amendment’s intention of 5-year fixed terms.
    5. Constitutional-Practical Gap: Creates a disconnect between constitutional intent and actual governance outcomes.

    Why does political centralization persist within the urban governance architecture?

    1. The Low-Equilibrium Trap: It allows state political leaders to withhold administrative powers from local bodies under the pretext of limited local capacity. This creates a cycle that justifies keeping control centralized.
    2. Sidelined Mayoral Positions: Limits the role of the Mayor to a largely ceremonial figure with short tenures and little executive authority. This is unlike the powerful mayoral models seen in global metropolises.
    3. Suppressed Local Leadership: Discourages the emergence of strong local leadership, as state governments view empowered municipal leaders as potential political competitors.
    4. Examples of Weak Executive Terms: Restricts political continuity across major urban areas, as seen in cities like Mumbai or Bengaluru. Here the mayoral term is often limited to a single year or lacks direct executive power over the municipal budget.

    How does India compare globally in empowering local governments?

    1. Public Workforce Concentration: The Capacity Deficit
      1. India: Local government employment accounts for slightly above 10% of India’s total public workforce.
      2. Global Contrast: In sharp contrast, nearly two-thirds (60-65%) of all government employees in China and the United States function at the local level.
    2. Service Delivery Deficit: Restricts local governance capacity in urban planning, public utilities and municipal administration.
      1. The Indian Reality: Functions like urban planning, public utilities (water, sanitation), and municipal administration are fragmented. 
      2. The Global Contrast: Global cities operate as autonomous service powerhouses. For example, the Mayor of London or the New York City government directly controls public transit, public housing, policing, and zoning laws.
    3. Economic Governance Gap: Weakens India’s ability to develop city-led growth ecosystems compared to China.
      1. The Indian Reality: Indian cities are treated as centers of consumption rather than engines of production. Municipalities have virtually no power to independently attract foreign direct investment (FDI), offer localized tax incentives, or create bespoke economic zones. They rely heavily on top-down state and central government schemes.
      2. The Global Contrast: China’s economic miracle was largely built on city-led growth ecosystems. Chinese municipal leaders are given vast economic autonomy to negotiate directly with global corporations, build infrastructure, and compete aggressively with neighboring cities for investments.
    4. Fiscal Decentralisation: The Funding Disparity
      1. The Indian Reality: Local government revenue in India accounts for less than 1% of the national GDP.
      2. The Global Contrast: Local government revenues routinely exceed 6% to 10% of GDP in many developed and emerging economies

    Why are Urban Local Bodies fiscally weak in India?

    1. Stagnant Own Revenues: Limits ULB tax generation to only 0.3% of GDP, remaining largely stagnant over decades.
      1. Lack of Buoyant Taxes: The abolition of Octroi (a local entry tax) and the subsequent rollout of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) subsumed several local taxes. This stripped ULBs of their most dynamic, inflation-linked local revenue sources.
      2. Outdated Valuation and Leakages: Municipalities rely on outdated property assessment systems, suffer from low collection efficiencies, and lack comprehensive digital property registries (GIS mapping), causing massive revenue leakages.
    2. Asymmetric Fiscal Growth: Allows Centre and States to significantly increase independent revenues while municipal finances remain weak.
    3. High Fiscal Dependence: Forces ULBs to depend on grants and transfers for basic operations.
    4. Low Spending Capacity: Restricts third-tier spending to less than 1% of GDP, whereas Centre and States spend nearly 15-20 times more.
    5. Conditional Funding: Ties urban reform initiatives to centrally sponsored schemes rather than stable municipal revenues.
    6. Example: Schemes such as Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and AMRUT linked funding to reforms but did not fundamentally resolve fiscal dependence.

    Why did India fail to monetise urban land unlike China?

    1. The Missed Opportunity of Land Value Capture: Urbanization naturally causes land and property values to skyrocket relative to GDP. China successfully harnessed this trend, while India could not effectively capture rising urban land values during rapid urbanisation.
      1. The Chinese Miracle: China used rapid economic growth to fiscalise rising land values. Instead of selling land off, it systematically leased land. This scaled its revenue from land taxes and sales from less than 1% of GDP to over 10% of GDP during peak years.
    The Rise: China’s revenue from land taxes and sales hovered near 1-2% of GDP in the early 2000s, began climbing rapidly after 2009, and spiked sharply throughout the 2010s.
    The Peak: It reached its absolute highest point, exceeding 10% of GDP, in the year 2020, right before starting a downward trajectory in 2021.
    1. The Indian Stagnation: In contrast, India’s revenues from land taxes remained roughly stagnant at about 1% of GDP over the same 1999 to 2021, completely failing to benefit from the real estate boom.
    1. Restrictive Legal Frameworks and Ideological Baggage: The inability to fiscalise land owes much to “socialist-era idealist ideology intersecting with vested interests.”
      1. The ULCRA Bottleneck: The Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA) of 1976 fragmented urban land markets. Designed to prevent land hoarding, it backfired by trapping massive amounts of land in legal disputes.
      2. Artifical Scarcity: It splintered urban land into small parcels with ill-defined titles. This created an artificial scarcity of land, skyrocketing prices for citizens, and yielded a trivial amount of revenue for the state.
    2. Underutilised Public Land and State Monopoly: The Indian state sits on vast wealth that it refuses to or cannot mobilize.
      1. The Monopoly Contrast: Unlike India, China maintained a complete monopoly on land, allowing it to act as the city’s primary bank.
      2. Frozen State Assets: In India, massive public sector entities, such as public enterprises, ports, the defence department, state-managed temples, and railways, hold vast amounts of vacant or encroached-upon land. These valuable urban parcels have never been monetised to fund municipal infrastructure.
    3. Weak Property Tax Systems: Restricts municipal revenue mobilisation through poor valuation and collection mechanisms.
    4. Real Estate Distortions: Encourages informality and contributes to the growth of black money in real estate markets.
    5. Striking Data: Chinese local land revenue per urban resident was nearly 15 times higher than India in 1999, rising to almost 225 times higher by 2020.

    How has excessive state control weakened urban democracy?

    1. Appointment Control: Allows state governments to appoint municipal commissioners and senior administrators.
    2. Personnel Dependence: Keeps municipal staff accountable primarily to states rather than elected city governments.
    3. Weak Democratic Accountability: Reduces responsiveness to local citizen concerns.
    4. Administrative Over-Centralisation: Limits municipal flexibility in planning and public service delivery.
    5. Reduced Local Innovation: Prevents cities from designing context-specific development models.

    What is the ‘low-equilibrium political trap’ affecting Indian cities?

    “Low-equilibrium political trap” is a self-reinforcing vicious cycle where the upper tiers of government deliberately keep Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) weak, and then use that weakness as a justification to deny them autonomy. Instead of evolving into self-governing institutions, Indian cities are structurally pinned down into a state of permanent underdevelopment.

    1. Deliberate Under-Empowerment: Keeps local governments weak in taxation, staffing and administration.
    2. Dependency Cycle: Uses weak performance as justification for withholding further powers.
    3. Political Incentive Problem: Discourages municipalities from levying realistic property taxes and user charges.
    4. Institutional Stagnation: Produces a self-reinforcing cycle of weak finances and poor governance.
    5. Outcome: Cities remain administratively dependent instead of functioning as autonomous governance institutions.

    Can empowered cities strengthen India’s economic growth and federalism?

    1. Competitive Sub-Federalism: Encourages cities to compete for investment, talent and industrial growth.
    2. Urban Growth Engines: Positions cities as centres of innovation, employment and productivity.
    3. Rise of Tier-II Cities: Highlights potential in Bhubaneswar, Coimbatore, Indore, Kochi, Mohali and Surat as emerging economic hubs.
    4. Urbanisation Pressures: Makes city governance increasingly important amid congestion and pollution in megacities like Delhi and Bengaluru.
    5. Demographic Shift: Increases political importance of urban voters, especially with future delimitation.

    Way Forward: How Can India Strengthen Urban Local Governance?

    1. Genuine Devolution of 3Fs: Ensure effective transfer of Funds, Functions and Functionaries to Urban Local Bodies in line with the spirit of the 74th Constitutional Amendment.
    2. Strengthening Municipal Finances: Expand property tax reforms, user charges and land value capture mechanisms to reduce dependence on state grants.
    3. Administrative Autonomy: Grant municipalities greater control over appointments, staffing and personnel management to improve accountability.
    4. Land Monetisation Reforms: Unlock underutilised public land and adopt scientific urban land valuation to generate sustainable municipal revenues.
    5. Competitive Sub-Federalism: Empower Tier-II and Tier-III cities to emerge as growth centres through decentralised planning and investment.

    Conclusion

    India’s federalism cannot remain confined to Centre–State relations when cities are becoming the primary drivers of economic growth. Constitutional recognition without real devolution has left Urban Local Bodies dependent and weak. Strengthening municipal autonomy, finances and administrative capacity is essential for building liveable cities and making democratic decentralisation meaningful.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] “The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.” Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ directly tests issues of devolution, municipal autonomy and fiscal decentralisation, which form the article’s core theme. The article explains this reluctance through weak fiscal autonomy, state control over staff, incomplete transfer of functions and poor municipal revenues despite the 74th Amendment.

  • Delhi Police Seek Review of UAPA Bail Principles

    Why in the News?

    The Delhi Police urged the Supreme Court of India to refer the issue of bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) to a larger Bench, citing “conflicting” judgments on prolonged incarceration and bail.

    Key Issue Before the Court

    • The question is whether: Long incarceration and delay in trial can override strict bail restrictions under UAPA.

    Delhi Police’s Argument

    Additional Solicitor General S. V. Raju argued:

    • Under Section 43D(5) of UAPA, the presumption of innocence takes a “backseat”.
    • If accusations appear “prima facie true”, bail restrictions become mandatory.
    • Conflicting Supreme Court judgments require consideration by a larger Bench.

    Background of the Case

    • The hearing concerned bail pleas of:
      • Abdul Khalid Saifi
      • Tasleem Ahmad
    • Accused in the 2020 Delhi riots conspiracy case.

    Reference to Recent Supreme Court Judgment

    • A Bench led by: B. V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan recently observed:
    • “Bail is the rule and jail is the exception” even under UAPA.
    • Prolonged incarceration violates:
      • Right to life
      • Personal liberty
      • Speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India

    K.A. Najeeb Judgment

    • The Court referred to the Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb case, which held: Constitutional courts can grant bail despite UAPA restrictions when trials are excessively delayed.

    Section 43D(5) of UAPA

    • Restricts bail if accusations appear prima facie true.
    • Considered one of the strictest bail provisions in Indian law.

    Related Development

    A Delhi court dismissed interim bail plea of Umar Khalid for attending bereavement rituals and caring for his ailing mother.

    UPSC Prelims Pointers

    • UAPA is India’s anti-terror law.
    • Section 43D(5) imposes strict bail conditions.
    • Article 21 guarantees life and personal liberty.
    • K.A. Najeeb judgment recognised prolonged incarceration as ground for bail.
    [2020] Consider the following statements: 
    1. The Constitution of India defines its ‘basic structure’ in terms of federalism, secularism, fundamental rights and democracy. 
    2. The Constitution of India provides for ‘judicial review’ to safeguard the citizens’ liberties and to preserve the ideals on which the Constitution is based. 
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? 
    a) 1 only
    b) 2 only
    c) Both 1 and 2
    d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • In federalism challenges, consensus is the solution

    Why in the News?

    India’s federalism debate has regained urgency because the post-2026 delimitation exercise could significantly reshape parliamentary representation due to changing demographic patterns. The discussion has gained further traction through a book, A Sixth of Humanity, which identifies a growing democratic deficit in representation, rising fiscal resentments, and weakening democratic sensitivity as emerging fault lines in Indian federalism.

    How Is India Witnessing a Rising Democratic Deficit in Representation?

    1. Equal Citizenship: Democracy requires that citizens possess broadly equal political weight, making periodic adjustment of parliamentary representation inevitable.
    2. Constitutional Freeze: Constitutional amendments in 1976 and 2002 froze delimitation until the first Census after 2026 to avoid penalising states that achieved population control.
    3. Demographic Divergence: Southern states and West Bengal have reached or fallen below replacement fertility levels, while parts of the Hindi heartland continue to record relatively higher population growth.
    4. Population Redistribution: Population share has increasingly shifted toward northern states, raising pressure for seat redistribution in Parliament.
    5. Striking Data: Based on recent population estimates:
      1. Southern States: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, may collectively lose approximately 23 Lok Sabha seats.
      2. Northern States: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, may collectively gain around 31 seats.
    6. Governance Disincentive: States that successfully implemented family planning increasingly perceive delimitation as penalising demographic success.
    7. Democratic Deficit: Federal tensions are no longer restricted to administrative authority; they increasingly concern the distribution of political voice itself.

    How Are Rising Fiscal Transfers Intensifying Federal Strains?

    1. Rising Fiscal Transfers: Finance Commission transfers have increased significantly over time. Redistribution has become a major federal issue.
    2. Widening Fiscal Gap: The gap between contributing and beneficiary states has widened sharply, especially after the 1990s.
      1. Hindi Heartland Gains: By 2023, Hindi heartland states received nearly 90% more transfers relative to economic contribution.
      2. Southern States’ Loss: Southern states received nearly 44% less relative to contribution, despite stronger economic and demographic performance.
      3. Western States’ Loss: Western states received around 58% less relative to contribution, increasing perceptions of fiscal imbalance.
    3. Beyond North-South Divide: The divide is not purely regional.
      1. Major contributors: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Haryana, besides southern states.
      2. Major beneficiaries: Odisha and West Bengal, alongside Hindi belt states.
    4. Redistributive Tension: Better-performing states increasingly view transfers as penalising economic and demographic success.
    5. Federal Concern: Redistribution is necessary for national cohesion. However, prolonged asymmetry risks creating regional resentment and combative federal politics.

    Why Is Cooperative Federalism Gradually Turning Combative?

    Cooperative Federalism ensures consultation, negotiation, and consensus-building between the Centre and States in policymaking. States function as partners rather than subordinates.

    Combative Federalism reflects increasing political confrontation, distrust, and unilateral decision-making, where Centre-State relations become adversarial.

    1. Consultative Deficit: Several major policy decisions are increasingly perceived to involve limited state consultation, weakening institutional trust.
    2. Policy Examples:
      1. Demonetisation (2016): Implemented with minimal prior state consultation.
      2. CAA, 2019: Triggered opposition from several states.
      3. Farm Laws: Generated strong resistance, especially from Punjab and other agrarian states.
      4. Criminal Law Reforms: Replacement of IPC, CrPC, and Evidence Act raised concerns over inadequate deliberation.
      5. Electoral Changes: Perceived centralisation in electoral processes created federal sensitivities.
      6. Women’s Reservation Act: Linking implementation to future delimitation revived regional anxieties.
    3. Power Asymmetry: India’s federal system gives the Union greater institutional power, increasing the need for restraint and accommodation.
    4. Changing Federal Culture: Earlier federal bargaining and compromise are increasingly perceived as giving way to majoritarian policymaking.
    5. Visible Consequence: Federal dissatisfaction has surfaced in Kashmir, Ladakh, Manipur, southern states, and among religious minorities, reflecting declining political trust.
    6. Resultant Shift: Weak consultation risks transforming cooperative federalism into combative federalism, where negotiation is replaced by confrontation.
    7. Visible Grievances: Federal dissatisfaction has surfaced in Kashmir, Ladakh, Manipur, southern states, and among religious minorities, reflecting weakening trust in institutions.

    What are the Deeper Causes Behind Federal Strains?

    Divergent Economic and Demographic Performance

    1. Economic Divergence: Since the 1980s, southern and western states, along with Haryana and West Bengal, have recorded faster growth in per capita GDP.
    2. Developmental Gap: Better-performing states increasingly generate greater economic output while simultaneously experiencing slower population growth.
    3. Migration Dynamics: Faster-growing regions attract labour migration, increasing demands on infrastructure and public expenditure
    4. Federal Contradiction: States generating greater economic value increasingly demand greater fiscal retention and political influence, whereas poorer states remain dependent on redistribution.
    5. High-Stakes Politics: Federal debates now concern both power and resources simultaneously, making compromise more difficult.

    Erosion of Democratic Sensitivity 

    1. Democratic Sensitivity: Federal systems require consultation, accommodation, compromise, and respect for dissent, especially within diverse societies.
    2. Historical Practice: Earlier federalism functioned through negotiation and bargaining, even amid political disagreements.
    3. GST Council Example (2018): The then Union Finance Minister reportedly avoided pushing through a vote on gambling taxation due to lack of consensus, preserving cooperative legitimacy.
    4. Current Challenge: Increasing unilateralism weakens the trust that sustains federal systems beyond constitutional text.
    5. Political Risk: Weakening democratic sensitivity may convert manageable disagreements into structural federal crises.

    What is Consensus-based federalism?

    Consensus-Based Federalism refers to a model of federalism where the Centre and States resolve disputes through consultation, negotiation, compromise, and mutual accommodation rather than unilateral decision-making. It prioritises trust-building and shared decision-making in managing political, fiscal, and administrative differences.

    Examples of Consensus-Based Federalism

    1. GST Council: Ensures Centre-State bargaining through consensus-based tax decisions. In 2018, the Union government reportedly avoided forcing a vote on gambling taxation due to lack of consensus.
    2. Linguistic Reorganisation (1956): Prevented regional alienation through negotiated accommodation of linguistic identities instead of coercive centralisation.
    3. 14th Finance Commission: Increased states’ share in the divisible tax pool from 32% to 42%, strengthening fiscal autonomy and cooperative federalism.
    4. COVID-19 Coordination: Facilitated Centre-State cooperation on vaccination, containment measures, and disaster response despite political differences.
    5. Creation of Telangana (2014): Reflected constitutional accommodation of regional aspirations through democratic negotiation.
    6. Inter-State Water Sharing Arrangements: Agreements on Krishna and Ravi-Beas rivers demonstrate negotiated, though contested, federal settlements.
    7. Key Outcome: Consensus-based federalism reduces regional alienation, strengthens legitimacy, and prevents cooperative federalism from turning combative.

    Can Consensus-Based Federalism Provide a Sustainable Solution?

    1. Institutional Consultation: Strengthens cooperative mechanisms such as the Inter-State Council (Article 263) and structured Centre-State dialogue.
    2. Delimitation Safeguards: Balances demographic justice with protection against penalising population-control success.
    3. Fiscal Reform: Ensures transparent and legitimate redistribution through balanced Finance Commission criteria.
    4. Consensus-based Policymaking: Reduces adversarial politics by prioritising negotiation over unilateral assertion.
    5. Democratic Self-restraint: Requires stronger constitutional actors to exercise restraint for preserving federal legitimacy.

    Conclusion

    India’s federal challenge today is not solely about constitutional distribution of powers but about preserving trust between unequals. Demographic shifts, fiscal redistribution disputes, and political centralisation have exposed tensions within the federal compact. Sustainable solutions require consultation, accommodation, compromise, and democratic self-restraint, ensuring that federalism remains an instrument of national integration rather than regional alienation.

    Value Addition

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Federalism

    1. Article 1: India as a “Union of States”.
    2. Seventh Schedule: Union, State and Concurrent Lists.
    3. Article 246: Legislative competence.
    4. Article 263: Inter-State Council.
    5. Article 280: Finance Commission.
    6. Article 275: Grants-in-aid.
    7. Article 356: President’s Rule.
    8. 73rd & 74th Amendments: Decentralisation.

    Key Commissions/Reports

    1. Sarkaria Commission (1983): Recommended cooperative rather than coercive federalism.
    2. Punchhi Commission (2007): Recommended greater consultation and state autonomy.
    3. 15th Finance Commission: Added demographic performance as a criterion.

    Key Supreme Court Judgments

    1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India: Strengthened federalism and limited misuse of Article 356.

    Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India: Reinforced cooperative federalism and constitutional morality.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What changes has the Union Government recently introduced in the domain of Centre-State relations? Suggest measures to be adopted to build the trust between the Centre and the States and for strengthening federalism.Linkage: This PYQ is directly aligned with the article’s core argument on eroding cooperative federalism, consultation deficit, and trust deficit between Centre and States.The article provides contemporary examples to enrich answers on strengthening federalism.

  • Supreme Court on Bail and UAPA

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court of India expressed “serious reservations” about aspects of its earlier judgment denying bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots conspiracy case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA).

    Key Observations by the Court

    • The Court reaffirmed that:
      • “Bail is the rule, jail is the exception.”
    • Justice Ujjal Bhuyan stated that prolonged incarceration without timely trial violates:
      • Right to life
      • Personal liberty
      • Speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India

    Section 43-D(5) of UAPA

    • Restricts grant of bail if accusations appear “prima facie true”.
    • Creates a very low threshold for the prosecution to oppose bail.

    Court’s Observation

    • Courts cannot keep an accused indefinitely jailed merely because charges appear prima facie true.
    • Delayed trials can convert pre-trial detention into punishment itself.

    Reference to K.A. Najeeb Judgment

    • The Court referred to the K.A. Najeeb Judgment, which held that constitutional courts can grant bail despite UAPA restrictions when incarceration becomes excessively prolonged.

    Constitutional Principle

    • Presumption of innocence remains a cornerstone of criminal justice.
    • Section 43-D(5) remains subordinate to Article 21.

    Background of the Case

    • Delhi Police booked Umar Khalid and others under UAPA in connection with the 2020 Delhi riots conspiracy case linked to protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).
    • Umar Khalid had spent over five years in prison as an undertrial.
    [2020] Consider the following statements: 
    1. The Constitution of India defines its ‘basic structure’ in terms of federalism, secularism, fundamental rights and democracy. 
    2. The Constitution of India provides for ‘judicial review’ to safeguard the citizens’ liberties and to preserve the ideals on which the Constitution is based. 
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? 
    a) 1 only b) 2 only c) Both 1 and 2 d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Ordinance Increases Supreme Court Judges to 37

    Why in the News?

    President Droupadi Murmu promulgated an ordinance increasing the number of judges in the Supreme Court of India to 37, excluding the Chief Justice of India.

    Key Highlights

    • The ordinance was issued under Article 123 of the Constitution of India.
    • Total sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court will rise:
      • From 34 to 38 judges
      • Including the Chief Justice of India

    Purpose of the Move

    • Aims to address rising pendency of cases.
    • Current backlog exceeds: 93,000 cases
    • Backlog is increasing rapidly ahead of the court’s summer recess.

    Amendment Made

    • The ordinance amended Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956.
    • Replaced “33” with “37” judges excluding the CJI.

    Article 124 of the Constitution of India

    • Originally provided for:
      • Chief Justice of India
      • Not more than seven judges
    • Parliament can increase the number by law.

    Evolution of Supreme Court Strength

    • 1950: 7 judges
    • 1956: 10
    • 1960: 13
    • 1977: 17
    • 1986: 25
    • 2009: 30
    • 2019: 33
    • 2026: 37

    Present Vacancy Situation

    Current vacancies include:

    • Seat of former CJI B. R. Gavai
    • Vacancy after retirement of Rajesh Bindal

    More retirements due in 2026:

    • Justice J.K. Maheshwari
    • Justice Pankaj Mithal
    • Justice Sanjay Karol

    Ordinance Rules

    • Ordinance must be approved by Parliament after reassembly.
    • It ceases to operate after six weeks if not approved by both Houses.
    [2025] With Reference to the Indian polity, consider the following statements: 
    I. An Ordinance can amend any central Act. 
    II. An Ordinance can abridge a Fundamental Right. 
    III. An Ordinance can come into effect from a back date. 
    Which of the statements given above are correct? 
    [A] I and II only [B] II and III only [C] I and III only [D] I, II and III

  • Supreme Court on Workers’ Right to Living Wage

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court of India observed that the State should ensure “living wages” for workers instead of treating protesting workers as “terrorists” while hearing petitions related to detentions under the National Security Act, 1980 after the Noida workers’ protest.

    Key Observations by the Supreme Court

    • Justice B. V. Nagarathna stated that workers demanding higher wages should not be viewed as terrorists.
    • Justice Ujjal Bhuyan referred to the Directive Principles of State Policy regarding living wages for workers.

    Constitutional Basis

    Article 43 of the Constitution of India

    • Directs the State to secure:
      • Living wages
      • Decent working conditions
      • Reasonable standard of life
      • Social and cultural opportunities for workers

    Issue Before the Court

    • Family members of detained protestors challenged arrests under the NSA.
    • Petitioners alleged:
      • Multiple FIRs based on the same conspiracy
      • No preliminary enquiry
      • Protestors labelled as “left-wing sympathisers”

    Court Directions

    • The Supreme Court ordered production of two detainees from Kasna jail on May 18.
    • Restrained the Uttar Pradesh government from shifting them to police remand.
    • Allegations of custodial torture were also raised before the Court.

    About the National Security Act (NSA), 1980

    • Preventive detention law allowing detention to maintain:
      • National security
      • Public order
      • Essential supplies and services
    • Allows detention without formal charges for a specified period.
    [2017] Which principle among the following was added to the Directive Principles of State Policy by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution? 
    (a) Equal pay for equal work for both men and women 
    (b) Participation of workers in the management of industries 
    (c) Right to work, education and public assistance 
    (d) Securing living wage and human conditions of work to workers

  • Sabarimala Review Case and Religious Freedom

    Why in the News

    • During the Sabarimala Temple Entry Dispute review hearing, the Union government argued before the Supreme Court that all religious practices are presumed constitutionally protected unless they violate: Public order, Morality, and Health
    • The Centre also questioned the judicially evolved doctrine of “Essential Religious Practices” (ERP).

    What is ERP?

    The ERP doctrine was evolved by the Supreme Court to determine:

    • Which religious practices are “essential” to a religion
    • Only such essential practices receive constitutional protection

    Centre’s Criticism of ERP Doctrine

    • The Centre argued:
      • The phrase “essential religious practices” does not appear in the Constitution.
      • It is a judicial innovation created through court interpretation.
    • According to the Centre:
      • Articles 25 and 26 should receive broad interpretation like other Fundamental Rights.
      • Courts should avoid excessive interference in religious matters.

    Supreme Court’s Observations

    • Faith Beyond Rituals: Surya Kant observed:
      • One need not visit temples to be religious.
      • Even lighting a lamp in a hut can express faith.
    • Hinduism as a Way of Life: Justice B. V. Nagarathna remarked:
      • Hinduism is a “way of life”
      • It is not dependent solely on rituals or temple visits

    Related Case Laws

    • Shirur Mutt Case
      • Origin of ERP doctrine
      • Court held religion includes essential practices
    • Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala
      • Allowed women of all ages entry into Sabarimala Temple
      • Linked exclusion to constitutional equality
    • Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Case: Upheld denominational autonomy regarding excommunication
    [2020] Consider the following statements: 
    1. The Constitution of India defines its ‘basic structure’ in terms of federalism, secularism, fundamental rights and democracy. 
    2. The Constitution of India provides for ‘judicial review’ to safeguard the citizens’ liberties and to preserve the ideals on which the Constitution is based. 
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? 
    a) 1 only b) 2 only c) Both 1 and 2 d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Tamil Nadu Assembly Floor Test 2026

    Why in the News

    Vijay won the confidence motion in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly with 144 votes, ensuring the survival of the TVK-led coalition government.

    Key Highlights of the Floor Test

    • Confidence Motion Passed
      • The motion moved by Chief Minister Vijay received: 144 votes in favour
    • Supporting Parties
      • Indian National Congress
      • Communist Party of India
      • Communist Party of India (Marxist)
      • Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi
      • Indian Union Muslim League
      • 25 rebel AIADMK MLAs
      • One AMMK MLA

    Constitutional Significance of Floor Test

    • What is a Floor Test?: A mechanism to determine whether the government enjoys majority support in the legislature.
    • Conducted By: Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
    • Constitutional Basis: Related to Article 164(2) of the Constitution:
    • Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly.

    Anti-Defection Aspect

    • Relevant Provision: Tenth Schedule of the Constitution
    • Deals With
      • Defection by legislators
      • Violation of party whip
    • Possible Issue Ahead
    • Potential action against rebel AIADMK MLAs.

    Note: In India, the office of the “whip” is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Rules of the House, or any parliamentary statute; rather, it is based on convention. However, the authority to issue whips and the consequences for defying them are legally upheld by the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law).

    [2020] A Parliamentary System of Government is one in which 
    a) All political parties in the Parliament are represented in the Government 
    b) the Government is responsible to the Parliament and can be removed by it 
    c) the Government is elected by the people and can be removed by them 
    d) the Government is chosen by the Parliament but cannot be removed by it before completion of a fixed term

  • One Case One Data & Su Sahay

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court of India has launched two major digital initiatives: “One Case One Data” and “Su Sahay”. These initiatives aim to modernise judicial administration and improve access to justice through technology.

    One Case One Data

    • “One Case One Data” is a nationwide digital integration initiative announced by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant.
    • It seeks to create a unified judicial data management system connecting:
      • Supreme Court
      • High Courts
      • District Courts
      • Taluka Courts

    Objective

    • Streamline case management
    • Build a comprehensive digital judicial database
    • Improve coordination among courts
    • Reduce duplication and delays

    Su Sahay

    • “Su Sahay” is an AI-powered chatbot integrated with the Supreme Court website.
    • It has been developed by:
      • National Informatics Centre (NIC)
      • Supreme Court Registry
    • Objective: To provide easier access to court-related information and services for litigants.

    Role of National Informatics Centre (NIC)

    • NIC is the premier technology institution under the Government of India responsible for:
      • E-governance infrastructure
      • Digital public platforms
      • Government IT services
    [2022] Consider the following: 
    1. Aarogya Setu 
    2. CoWIN 
    3. DigiLocker 
    4. DIKSHA 
    Which of the above are built on top of open-source digital platforms? 
    (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2, 3 and 4 only (c) 1, 3 and 4 only (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4