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Subject: Polity

  • The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025

    Why in the News?

    The Union Home Minister is set to introduce three bills in the Lok Sabha to provide legal framework for removal of the Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Chief Ministers and Ministers in States and UTs who are “arrested and detained in custody on account of serious criminal charges.”

    Which are the three Bills?

    1. 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2025 (discussed below)
    2. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Amendment) Bill, 2025 – Provides clarity on removal of CM and Ministers in J&K.
    3. Government of Union Territories (Amendment) Bill, 2025 – Defines similar provisions for Puducherry and other UTs.

    About the 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2025:

    • Scope: Applies to Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and Ministers at Union, State, and Union Territory levels.
    • Grounds for Removal: Arrest and detention for 30 consecutive days for an offense punishable by five years or more.
    • Reappointment: Possible after release from custody.
    • Objective: Prevent prolonged tenure of arrested leaders in office (e.g., recent case involving Delhi CM Arvind Kejriwal).

    Amendments proposed to the following Articles:

    Current Provision Limitation Changes Proposed
    Article 75 (Union – PM & Union Ministers) PM appointed by President; Ministers appointed on PM’s advice. They hold office during the pleasure of the President. Removal is political (loss of confidence, resignation, dismissal). No explicit mechanism to remove PM/Ministers if detained/arrested for long periods. New provision: If PM or any Union Minister is detained in custody for 30 consecutive days for a serious offense (≥5 years punishment), they must resign by 31st day or automatically cease to hold office. They may be reappointed after release.
    Article 164 (States – CM & State Ministers) CM appointed by Governor; Ministers appointed on CM’s advice. They hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. Council of Ministers collectively responsible to State Assembly. No clear rule for automatic removal if CM/Ministers remain in custody. Similar to Union level: If CM or Minister is detained in custody for 30 consecutive days under serious charges (≥5 years punishment), they automatically lose office. Reappointment allowed after release.
    Article 239AA (Union Territory of Delhi – CM & Ministers) Special status for Delhi (NCT). CM and Council of Ministers aid & advise LG. They hold office as per political responsibility to the Assembly. No explicit provision for automatic removal on detention. A new Section 5A to be inserted: CM/Ministers of NCT of Delhi cease office if detained for 30 days under serious charges (≥5 years). Reappointment possible after release.

    Rationale and Significance:

    • At present, the Constitution has no provision for automatic removal of ministers in custody.
    • Bill ensures that office bearers uphold public trust and do not undermine governance during detention.
    • The statement of objects emphasized that elected representatives must rise above political interests and maintain conduct beyond suspicion.
    • Promotes integrity of democracy by aligning ministerial positions with constitutional morality and accountability.
    [UPSC 2020] Consider the following statements:

    1. According to the Constitution of India, a person who is eligible to vote can be made a minister in a State for six months even if he/she is not a member of the Legislature of that State.

    2. According to the Representation of People Act, 1951, a person convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to imprisonment for five years is permanently disqualified from contesting an election even after his release from prison.

    Options: (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2*

     

  • When can Courts order a Recount of Votes?

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court for the very first time has recounted EVM votes on its premises and overturned a Haryana sarpanch election result.

    Legal Framework for Challenging Election Results:

    • Parliamentary, Assembly, State Council elections: Validity can be challenged by filing an election petition in the High Court of the state where the election was held.
    • Local government elections: Petitions must be filed at district-level civil courts.
    • Eligibility to file: Only a candidate or elector related to the election can file.
    • Timeframe: Petition must be filed within 45 days of result declaration.
    • Petition requirements:
      • Must contain concise statement of material facts.
      • Allegations of “corrupt practices” must include names of individuals, dates, and locations.
    • Judicial Approach:
      • SC considers corrupt practices as quasi-criminal, requiring high standard of proof.
      • Vague or ambiguous petitions are dismissed.
    • Legal Basis:
      • Representation of the People Act, 1951.
      • State Panchayat Raj Acts.

    Grounds for Invalidating an Election:

    Courts can void an election on:

    • Bribery or undue influence, e.g., hiding criminal antecedents or promoting enmity.
    • Candidate disqualified/unqualified on the election date.
    • Improper rejection of nomination paper.
    • Improper acceptance of nomination or improper reception/rejection of votes, if shown to materially affect results.
    • Non-compliance with Constitution or election laws/rules, if it materially impacted the outcome.

    When can Courts order Recount of Votes?

    • A recount is a possible judicial remedy but not granted lightly.
    • Seen as affecting vote secrecy, which is vital to free and fair elections.
    • Courts order recounts only if:
      • Petitioner presents specific material facts.
      • Evidence shows a prima facie case of probable counting error.
      • Recount is deemed necessary for justice.
    • Normally conducted at election location.
    • Exception: Panipat case, where SC recounted votes in its own premises.

    Can Courts declare a new Winner?

    • Rare, but courts can declare a new winner if:
      • Evidence shows petitioner (or another candidate) actually had majority of valid votes.
      • Or petitioner proves they would have won but for votes gained through corrupt practices.
    • Requires concrete, quantifiable evidence of tainted votes.
    • Example: In Feb 2024 Chandigarh mayoral election, SC declared a new winner after:
      • Presiding officer wrongly invalidated 8 paper ballots.
      • All votes had been cast for the losing candidate.
      • SC restored them as valid, making the losing candidate the winner.
    [UPSC 2004] Consider the following tasks:

    1. Superintendence, direction and conduct of free and fair elections.

    2. Preparation of electoral rolls for all elections to the Parliament, State Legislatures and the Office of the President and the Vice-President.

    3. Giving recognition to political parties and allotting election symbols to political parties and individuals contesting the election.

    4. Proclamation of final verdict in the case of election disputes.

    Which of the above are the functions of the Election Commission of India?

    Options: (a) 1, 2 and 3* (b) 2, 3 and 4 (c) 1 and 3 (d) 1, 2 and 4

     

  • [18th August 2025] The Hindu Op-ed: A case for judicial introspection

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2017] To enhance the quality of democracy in India the Election Commission of India has proposed electoral reforms in 2016. What are the suggested reforms and how far are they significant to make democracy successful?

    Linkage: The 2016 ECI reforms sought to strengthen electoral transparency and fairness, while the current debate on the 2023 Act vs. Baranwal judgment highlights how the independence of ECI itself is under threat. Together, they show that both institutional autonomy and procedural reforms are essential for improving the quality of democracy.

    Mentor’s Comment:

    The credibility of elections is the lifeline of any democracy. Recent controversies around the appointment of Election Commissioners and the weakening of institutional safeguards have put India’s electoral integrity under the spotlight. This article unpacks the constitutional debates, judicial interventions, legislative countermeasures, and comparative global experiences to help aspirants understand the stakes involved in preserving the Election Commission of India (ECI) as an independent constitutional body.

    Introduction

    The Election Commission of India (ECI) ensures that elections are free, fair, and impartial. In 2023, the Supreme Court’s Anoop Baranwal case gave more independence to the ECI by including the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in the appointment process. But Parliament quickly passed a law removing the CJI and putting a Cabinet Minister in his place. The Court did not stop this change, and elections in 2024 were conducted under this new system. This has raised doubts about whether the ECI can act independently from the government.

    Current debate over who controls ECI appointments

    1. Nullification of Baranwal judgment: The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. replaced the CJI with a Cabinet Minister (nominated by the PM) in the selection panel, reversing judicial attempts to ensure independence.
    2. Supreme Court’s refusal to stay the law: In Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India (2024), the SC upheld the Act’s validity for the time being, allowing the government’s version to prevail in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.
    3. Failure of judicial vigilance: A potentially independent ECI could have overseen elections more impartially, but judicial reluctance meant the executive retained control.
    4. Global parallels: Scholars like Landau and Dixon (2020) warn how courts sometimes legitimize authoritarian regimes by siding with executive dominance in electoral matters.

    Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023): The Supreme Court’s big step for ECI independence

    1. Article 324 interpretation: The Court held that appointments to the ECI must be insulated from the executive’s exclusive control.
    2. Role of CJI: Inclusion of the Chief Justice in the selection committee was seen as a safeguard against partisanship.
    3. Warning against pliability: The judgment noted that a “pliable ECI” could become a tool for perpetuating power, undermining free and fair elections.

    The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023: Parliament’s counter to the Court

    1. Executive dominance: By excluding the CJI and including a Cabinet Minister, the law tilted the balance back towards government control.
    2. Presumption of validity: The SC’s refusal to strike down or stay the Act demonstrated a conservative approach, prioritizing legislative supremacy over constitutional safeguards.
    3. Practical implications: The 2024 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections were conducted under an ECI shaped by this executive-heavy framework.

    Global lessons on electoral manipulation

    1. Authoritarian strategies: According to Landau & Dixon, regimes in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia used courts and electoral commissions to legitimize manipulated outcomes.
    2. Pre-election manipulation: Autocrats often consolidate institutions (courts, ECs) well before elections, creating a tilted playing field.
    3. Positive global model: South Africa’s Chapter Nine institutions, including its Electoral Commission, provide a framework for independent, fourth-branch institutions to safeguard democracy.

    Fourth pillar of democracy: Autonomous Institutions

    1. Beyond traditional separation: Modern democracies recognize institutions beyond Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary such as independent ECs, CAGs, Information Commissions.
    2. Imaginative interpretation: In the Baranwal case, the Court attempted to evolve the ECI into such a fourth branch institution, enhancing checks on executive power.
    3. Legislative reversal: The 2023 Act effectively nullified this innovation, raising questions about India’s commitment to electoral impartiality.

    The road ahead for electoral reforms: Restoring faith in Democracy

    1. Reinstating CJI in the selection panel: This would revive the spirit of the Baranwal verdict.
    2. Fresh appointments through a reformed process: Ensuring a genuinely independent ECI could require re-selection of commissioners.
    3. Truth Commission role: A reformed ECI could investigate alleged instances of electoral fraud, restoring voter confidence.

    Conclusion

    The ECI is not just another administrative body, it is the custodian of the democratic process. The dilution of judicial safeguards in its appointment mechanism risks eroding the integrity of elections, thereby weakening the very foundation of democracy. Restoring the spirit of Baranwal by reinstating the CJI’s role in appointments and insulating the ECI from executive control remains the most urgent democratic reform.

    Mapping Microthemes (GS relevance)

    • GS-II (Polity & Governance): Electoral reforms, Independence of constitutional bodies, Separation of powers.
    • GS-I: Role of institutions in shaping democratic practices.
    • GS-III: Impact of political manipulation on governance outcomes.
    • GS-IV (Ethics): Constitutional morality, impartiality, institutional integrity.

  • How inclusive is EC’s special revision exercise?

    The Election Commission of India’s (ECI) Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has become a focal point of debate, extending beyond a routine update. The ECI’s insistence on specific identity and citizenship proofs, most notably the birth certificate, has sparked a critical discussion. The core issue is the potential for widespread voter exclusion, which stands in stark contrast to the foundational democratic principle of ensuring the broadest possible inclusion of all eligible citizens. A recent Lokniti-CSDS survey, conducted across five states and one Union Territory, provides compelling data that challenges the feasibility and inclusivity of the SIR exercise as it is currently designed.

    The Paradox of Electoral Reforms: Inclusion vs. Exclusion

    The Unintended Consequences of the Special Intensive Revision

    1. Documentation Burden: Over half of all respondents lack a birth certificate. A similar proportion lacks a domicile or caste certificate, while at least two-thirds don’t have their parents’ birth certificates.
    2. Widespread Lack of Awareness: Only 36% of respondents were aware of the SIR exercise or its document requirements, indicating a massive information gap.
    3. Socio-Economic Disparities: The lack of necessary documents disproportionately affects vulnerable groups. Roughly 5% of respondents had none of the 11 documents required by the EC. This group of “No Document Citizens” had a higher percentage of women, and were predominantly from the lower economic half, with over one-fourth being SC and over 40% OBC.

    Which groups are most vulnerable to exclusion?

    1. No-document citizens: 5% of respondents had none of the 11 documents.
    2. Marginalized impact: Majority of these were women, ¾ from lower economic strata, ¼ SC, and 40% OBC.
    3. Parental records: Absence of parental birth certificates was as high as 87% in Madhya Pradesh and 72% mothers in Uttar Pradesh.

    Impact of the SIR on Indian democracy

    • Core democratic risk: Exclusion of eligible voters undermines the principle of universal adult suffrage.
    • State capacity challenge: Weak record-keeping and low administrative accessibility deepen inequalities.
    • Policy dilemma: While cleansing electoral rolls is important, the current framework risks mass deletion of legitimate voters.

    Administrative challenges contributing to this problem

    1. Inconsistent Birth Certificate Possession: The possession of birth certificates varies sharply across states, revealing significant administrative and historical disparities. In Madhya Pradesh only 11% of respondents had a birth certificate and in West Bengal, with a 49% possession rate. Even in states with higher rates like West Bengal and Delhi, at least half the population still lacks this document.
    2. Difficulty in Obtaining Documents: The process is perceived as “very difficult” by a substantial portion of the population in major states, including 46% in Delhi, 41% in Kerala, 40% in Madhya Pradesh, and 41% in West Bengal.
    3. Parental Documents as a Major Hurdle: The requirement for parental documents for those born after 1987 (and for both parents for those born after 2003) is a near-impossible condition for many.
    4. State Capacity Gaps: The survey highlights the varying capacity of different states to provide and maintain official records, which is a major factor in the documentation gaps.
    5. Exclusion of Aadhaar: The EC’s decision to exclude Aadhaar creates an unnecessary barrier for voters, especially in states where other documents are rare.

    The findings of the Lokniti-CSDS survey underscore that while cleansing electoral rolls is a valid goal, the current SIR framework is not inclusive. The reliance on documents that many citizens lack, coupled with significant state-wise and socio-economic disparities in document possession, creates a high risk of voter exclusion. The data show that the exercise, as it stands, is more likely to disenfranchise legitimate voters than to simply remove errors, highlighting the need for a more pragmatic and flexible approach that accounts for the ground realities of India’s diverse population.

     

    Value Addition

    The SIR’s Challenge to Inclusive Democracy

    The Election Commission’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) aims to update voter lists but risks excluding many citizens. This is a problem because it goes against the core democratic principle of including all eligible voters.

    1. Cleansing vs. Exclusion: While cleaning up the voter list is a good goal, the SIR’s strict rules about documents could lead to the removal of many people who have a legal right to vote. The survey showed that 5% of people lack any of the required documents, with this problem hitting women and people from lower economic backgrounds the hardest.
    2. State Variation: The SIR’s uniform rules are problematic because the ability to get official documents varies greatly across India. For example, possession of a birth certificate is very low in Madhya Pradesh (11%) compared to West Bengal (49%).
    3. Democratic Principle: Democracy depends on everyone having the right to vote. By creating new barriers, the SIR exercise weakens the foundation of free and fair elections.

    Mapping Micro Themes:

    1. GS1: Social exclusion, regional disparities in documentation.
    2. GS2: Electoral reforms, governance capacity, rights of citizens.
    3. GS3: Use of technology (Aadhaar vs exclusions), administrative bottlenecks
    4. GS4: Ethical governance, fairness, justice in democracy.

    PYQ Relevance:

    [UPSC 2017] To enhance the quality of democracy in India the Election Commission of India has proposed electoral reforms in 2016. What are the suggested reforms and how far are they significant to make democracy successful?

    Linkage: The 2016 ECI reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability (e.g., NOTA, state funding, criminal disqualification), while the SIR focuses on electoral roll accuracy. Both highlight the tension between integrity and inclusivity in democracy. The linkage shows that reforms must balance systemic credibility with citizens’ access, else democracy risks exclusion.

     

  • Supreme Court interventions in Civil–Criminal overlap Cases

    Why in the News?

    In August 2025, the Supreme Court intervened twice to prevent the misuse of criminal proceedings in essentially civil disputes.

    About Civil and Criminal Cases:

    • Civil cases involve disputes between individuals or organisations and are mostly governed by Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The aim is to resolve rights and duties, usually through compensation (damages) or injunctions. Examples: property disputes, contract breaches, divorce, custody, money recovery.
    • Criminal cases involve offences against the state or society. The objective is punishment and deterrence. Initiated by the state prosecutor. Examples: theft, cheating, assault, murder.
    • Burden of proof:
      • Civil cases: Decided on a preponderance of probabilities (more likely than not).
      • Criminal cases: Guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
    • Dual Cases: Some acts can give rise to both civil and criminal liability. For dual proceedings, there must be proof of criminal intent before entering the commercial or personal relationship.
    • Timelines: Data from the National Judicial Data Grid (2025) shows civil cases are slower (avg. 4.91 years) compared to many criminal cases (70% disposed within a year).

    Recent Supreme Court Actions:

    • Rajasthan plywood dispute case (Aug 13, 2025): SC held there was no criminal breach of trust in a simple sale transaction. Denial of pre-arrest bail by the High Court was overturned.
    • Allahabad HC case (Aug 4, 2025): SC criticised a judge for allowing criminal proceedings in a business transaction dispute, calling it a “mockery of justice”. The judge was temporarily barred from handling criminal cases, later reinstated after CJI intervention.
      • The SC clarified that civil disputes cannot be turned into criminal prosecutions unless fraud or criminal intent is clearly shown.
    [UPSC 2016] With reference to the ‘Gram Nyayalaya Act’, which of the following statements is/are correct?

    1. As per the Act, Gram Nyayalayas can hear only civil cases and not criminal cases.

    2. The Act allows local social activists as mediators/reconciliators.

    Options: (a) 1 only (b) 2 only* (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

     

  • Aid and advice: On Jammu and Kashmir and the Lieutenant-Governor’s Assembly member nominations

    The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has told the J&K High Court that the Lieutenant-Governor (L-G) can nominate five Assembly members without the “aid and advice” of the elected government. This position has sparked a constitutional debate over democratic accountability in a politically sensitive Union Territory where such nominations could alter the balance of power. This is significant because these nominations could decide the majority in a 119-member House, potentially overturning the people’s electoral verdict. The High Court is examining whether this undermines the Constitution’s basic structure.

    Core issues before the J&K High Court

    1. Constitutional question: Whether the 2023 amendments to the J&K Reorganisation Act, allowing the L-G to nominate five members, violate the Constitution’s basic structure.
    2. Potential impact: These five voting members could “convert a minority government into a majority government and vice versa,” influencing governance stability.
    3. Judicial scope: Goes beyond statutory interpretation into democratic essence.

    Provisions of the 2023 amendments

    1. Sections 15A & 15B of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019: Allows nomination of two Kashmiri migrants (including one woman) and one from Pakistan-occupied J&K, in addition to two women if inadequately represented.
    2. Total seats: Creates five nominated members in the 119-member Assembly.
    3. Voting rights: These nominees have full voting powers.

    Centre’s justification of this power

    1. MHA’s submission: Nominations fall outside the elected government’s remit, citing K. Lakshminarayanan vs Union of India (Puducherry).
    2. Legal references: Invokes “sanctioned strength” concept, including elected + nominated members, and Section 12 of the 1963 Union Territories Act on voting procedures.
    3. Approach: Focuses on legal technicalities rather than broader constitutional implications.

    Concerns over democratic implications

    1. Risk of mandate distortion: In a tight Assembly, nominees could decide government stability.
    2. Precedent in Puducherry: In 2021, nominated members plus defectors contributed to the collapse of the Congress-led government.
    3. UT context: J&K’s downgrade from State to UT in 2019 happened without consultation with elected representatives, making accountability critical.

    Supreme Court jurisprudence on L-G’s powers

    1. Delhi Services Cases (Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Union of India (2018), Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Union of India & Anr. (2023)): SC held that the L-G should act on the “aid and advice” of the elected government, with discretion as the exception.
    2. Contradiction: MHA’s stance that nominations lie outside the elected government’s domain runs counter to this jurisprudence.

    Conclusion

    The J&K nominations issue highlights the tension between administrative authority and the democratic mandate. In politically sensitive regions, bypassing elected governments in decisions that can shift Assembly majorities risks undermining public trust and the constitutional promise of representative governance.

    Value Addition
    • Basic Structure Doctrine: It evolved through landmark cases such as Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala (1973), which holds that Parliament cannot amend the Constitution in a way that damages its essential features. Representative democracy and federalism are recognised as part of this basic structure.
    • Lakshminarayanan Case (2019): In K. Lakshminarayanan vs Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld the Centre’s power to nominate MLAs in Puducherry without consulting the elected government. While constitutionally valid, the aftermath showed that nominated members could be politically aligned with the Centre, leading to destabilisation of the elected government. This precedent is now central to the J&K dispute, as similar powers are being exercised by the L-G.
    • Delhi vs L-G Jurisprudence: Through Government of NCT of Delhi vs Union of India (2018) and Government of NCT of Delhi vs Union of India & Anr. (2023), the Supreme Court emphasised that the L-G should act on the “aid and advice” of the elected Council of Ministers, except in explicitly stated matters of discretion. This jurisprudence reinforces the principle that administrative authority should not override the electoral mandate, making the MHA’s argument in J&K appear contrary to evolving constitutional norms.
    • Union Territory Governance Model: Union Territories with legislatures (like Delhi, Puducherry, and now J&K) operate under a hybrid governance system where the Centre retains significant control while local governments have legislative powers. This model inherently contains tensions between central authority and local democratic accountability. In politically sensitive UTs like J&K, such tensions are magnified, especially when powers like nominations can shift legislative majorities.

    Mapping Micro Themes for GS Paper II

    Topic Micro Theme Example
    Centre–State Relations Constitutional role of L-G in UTs & states J&K L-G nominations without elected govt’s aid and advice
    Electoral Process Integrity Impact of nominated members on Assembly majority Puducherry 2021 govt collapse case
    Basic Structure Doctrine Threat to democratic accountability HC challenge to J&K Reorganisation Act amendments
    Comparative Jurisprudence Lakshminarayanan vs Union of India precedent Puducherry nominated MLAs case
    Federalism in Special Regions J&K statehood restoration debate SC acknowledgement & public demand

    PYQ RELEVANCE

    [UPSC 2016] Discuss the essentials of the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act and the controversies regarding the powers of the Lieutenant Governor vis-à-vis the elected government in the NCT of Delhi.

    Linkage: The 69th Constitutional Amendment Act created a legislative assembly for Delhi and defined the relationship between the L-G and the elected government, leading to recurring disputes over whether the L-G must act on the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers.

    The J&K nominations case mirrors this constitutional tension—while Delhi’s dispute involved administrative control and services, J&K’s controversy centres on the L-G’s power to nominate voting members without elected government concurrence. Both situations raise a common constitutional question: Can the L-G exercise discretionary powers in a manner that can override or alter the democratic mandate? This makes Delhi’s precedent and Supreme Court rulings directly relevant to interpreting J&K’s case.

    Practice Mains Question

    Discuss the constitutional implications of granting the Lieutenant-Governor of Jammu & Kashmir the power to nominate Assembly members without the aid and advice of the elected government. In your answer, examine its impact on the democratic process in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence.

  • Removal of High Court Judges

    Why in the News?

    Lok Sabha Speaker has initiated removal proceedings against a Judge of the Allahabad High Court by admitting a motion signed by 146 members and forming a three-member inquiry committee.

    About Appointment of High Court Judges:

    • Constitutional Basis: Article 217 of the Constitution of India.
    • Appointing Authority: President of India, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI), Governor of the concerned State, and Chief Justice of the concerned High Court.
    • Collegium System: The proposal is initiated by the High Court’s Chief Justice, forwarded through the Chief Minister and Governor, and decided by the CJI along with the two senior-most judges of the Supreme Court.
    • Chief Justice Posting Policy: Chief Justices are appointed from outside the State to ensure impartiality.
    • Transfers: The CJI and senior-most judges of the Supreme Court decide transfers to maintain judicial independence.

    Removal Process:

    • Grounds: Proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
    • Procedure: Impeachment process under Articles 124(4) and 217, and Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
    • Initiation: Motion signed by at least 100 Lok Sabha MPs or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs.
    • Inquiry: 3-member committee comprising a Supreme Court judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court, and a distinguished jurist investigates the charges.
    • Voting Requirement: Two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament for removal.
    • In-House Mechanism: CJI can initiate internal inquiries and advise resignation in serious cases.

    Other Notable Cases:

    • Justice V. Ramaswami (1993): Faced impeachment for financial misconduct; motion failed in Lok Sabha.
    • Justice Soumitra Sen (2011): Resigned after Rajya Sabha voted for removal over fund misappropriation.
    • Justice K. Veeraswamy: Corruption case remained unresolved until his death.
    • Justice Shamit Mukherjee (2003), Justice Nirmal Yadav (2008), Justice S.N. Shukla (2017): Faced criminal charges for corruption after in-house inquiries.
    [UPSC 2007] Consider the following statements:

    1. The mode of removal of a Judge of a High Court in India is the same as that of the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court.

    2. After retirement from office, a permanent Judge of a High Court cannot plead or act in any court or before any authority in India.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    Options: (a) 1 only * (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

     

  • Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court has raised a key question—whether the “potentiality of abuse” of Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which punishes acts endangering the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India, could be a ground to declare the provision unconstitutional.

    Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

    About Section 152 BNS:

    • Deals with: Acts endangering sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India.
    • Origin: Introduced in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, effective 1 July 2024, replacing Section 124A IPC (sedition).
    • Scope: Criminalises purposeful or knowing acts that:
      • Excite secession, armed rebellion, or subversive activities.
      • Encourage separatist feelings.
      • Endanger sovereignty, unity, or integrity of India.
    • Means Covered: Words (spoken/written), signs, visible representation, electronic communication, financial means, or any other method.
    • Punishment: Life imprisonment or imprisonment up to 7 years + fine.
    • Nature of Offence: Cognizable, non-bailable, triable by Court of Session.
    • Exception Clause: Lawful criticism of government measures to seek change—without inciting rebellion/secession—is not an offence.
    • Key Difference from Section 124A IPC: Focus shifted from “disaffection against Government” to direct threats against the nation’s unity and sovereignty, with explicit recognition of digital-era methods.

    Issues with Section 152 BNS:

    • Potential for Misuse: Broad and subjective terms like “endangering sovereignty” can be stretched to target political dissent, journalism, and activism.
    • Vagueness: Undefined concepts (e.g., “sovereignty” in context of speech) create uncertainty, enabling arbitrary interpretation by authorities.
    • Similarity to Sedition Law: Despite rewording, its core effect mirrors Section 124A IPC, which is under constitutional challenge for curbing free speech.
    • Chilling Effect on Free Speech: Risk of self-censorship among journalists, activists, and citizens due to fear of prosecution.
    • High Punishment and Cognizability: Harsh penalties combined with arrest without warrant heighten scope for harassment before judicial scrutiny.
    • Digital Surveillance Concerns: Explicit coverage of electronic communication and financial means may widen investigative reach into personal digital activities.
    • Judicial Burden: Courts will need to repeatedly interpret the law to balance Article 19(1)(a) freedom of speech with state security.
    [UPSC 2025] Sedition has become my religion” was the famous statement given by Gandhiji at the time of:

    (a) the Champaran Satyagraha (b) publicly violating Salt Law at Dandi* (c) attending the Second Round Table Conference in London (d) the launch of the Quit India Movement

     

  • [11th August 2025] The Hindu Op-ed: Language Lessons

    [UPSC 2020] National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goals-4 (2030). It intended to restructure and re-orient the education system in India. Critically examine the statement.        

    Linkage: NEP 2020 broadly supports SDG-4 through its focus on universal access, equity, and quality, but faces implementation challenges due to India’s socio-cultural diversity and federal structure. The NEP 2020’s emphasis on multilingualism aligns with SDG-4 goals of inclusive and equitable quality education, but the Tamil Nadu and Karnataka cases show that its three-language policy faces resistance where it clashes with local linguistic and cultural priorities. This highlights the challenge of balancing national education reforms with state-specific needs while still aiming for SDG-4 targets

     

    Mentor’s Note:

    India’s language debate tests the balance between national policy goals and state linguistic autonomy, a key aspect of federalism. While NEP 2020’s three-language formula aims at unity through multilingualism, southern states like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka favour a two-language model to protect cultural identity and shape education on their own terms. This is as much about governance and diversity as it is about language. This issue is highly relevant for UPSC GS Paper 2 – Governance, Constitution, Federalism, and Education Policy.

     

    Introduction:

    India’s education system is shaped not only by pedagogy but also by its multilingual and multicultural character. The NEP 2020 recommends a three-language policy, with at least two being native to India, aiming to promote linguistic diversity and national integration. However, Tamil Nadu’s State Education Policy (SEP) and Karnataka’s proposed SEP prioritize local languages + English over Hindi or any other third compulsory language, reflecting deep-rooted socio-political contexts. This ongoing debate exemplifies the delicate balance between national policy frameworks and state-specific educational priorities.

    The Two-Language Policy in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka:

    Tamil Nadu’s Approach

    1. Continues the two-language policy: Tamil + English.
    2. Makes Tamil compulsory up to Class 10 across all boards.
    3. Promotes critical thinking, digital literacy, climate education, and social justice.
    4. Focus on STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, Mathematics) education and special support for tribal, disabled, and first-generation learners.
    5. Seeks uniform, high-quality public education as a priority.

    Karnataka’s Proposed Approach

    1. Kannada (or mother tongue) + English as compulsory languages.
    2. Medium of instruction: Kannada or mother tongue up to Class 5, preferably till Class 12.
    3. Discontinuation of the three-language policy (Hindi as third language removed).
    4. Development of state-specific curriculum, moving away from NCERT textbooks.
    5. Bilingual teaching methods for better learning outcomes.

    National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 and the Three-Language Policy

    NEP’s Recommendation:

    1. Three-language formula at school level.
    2. Two local languages (mother tongue/regional language).
    3. One other Indian language (often Hindi, though not mandatory).
    4. Based on the Kothari Commission (1968) suggestion to encourage multilingualism.

    Intended objectives:

    1. Promote national unity by encouraging communication across linguistic regions.
    2. Preserve linguistic diversity by ensuring regional languages remain central to education.
    3. Enhance linguistic versatility to prepare students for mobility within India.
    4. Strengthen early learning through mother tongue instruction in primary classes, as supported by UNESCO research.

    Criticism and Challenges:

    • Perceived Hindi Imposition:
      • In non-Hindi speaking states like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, the inclusion of Hindi as the third language is seen as a political and cultural imposition.
      • Historical background: Tamil Nadu’s anti-Hindi agitations (1960s) shape continued resistance.
    • Demand for English as a Medium:
      • Parents and students increasingly prefer English-medium education for global competitiveness.
      • Concerns that a strong emphasis on Hindi may reduce the focus on English proficiency, which is linked to employment and higher education abroad.
    • Federalism Concerns:
      • Education is in the Concurrent List; States argue they should have autonomy to design curricula and decide language policy.
      • Central guidance seen as overreach into state cultural identity.
    • Implementation Gaps:
      • Shortage of qualified teachers for multiple languages.
      • Logistical difficulty in providing quality instruction in three languages, especially in rural schools.

    Constitutional & Federal Dimensions:

    1. Education is a subject in the Concurrent List.
    2. Article 345: States can adopt any one or more languages for official use.
    3. Article 351: Directive for development of Hindi.
    4. 8th Schedule: Recognizes 22 languages, protecting linguistic diversity.
    5. Cooperative Federalism: Centre and States must align education policy without overriding local aspirations.

    Critical Issues Beyond Language:

    1. Equity in Public Education: Need to strengthen government schools for uniform quality.
    2. Access & Inclusion: Support for marginalized communities.
    3. Curriculum Modernization: Integrating digital skills, climate education, and critical thinking.
    4. Resource Allocation: Pending ₹2,152 crore education funds for Tamil Nadu highlight fiscal federalism concerns.

    Conclusion:

    Language policies should respect India’s diversity and focus on improving education quality. The Centre must work with states, not over them, to improve schools, modernize curriculum, and ensure equal opportunities.

    Value Addition:

    Examples for Enrichment

    1. Kothari Commission (1968) – promoted three-language formula but warned against imposition.
    2. Sri Lanka’s language policy conflict – example of risks in linguistic dominance.
    3. World Bank Learning Poverty Index – shows importance of mother tongue teaching.
    4. ASER 2023: Mother tongue learning helps early literacy.
    5. UNESCO 2023 Report: Supports teaching in the local language for better outcomes

    Mapping Micro-Themes:

    GS-I Cultural diversity, linguistic identity, regionalism

    • Cultural Identity: Language as a marker of state pride
    GS-II Federalism, education policy under Concurrent List, Centre–State relations, Constitutional provisions on language

    • Federalism: Illustrates cooperative federalism challenges
    • Equity in Education: Inclusion for marginalized groups
    • Policy Dispute: Example of Centre–State tension on education
    GS-III Human capital development, role of education in economic growth
    GS-IV Ethics in policy: respect for diversity, fairness, inclusion

    Practice Mains Question

    “Language in education is both a cultural right and a tool for development. Discuss the recent shift of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka towards a two-language formula in the context of federalism and inclusive education.” (250 words)

     

  • Nominations to J&K Assembly

    Why in the News?

    The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) informed the J&K High Court that the Lieutenant-Governor (L-G) can nominate five members to the J&K Legislative Assembly without the aid and advice of the elected government.

    About Nominations in State Assemblies:

    • Election Mode: Members are mainly directly elected from single-member constituencies.
    • Assembly Size: Ranges from 60–500 members; smaller States/UTs like Sikkim, Goa, Mizoram, and Puducherry have fewer by parliamentary approval.
    • Anglo-Indian Nomination (Abolished): Governors earlier nominated 1 Anglo-Indian member if under-represented; abolished by 104th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2019 (effective Jan 2020).
    • Rights of Nominated Members: Same rights/duties as elected members, except in matters needing a direct electoral mandate.
    • Prevalence: Most States have no nominated members; allowed only under special constitutional/legal provisions.
    • Parliamentary Nomination Abolition: Anglo-Indian nomination in Lok Sabha (2) and State Assemblies (1) also removed by the 104th Amendment.
    • Legislative Council Difference: In Vidhan Parishads, Governors nominate 1/6th members from literature, science, art, co-operatives, and social service.

    Exceptions for Jammu & Kashmir:

    • Special Provision: Under J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 (amended 2023), the Lieutenant-Governor can nominate:
      • Women: 2 women if under-represented.
      • Migrants: 2 Kashmiri migrants (including 1 woman).
      • PoJK Community: 1 member from Pakistan-occupied J&K community.
    • Seat Structure: Nominated members are in addition to elected members; Assembly = 114 elected + nominated (24 PoJK seats vacant).

    Legal Basis in J&K:

    • Statutory Provision: Sections 15, 15A, 15B of J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 (amended 2023) grant L-G nomination powers.
    • MHA Clarification:
      • Nature of Power: Statutory function at L-G’s discretion, without elected government’s aid/advice.
      • Precedent: Similar powers under Union Territories Act, 1963 (e.g., Puducherry).
      • Counting Rule: Nominated members are part of sanctioned Assembly strength.
    • Purpose: To ensure representation for displaced communities, marginalized groups, and women.
    [UPSC 2023] Consider the following statements in respect of election to the President of India:

    1. The members nominated to either House of the Parliament or the Legislative Assemblies of States are also eligible to be included in the Electoral College.

    2. Higher the number of elective Assembly seats, higher is the value of vote of each MLA of that State.

    3. The value of vote of each MLA of Madhya Pradesh is greater than that of Kerala.

    4. The value of of vote of each MLA of Puducherry is higher than that of Arunachal Pradesh because the ratio of total population to total number of elective seats in Puducherry is greater as compared to Arunachal Pradesh.

    How many of the above statements are correct?

    Options: (a) Only one* (b) Only two (c) Only three (d) All four