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Subject: Polity

  • [27th October 2025] The Hindu Op-ed: The contours of constitutional morality

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2021] Constitutional Morality’ is rooted in the Constitution itself and is founded on its essential facets. Explain the doctrine of ‘Constitutional Morality’ with the help of relevant judicial decisions.

    Linkage: This topic is highly significant for UPSC Mains, especially in GS Paper II (Polity & Governance) and GS Paper IV (Ethics), as it tests the understanding of how ethical governance aligns with constitutional principles.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Constitutional morality lies at the heart of India’s democratic ethos, acting as the invisible moral compass that guides law, governance, and justice. The article, written by Justice K. Anand Venkatesh, explores how morality is embedded within constitutional functioning. It is not embedded as a sentimental ideal, but as a living principle that upholds the dignity of institutions and individuals alike. In a time when popular morality often clashes with constitutional values, this debate assumes renewed urgency.

    Introduction

    The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly reaffirmed the link between law and morality, from P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994) to the Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018). The concept of constitutional morality, originally discussed by Greek historian George Grote in 1846, has resurfaced as a vital restraint against arbitrary governance and populist impulses. It demands adherence to constitutional values, equality, liberty, justice, and fraternity, by all organs of the State and its citizens.

    Why in the News

    Recent judicial pronouncements have revived debates around constitutional morality as a guiding force for both lawmakers and administrators. Justice Venkatesh’s commentary highlights that democracy without moral discipline risks degenerating into majoritarian rule, where transient popular sentiments override fundamental rights. The renewed emphasis on cultivating constitutional morality reflects India’s struggle to reconcile ethical governance with political pragmatism.

    Evolution and Context of Constitutional Morality

    1. Historical Roots: Greek historian George Grote coined “constitutional morality” to describe citizens’ disciplined adherence to constitutional norms ensuring liberty and restraint in governance.
    2. Indian Adoption: The term entered Indian discourse through Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who viewed it as essential for the successful working of democracy in a diverse society.
    3. Judicial Recognition: The Supreme Court acknowledged the interlinkage of law and morality in P. Rathinam (1994). It emphasized the law’s moral purpose , “to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State.”
    4. Hart-Devlin Debate: In the 1960s, the famous Hart-Devlin debate discussed whether the law should enforce moral standards. This is an idea that continues to influence Indian jurisprudence.

    What Distinguishes Constitutional Morality from Popular Morality

    1. Constitutional Morality: Reflects adherence to constitutional principles such as rule of law, equality before law, and institutional propriety.
    2. Popular Morality: Represents transient societal opinions or majoritarian values, often inconsistent with constitutional ethics.
    3. Judicial Balancing: Courts have often upheld constitutional morality against majoritarian pressures, as seen in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), where decriminalization of homosexuality was justified on constitutional grounds rather than social acceptance.
    4. Outcome: Promotes stability, fairness, and inclusivity in democratic functioning.

    Judicial Approach and Key Judgments

    1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): Reinforced secularism as a constitutional principle forming part of basic structure.
    2. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): Introduced the “basic structure doctrine,” embedding constitutional morality as a restraint on legislative excess.
    3. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): Stressed that constitutional morality must prevail over religious or social morality, allowing women’s entry into Sabarimala Temple.
    4. Navtej Singh Johar (2018): Affirmed that constitutional morality demands protection of individual autonomy and dignity, even if social morality disagrees.
    5. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India (2018): Asserted that constitutional functionaries must act within “constitutional morality,” not political expediency.

    Challenges in Practising Constitutional Morality

    1. Institutional Erosion: Weakening of legislative debate and executive accountability dilutes constitutional culture.
    2. Majoritarian Pressures: Electoral populism often overrides institutional restraint and judicial independence.
    3. Moral Ambiguity: Absence of a codified moral code makes enforcement of constitutional morality subjective.
    4. Public Awareness: Limited civic understanding of constitutional ethics hampers its internalization at citizen level.

    Way Forward

    1. Cultivation of Ethical Citizenship: Strengthens democratic maturity through civic education and moral training.
    2. Institutional Accountability: Ensures public functionaries act within constitutional boundaries through transparent checks.
    3. Judicial Vigilance: Maintains the moral compass of the State through continued emphasis on rights-based interpretation.
    4. Political Restraint: Encourages lawmakers to prioritize constitutional conscience over populist demand.

    Conclusion

    Constitutional morality ensures that democracy functions not merely through elections but through adherence to constitutional ethics. It provides a moral foundation for governance, ensuring that justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity are lived realities, not abstract ideals. In an era of polarization, it acts as the Republic’s moral compass, binding the State and its citizens to the spirit of the Constitution.

  • Gorkhaland statehood, Government names ex-DY NSA as interlocutor

    Introduction

    India’s federal architecture is unique: it allows the creation of new states to accommodate cultural, linguistic, administrative, or developmental aspirations under Article 3 of the Constitution. Yet, every statehood movement also reflects deeper struggles over identity, representation, and development.

    The Gorkhaland issue, revived by the Centre’s recent move to appoint an interlocutor, is one of the oldest and most persistent among these. While it directly concerns the Darjeeling hills and adjoining areas of West Bengal, it mirrors similar aspirations voiced across India, from Vidarbha to Bodoland, Harit Pradesh, and Kukiland.

    The Gorkhaland Appointment: Why is this news significant?

    The Centre’s decision to name ex-Dy NSA Pankaj Kumar Singh as interlocutor for Gorkha talks is a politically charged step:

    1. First formal engagement in years: It revives official talks after a long hiatus, moving beyond ad hoc arrangements like the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA).
    2. High-level signalling: The appointment of a senior security expert signals that the government sees the issue as sensitive, with implications for internal security and electoral politics.
    3. Identity at stake: It concerns recognition of the Gorkha community’s distinct identity, and a permanent political solution to decades of protests and autonomy struggles.
    4. Pre-election dimension: With West Bengal Assembly elections approaching, the move is seen as an attempt to politically engage the hill electorate, which has historically swung between national and regional parties.
    5. Potential precedent: Success in structured dialogue may offer a model for addressing other regional aspirations through negotiation instead of agitation.

    Understanding the Gorkhaland Issue

    Historical Context

    1. Origins: The demand for Gorkhaland dates back to 1907, when the Hillmen’s Association first sought a separate administrative unit for the Nepali-speaking people of Darjeeling under British rule.
    2. Post-Independence Phase: With linguistic reorganisation (1950s), Nepali-speaking Gorkhas felt their identity was inadequately represented in Bengali-dominated West Bengal.
    3. 1980s Uprising: The movement, led by Subhash Ghising’s Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), turned violent; it led to the creation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) in 1988 as a compromise.
    4. Second Wave: In 2007, Bimal Gurung formed the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM), renewing the demand; this led to the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) in 2011, but unrest persisted.
    5. Present Phase: The latest talks under an interlocutor aim to find a “permanent political solution” and recognition of 11 sub-tribes as Scheduled Tribes.

    Key Demands

    1. Separate Gorkhaland State: Carved out of Darjeeling and parts of Kalimpong, to ensure administrative autonomy and cultural recognition.
    2. Scheduled Tribe Status: For 11 Gorkha sub-tribes to ensure constitutional protections and socio-economic inclusion.
    3. Constitutional Recognition: Safeguards for the political identity and rights of the Gorkha people under the Indian Constitution.

    Statehood Demands in India: The Bigger Picture

    India has witnessed over 30 major statehood demands since Independence. While the Constitution empowers Parliament to reorganize states under Article 3, these movements have tested the balance between administrative efficiency, cultural autonomy, and political representation.

    Why Do Statehood Demands Arise?

    • Cultural & Linguistic Identity:
        1. Key reason: Desire for recognition of unique language, ethnicity, or cultural practices.
        2. Examples: Gorkhaland (Nepali-speaking identity), Bodoland (Bodo tribes), Vidarbha (Marathi dialect and identity).
    • Developmental Disparities:
        1. Economic neglect and poor resource distribution often drive demands.
        2. Example: Telangana’s movement was anchored in perceived neglect by Andhra’s political elite.
    • Administrative Efficiency:
        1. Smaller states are believed to ensure better governance and resource management.
        2. Example: Creation of Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand in 2000.
    • Political Representation & Power-sharing:
        1. Regional elites demand greater political space or autonomy to reflect local aspirations.
    • Ethnic Security and Integration:
      1. Fear of cultural assimilation or discrimination by dominant groups drives ethnic-based mobilisation (e.g., Bodoland, Kukiland, Karbi Anglong).
    Year Movement Outcome
    1953 Andhra State (Potti Sriramulu movement) First linguistic state formed
    1960 Maharashtra & Gujarat Bombay Reorganisation Act
    1972 Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura New northeastern states created
    1987 Mizoram & Arunachal Pradesh Granted full statehood
    2000 Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand Created for administrative and developmental reasons
    2014 Telangana Result of sustained agitation
    Ongoing Gorkhaland, Bodoland, Vidarbha, Bundelkhand Unresolved, periodic agitations

    Constitutional Mechanism for Creating New States

    Article 3 empowers Parliament to form new states by altering the boundaries or names of existing ones.

    Procedure:

    1. Process: Bill introduced in Parliament → Referred to State Legislature for views (not consent) Passed by simple majority.
    2. Centre’s Discretion: State opinion is advisory, not binding — ensuring national flexibility but sometimes triggering discontent.
    3. Examples:
      • Telangana was created despite Andhra Pradesh’s legislature opposing it.
      • Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar through a parliamentary process.

    Challenges and Implications of Statehood Movements

    1. Political Fragmentation: Multiplying small states may weaken national coherence and increase Centre-State friction.
    2. Administrative Burden: Creating new bureaucratic structures increases fiscal costs.
    3. Resource Distribution Issues: Conflicts over rivers, minerals, and forest resources (e.g., Telangana-Andhra).
    4. Ethnic Competition: One community’s recognition can fuel new demands from others.
    5. Positive Outcomes: Improved local governance, targeted development, and better representation when well-implemented (e.g., Chhattisgarh’s success in rural health and PDS).

    Lessons from Gorkhaland and Other Movements

    1. Need for Institutional Dialogue: Interlocutors and commissions reduce the risk of violent agitation by creating formal channels for negotiation.
    2. Multi-stakeholder Approach: Engagement should include Centre, State, local bodies, and civil society, not just political parties.
    3. Development-Based Solutions: Autonomy and identity must align with socio-economic development for long-term peace.
    4. Model for Others: If successful, the Gorkhaland dialogue could serve as a precedent for resolving other autonomy demands peacefully.

    Conclusion

    The Gorkhaland issue is not merely a regional agitation; it is part of India’s broader story of balancing unity with diversity, integration with autonomy, and identity with development. The Centre’s interlocutor initiative provides a constitutional, consultative path forward, one that aligns with India’s ethos of resolving internal aspirations democratically.

    As India continues to evolve, the challenge will be to ensure that new demands for statehood or autonomy are addressed through dialogue, data, and development, not through division or delay.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2013] Creation of a large number of smaller States would bring in effective governance at the State level. Discuss.

    Linkage: This PYQ links directly with Gorkhaland and other statehood demands, testing ideas of better governance and federal balance. The article helps students with examples, chronology, and constitutional context to write precise GS II answers.

  • Restoring fiscal space for the states

    Introduction

    India’s fiscal federalism has long been guided by the principle of cooperative balance, where both the Centre and States share resources, responsibilities, and accountability. However, the post-GST era has altered this equilibrium. The recent merger of the GST compensation cess with regular tax marks a watershed moment, ending an era of fiscal cushioning for States and raising pressing questions about States’ financial independence.

    With rising public aspirations, widening service delivery gaps, and increased welfare commitments, States are grappling with constrained fiscal space. The centralisation of taxation powers, growing dependence on Central transfers, and the limited flexibility to raise revenue are redefining India’s fiscal federalism.

    Why in the News?

    The abolition of the GST compensation cess, after five years of implementation, marks a turning point in India’s fiscal framework. For the first time since GST’s rollout in 2017, the compensation mechanism, which assured States 14% annual revenue growth, has ended.

    This is significant because:

    • The cess previously cushioned States from revenue shortfalls during GST transition.
    • Its removal exposes the true fiscal capacity of States, revealing wide disparities in revenue generation.
    • The Centre’s growing use of cesses and surcharges, which are not shareable with States, has further squeezed State finances.
    • The resulting imbalance has rekindled the debate on “fiscal autonomy versus fiscal efficiency.”

    Evolving Fiscal Architecture

    How has GST altered India’s tax landscape?

    1. Shift from origin-based to destination-based taxation: GST replaced multiple State taxes with a unified structure, eroding the States’ control over indirect taxes.
    2. Shared tax base: Both Centre and States levy GST, but decision-making lies with the GST Council, where the Centre has a dominant role.
    3. Erosion of fiscal autonomy: States lost independent authority to adjust tax rates or design fiscal responses tailored to their economies.
    4. Cess and surcharge dominance: These have become a parallel fiscal instrument for the Centre, bypassing the divisible tax pool.

    Changing Centre–State Financial Relations

    How have constitutional mechanisms evolved over time?

    1. Articles 268–293 define the fiscal relationship between Centre and States.
    2. The Finance Commission (Article 280) determines devolution, but several States allege that the criteria penalise progressive, industrial States.
    3. With the abolition of the Planning Commission in 2014, only two main transfer channels remain, Finance Commission grants and Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS).
    4. Article 282 allows discretionary Central grants, often perceived as politically influenced, affecting opposition-ruled States disproportionately.

    Declining Devolution and Fiscal Dependence

    How serious is the resource imbalance between Centre and States?

    1. Despite recommendations of 42% devolution (14th Finance Commission), actual transfers as a share of gross tax revenue have declined.
    2. Cesses and surcharges, which are non-shareable, reached ₹3.86 lakh crore (RE 2024–25) and are projected at ₹4.23 lakh crore (BE 2025–26).
    3. Central transfers still account for 44% of States’ revenue receipts, ranging from 72% for Bihar to 20% for Haryana, highlighting the uneven dependency landscape.
    4. The Centre collects 67% of total tax revenue, while States handle over 52% of total expenditure, particularly in health, education, and agriculture.
    5. This structural mismatch constrains States’ fiscal flexibility and deepens intergovernmental friction.

    Emerging Demands for Fiscal Reforms

    What are States and experts proposing for fiscal autonomy?

    1. Restructuring tax-sharing principles: Revisiting Finance Commission formulas to reflect true expenditure needs and reward performance equitably.
    2. Personal Income Tax sharing: Proposal to share or allow States to “top up” the personal income tax base to reduce fiscal dependence.
    3. Learning from Canada: Canadian provinces collect 54% of taxes and spend 60%, offering a model of greater subnational flexibility.
    4. Transparent devolution: Merging cesses and surcharges into the divisible pool could enhance transparency and equity.
    5. Independent fiscal oversight: Establishing a permanent intergovernmental fiscal council for mediation and coordination.

    The Way Forward: Towards Cooperative Fiscal Federalism

    How can fiscal space be restored to States?

    1. Revisit GST architecture: Grant States limited powers to vary tax rates within a band for specific commodities or services.
    2. Rationalise CSS schemes: Allow greater flexibility for States to design locally suited welfare interventions.
    3. Enhance fiscal responsibility: Encourage States to improve tax compliance, widen base, and adopt technology-driven revenue administration.
    4. Periodic fiscal reviews: Institutionalise data-based monitoring to balance efficiency with equity.
    5. Political cooperation: Encourage a non-partisan GST Council model where fiscal debates remain guided by economic logic, not politics.

    Conclusion

    India’s growth story is fundamentally federal. The vitality of its States determines the resilience of its economy. As the GST compensation era ends and States’ expenditure responsibilities rise, restoring their fiscal autonomy is essential for sustainable growth. True cooperative federalism demands not just consultation but real power-sharing in fiscal decision-making. Empowering States fiscally is not a concession — it is a constitutional necessity for a balanced and vibrant India.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What changes has the Union Government recently introduced in the domain of Centre-State relations? Suggest measures to be adopted to build the trust between the Centre and the States and for strengthening federalism.

    Linkage: The phasing out of the GST compensation cess and rising use of non-shareable cesses and surcharges reflect the Centre’s growing fiscal dominance, compelling States to seek reforms in tax devolution to rebuild trust and uphold true cooperative federalism.

  • Legal Information Management and Briefing System (LIMBS)

    Why in the News?

    The Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice, inaugurated the “Live Cases” Dashboard under the Legal Information Management and Briefing System (LIMBS) at Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi.

    About LIMBS Portal:

    • Overview: A centralised, web-based litigation management platform developed by the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law & Justice, under the Digital India initiative.
    • Purpose: Enables real-time monitoring, coordination, and analysis of court cases involving the Union of India, covering all ministries, PSUs, and autonomous bodies.
    • Design & Function: Serves as a single digital interface connecting nodal officers, legal cells, and advocates for streamlined case management and reduced duplication.
    • Policy Alignment: Implements the Prime Minister’s directive to minimise government litigation, improve inter-ministerial coordination, and enhance transparency and efficiency.
    • Scale (2025): Tracks 7.23 lakh live cases from 53 ministries/departments; over 13,000 ministry users and 18,000 advocates actively update records.
    • Integration: Linked with national judicial databases for automated case updates and status tracking.

    Key Features:

    • Dashboard Monitoring: Real-time visual dashboard showing ministry-wise pending, disposed, and contempt cases for trend analysis.
    • Court Connectivity: Integration with the Supreme Court, 25 High Courts, District Courts, and 9 Tribunals for live order retrieval.
    • Advanced Search: Multi-parameter filtering by court, advocate, ministry, judgment date, or financial value.
    • User Hierarchy: Tiered access for Nodal Officers, Admins, and Advocates ensuring accountability and data integrity.
    • Document & Fee Management: Digital upload of pleadings, notices, and advocate bills for secure, paperless workflow.
    • Accessibility & Security: 24×7 open-source platform with cybersecurity compliance and uninterrupted access.
  • 20 years of Right to Information (RTI)

    Why in the News?

    RTI activists across India marked 20 years since the Right to Information Act, 2005, came into effect.

    About the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005:

    • Overview: Passed by Parliament in 2005, replacing the Freedom of Information Act, 2002.
    • Objective: Empower citizens to access information freely from public authorities to promote openness and good governance.
    • Scope: Applicable to Central, State, and Local Governments, public sector undertakings, and statutory bodies.
    • Key Provision: Under Section 22, the RTI Act overrides all other laws that may restrict access to information.
    • Constitutional Basis:
      • It is derived from Article 19(1)(a), the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression.
      • The Supreme Court has recognized access to information as implicit in freedom of expression.
      • Backed by Article 32 and Article 226, citizens can seek redress for violations through the Supreme Court and High Courts.
      • RTI upholds constitutional principles of equality (Article 14) and personal liberty (Article 21) by ensuring informed citizen participation.
    • Timeframe for Response:
      • 30 days in general cases.
      • 48 hours when life or liberty is involved.
    • Exemptions from Disclosure:
      • Section 8(1): Exempts disclosure of information that could compromise sovereignty, national security, strategic or economic interests, or affect foreign relations.
      • Section 8(2): Allows disclosure if public interest outweighs potential harm to protected interests.
      • Proactive Disclosure: Every public authority must digitize records and proactively publish information to minimize formal RTI requests.
    • RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019:
      • The amendment removed fixed tenure (5 years) and salary parity with Election Commissioners.
      • It vested powers in the Central Government to determine terms of service, tenure, and allowances for CIC and ICs.
      • This was viewed as reducing the institutional autonomy of the RTI framework, raising concerns among transparency advocates.

    Institutional Framework:

    1. Central Information Commission (CIC)

    • Composition: Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) + up to 10 Information Commissioners (ICs).
    • Appointment: By the President on recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister (Chairperson), Leader of Opposition (Lok Sabha), and a Union Cabinet Minister.
    • Tenure: As prescribed by the Central Government or until 65 years of age, whichever is earlier.
    • Functions:
      • Inquire into complaints and appeals under RTI.
      • Exercise civil court powers for summoning witnesses or documents.
      • Conduct suo motu inquiries in cases of systemic non-compliance.
    1. State Information Commissions (SICs)

    • Composition: State Chief Information Commissioner + up to 10 Information Commissioners.
    • Appointment: By the Governor, based on recommendations from a committee chaired by the Chief Minister, along with the Leader of Opposition and a Cabinet Minister.
    • Qualifications: Persons of eminence in public life, not affiliated with political parties or profit-making roles.
    • Functions: Parallel to CIC at the state level, ensuring local compliance with RTI obligations.
    [UPSC 2019] There is a view that the Officials Secrets Act is an obstacle to the implementation of RTI Act. Do you agree with the view? Discuss.

    [UPSC 2018] The Right to Information Act is not all about citizens’ empowerment alone, it essentially redefines the concept of accountability.” Discuss.

     

  • SC exempts pre-2022 Surrogacy Cases from Age Restrictions

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court has ruled that age limits prescribed under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 do not apply retrospectively to couples who had frozen their embryos and initiated the surrogacy process before January 25, 2022, the date when the law came into effect.

    Case Background:

    • Petitions: Filed by three couples who had undergone IVF and frozen embryos before Jan 25, 2022, when the Surrogacy Act came into effect.
    • Issue: They became ineligible under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) (age limits: women 23–50, men 26–55).
    • Argument: Since embryos were created pre-2022, the process was already initiated and could not be retrospectively invalidated.
    • Court’s View: Recognised embryo freezing as a lawful start to surrogacy; held that new age restrictions cannot retroactively disqualify such couples.

    Supreme Court’s Observations and Constitutional Findings:

    • No Retrospective Disqualification: The age restrictions introduced by the 2021 law cannot apply retrospectively to cases where medical procedures had already begun.
    • Equality in Conception Modes: Justice Nagarathna emphasised that couples conceiving through assisted reproductive technologies (ART) must enjoy the same constitutional protection as those conceiving naturally.
    • Article 21 & Reproductive Autonomy: The Court reaffirmed that the right to reproductive choice including IVF, ART, or surrogacy, forms part of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21.
    • Article 14 & Equality Before Law: Retrospective age-based exclusion was termed arbitrary and unreasonable, amounting to a violation of equality.
    • Parenting Competence Argument Rejected: The Court rejected the notion that older parents are inherently less capable, stating that state authorities cannot retrospectively judge parenting ability once medical procedures have been initiated lawfully.
    • Non-Retroactivity Principle: Reinforced the rule that unless a statute explicitly states otherwise, it operates prospectively.
    • Precedent Applied: Relied on Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), where the Court recognised reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity as constitutionally protected rights.

    Back2Basics: Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021

    • Objective: To regulate surrogacy, prevent commercial exploitation, and ensure ethical, altruistic surrogacy based solely on medical necessity.
    • Legislative Intent: To promote ethical medical practices, protect the rights of surrogate mothers and children, and curb commercialisation while respecting constitutional morality and reproductive dignity.
    • Applicability: Extends to all surrogacy cases involving Indian citizens and permanent residents, and works alongside the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021.
    • Key Provisions:
      • Type Permitted: Only altruistic surrogacy (no payment except medical expenses).
      • Eligibility for Couples: Married for at least five years; woman 23–50 yrs, man 26–55 yrs; no living biological, adopted, or surrogate child.
      • Single Women: Only widows or divorcees (35–45 yrs) are eligible; unmarried women excluded (under legal challenge).
      • Surrogate Requirements: Must be a close relative, married, with at least one biological child; age 25–35 years.
      • Certification: Requires Certificate of Essentiality, infertility proof, parentage order, and insurance for the surrogate.
      • Penalties: Commercial surrogacy banned; violation punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment and ₹10 lakh fine.
      • Regulatory Bodies: Establishment of National and State Surrogacy Boards for implementation and oversight.

    Issues Highlighted by the Supreme Court:

    • Absence of Transitional Provisions: The 2021 Act lacks a “grandfather clause” protecting couples already in process before its commencement.
    • Inconsistent Standards: The Court questioned why adoption laws have no upper age limit, while surrogacy does, creating unequal treatment among parents.
    • Gender Discrimination: Restricting surrogacy access to only married couples and excluding unmarried women was flagged as a potential Article 14 violation.
    • Fundamental Rights Impact: Retrospective restrictions infringe upon the right to equality and reproductive freedom under Articles 14 and 21.
    • State Overreach: The Court cautioned that the state’s intent to protect child welfare cannot override individual liberty or invalidate rights exercised under prior legal norms.

    Significance of the Judgment:

    • Reinforcement of Reproductive Rights: Confirms that assisted reproduction and surrogacy fall within the ambit of reproductive autonomy and personal liberty.
    • Protection Against Legal Injustice: Shields couples who initiated lawful medical procedures from retrospective disqualification.
    • Constitutional Precedent: Establishes that statutory changes cannot nullify pre-existing lawful rights, strengthening India’s jurisprudence on non-retroactivity.
    • Judicial Balance: Maintains a balance between ethical regulation of surrogacy and protection of individual autonomy.
    • Wider Applicability: Permits similarly placed couples to seek relief before respective High Courts, widening the ruling’s scope.
    • Affirmation of Constitutional Morality: The Court underscored that justice, equity, and good conscience must guide interpretation where legislation creates unintended inequities.
    [UPSC 2024] Under which of the following Articles of the Constitution of India, has the Supreme Court of India placed the Right to Privacy?

    (a) Article 15 (b) Article 16 (c) Article 19 (d) Article 21*

     

  • SC upholds Property Inheritance Rights for Gond Tribal Women

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court of India has affirmed that women of the Gond community, a Scheduled Tribe under Article 342, are entitled to inherit ancestral property, even where no explicit tribal custom confers this right.

    Supreme Court Verdict on Gond Women’s Inheritance Rights:

    • Background: Case concerned women of the Gond Scheduled Tribe seeking equal inheritance rights over their maternal grandfather’s ancestral property.
    • Lower Court Rulings: The trial court and Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the plea, holding that no tribal custom granted such rights and placing the burden of proof on the women.
    • Supreme Court Review: On 17 July 2025, a Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Joymalya Bagchi examined whether constitutional equality overrides unwritten tribal customs excluding women from succession.
    • Legal Context: Under Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act (1956), Scheduled Tribes are excluded unless specifically notified—none apply to Gonds—so the dispute was governed by customary tribal law.

    Supreme Court’s Ruling:

    • Presumption of Equality: The Court reversed lower findings, holding that equality must be presumed unless a proven, valid custom denies it.
    • Burden of Proof: Stated that custom cannot be presumed; it must be ancient, certain, and reasonable, proven through credible evidence.
    • Gender Justice: Rejected patriarchal inferences drawn from Hindu traditions, asserting such predispositions have “no place” in the case.
    • Guiding Principle: In absence of valid custom, courts must decide per “justice, equity, and good conscience.”

    Constitutional Principles Applied:

    • Article 14: Ensures equality before law; male-only inheritance lacks rational basis.
    • Article 15(1):  Prohibits sex-based discrimination; used to strike down exclusion of women.
    • Article 38: Mandates elimination of inequality across social and gender lines.
    • Article 46:  Requires protection of Scheduled Tribes from exploitation and injustice.
    • Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 cited for illustrating gender-equal intent, not direct applicability.

    Constitutional–Customary Balance:

    • Conflict: Between tribal autonomy under Fifth/Sixth Schedules and constitutional equality under Part III.
    • Precedent Shift: Unlike Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar (1996), which upheld male-only inheritance, the 2025 ruling held that when custom is unproven or discriminatory, Article 14 prevails.
    • Significance: Moves jurisprudence from deference to custom toward enforcement of constitutional morality, ensuring tribal women’s equal property rights.
    [UPSC 2023] Explain the constitutional perspectives of Gender Justice with the help of relevant Constitutional Provisions and case laws.

    [UPSC 2015] Discuss the possible factors that inhibit India from enacting for its citizens a uniform civil code as provided for in the Directive Principles of State Policy.

     

  • [7th October 2025 ] The Hindu Op-ed: Calling out the criticism of the Indian Judiciary

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] Constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence is a prerequisite of democracy”. Comment.

    Linkage: The article defends judicial independence as the backbone of India’s democracy, arguing that blaming courts for developmental delays undermines their constitutional role as checks on executive excesses. It reinforces that true democracy thrives only when judicial autonomy remains uncompromised.

    Mentor’s Comment

    In an era where the pursuit of Viksit Bharat (Developed India) dominates public discourse, the judiciary is increasingly being portrayed as a bottleneck in India’s development journey. However, this narrative is not only simplistic but dangerous. This article delves deep into the recent criticism of India’s judiciary, particularly remarks made by Sanjeev Sanyal, and explores whether such allegations hold ground. It highlights how governance failures, legislative vagueness, and unchecked executive litigation are often the real culprits behind systemic inefficiencies. The aim is to help aspirants understand the complex interlinkages between judiciary, governance, and development, a recurring UPSC theme.

    Introduction

    The judiciary has long been one of the cornerstones of India’s democracy. Yet, it often finds itself under scrutiny for delays, pendency, and procedural rigidities. The recent remarks by Sanjeev Sanyal, member of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council, blaming the judiciary as the “single biggest hurdle” in India’s development, reignited a larger debate: Is the judiciary obstructing growth, or is it merely reflecting systemic governance failures? This question is crucial for UPSC aspirants because it encapsulates multiple administrative, ethical, and policy dimensions, from judicial accountability to executive responsibility and the balance of powers enshrined in the Constitution.

    Why in the News?

    At the Nyaya Nirman Conference, Sanjeev Sanyal claimed that India’s judiciary is the “single biggest hurdle” to achieving Viksit Bharat within 20–25 years. His comments triggered debate as it was not the first time that the judiciary was blamed for impeding development. What makes it significant is the reduction of a constitutional pillar into a scapegoat — reflecting a wider trend of executive deflection from governance failures. The issue is striking because judicial delays, though real, are often symptoms of legislative imprecision, government over-litigation, and vacant judicial posts, not merely judicial inefficiency.

    Is the Judiciary the “Single Biggest Hurdle” to Development?

    1. Oversimplified blame – The criticism ignores that the judiciary merely enforces laws framed by Parliament. For instance, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 mandates pre-suit mediation — a legislative choice, not a judicial one.
    2. Structural imbalance – Judicial delays stem from vacancies (over 30%), poor digital infrastructure, and overburdened lower courts rather than deliberate obstructionism.
    3. Reality check – India’s judiciary handles one of the world’s heaviest caseloads, with judges hearing 50–100 cases per day, highlighting efficiency within constraints.

    What Lies Behind Judicial Delays?

    1. Government as the biggest litigant – The Union and State governments account for nearly 50% of all cases. Tax authorities, ministries, and PSUs appeal even routine orders, consuming judicial time and resources.
    2. Arbitrary tendering & contractual behaviour – Governments frequently breach contracts or impose unreasonable conditions, compelling contractors and citizens to litigate for basic rights.
    3. Vague and outdated laws – Laws are often drafted imprecisely, leading to interpretational disputes. The new criminal laws and upcoming Income-Tax Act recycle old frameworks with cosmetic changes.

    Are Courts Overworked or Underworked?

    1. Myth of short working hours – Court sittings (10:30 AM–4 PM) mask the hours of preparatory and post-hearing work, including judgment writing and research.
    2. Vacations misunderstood – Vacations are largely used to complete reserved judgments, not for leisure. Vacation benches continue urgent hearings.
    3. Caseload pressure – District courts bear the brunt, where justice delivery meets the common citizen. High pendency here directly affects the perception of delay.

    How Does Poor Law-Making Add to Judicial Burden?

    1. Ambiguity in drafting – The 99-to-1 problem, as noted by Sanyal himself, arises due to poorly framed laws meant to control the 1% of abusers, complicating life for the 99%.
    2. Linguistic confusion – Replacement of terms like “notwithstanding” with “irrespective” in new laws reflects shallow reform, creating fresh waves of litigation rather than clarity.
    3. Superficial reform – Cosmetic renaming (Codes → Sanhitas) in criminal law reform fails to address colonial legacies or procedural inefficiencies.

    What is the Broader Message for Governance and Democracy?

    1. Deflecting accountability – Calling courts the bottleneck diverts attention from executive and legislative lapses.
    2. Constitutional balance – Judiciary serves as a check on arbitrary power, ensuring that speed does not override justice.
    3. True development – A “Viksit Bharat” cannot emerge by weakening judicial independence but by strengthening institutional capacity across all pillars of democracy.

    Conclusion

    Blaming the judiciary for India’s developmental delays is a misdiagnosis of a systemic illness. The judiciary, though imperfect, mirrors the inefficiencies entrenched in India’s governance — from poor drafting and over-litigation to resource neglect. The real challenge lies not in reducing judicial authority but in reforming governance practices, streamlining litigation, and investing in judicial infrastructure. A strong, independent judiciary is not an obstacle but the guarantor of sustainable development and rule of law.

  • Why is ADR crucial for India’s courts?

    Introduction

    India’s courts are gasping under the weight of delays. According to the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), there are 4.57 crore pending cases, with nearly 63 lakh in High Courts and over 80,000 in the Supreme Court. For many citizens, justice delayed has become justice denied. Against this backdrop, the government’s renewed commitment to strengthen Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) marks an important turning point. ADR, rooted in India’s traditional dispute resolution practices, represents not just a procedural alternative, but a philosophical one. It shifts justice from confrontation to consensus, from hierarchy to harmony.

    Why is ADR in the News?

    The Minister of Law and Justice, Arjun Ram Meghwal, recently emphasized that India’s legal reforms must draw from its civilisational roots, particularly the doctrine of Panch Parmeshwar, the age-old village system of resolving disputes through collective wisdom. This announcement is significant for three reasons:

    1. Civilisational continuity: For the first time in recent years, legal reform is being explicitly linked to indigenous justice philosophy.
    2. Crisis in pendency: With cases exceeding 4.5 crore and vacancy rates of 33% in High Courts and 21% in district courts, India’s formal judicial system is overburdened beyond capacity.
    3. Demand for inclusion: ADR offers an alternative that is faster, cheaper, and socially inclusive, especially for marginalised groups who find formal litigation intimidating.

    In essence, ADR is not just reform, it is rescue.

    What is Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and How Does It Work?

    1. Definition: ADR refers to mechanisms outside formal courts that help parties resolve disputes through mutual understanding, mediation, arbitration, conciliation, or Lok Adalats.
    2. Objective: To provide speedy, affordable, and amicable resolution while reducing judicial burden.
    3. Legal Framework:
      1. Article 39A of the Constitution mandates equal justice and free legal aid.
      2. Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 formally recognizes ADR processes.
      3. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (amended in 2021) gives statutory backing to arbitration agreements and conciliation processes.
    4. Time-bound resolution: The Arbitration Act, 2021 fixes a maximum 180-day period for dispute resolution — a stark contrast to the years spent in litigation.
      1. Exit Clause: If a party is dissatisfied, they can opt out after two sessions of mediation.
    5. Pre-litigation mediation: Encouraged for civil and commercial disputes, helping prevent new cases from entering the judicial pipeline.
    6. Example: Many commercial entities now resolve contractual disputes through institutional arbitration centres such as the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), saving both time and cost.

    How Do Lok Adalats Strengthen Access to Justice?

    1. Legal Basis: Lok Adalats are governed by the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, deriving strength from Article 39A.
    2. Types of Lok Adalats:
      • Permanent Lok Adalats (Section 22-B)
      • National Lok Adalats (held periodically)
      • E-Lok Adalats (virtual platforms launched post-COVID-19).
      • First Lok Adalat: Held in Gujarat in 1999 — symbolizing people’s justice at minimal cost.
    3. Finality of Decisions: Awards are final and binding, with no provision for appeal, ensuring swift closure.
    4. Safeguards: If dissatisfied, parties can still approach formal courts, preserving fairness.
    5. Impact: Lok Adalats have successfully resolved lakhs of cases annually, especially in motor accident and bank recovery disputes.

    Why is Strengthening ADR a Necessity, Not a Choice?

    1. Judicial Overload: Judges in Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Kerala handle over 4,000 cases each, severely limiting judicial attention.
    2. Delay and Disillusionment: A large portion of cases have been pending for over 10 years, eroding public faith in formal justice.
    3. Vacancies and Infrastructure Gaps: With 33% High Court and 21% district court vacancies, the backlog is worsening.
    4. Societal Benefits: As former CJI D.Y. Chandrachud noted, mediation is a tool for social change, aligning community norms with constitutional values through open dialogue.
    5. Cultural Relevance: ADR resonates with India’s traditional ethos, the village panchayat system was historically based on consensus, not contest.
    6. ADR thus not only decongests courts but humanises justice, making it conversational rather than confrontational.

    Which States Have the Highest Backlog and Why It Matters

    1. Data from the India Justice Report 2025:
      • Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar have the highest backlog.
      • High Court pendency: Nearly 63 lakh cases.
      • District courts: The majority of the 4.57 crore pending cases.
    2. Vacancy crisis: Shortage of judges and staff deepens the delays.
    3. State ranking mechanism: The India Justice Report evaluates states on justice delivery, infrastructure, and human resources, revealing wide inter-State disparities.
    4. Call for reform: Strengthening ADR is crucial to ensure per capita justice delivery, especially in states lagging behind in judicial capacity.

    Conclusion

    ADR is not merely an alternative, it is an evolution of justice delivery in India. Rooted in India’s cultural traditions yet aligned with global best practices, ADR offers a pragmatic pathway to tackle pendency and ensure timely justice. Strengthening awareness, institutional capacity, and legal infrastructure around ADR will be key to transforming India from a litigating society into a resolving society — where justice is swift, simple, and shared.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2015] What are the major changes brought in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 through the recent Ordinance promulgated by the President? How far will it improve India’s dispute resolution mechanism? Discuss.

    Linkage: The 2015 Ordinance streamlined arbitration by fixing strict timelines and limiting court interference, strengthening India’s move toward faster, credible, and globally competitive dispute resolution, aligning with the core goals of ADR reform.

  • [3rd October 2025] The Hindu Op-ed: Should Ladakh get statehood?

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What changes has the Union Government recently introduced in the domain of Centre-State relations? Suggest measures to strengthen federalism.

    Linkage: Ladakh’s case reflects the Union’s increasing control over border UTs, where administrative powers lie with the LG and Centre, marginalising local bodies — a recent trend in Centre-State/UT relations. Strengthening federalism requires constitutional safeguards (Sixth Schedule/statehood) and greater devolution of powers and finances to elected institutions.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The debate on Ladakh’s statehood is not merely about administrative restructuring, it is about the soul of Indian federalism. It combines questions of representation, tribal identity, border security, and constitutional safeguards. This issue is now a case study in balancing national interests with local aspirations.

    Introduction

    Ladakh, separated from Jammu & Kashmir in 2019 and designated a Union Territory (UT), was expected to gain autonomy and focused development. Instead, it has witnessed deepening resentment. The recent violence in Leh (September 24, 2025), which left four dead and led to the arrest of climate activist Sonam Wangchuck under the NSA, highlights the widening trust deficit. Civil society platforms like the Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) demand statehood, inclusion under the Sixth Schedule, a Public Service Commission, and separate Lok Sabha representation.

    Why in the News?

    This is the first major violent episode in Ladakh since its conversion to a UT, bringing the region’s discontent into national focus. While the Centre insists that measures like reservations and recruitment drives are underway, locals argue these are executive orders, not constitutional guarantees. The clash exposes the failure of the UT model in ensuring democratic accountability, despite Ladakh’s strategic importance on the China–Pakistan frontier.

    Democratic Deficit in Ladakh

    1. Loss of Voice: Earlier part of J&K Assembly; now Ladakhis cannot influence laws or leadership.
    2. Dominance of Bureaucrats: Short-term officials override local voices, bypassing elected Hill Councils.
    3. Recruitment Vacuum: No Public Service Commission; six years without gazetted officer recruitments.

    Tribal and Land Safeguards at Risk

    1. Earlier Protection: Article 370 & 35A guaranteed land and job protections.
    2. Post-2019 Vacuum: Absence of safeguards raises fears of demographic change.
    3. Constitutional Demands: LAB & KDA demand Sixth Schedule — protection for tribal culture, language, land rights, beyond mere executive orders.

    Sixth Schedule vs Statehood

    1. Government Stance: Argues Sixth Schedule inclusion is a logical first step before statehood.
    2. Counter View: Sajjad Kargili stresses that Sixth Schedule alone is insufficient; democracy needs statehood.
    3. Delhi Model Analogy: UTs with legislatures (Delhi) show friction with LGs — raising doubts about partial arrangements.

    Population and Statehood Question

    1. Centre’s Hesitation: Population (~3.5 lakh) too small for statehood.
    2. Rebuttal: Sikkim (similar population) became a State in 1975; Goa in 1987.
    3. Fragmented Governance: Ladakh’s five new districts have micro-populations (5,000–7,000), making local governance difficult without a state-level structure.

    Federalism and Centre-State Relations

    1. Supreme Court Endorsement: Upheld bifurcation of J&K into UTs.
    2. Federal Concerns: Raises questions about top-down imposition of governance models in sensitive areas.
    3. Centre vs Local Bodies: ₹6,000 crore annual budget, but only ₹600 crore devolved to Hill Councils; rest controlled by LG & bureaucrats.

    Security Dimensions and Border Considerations

    1. Centre’s Argument: Border sensitivity justifies UT status.
    2. Counterpoint: Punjab, Sikkim, Uttarakhand are border states yet enjoy full statehood.
    3. Chinese Incursion 2020: Occurred post-UT status, undermining the security rationale.

    Civil Society Demands and Distrust

    1. Four Core Demands: Statehood, Sixth Schedule, Public Service Commission, dual Lok Sabha seats (Leh & Kargil).
    2. Distrust of MHA: LAB & KDA halted talks, citing cosmetic concessions (women’s reservation, ST reservation) that miss the core demands.
    3. Governance Paralysis: Hill Councils reduced to ceremonial bodies; LG ignores their inputs.

    Nationalism vs Allegations of “Anti-national”

    1. Local Sentiment: Ladakhis argue they are patriotic, sacrificing lives to defend frontiers.
    2. Mistrust Campaign: Trolls label them pro-China/pro-Pakistan, deepening alienation.
    3. Identity Politics: Perceived delegitimisation fuels separatist tendencies — dangerous for a border region.

    Comparative Perspectives

    1. Delhi & Puducherry: UTs with legislatures — persistent Centre-LG tussle.
    2. North-East Sixth Schedule States: Despite safeguards, autonomy diluted by weak implementation.
    3. Statehood as Trust-Building: Granting Ladakh statehood could mirror past steps where integration was strengthened by empowerment (Sikkim, Mizoram).

    Conclusion

    The Ladakh case underscores that federalism is not only about administrative convenience but about trust-building. Sixth Schedule inclusion may provide interim safeguards, but without democratic statehood, Ladakh risks remaining voiceless. The challenge before India is to ensure that Ladakhis, guardians of a strategic frontier, feel like equal partners in the Union, not subjects of bureaucratic rule.