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  • [12th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: A bigger BRICS, shaped by India’s vision

    [12th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: A bigger BRICS, shaped by India’s vision

    Question (2023, GS2): “‘Virus of Conflict is affecting the functioning of the SCO’. In the light of the above statement point out the role of India in mitigating problems.
    Linkage: This question directly mirrors the central tension of the New Delhi BRICS summit: holding a common line and delivering technical outputs when key member states are at war or experiencing severe conflict. It highlights India’s strategic role as a mediator and consensus-builder in multilateral forums

    Mentor Comment

    India has used its chairship of BRICS to convert the grouping’s agenda into a set of named functional outputs, and the New Delhi summit on 12 and 13 September 2026 is where those outputs are placed before the leaders. The chairship ran around 350 meetings across Indian cities, 22 of them at ministerial level, following the template India used for the G-20 Summit it hosted in New Delhi in 2023. India reframed the acronym around “building resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability”, and the deliverables track that framing: centres of excellence, a logistics framework, an enterprise portal and a set of research repositories. The grouping now carries 11 members and about 10 partner countries, and its collective output measured at purchasing power parity, meaning output adjusted for differences in domestic price levels, exceeds that of the G-7. The tension in the summit lies between the two things it is being asked to do at once, settle a set of technical cooperation outputs, and hold a common line among members several of whom are at war.

    Pillars of BRICS cooperation

    1. Political and security: The first pillar covers the grouping’s positions on conflicts, security cooperation and global governance questions.
    2. Finance and the economy: The second pillar covers trade, payments, development finance and economic cooperation among members.
    3. Culture and people-to-people exchanges: The third pillar covers education, health, skilling and social cooperation between member societies.
    4. Where India’s chairship agenda sits: The agenda India pursued relates more to the second and third pillars than to the first, since the leaders themselves settle the large geopolitical questions.

    Why is the Delhi summit a landmark?

    1. The backdrop: It takes place against geopolitical turbulence produced by a combination of forces, ongoing wars and conflicts, a breakdown in global governance, and the changing nature of global alliances.
    2. The grouping’s weight: BRICS now has 11 prominent members and about 10 partner countries, and its collective economic output in purchasing power parity terms outstrips that of the G-7, making it one of the largest and most important transcontinental groupings outside the West.
    3. The technology contest: Technological forces such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing are being weaponised, with both great powers trying to win the battle for tech supremacy.

    How did India prepare for the chairship?

    1. The template: India followed the approach it had used for the 2023 G-20 Summit in New Delhi.
    2. The scale of the process: Around 350 meetings were conducted in cities across the country, with 22 held at the ministerial level.
    3. The stated focus: India announced that it would focus on “building resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability”, giving a new expansion to the BRICS acronym.
    4. The intent behind the framing: The reframing was used to refocus and recalibrate the BRICS agenda rather than to inherit the previous year’s priorities unchanged.

    What has the chairship delivered on resilience?

    1. A digital centre for grids and storage: The BRICS Digital Centre of Excellence for Smart Grids and Energy Storage was launched under India’s stewardship.
    2. A logistics framework: The BRICS Logistics Supply Chain Cooperation Framework was adopted.
    3. Centres on farming systems: Centres of Excellence on Agro-Ecology and Regenerative Agriculture were established.
    4. What they are expected to do: Once operationalised, these initiatives are intended to provide the ballast that would make member economies genuinely resilient.

    What is on the innovation agenda?

    1. Capital for new firms: A start-up innovation fund and an incubator network were proposed.
    2. A digital public infrastructure repository: Members would pool digital public infrastructure, meaning the shared digital systems for identity, payments and data exchange that public services run on.
    3. A science and research repository: A common repository for scientific and research material was proposed alongside it.
    4. A plan for large research facilities: The action plan of the BRICS Working Group on research infrastructures and mega science projects sits within this pillar.
    5. Why pooling matters here: Members are not all at the same level of development in scientific research, so shared facilities and repositories are worth more to some members than to others.

    What does the cooperation pillar carry?

    1. Trade rules: Leaders are expected to endorse recommendations on revitalising the multilateral trading system.
    2. Health: A network of centres of excellence on mental wellness is to be welcomed by the leaders.
    3. Cities: A BRICS urbanisation forum is to be established.
    4. Women and digital access: Enhancing the digital capacity of women forms part of the recommendations.
    5. Skills and small enterprise: Cooperation is to be intensified in education and youth skilling, and through the BRICS Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Cooperation Portal.

    What does the sustainability agenda add?

    1. It continues the previous chair’s priority: Sustainability was the centrepiece of Brazil’s agenda in the preceding year, and India built on that base rather than replacing it.
    2. Land and forests: Combating desertification, and guidelines for disaster management and forest-fire preparedness, are specific areas of cooperation under this head.
    3. Aviation fuel: A BRICS forum on sustainable aviation fuels forms part of the agenda.
    4. Adaptation rather than mitigation: Advancing climate resilience through people-centric and community-based adaptation is included, which matters because international fora tend to focus almost exclusively on mitigation.

    Can a functional agenda hold when summit level geopolitics pulls the other way?

    1. The two tracks belong to different pillars: The chairship’s outputs sit in the economic and people-to-people pillars, and the large geopolitical questions are settled by the leaders under the first.
    2. The functional track is the more predictable of the two: Substantive outcomes appear assured on the strength of the ministerial and working group meetings already chaired, independent of what the leaders’ session produces.
    3. The caveat on the grouping: BRICS has to avoid being caught in geopolitical currents that are not of its own making and carry no strategic value for its members.
    4. Why it survives the contradiction: The grouping is now too large to be either ignored or allowed to fail, which gives members an interest in a working agenda even where they diverge politically.
    5. What it is ultimately for: The grouping helps members enhance their strategic options and push geopolitics towards a multipolar order, both of which are organising principles of India’s foreign policy.

    Challenges to India’s BRICS chairship agenda

    1. The deliverables are institutions without budgets: A centre of excellence, a framework and a portal each need a host, staff and recurring funding, none of which a one year chairship can commit on the group’s behalf. Eg. The BRICS Vaccine Research and Development Centre, announced in 2020, functions as a virtual network of national institutions rather than a staffed facility.
      The Fix: Attach each new centre to a named host institution with a member funded budget line recorded in the summit declaration.
    2. Repositories hold only what members choose to deposit: A digital public infrastructure repository and a science repository depend on voluntary contribution, and members operate under differing national data and procurement rules. Eg. Members’ identity and payment systems sit under separate data laws, so specifications and code are not equally shareable.
      The Fix: Settle a common licence and a deposit obligation for contributed material before the repositories open.
    3. A declaration carries no review of the last one: Outcomes are recorded as commitments in a communique, and no member reports against them the following year. Eg. The Rio declaration of July 2025 ran to 126 points with no implementation review attached to it.
      The Fix: Require the incoming chair to publish an implementation report against the previous declaration alongside the new one.
    4. The enterprise agenda needs a payments channel that is not yet working: An MSME portal and a start-up fund assume a listed supplier in one member country can be paid from another without routing through third currency correspondent banking. Eg. The grouping’s own cross border payment initiative remains at pilot stage.
      The Fix: Sequence the portal behind a working local currency settlement arrangement for the member pairs that already trade at scale.

    Conclusion

    The chairship’s output is a set of centres, frameworks, repositories and portals, and their value is decided after the summit closes rather than in its declaration. What converts an announced centre into a working institution is a host, a staff and a recurring budget, and none of those is a summit level decision. The grouping’s own design works against this, since priorities reset annually with the rotating chair and nothing obliges the next one to carry a predecessor’s working groups forward. What to watch is whether the declaration names a host institution and a funding source for the new centres, and whether the chair that follows India adopts the research infrastructure action plan rather than substituting its own themes.

    About BRICS

    1. What it started as: The acronym was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to identify a set of high growth emerging economies, and it was an investment category before it was a forum.
    2. How it became a grouping: The first meeting of Foreign Ministers took place on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006, and the first formal Leaders’ Summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. How it expanded: South Africa joined in 2011. The 2023 Johannesburg Summit opened membership further, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joining in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025.
    4. The partner tier: A Partner Country category was introduced in 2024 to engage states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without conferring full membership.

    Institutions and Initiatives of BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Headquartered in Shanghai, it lends for infrastructure and sustainable development, and has approved over $35 billion in loans.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A $100 billion pool of member foreign exchange reserves providing short term liquidity support to a member under balance of payments pressure.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross border payment initiative intended to settle trade among members in local currencies rather than through existing dollar based messaging channels.
    4. Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation: Six satellites contributed by member states, sharing earth observation data for disaster management and resource monitoring.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. Population weight: The grouping represents over 45 per cent of the world’s population, about 3.6 billion people.
    2. Energy weight: Members account for roughly 42 per cent of global oil production and exports, which is what the inclusion of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates added to the bloc.

    Challenges in BRICS

    1. Consensus across 11 members with different political systems: A joint declaration needs every member’s assent, so the text settles at the level the most reluctant member accepts. Eg. Declarations avoid language on human rights and democratic norms, since the membership spans elected governments and authoritarian ones.
      The Fix: Adopt a variable geometry, letting a subset of willing members carry an initiative under the BRICS name without requiring unanimity.
    2. One member’s economic weight shapes the agenda: China’s size gives it disproportionate influence over what the grouping prioritises and whom it admits. Eg. It has pushed for the inclusion of states carrying heavy Chinese debt exposure, which would tilt the bloc towards a China centred platform.
      The Fix: Publish membership criteria weighted to economic complementarity and regional balance rather than to any single member’s sponsorship.
    3. Reducing dollar dependence moves slower than the rhetoric: Settlement habits, contract law and reserve holdings all favour the incumbent currency. Eg. The US dollar still settles over 80 per cent of global trade.
      The Fix: Target local currency invoicing on the bilateral pairs that already have settlement arrangements, rather than pursuing a common currency.
    4. There is no permanent secretariat or charter: Each chair runs the calendar from its own foreign ministry, so institutional memory travels out with the chair. Eg. Working group records and unfinished action plans are held by the outgoing chair rather than by the grouping.
      The Fix: Create a small standing secretariat funded by member contributions to hold working group records and track commitments between summits.
    5. Trade within the bloc remains thin: Members trade more with the industrialised economies than with each other, which limits what economic cooperation can deliver. Eg. Most members still rely on G7 markets for high technology imports and for services exports.
      The Fix: Negotiate a tariff preference schedule among members on a limited list of manufactured goods, which is achievable without a full trade agreement.
  • Fueling the Blue Economy: six years of the fisheries flagship scheme

    Fueling the Blue Economy: six years of the fisheries flagship scheme

    Why in News

    The Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) completed six years. PMMSY is the flagship scheme for the fisheries sector.

    Core facts

    1. Budget: A record ₹2,500 crore was allocated in the 2026 to 2027 Budget Estimate. Total outlay since the 2020 to 2021 year is ₹20,750 crore.
    2. Fish production: It rose from 141.64 lakh tonnes to 197.75 lakh tonnes. The base year is 2019 to 2020. The latest figure is for 2024 to 2025.
    3. Exports: Fisheries exports rose from ₹46,663 crore to ₹73,890 crore over the same span.
    4. Employment: The scheme supported employment for 58 lakh persons. It backed 2,195 Fish Farmers Producer Organizations.
    5. Structure: PMMSY runs a Central Sector component and a Centrally Sponsored Scheme component.
    6. Sub scheme: The Pradhan Mantri Matsya Kisan Samridhi Sah Yojana (PM MKSSY) has an estimated ₹6,000 crore outlay for 2023 to 2024 up to 2026 to 2027. It formalises the sector through digital identities.
    7. Digital platform: The National Fisheries Digital Platform (NFDP) launched in September 2024. It recorded over 37.23 lakh registrations as of 8 September 2026.
    8. Coastal villages: 100 coastal villages are identified as Climate Resilient Coastal Fishermen Villages. Each carries a ₹200 lakh unit cost, fully government funded.
    9. Livelihoods: The fisheries sector sustains nearly three crore livelihoods.

    Static Context

    1. PMMSY launched in 2020. The Department of Fisheries under the Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying runs it.
    2. Blue Economy is the sustainable use of ocean resources for growth, livelihoods and ocean health. PMMSY aligns with Sustainable Development Goal 14, Life Below Water.
    3. A Recirculatory Aquaculture System (RAS) filters and reuses water. It allows intensive fish farming on minimal land and water.
    4. Biofloc technology recycles nutrients using beneficial microbes with minimal water exchange.

    Prelims angle

    PMMSY launch in 2020 under the Department of Fisheries; PM MKSSY as a Central Sector sub scheme; NFDP launch in 2024; the working principle of Recirculatory Aquaculture System biofilters that convert ammonia to nitrate; PMMSY link to Sustainable Development Goal 14.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 3, economics of animal rearing and allied sectors. The Blue Economy frame fits a question on fisheries as a driver of coastal livelihoods and sustainable growth.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] With reference to the role of biofilters in Recirculating Aquaculture System, consider the following statements:
    1. Biofilters provide waste treatment by removing uneaten fish feed.
    2. Biofilters convert ammonia present in fish waste to nitrate.
    3. Biofilters increase phosphorus as nutrient for fish in water.
    How many of the statements given above are correct?
    (a) Only one
    (b) Only two
    (c) All three
    (d) None

  • BRICS: evolution, cooperation and India’s leadership ahead of the 18th Summit

    BRICS: evolution, cooperation and India’s leadership ahead of the 18th Summit

    Why in News

    India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit on 12 to 13 September 2026 at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi. BRICS is a grouping of major emerging economies.

    Current stage and next milestone

    India chairs BRICS for the fourth time in 2026. The leaders’ sessions run on 12 to 13 September 2026. The chairship has already run over 350 ministerial meetings across 25 cities.

    Core facts

    1. Origin: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs. It projected Brazil, Russia, India and China as future major economies.
    2. Formation: South Africa joined in 2010, forming BRICS.
    3. Membership now: The grouping has 11 full members: Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. A Partner Country framework adds ten more nations.
    4. Weight: Members hold 49.5% of global population, 40% of global Gross Domestic Product and 26% of global trade.
    5. India’s chairships: They occurred in 2012, 2016, 2021 and 2026.
    6. Theme 2026: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.
    7. Three pillars: Political and security cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural exchanges.
    8. 2026 agenda: Agriculture, health, urban infrastructure, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, supply chains and climate resilience.

    Static Context

    1. The New Development Bank (NDB) is the BRICS development bank. It was set up at the 6th Summit via the Fortaleza Declaration of 2014. Its headquarters is in Shanghai.
    2. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement is the BRICS currency swap framework for balance of payments support.
    3. The 16th Summit was held at Kazan, Russia, in 2024. The latest expansion admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

    Prelims angle

    NDB headquarters at Shanghai and its Fortaleza Declaration origin; BRICS membership list and the 11 member count; India’s chairship years; the NDB is a BRICS body, not an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation body.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, global groupings affecting India’s interests. BRICS suits a question on its role as a counterweight in global governance and a platform for the Global South.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements with regard to BRICS:
    I. The 16th BRICS Summit was held under the Chairship of Russia in Kazan.
    II. Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS.
    III. The theme of the 16th BRICS Summit was Strengthening Multiculturalism for Just Global Development and Security.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) I and II
    (b) II and III
    (c) I and III
    (d) I only
    Answer: (a)”

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • Seventh Gender Samvaad centres women’s leadership in rural livelihoods

    Why in News

    The Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY NRLM) held the seventh Gender Samvaad on women’s agency in livelihoods.

    Core facts

    1. Theme: The edition focused on moving women from participation to leadership in livelihoods.
    2. Scale: Over 6 lakh stakeholders joined. Participation rose from 1,400 in April 2021 to near 6 lakh by September 2025.
    3. SHG base: The Self Help Group (SHG) movement represents over 100 million women.
    4. Lakhpati Didi: 346 million Lakhpati Didis earn over ₹1,00,000 a year. A Lakhpati Didi is an SHG woman with annual household income at or above ₹1 lakh.
    5. State models cited: Maharashtra’s Women Farmers’ Empowerment Bill recognises women without formal land titles. Odisha’s Bhubaneswar Declaration advances women’s land rights. Andhra Pradesh’s natural farming is led by women’s SHGs.
    6. Institution building: The focus is on strengthening Cluster Level Federations, Producer Groups and Farmer Producer Organisations (FPO). Governance, financial record keeping and credit readiness are flagged for the United Nations International Year of Women Farmers 2026.
    7. Entrepreneurship drive: The National Campaign on Entrepreneurship II runs from 21 August to 21 November 2026. It promotes enterprise development, value chains and market access for SHG women.

    Static Context

    1. DAY NRLM launched in 2011 as Aajeevika. It mobilises rural poor women into SHGs and their federations. The Ministry of Rural Development runs it.
    2. Gender Samvaad launched in April 2021. It is a joint platform of DAY NRLM and the Institute for What Works to Advance Gender Equality (IWWAGE). It shares gender practice across State Rural Livelihoods Missions.
    3. An SHG is a small voluntary savings and credit group, usually of 10 to 20 members. The SHG Bank Linkage Programme connects these groups to formal bank credit.

    Prelims angle

    DAY NRLM launch as Aajeevika in 2011 under the Ministry of Rural Development; Lakhpati Didi income threshold of ₹1 lakh; the SHG Bank Linkage Programme; distinction between Self Help Groups and Farmer Producer Organisations.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, development processes and the role of SHGs. The theme fits a question on SHGs as vehicles of women’s economic empowerment and poverty reduction.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2012] How does the National Rural Livelihood Mission seek to improve livelihood options of rural poor?
    1. By setting up a large number of new manufacturing industries and agri-business centres in rural areas
    2. By strengthening ‘Self-Help Groups’ and providing skill development
    3. By supplying seeds, fertilizers, diesel pumpsets, and micro-irrigation equipment free of cost to farmers
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (b)”

    “[2020, GS2, 15 marks] “Micro-Finance as an anti-poverty vaccine, is aimed at asset creation and income security of the rural poor in India”. Evaluate the role of Self Help Groups in achieving the twin objectives along with empowering women in rural India.”

  • Securing Farmers’ Future with Dignity: seven years of the farmer pension scheme

    Why in News

    The Pradhan Mantri Kisan Maandhan Yojana (PM KMY) completed seven years. PM KMY is a voluntary contributory pension scheme for small and marginal farmers.

    Core facts

    1. Launch: PM KMY launched on 12 September 2019.
    2. Core benefit: It assures a minimum pension of ₹3,000 per month from the age of 60.
    3. Enrolment: Total enrolment is 24,96,252 farmers as of February 2026. Haryana leads with 5.75 lakh. Bihar follows with 3.46 lakh.
    4. Outlay used: Government investment since 2019 is ₹540.66 crore.
    5. Administration: It is a Central Sector Scheme under the Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) is the pension fund manager.
    6. Eligibility: It covers farmers holding cultivable land up to two hectares. The entry age band is 18 to 40 years. Names must appear in land records as of 1 August 2019.
    7. Contribution: The farmer pays ₹55 to ₹200 per month by entry age. The government matches the farmer’s contribution equally.
    8. Family pension: A surviving spouse receives 50% of the pension, that is ₹1,500 per month.
    9. Exclusions: Income tax payers, registered professionals and beneficiaries of other pension schemes are barred. These other schemes include the National Pension System (NPS), the Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC), the Pradhan Mantri Shram Yogi Maandhan (PM SYM) and the Pradhan Mantri Laghu Vyapari Maandhan (PM LVM).
    10. Enrolment route: Enrolment runs through Common Service Centres using Aadhaar, a bank account and mobile One Time Password. A farmer may route PM KISAN benefits into the PM KMY contribution.

    Static Context

    1. PM KISAN is the Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi. It transfers ₹6,000 per year in three instalments to landholding farmer families.
    2. A Central Sector Scheme is funded fully by the Union government. A Centrally Sponsored Scheme splits funding between the Centre and the states.
    3. LIC is a statutory insurer. It was set up under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.

    Prelims angle

    PM KMY pension amount of ₹3,000 and entry age 18 to 40; LIC as the fund manager; the two hectare landholding ceiling; the distinction between Central Sector and Centrally Sponsored schemes; overlap bars with PM SYM and NPS.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections. The scheme suits a question on old age income security for the unorganised and agrarian workforce.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] Regarding ‘Atal Pension Yojana’, which of the following statements is/are correct?
    1. It is a minimum guaranteed pension scheme mainly targeted at unorganized sector workers.
    2. Only one member of a family can join the scheme.
    3. Same amount of pension is guaranteed for the spouse for life after subscriber’s death.
    Select the correct answer using the code given below.
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (c)”

  • Inclusive and trusted intelligent finance pitched at Global Fintech Festival 2026

    Why in News

    The Ministry of Communications set out India’s digital finance record at the Global Fintech Festival 2026 in Mumbai.

    Core facts

    1. Guiding frame: Finance must become inclusive before it becomes intelligent. Connectivity, compute and trust are named the new digital trinity.
    2. Internet access: It expanded from 25 crore users to 100 crore users over a decade.
    3. Broadband access: It grew from 6 crore to 103 crore, a 16 fold rise in ten years. About 6.5 lakh villages now join the digital economy.
    4. 5G rollout: The fifth generation (5G) network covers 99.9% of districts and 85% of the population within 26 months of its 2022 launch. It runs on over 5 lakh base stations with ₹4.5 lakh crore capital expenditure.
    5. Data price: Data costs about 10 cents per gigabyte. India is stated as the world’s most affordable data market.
    6. Unified Payments Interface (UPI): UPI is a real time retail payment system linking bank accounts for instant transfers. It processed 24,162 crore transactions worth ₹314 lakh crore in the 2025 to 2026 financial year. It forms 84% of domestic digital transactions and 49% of global real time payment volumes.
    7. UPI abroad: It is live in nine countries at no cost. Expansion to 20 more nations is planned.
    8. Financial inclusion base: 60 crore Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) accounts are open. 9 billion documents sit on DigiLocker, the government’s digital document wallet.
    9. Rural coverage: Under Digital Bharat Nidhi, 22,000 towers are being placed across 34,000 villages without telecom links.
    10. Fraud tools: Sanchar Saathi blocks suspicious connections and stolen devices. ASTR, an Artificial Intelligence (AI) tool, cut 88 lakh suspicious mobile connections. The Financial Fraud Risk Indicator blocks fraudulent transfers before withdrawal.
    11. Stated vision: A Trust Grid would integrate telecom, digital identity, UPI and financial systems. The 6G mission targets 10% of global patents.

    Static Context

    1. UPI is operated by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI). NPCI is an umbrella body for retail payments set up in 2008 under the guidance of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Indian Banks’ Association.
    2. Digital Bharat Nidhi is the successor to the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF). It was renamed under the Telecommunications Act, 2023. It funds telecom access in commercially unviable rural and remote areas.
    3. PMJDY launched in 2014 as the national financial inclusion mission. It provides basic savings accounts, RuPay cards and overdraft access.
    4. DigiLocker operates under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. It issues and stores verified documents linked to Aadhaar.

    Prelims angle

    UPI versus Central Bank Digital Currency (Digital Rupee) distinctions; the operator of UPI is NPCI, not RBI; Digital Bharat Nidhi sits under the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and replaces the USOF; PMJDY launch year 2014; Sanchar Saathi as the fraud reporting platform.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 3, Indian economy and inclusive growth. The digital public infrastructure stack can frame a question on how far technology driven financial inclusion closes welfare and credit gaps.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which one of the following statements about Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Central Bank Digital Currency (Digital Rupee) is NOT correct?
    (a) UPI is a real-time payment system but Digital Rupee is akin to sovereign paper currency
    (b) In case of UPI, settlement for end users happens instantly; in case of Digital Rupee, wallet balance gets transferred to another wallet (no traditional settlement)
    (c) UPI transactions are recorded by banks and reflected in bank statements; in case of Digital Rupee, no data is captured in bank statements
    (d) In both the cases (UPI and Digital Rupee), the liability lies with the users and their respective banks
    Answer: (d)”

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] What is the status of digitalization in the Indian economy? Examine the problems faced in this regard and suggest improvements.”

  • For Bihar flood problem, solution lies beyond

    Why in the News

    Bihar received 27 per cent below normal rainfall between 1 June and the first week of September, and large parts of the state are still under water. Six rivers, the Ganga, Gandak, Kosi, Budhi Gandak, Punpun and Ghaghra, have risen above danger levels in different stretches. The flooding therefore cannot be explained by how much rain fell on the state, which locates the cause in how its rivers and channels are managed. The state’s inherited answer has been containment, holding rivers inside defined channels behind embankments since colonial times. That method separates a river from its floodplain, and with silt raising the bed year on year it reduces the channel’s capacity to carry the discharge it is given. The contested question is whether flood works should keep aiming to hold the river in, or to give it space to spread safely.

    Why did rivers cross danger levels in a deficit monsoon?

    1. The rainfall record for the season: The state recorded 27 per cent below normal rainfall for the period from 1 June to the first week of September.
    2. Two causes acting together: High upstream river flows combined with erratic weather, meaning spells of heavy localised rainfall inside an overall seasonal deficit, pushed rivers over their banks.
    3. A tributary can flood because the main river is high: The unusually high level of the Ganga created a backwater effect in the Gandak and the Punpun, the condition where a high level in the receiving river obstructs the outflow of a river draining into it.
    4. What that effect did: Both tributaries drain into the Ganga, and its high level made their discharge difficult, so water backed up in the tributaries and added to the flooding.
    5. Danger level is a gauge based threshold: It is the level fixed for each gauge site above which a river threatens habitation and property, so six rivers crossing it in different stretches describes localised failures rather than one basin wide event.

    What does containment by embankment do to a river?

    1. It cuts the river off from its floodplain: Embankments separate rivers from the floodplains that would otherwise absorb and spread a high discharge.
    2. The bed rises inside the confined channel: Continuous silt deposition raises the riverbed and reduces the channel’s capacity to carry flow.
    3. A breach concentrates the damage: When an embankment breaches, artificially contained water rushes into homes and fields at a depth and force an unconfined flood would not produce.
    4. Each year of containment narrows the next year’s margin: A rising bed inside fixed embankments means the same discharge sits higher against the same defences, so the safety margin shrinks with no change in rainfall.

    Why will higher embankments not settle the problem?

    1. The premise needs revisiting: The state needs to reconsider the idea that higher or stronger embankments will by themselves contain floods, since the containment is what raises the bed against them.
    2. Maintenance remains an obligation: Existing embankments protect settlements and land that have grown up behind them, so the choice is not between maintaining them and abandoning them.
    3. The stated objective is the opposite of containment: Persistent monsoon floods point to the need to give the river space to spread safely during periods of high discharge, which a confined channel is designed to prevent.
    4. This is an execution problem, not a knowledge problem: The measures required are already identified in policy, and the flooding continues, which places the failure in implementation rather than in diagnosis.

    What must accompany embankment maintenance?

    1. Restoration of drainage channels: The natural and constructed drains that carry water off the land have to be reopened, since water that cannot drain stays on fields after the river level falls.
    2. Protection of floodplains: The land a river needs during high discharge has to be kept free of the construction and occupation that turns a spread into a disaster.
    3. Better land use planning: Where settlement, cropping and infrastructure are permitted has to follow the flood behaviour of the stretch rather than precede it.
    4. Restoration of wetlands: Wetlands in the basin hold and release flood water, and their loss transfers that volume to the channel and to the settlements behind the embankment.
    5. Deployment of early warning systems: Warning converts an unavoidable flood into an evacuated one, and it is the only measure on this list that reduces loss without altering the river.

    Why has an existing basin plan not changed the outcome?

    1. The imperatives are already on record: The Ganga Basin River Management Plan, implemented for more than a decade, acknowledges these requirements.
    2. The outcome has not followed: Persistent monsoon floods in Bihar show how much remains to be done to give the river room to spread during high discharge.
    3. One requirement sits outside the state’s control: Addressing Bihar’s concerns requires greater coordination between the riverine states on reservoir releases, since a downstream state’s peak is partly set by upstream release decisions.

    Where does the Farakka question sit in this argument?

    1. The state’s long standing contention: Bihar has argued that the barrage and the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty compounded its river management challenges.
    2. The mechanism it alleges: Its case is that the barrage altered the Ganga’s flow regime, affecting the movement and deposition of the river’s sediment load.
    3. The causal claim is not settled: The extent to which this contributes to flooding in Bihar remains contested, so it cannot carry the whole explanation for the season’s flooding.
    4. The claim still belongs in the negotiation: Renegotiation of the 1996 treaty, which expires in December, should take account of Bihar’s concerns over silt accumulation and the state’s river management needs.
    5. The evidence base has to be current: Any new arrangement needs to be informed by updated data on river flows and climate change projections rather than on historical records alone.
    6. The principle extends past this treaty: In a period of erratic weather, states and countries sharing a river basin have to strengthen coordination to manage flows and reduce flood related distress.

    Challenges to embankment based flood control in Bihar

    1. The network is too long to maintain to standard: Bihar carries roughly 3,800 km of flood embankments, and every weak section of it is tested in the same few weeks each year. Eg. Breaches are recorded each season at several points across different river systems rather than at one predictable location.
      The Fix: Publish a stretch wise condition rating for the full embankment length before each monsoon, with repair funds released against the ratings rather than spread evenly.
    2. Containment creates waterlogging behind the line: An embankment that keeps a river out also keeps rainwater and local drainage in, so land behind it is lost to standing water rather than to flooding. Eg. Large areas in the Kosi and Gandak belts of north Bihar remain waterlogged well after river levels have fallen.
      The Fix: Build and maintain sluice and pump drainage at every point where an embankment crosses a natural drain, and treat the outfall as part of the embankment asset.
    3. People live between the embankments: Villages inside the embanked corridor are flooded every year by design, without the protection the structure was built to provide. Eg. Settlements between the eastern and western Kosi embankments are inundated annually while the land outside them is defended.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory resettlement and compensation entitlement for households inside the embanked corridor, separate from general flood relief.
    4. The decisive failure point can lie outside the state: The Kosi and the Gandak are regulated by structures in Nepalese territory, so a breach beyond Bihar’s jurisdiction can determine its flood year. Eg. The 2008 Kosi flood followed a breach at Kusaha, upstream of the barrage in Nepal, and displaced close to three million people in Bihar.
      The Fix: Establish a joint pre monsoon inspection and certification regime with Nepal for the Kosi and Gandak structures, with agreed repair timelines.
    5. Warning lead time is short because the catchment is foreign: Rainfall and discharge data from the upper catchments decide how much notice a district can be given, and that data is not generated within India. Eg. A peak on the Kosi can reach the Bihar plains within a day of heavy rainfall in its Nepalese catchment.
      The Fix: Extend real time telemetry sharing across the upper catchments and route it directly to district administrations rather than only to state control rooms.
    6. Silt removal has no funded programme: Reversing a raised bed is slow work with no annual budget head behind it, so the only measure reliably funded is raising the embankment. Eg. Dredging in the state is undertaken for navigation on specific stretches rather than for restoring channel capacity across a river.
      The Fix: Create a standing sediment management head in the state’s water resources budget, reporting channel capacity rather than embankment height as its outcome.

    Conclusion

    A flood season inside a rainfall deficit places the cause in the river system rather than in the monsoon, and that changes what a flood programme should be measured against. Protection built on confining rivers cannot hold once the beds inside those confinements keep rising. The question Bihar now faces is whether it makes channel capacity and floodplain space the stated objective of its flood works, or continues to judge success by the height and length of its defences. The water negotiation ahead is where the state’s sediment case will either become an operating rule or remain a grievance.

    Back2Basics: Ganga Basin River Management Plan

    1. What it is: A basin scale plan that treats the Ganga as a single hydrological unit, covering environmental flows and sediment alongside pollution abatement, rather than as a set of separate state level works.
    2. Why a basin frame: The Ganga basin covers about 861,000 sq km in India, close to 26 per cent of the country’s geographical area, spread across 11 states.
    3. Who carries the Ganga programme: The National Mission for Clean Ganga, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, is the implementing arm of the National Ganga Council and was constituted as an authority under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
    4. What a basin plan can and cannot do: It sets requirements across the basin and depends on state departments and inter state coordination to execute them, which is how its imperatives can stand on record for years without changing outcomes on the ground.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS1, 15 marks] In what way can floods be converted into a sustainable source of irrigation and all – weather inland navigation in India?”

  • Farakka treaty nearing expiry, JDU revives campaign against barrage

    Why in the News

    Janata Dal (United), a partner in the ruling coalition in Bihar, has launched a campaign across 12 districts of the state along the Ganga demanding that the Farakka barrage be dismantled, and opposing any renewal of the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty. The treaty it is targeting was signed in December 1996 and set a 30 year framework for sharing Ganga waters at the barrage during the dry season. That framework lapses this December, which converts a standing state grievance into a live negotiating question. The state government’s own position is narrower, that Bihar’s interest should be guarded in the treaty, with the Chief Minister stating in Munger that the state receives Ganga water for only four months of the year against a need for year round flow. A bilateral water sharing arrangement is the Union government’s to negotiate, and what is now being pressed is not a better share but the removal of the structure the sharing is measured at.

    What does the 1996 Ganga water sharing treaty do?

    1. Who it binds and what it covers: It is a bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh, signed in December 1996, regulating the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka barrage in West Bengal.
    2. The season it governs: It applies primarily to the dry season, running from 1 January to 31 May, which is when the flow available at the barrage is least able to meet both countries’ requirements.
    3. Why a 30 year term was written in: The treaty established a binding framework for 1996 to 2026 to replace the earlier short term stopgap arrangements and give both sides predictable distribution.
    4. Where it now stands: That framework lapses this December, so continuation requires a fresh negotiation rather than an automatic rollover.

    Why was the barrage built, and what did it change on either side?

    1. The purpose it was built for: The barrage was built in 1975 to divert water from the Ganga into the Hooghly river, to flush out silt and keep Kolkata Port navigable.
    2. The downstream effect in Bangladesh: The diversion reduced downstream flow into Bangladesh, producing severe water shortages, increased soil salinity and ecological stress in the south of that country.
    3. The upstream effect Bihar reports: Heavy silt trapped behind the barrage has raised the Ganga’s riverbed, destroying the river’s natural storage capacity and driving seasonal floods.
    4. One structure sits behind both complaints: The diversion that sustains a port channel downstream is the same arrangement that holds sediment upstream, so the barrage is what both sets of grievances point at.

    What is Bihar’s stated grievance?

    1. A flood and parch cycle upstream: The state government’s position is that the barrage has created a severe flood and parch dynamic upstream of it, alternating inundation with shortage rather than steadying the flow.
    2. Four months of water against a year round need: The Chief Minister has stated that Bihar currently receives Ganga water only from July to October, and requires flow throughout the year.
    3. What the state asks of the Union government: Its stated demand is that the treaty safeguard Bihar’s interest, which places a riparian state’s claim inside a negotiation it is not a party to.

    What is the campaign demanding, and how is it being run?

    1. A demand to dismantle, not to renegotiate: The party is demanding that the barrage be dismantled, citing a stance its chief and former Chief Minister has repeatedly taken with the Union government that the structure causes heavy siltation and floods.
    2. Outright opposition to renewal: The party’s stated position is that it is completely against renewal, on the ground that the treaty fails to serve the state’s interests and remains a primary cause of flooding.
    3. Where it is being taken: The ‘Nitish Samvad’ campaign covers the 12 districts through which the Ganga flows in Bihar, and has so far covered four, Buxar, Bhojpur, Begusarai and Khagaria.
    4. How it is being conducted: It is led by the party’s national working president, a Rajya Sabha member, and carries recorded audio messages of the party chief, who is not travelling for it.
    5. The timetable it is working to: The party intends to finish the campaign well before the treaty ends in December, which places it ahead of any decision on renewal.

    Challenges to renegotiating the Ganga water sharing framework

    1. A riparian state has no seat at the table: Water is a State subject, and a treaty with a foreign country is the Union government’s exclusive power, so a state can press a claim and cannot block an agreement. Eg. The India-Bangladesh Teesta water sharing draft has remained unsigned since 2011 over West Bengal’s objections, without the state being a party to it.
      The Fix: Constitute a standing consultative mechanism with the basin states before negotiation opens, with their submissions placed on record as part of the Indian position.
    2. The sharing formula rests on historical flows: The arrangement was built on the average dry season availability recorded at the barrage over four earlier decades, and that baseline no longer describes current or projected flows. Eg. Its operation depends on how much water actually arrives at the barrage in each ten day period of the dry season.
      The Fix: Write the next arrangement on a rolling flow record revised at fixed intervals, rather than on a single fixed historical average.
    3. Sediment has no institutional owner: The dispute Bihar raises is about silt rather than volume, and no authority holds the power to order desilting or to set a sediment budget for the river. Eg. The approach channel at Farakka itself requires repeated dredging to stay open, which relocates silt rather than reducing the load.
      The Fix: Attach a sediment management protocol to the barrage’s operating rules, naming the responsible authority and the annual dredging and disposal obligation.
    4. The flood peaks are set outside India: The Kosi and the Gandak, the rivers that deliver Bihar’s worst flood peaks, rise in Nepal, so peak discharge is governed by catchments and structures beyond this treaty’s scope. Eg. The Kosi and Gandak barrages stand in Nepalese territory and are operated by India under the 1954 Kosi Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement.
      The Fix: Pair the Ganga negotiation with a flow data sharing and release coordination arrangement with Nepal on the Kosi and Gandak.
    5. Removing the structure moves the problem rather than ending it: Dismantling the barrage would restore downstream flow and withdraw the diversion that keeps the Bhagirathi-Hooghly channel and the Kolkata port route navigable. Eg. The feeder canal at Farakka exists solely to carry that diverted flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly system.
      The Fix: Commission an independent flow and sediment study of the barrage’s upstream and downstream effects, so the dismantling demand is tested against measured alternatives rather than settled politically.

    Conclusion

    A dry season sharing arrangement is now being contested on grounds it was never written to address, since the demand from Bihar concerns sediment and flood behaviour rather than the volume of water allotted. That mismatch is what makes renewal harder than an extension of terms. The decision to watch is whether the Union government opens the negotiation with a stated position on siltation upstream of the barrage, or confines it to the dry season allocation. Confined to allocation, a new agreement settles the bilateral question and leaves the domestic one exactly where it started.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. Where it stands: Across the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, a short distance upstream of the point where the river enters Bangladesh.
    2. Its scale: The barrage runs about 2,240 metres across the river and carries a road and rail link over it.
    3. How the diversion works: A feeder canal roughly 38 km long carries water from above the barrage into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, the channel the diversion was designed to sustain.
    4. Who operates it: The Farakka Barrage Project authority, under the Union Ministry of Jal Shakti, runs the structure and its regulating gates.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”

  • As India probes origin of 5 baby orangutans, Indonesia prepares ground for repatriation

    Why in the News

    Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry has written to India offering government to government and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) coordination on five baby orangutans, and is preparing the technical requirements for their repatriation. The letter, sent by its Directorate of Species and Genetic Conservation, went to the Director General of Forests and Special Secretary in the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, who is also India’s CITES Management Authority. It follows the rescue of the five animals from a forest in Balasore district of Odisha, after which a preliminary assessment placed them as Sumatran and raised the possibility of an organised transnational wildlife trafficking network. Indonesia has stated that it respects the judicial and statutory procedures applicable in India, and the Indian side has replied that state forest authorities must finish their official investigation first. Any decision on custody, transport or transfer also needs the authorisation of a competent judicial court. Repatriation is therefore not held up by either government’s willingness, and it waits on a genetic result and a court order.

    What does CITES do, and what does Appendix I mean?

    1. What the treaty regulates: CITES is a multilateral treaty more than 50 years old that regulates global trade in wild animals and plants, so that the trade is legal, sustainable, traceable and does not threaten a species’ survival in the wild.
    2. What Appendix I does: It prohibits trade in species that are endangered, which removes commercial international trade in a listed species from the set of lawful transactions.
    3. How it operates inside a country: Each party designates a Management Authority that issues permits, verifies specimens and handles correspondence with other parties, which is why Indonesia’s letter went to that office in India rather than through a general diplomatic channel.
    4. What it does not settle: The Convention regulates trade and leaves the disposal of confiscated live animals, including whether they return to the country of origin, to the seizing country’s own law and courts.

    What has Indonesia asked for, and what has it offered?

    1. The information sought: Its communication asked for details of the incident, the species, the animals’ health, the investigation being carried out, and the collection of genetic samples.
    2. The offer on verification: It conveyed its readiness to cooperate with India on species and origin verification.
    3. The commitment if origin is confirmed: If the animals are confirmed as originating from Indonesia, it would undertake the measures needed for repatriation under CITES and its own national laws.
    4. The logistics already being assembled: It is preparing health examinations, quarantine arrangements, genetic identification, transport, animal welfare safeguards and appropriate post arrival rehabilitation.

    Why does the origin question turn on DNA rather than appearance?

    1. What the current assessment rests on: The animals are suspected to be from Sumatra on the basis of preliminary observations of their physical and morphological characteristics.
    2. What morphology cannot establish: Conclusive identification requires a DNA examination, which would fix their species, their geographical origin, and whether they came from the wild or had been held in captivity earlier.
    3. The range is wider than the working assumption: The animals could be from either Indonesia or Malaysia, and only DNA sampling can establish which population they belong to.
    4. Why the wild or captive finding matters: It separates a fresh capture from the wild from an animal moved out of an existing captive collection, and the two point to different chains of supply.

    What does the case suggest about the trafficking chain?

    1. A network rather than a single consignment: The possibility of an organised transnational wildlife trafficking network is being taken seriously on the Indonesian side.
    2. An enforcement arm has been brought in: Indonesia’s Directorate General of Forestry Law Enforcement has been roped in alongside its conservation directorate.
    3. The chain details sought from India: It has asked for the suspected trafficking route, the point of entry, the transit countries, the documentation, and the preliminary investigation findings.
    4. The jurisdictional follow through: Where the evidence reveals persons, transactions or collection points inside Indonesian jurisdiction, Indonesian authorities would act under national law and through international law enforcement cooperation.
    5. No names at this stage: The stated position is that identifying particular individuals or networks before the evidence is formally established would be premature.

    Challenges to returning trafficked wildlife to its country of origin

    1. Statutory machinery for the Convention arrived late: A Management Authority with powers written into domestic law is what lets a seizure move through a treaty process rather than an ad hoc one. Eg. India joined CITES in 1976 and acquired statutory CITES provisions, including a designated Management Authority and a schedule for listed specimens, only through the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022.
      The Fix: Publish a standing disposal protocol for confiscated live exotic animals, so custody, testing and transfer follow one written sequence from the day of seizure.
    2. A genetic result needs something to compare against: A DNA sample names a population only where reference profiles for wild populations already exist in an accessible library. Eg. Orangutans are recognised as three separate species, Bornean, Sumatran and Tapanuli, so a match has to resolve to a population rather than to an island.
      The Fix: Route seizure samples through a designated wildlife forensic laboratory that holds or can obtain source country reference profiles under a standing arrangement.
    3. Custody cost and welfare risk grow with the proceedings: Infant animals have to be housed, fed and treated for as long as the investigation and the court process run, and the holding facility is rarely built for the species. Eg. The five animals are being held in a zoological park in Odisha while the state investigation continues.
      The Fix: Set a statutory outer limit for a disposal decision on confiscated live animals, with interim custody vested in a facility equipped for the species.
    4. A returned great ape cannot simply be released: Infant orangutans learn foraging, nest building and predator avoidance from their mothers, so an orphaned animal needs years of rehabilitation before any release is possible. Eg. Indonesia’s own orangutan centres in Sumatra and Kalimantan run multi year forest school programmes before a release attempt.
      The Fix: Name the receiving rehabilitation centre and its capacity in the repatriation arrangement before the transfer is authorised, not after.
    5. No single authority covers the whole route: Source, transit and seizure fall under different national agencies, so the chain is investigated in fragments by bodies with no shared case file. Eg. The South Asia Wildlife Enforcement Network and its Southeast Asian counterpart exist precisely because wildlife crime routes cross the jurisdiction of several enforcement agencies.
      The Fix: Constitute a joint investigation team with named nodal officers in the source, transit and seizure countries at the point of seizure rather than after the first findings.

    Conclusion

    Both governments have already agreed on the process, so neither the treaty nor diplomacy is what decides where these animals end up. The sequence runs through a state forest investigation, a genetic result, and a court’s authorisation for custody and transfer, in that order. The step to watch is whether the genetic examination is commissioned early enough to be available when the court takes up the custody question, since a case decided without it settles the animals’ future on appearance alone. The wider test is whether the seizure produces a traced route and named collection points, or ends as five rescued animals and no network.

    Back2Basics: Orangutans

    1. What they are: The only great apes found in Asia, tree dwelling and native to the rainforests of Borneo and Sumatra in Indonesia and Malaysia.
    2. How many species: Three are recognised, the Bornean, the Sumatran and the Tapanuli, the last described as a separate species in 2017 and the rarest of the great apes.
    3. Conservation status: All three are listed as critically endangered on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List.
    4. Reproductive pace: Females give birth once in six to eight years, the longest interval of any land mammal, which is why a poached infant is not replaced within a generation.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015] With reference to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which of the following statements is/are correct? (1) IUCN is an organ of the United Nations and CITES is an international agreement between governments. (2) IUCN runs thousands of field projects around the world to better manage natural environments. (3) CITES is legally binding on the States that have joined it, but this Convention does not take the place of national laws. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Looking up at the drones

    Why in the News

    Data pooled from over 1,200 drones intercepted in Punjab since 2024 has mapped the cross border smuggling network that flies them. The mapping names the launch pads inside Pakistan’s Punjab, the Indian villages where payloads are dropped, the hours of peak activity and the altitudes flown. It follows an interception count that has held steady rather than fallen, with 294 Pakistani drones downed by the Border Security Force (BSF) and allied agencies in Punjab in 2024, 287 in 2025 and roughly the same number again by August 2026. Punjab had answered the threat in August 2025 with the Rs 51.4 crore ‘Baaz Akh’ (Hawk Eye) Anti-Drone System (ADS), the first state level anti-drone grid in the country. The same dataset shows why that answer is not holding, since drones now carry satellite links and a return to home fail-safe that turns them back before they can be brought down. The network along Punjab’s 550-km International Border is therefore better understood than at any point since 2019 and no easier to stop.

    What is the ‘Baaz Akh’ Anti-Drone System?

    1. What it is: A state funded anti-drone grid deployed by the Punjab government as a second line of defence behind the BSF’s own portable interception equipment.
    2. The four functions it performs: It detects a drone’s movement and signal, tracks it on a digital map, jams its control link, and forces an emergency landing for ground recovery.
    3. What it jams: It disrupts either radio frequency control signals or satellite navigation frequencies, and can identify the ground control station operating the drone.
    4. Its reach: The system works over a range of 8 to 10 km and issues automated alerts to security agencies.

    What does the intercepted drone data reveal about the network’s geography?

    1. Eight launch pads, two of them primary: Sustained sorties come from at least eight launch pads in Pakistan’s Punjab, with the villages of Jahman and Masteki as the main two.
    2. Both primary pads face Tarn Taran: Jahman sits directly across from the Khalra sector in Tarn Taran district. Masteki lies in the Sehjra enclave, a pocket of Pakistani territory surrounded by India on three sides, roughly opposite Khem Karan town.
    3. The remaining pads: They lie near Kasur, opposite Khem Karan; Qila Jiwan Singh, opposite Rajatal in the Attari sector; Wagah, opposite Attari; and Narowal, across from Dera Baba Nanak in Gurdaspur district.
    4. The landing areas: Payloads are dropped at Bhindi Saidan, Attari, Rajatal, Dall, Daleri, Maari Meghaan, Wan and villages around Khem Karan including Kals and Mastgarh.
    5. Where the drones are recovered: The highest number of interceptions on the Indian side occur 3.5 km to 10 km from the International Border.

    What do the timing and flight patterns show?

    1. A fixed nightly window: Maximum activity falls between 10 pm and 4 am, at an average of 12 to 15 drones an hour.
    2. The drops cluster on two days: The highest number of consignment drops take place on Thursdays and Saturdays.
    3. Sortie length separates stock from modified platforms: The average sortie runs 45 minutes, and modified drones average 24 minutes. Eg. One DJI Matrice drone recorded 42.67 minutes and a DJI Matrice 4 Pro recorded 15 minutes before it was downed.
    4. Altitude separates them too: Commercial DJI platforms fly at about 500 feet, and a modified eight rotor platform, the octocopter, was tracked at 2,500 feet.
    5. The drop point is chosen for pickup, not for accuracy: Consignments are dropped on agricultural fields for couriers to collect. Navigational error and incorrect GPS data put some payloads onto farmhouses and homes instead.

    How has the technology changed since the incursions began?

    1. The 2019 baseline: Pakistani drones were first noticed in Punjab around 2019, operating on rudimentary radio frequency direction control.
    2. The 2026 platform: Drones now operating in Punjab carry satellite communication and anti-jamming capability, and some downed in Punjab were navigating on Starlink satellite links.
    3. The airframes are commercial and Chinese made: The platforms in use for drug smuggling include the DJI Mavic 4 Pro, which can fly multiple sorties, and the DJI Matrice 300 RTK, which carries a large payload.
    4. The payload has not narrowed: The consignments carry narcotics, weapons and explosives, launched from pads deep inside Pakistan’s Punjab and dropped across the border under cover of darkness.

    Why does the fence no longer decide what crosses the border?

    1. It was built for a different mode of entry: The 462-km fence along the International Border went up mainly in the late 1980s and early 1990s to stop infiltration and smuggling during the militancy years.
    2. What it consists of: It is a multi-layered barrier of 8 to 12 feet, topped with rows of concertina and razor wire and, in places, high voltage ‘cobra’ wires, with a patrol track, observation towers and border outposts along it. Most of the feasible land border had been fenced and floodlit by 1993.
    3. It does not stand on the border: Older ground rules placed it some 150 yards inside Indian territory. In many stretches it was built two to three km in, leaving large tracts of farmland between the fence and the Zero Line.
    4. The gaps are physical as well as aerial: The line carries riverine and flood related gaps, and the incursions it was built to stop now arrive over it rather than through it.

    Why does detection not translate into seizure?

    1. The return to home fail-safe defeats the jam: Drones detect the interference from jamming, locking or control signal disruption and fly back to their launch point in Pakistan before they can be neutralised or recovered on the Indian side.
    2. Jamming weakens with distance: Some attempts fail simply because the drone is too far from the jamming unit when it is engaged.
    3. Autonomous platforms are not vulnerable to the method: Current systems fail against resilient drone networks built with features that reduce dependence on radio frequency control, which is what jamming targets.
    4. Coverage is thin: Security officers put the requirement at at least 100 jamming units for effective wider coverage, against the units now deployed on vehicles and in fixed positions.
    5. Recovery depends on people, not the grid: Interception is a layered system requiring coordination between the BSF, police quick reaction teams and ground recovery parties, so detection without a rapid ground response yields no seizure.
    6. Three threats the grid does not yet address: Small and low signature drones go undetected, drones operating together in swarms on artificial intelligence and decentralised communication are anticipated, and remote terrain with harsh weather leaves some drop zones inaccessible.

    What role do the border villages play in interception?

    1. They are the first reporting layer: Punjab set up village defence committees to help tackle cross border smuggling and drones, and their members coordinate with the BSF and local authorities on stray drones and recovered weapons.
    2. The reporting chain is unreliable: A committee member in Gilpan, where a drone dropped a kg of contraband in his kitchen garden 700 metres from the fence, got no response from the local police station or the Deputy Superintendent of Police, and the local police moved only after the Senior Superintendent of Police in Tarn Taran was called.
    3. Recovery is a race the couriers usually win: In the same village a second drone dropped a payload at the village edge that evening. The BSF received the location and moved to cordon the area, and the men had already collected the consignment and fled by the time it arrived.
    4. Farmers fear prosecution more than the drop: A farmer whose field received a consignment in Mahawa, Amritsar, approached the committee fearing arrest, and the police eventually filed a case against unidentified persons.
    5. Some settlements sit inside the flight path: Mahawa lies a kilometre from the Zero Line with nearly 150 of its 2,800 acres between the Zero Line and the fence, and drones travel up to six kilometres inside the border directly over houses and fields.
    6. Activism against the trade carries a cost: The sarpanch of Attari village, a settlement of around 25,000 known for its campaigning against drugs and smuggling, was injured in an alleged attack by narcotics smugglers.

    Challenges to countering cross border drone smuggling

    1. The cost asymmetry runs the wrong way: A commercial quadcopter costs a fraction of the detection and jamming equipment needed to stop it, so the defender pays more per sortie than the smuggler. Eg. The DJI platforms recovered in Punjab are off the shelf civilian models sold for survey and photography work.
      The Fix: Shift procurement toward cheap distributed sensors feeding one command picture, rather than a small number of high cost integrated units.
    2. Jamming cannot be used freely in civil airspace: Broad spectrum jamming and navigation spoofing interfere with civil aviation and telecom signals, which limits where and how long a grid can be switched on. Eg. Amritsar’s Sri Guru Ram Dass Jee International Airport sits within a few tens of kilometres of the border stretches under surveillance.
      The Fix: Authorise narrow band directional jamming tied to a designated counter drone corridor, cleared in advance with the civil aviation regulator.
    3. Attribution stops at the launch pad: A recovered drone establishes the route and the airframe, and it does not establish who financed or ordered the consignment. Eg. Cases from border villages routinely close against unidentified persons because the courier is the only link recoverable on the ground.
      The Fix: Treat each recovered drone as a forensic exhibit, with serial, flight log and payload traced through a single dedicated investigation unit rather than by the local police station.
    4. Responsibility is split across agencies: Border guarding, state policing and airspace regulation sit with different authorities, so no single body owns the counter drone task end to end. Eg. Punjab’s grid is a state asset operating alongside the BSF’s own portable interception equipment on the same stretch of border.
      The Fix: Place the state grid, the border force’s equipment and police response under one joint operations centre per border district.
    5. Interdiction does not touch demand: Stopping a consignment in the air does nothing to the narcotics market that pays for the next one. Eg. Village committee members link the drone drops directly to drug use among young people in the border belt.
      The Fix: Pair the counter drone grid with treatment and de-addiction capacity in the border districts, so the seized supply is not simply replaced.
    6. Legal cover for the technology is thin: Bringing down an aircraft, jamming a signal and seizing a payload each rest on different statutory powers, and none was written with armed drones in mind. Eg. Civil drone operations in India are governed by the Drone Rules, 2021, which regulate lawful operators rather than hostile cross border flights.
      The Fix: Enact a standing counter unmanned aircraft framework naming the authorities empowered to detect, jam, down and seize, and the evidentiary status of what is recovered.

    Conclusion

    The border belt’s smuggling geography is no longer a matter of inference, since the launch pads, the drop villages, the flying hours and the altitudes are now on record. That record shifts the problem from intelligence to coverage, because a mapped network still needs equipment dense enough to engage it before it turns back. The measure to watch is whether the jamming grid reaches the density its own operators have asked for, and whether the annual interception count starts falling rather than holding flat. A count that stays level while the grid expands would show the platforms are outrunning the countermeasure rather than being contained by it.

    Back2Basics: Border Security Force

    1. What it is: India’s primary border guarding force, raised on 1 December 1965 after the India-Pakistan war exposed the limits of relying on state armed police on the border.
    2. Who it reports to: It is a Central Armed Police Force under the Ministry of Home Affairs, and it guards the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders in peacetime.
    3. Where its powers come from: The Border Security Force Act, 1968 gives its personnel powers of search, seizure and arrest within a notified belt running inland from the border.
    4. How far that belt extends: The Union government extended that jurisdiction to 50 km from the border in Punjab, West Bengal and Assam in 2021, up from 15 km in Punjab.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by our adversaries across the borders to ferry arms / ammunitions, drugs, etc., is a serious threat to internal security. Comment on the measures being taken to tackle this threat.”