[3rd July 2026] The Hindu OpED: The right to a fair trial at the crossroads

Why in the News?

The Supreme Court denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the 2020 Delhi riots case earlier this year, though they have been in pre-trial detention for nearly six years. This has renewed the question of how long an accused can be held without trial, and exposed inconsistency in how courts weigh delay against the gravity of the offence under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. At stake is whether pre-trial incarceration under anti-terror law is becoming punishment before conviction.

Why does prolonged pre-trial detention under the UAPA raise a constitutional question of personal liberty?

1. Delay triggers Article 21 right: The Supreme Court’s own prior judgments hold that an extended trial delay triggers the accused’s right to personal liberty under Article 21.
2. Statutory conditions cannot override the Constitution: The UAPA’s strict bail conditions cannot override the constitutional right to personal liberty.
3. Gravity of offence remains an allegation: At the bail stage, the gravity of the offence is only an allegation made by the state, not a proven fact.
4. Sliding scale of detention: Allowing gravity to override delay creates a sliding scale that keeps certain individuals in jail for years simply because they are accused of grave offences.
5. Precedent of prolonged wrongful detention: Individuals accused under the UAPA have been held in jail for over two decades before being acquitted, losing the most productive years of their lives.

Does weighing the gravity of the offence against delay protect due process, or does it convert the trial into the punishment itself?

1. Judge controls the pace of trial: The judge, not the accused, controls the courtroom and decides the pace of the trial.
2. Responsibility for delay rests with the judiciary: The judge bears the ultimate responsibility to complete a trial within a reasonable timeframe, regardless of applications filed by either side.
3. Internal Court criticism: A separate two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court openly criticised the Delhi riots bail rejection as contrary to established precedent.
4. Reaffirmation of the rule of law: The Bench reiterated that individuals cannot be incarcerated indefinitely without trial under a Constitution committed to the rule of law.
5. Delay used as a proxy for guilt: Treating an unproven allegation of gravity as sufficient ground to override delay effectively punishes the accused before the trial concludes.

Why does inconsistency across and within courts on UAPA bail undermine the rule of law?

1. Referral to a larger Bench: In a related case, the Delhi riots Bench referred the question of how long pre-trial detention can continue to the Chief Justice, for the constitution of a larger Bench.
2. Unresolved apex court debate: The Supreme Court is now debating whether individuals who have spent over half a decade in jail without trial should be released, and the question remains open even as detention continues to lengthen.
3. Contrasting High Court rulings: The Delhi High Court granted bail to Kashmiri human rights activist Khurram Parvez after more than four years without trial, weighing the length of detention heavily.
4. Same judge, opposite outcomes: The judge who granted Khurram Parvez bail had earlier denied bail in the Delhi riots case, where the accused had already spent over four years in jail.
5. Same facts, different verdicts a year apart: In the Delhi riots case itself, the same judge delivered opposing bail judgments on the same underlying facts within a year.

What limited international references does the article draw upon to illustrate this concern? 

1. France, Dreyfus comparison: The article compares the over-five-year detention of the Delhi riots accused to the imprisonment of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a French political prisoner, without detailing the length or process of the Dreyfus case itself.
2. United Kingdom and United States, dissent conflated with terrorism: The article cites recent actions in the UK and US against dissent linked to the Israel-Palestine conflict as examples of states blurring political dissent with terrorism, without naming a specific law or institutional mechanism.

Why does the political character of laws like the UAPA make judicial consistency especially critical?

1. Political character of anti-terror law: Laws such as the UAPA carry an undeniably political character because they criminalise activities that can also constitute legitimate dissent.
2. Global pattern of blurring dissent and terrorism: States across the world have repeatedly interpreted anti-terror laws in ways that blur the line between political dissent and terrorism.
3. Consequence of inconsistency: Repeated inconsistency across cases and courts on a basic issue like pre-trial incarceration damages the rule of law and the cause of fundamental rights.

What must the judiciary ensure to prevent laws like the UAPA from being weaponised?

1. Non-negotiable constitutional floor: The state cannot keep people behind bars for years without trial, regardless of how legal interpretation is otherwise contested.
2. Process as punishment: Allowing incarceration without trial to continue makes a mockery of the rule of law and entrenches the pre-trial process itself as the punishment.
3. Pending resolution: It remains unclear whether or when the Supreme Court’s larger Bench will resolve the underlying question.
4. Continuing cost: Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam remain in custody as the last two accused student activists in the Delhi riots case, with five years in prison having turned into six.
5. Rising stakes: The cost of continued detention falls both on the lives of the imprisoned individuals and on the credibility of the rule of law.

Conclusion

Judicial inconsistency in weighing delay against the gravity of offence is allowing pre-trial detention under laws like the UAPA to function as punishment before conviction. This threatens the constitutional right to personal liberty under Article 21 and creates space for anti-terror law to be used against political dissent. Until the Supreme Court’s larger Bench settles the doctrine, cases such as that of Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam will continue to test the gap between the rule of law and its practice.